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ABSTRACT 
This  r e p o r t  examines t h e  campaign fund ra i s ing  v e h i c l e s  commonly r e f e r r e d  
t o  a s  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees. It t r a c e s  t h e i r  evolu t ion  and t h e i r  growth, 
both i n  number and i n  l e v e l  of f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  and it ana lyzes  t he  impact 
they a r e  having on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system today. 

INTRODUCTION 
P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  (PACs) a r e  t h e  v e h i c l e s  th rough  which i n t e r e s t  
groups  r a i s e  and c o n t r i b u t e  money t o  p o l i t i c a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  Although o r i g i n a l l y  
t h e  a lmost  e x c l u s i v e  domain of o rgan ized  l a b o r ,  t h e i r  appea l  h a s  extended s i n c e  
t h e  e a r l y  1970s t o  b u s i n e s s e s ,  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  and a  wide range of  o t h e r  
i n t e r e s t  groups .  T h e i r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  number and t h e i r  growth i n  l e v e l  of  
f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  h a s  o c c u r r e d  a t  a  r a p i d  pace .  I n  1982,  
t h e  3,371 PACs had r e c e i p t s  i n  e x c e s s  of $199 m i l l i o n  and c o n t r i b u t e d  more 
t h a n  $83 m i l l i o n  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  Congress .  PACs have t h u s  
become a  major s o u r c e  of campaign f i n a n c i n g  i n  modern c o n g r e s s i o n a l  campaigns.  
The amount of  money PACs a r e  p r o v i d i n g  t o  campaigns h a s  r a i s e d  q u e s t i o n s  
a8 t o  whether t h e s e  contributio_pssssare e n a b l i n x  s p e c i a l  - - i n t e r e s t s  - - t o  g a i n  
- - -  -_ __ - 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  - - -  p r o c e s s ,  by - 
o b l i g a t i o n  by t h e  r e c i p i e n t s  of  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  d o n a t i o n s .  These concerns  a r e  
---- - -- 
c h a l l e n g e d  by t h o s e  who i n s i s t  t h a t  PAC money i s  g e n e r a l l y  g iven  t o  reward p u b l i c  - .-. - .  
o f f i c i a l s  who a r e  b a s i c a l l y  sympathe t i c  w i t h  t h e  i s s u e  g o a l s  of  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
- 
group ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  promote s h i f t s  i n  v o t i n g  p a t t e r n s  which a r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  o r  cons t i tuency-based  views of t h e  l e g i s l a t o r .  
Fur the rmore ,  PACs a r e  viewed by t h e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s  s imply  ano the r  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p l u r a l i s m  r e f l e c t e d  i n  i n t e r e s t  group a c t i v i t y  s i n c e  t h e  founding o f  t h e  -- - 
Nat ion .  
T h i s  d e b a t e  r e v e a l s  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  o u t l o o k  a s  t o  t h e  r o l e  of  
i n t e r e s t  groups  i n  p u b l i c  po l i cy -making  and t h e  most d e s i r e d  method f o r  
t h e  f i n a n c i n g  of  e l e c t i o n  campaigns.  
T h i s  r e p o r t  examines t h e  growth of  PACs i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  and a n a l y z e s  
t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  r e l i a n c e  upon them i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  campaigns.  
It focuses  on t h e  r o l e  of  PACs i n  campaigns f o r  t h e  U.S. Congress ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  
because  i t  i s  t h e r e  t h a t  PAC a c t i v i t y  has  been most pronounced. Only a  s m a l l  
f r a c t i o n  of  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  h a s  been g iven  t o  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  ( l a r g e l y  because  of p u b l i c  funding of such e l e c t i o n s ) ,  
and knowledge of  PAC a c t i v i t y  a t  t h e  S t a t e  and l o c a l  l e v e l  is  q u i t e  l i m i t e d .  
In  any c a s e ,  t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  by PAC a c t i v i t y  a t  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  l e v e l  
have a  pronounced e f f e c t  on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem a s  a  whole. Th i s  s t u d y  
d i s c u s s e s  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  c o n t r o v e r s y  s u r r o u n d i n g  PACs and 
t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system. 
Chapter  One d i s c u s s e s  what i s  meant by t h e  term " p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  c o w i t t e e "  
and g i v e s  a  rough i d e a  of  how i t  f u n c t i o n s .  Chapter Two p l a c e s  PACs i n  p e r s p e c t i v e  
by examining how b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  were involved i n  campaign f i n a n c i n g  b e f o r e  
t h e  modern PAC e r a  and t r a c e s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e ,  e x e c u t i v e ,  and j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s  
which gave impetus t o  t h e i r  growth and development.  Chapter  Three  p r e s e n t s  t h e  
d a t a  on t h e i r  growth and ~ r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  i n  t e rms  of  bo th  numbers and d o l l a r s ,  
and reviews t h e  most widely  h e l d  t h e o r i e s  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e i r  growth. Chap te r  Four 
a n a l y z e s  t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  by PACs i n  t e rms  of t h e i r  impact on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
system. Chap te r  F i v e  reviews r e c e n t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  c u r t a i l  PAC 
i n f l u e n c e ,  a n a l y z e s  some of t h e  c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l s  t o  l i m i t  them, and d i s c u s s e s  
t h e  p rognos i s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  of  PACs i n  our  p o l i t i c a l  system. F i n a l l y ,  a  
b i b l i o g r a p h y  and appendix  a r e  inc luded  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e f e r e n c e .  
Two exp lana t ions  regard ing  terminology used i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  bear  mentioning. 
F i r s t ,  t h e  term " i n t e r e s t  group" i s  used t o  r e f e r  t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  which pursue 
p a r t i c u l a r  po l i cy  g o a l s  through t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a ,  and i t  encompasses 
c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  l a b o r  un ions ,  and t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  v a r i o u s  
i d e o l o g i c a l  o r  i s s u e  groups.  
Second, because o f  t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  and t h e  publ ic  i n t e r e s t  i n  those  PACs 
which a r e  i d e o l o g i c a l l y  homogenous i n  n a t u r e ,  t h i s  r e p o r t  makes r e f e r e n c e  t o  
" l i b e r a l "  and "conserva t ive"  PACs. I n  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  i n s t a n c e s ,  t h e s e  l a b e l s  
r e f l e c t  t h e  s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  groups themselves; a t  t h e  ve ry  l e a s t ,  they 
r e f l e c t  t h e  widespread and uncontested c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  appear ing  i n  t h e  media 
and i n  academic w r i t i n g s .  
F i n a l l y ,  s e v e r a l  i n d i v i d u a l s  deserve  a  no t e  o f  thanks f o r  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n c e  
i n  t h e  p repa ra t i on  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Kent Cooper, Chief o f  t h e  
Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Commission's Publ ic  Records D iv i s ion ,  provided inva luab le  and 
p a t i e n t  h e l p  i n  t h e  compi la t ion  of  d a t a  f o r  Chapter Three. He a l s o  reviewed t h a t  
c h a p t e r ,  a s  d i d  P ro fe s so r  Herbert  Alexander of  t h e  C i t i z e n s v  Research Foundation. 
Sher ry  Shapiro and Edkth S u t t e r l i n ,  Congressional  Research Se rv i ce  b i b l i o g r a p h e r s ,  
a s s i s t e d  i n  t h e  p repa ra t i on  of  t h e  b ib l iography  a t  t h e  end of t h i s  r e p o r t .  
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT IS A POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE AND HOW DOES IT WORK? 
In s e t t i n g  t h e  s t a g e  for  t h e  d i s cus s ion  t o  fol low,  t h i s  chap te r  d e f i n e s  
t h e  term " p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee" and ske tches  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  o u t l i n e  of 
how a PAC ope ra t e s .  This  i s  not intended t o  be an e x p l i c i t ,  d e t a i l e d  gu ide  
t o  the  formation of a  PAC; such guides  do e x i s t  and, i n  f a c t ,  provided 
cons ide rab l e  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h e  p repa ra t i on  of t h i s  o u t l i n e .  - 1/ Those 
cons ide r ing  s e t t i n g  up a  PAC would be w e l l  advised t o  ob t a in  copies  of t h e  
Fede ra l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act,  T i t l e  11 of t h e  Code of Federa l  Regula t ions  
( p e r t a i n i n g  t o  Federa l  ~ l e c t i o n s ) ,  and t h e  Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Commission's 
Campaign Guide f o r  Nonconnected Committees o r  Campaign Guide f o r  Corpora t ions  
and Labor Organiza t ions .  This  chapter  is  confined t o  conveying some idea  
of what i s  involved i n  t h e  mechanics of s e t t i n g  up and ope ra t i ng  a  PAC, so  
a s  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  r o l e  t he se  v e h i c l e s  play i n  American p o l i t i c s  and t h e  
i s s u e s  they r a i s e  fo r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system. 
I. WHAT IS  A POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 
The term " p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee" i s  widely used t o  denote  a l ega l  
e n t i t y  which i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by an i n t e r e s t  group t o  r a i s e  and spend money 
i n  an at tempt  t o  i n f luence  e l e c t i o n s .  In s p i t e  of i t s  common usage, t h e  term 
1/ Sudow, William E. Organiza t ion  and Adminis t ra t ion:  PAC Legal 
~ o n s i z e r a t i o n s .  I n  P o l i t i c a l  Action f o r  Business:  The PAC Handbook. 
Washington, Fraser  Assoc i a t e s ,  1981. p. 192-218. Sproul ,  C u r t i s  C. 
Corpora t ions  and Unions i n  Federa l  P o l i t i c s :  A P r a c t i c a l  Approach t o  
Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Law Compliance. In P o l i t i c a l  Action Committees and 
Campaign Finance: Symposium. Arizona Law Review, v .  22 ,  1980: 465-518. 
i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  a  c o l l o q u i a l  e x p r e s s i o n  which does not  appear  i n  F e d e r a l  s t a t u t e s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  unders tand  t h e  l e g a l  framework i n  which a  PAC o p e r a t e s ,  one must 
e x p l o r e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  of  t h r e e  r e l a t e d ,  bu t  not e q u i v a l e n t ,  l e g a l  terms:  
11 p o l i t i c a l  committee," " s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund," and " m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  p o l i t i c a l  
V i r t u a l l y  a l l  PACs, a s  we w i l l  r e f e r  t o  them throughout  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  a r e  
" p o l i t i c a l  committees."  Under t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  2 U.S.C. 431 of t h e  F e d e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act (FECA): 
( 4 )  The term " p o l i t i c a l  committee" means-- 
(A) any commit tee ,  c l u b ,  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  o r  o t h e r  group o f  
pe r sons  which r e c e i v e s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a g g r e g a t i n g  i n  e x c e s s  
of $1,000 d u r i n g  a  c a l e n d a r  yea r  o r  which makes e x p e n d i t u r e s  
a g g r e g a t i n g  i n  excess  of  $1,000 d u r i n g  a  c a l e n d a r  y e a r ;  o r  
(B) any s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund e s t a b l i s h e d  under t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  of  s e c t i o n  441b(b)  of  t h i s  t i t l e ;  o r  
(C) any l o c a l  committee of  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  which 
r e c e i v e s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a g g r e g a t i n g  i n  e x c e s s  of  $5,000 d u r i n g  a  
c a l e n d a r  y e a r ,  o r  makes payments exempted from t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o r  e x p e n d i t u r e  a s  d e f i n e d  i n  paragraphs  ( 8 )  and 
(9) of  t h i s  s e c t i o n  a g g r e g a t i n g  i n  e x c e s s  of $5,000 d u r i n z  a  
c a l e n d a r  y e a r ,  o r  makes c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a g g r e g a t i n g  i n  e x c e s s  
of $1,000 d u r i n g  a  c a l e n d a r  year  o r  makes e x p e n d i t u r e s  
a g g r e g a t i n g  i n  e x c e s s  o f  $1,000 d u r i n g  a  c a l e n d a r  y e a r .  
For purposes  of  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  t h e  t h i r d  type  of p o l i t i c a l  cormnittee--ones t h a t  
a r e  a f f i l i a t e d  w i t h  a  p o l i t i c a l  pa r ty - -wi l l  not  be  c o n s i d e r e d ;  t h e s e  a r e  no t  
what i s  g e n e r a l l y  meant a s  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees.  I n s t e a d ,  t h i s  r e p o r t  
i s  concerned w i t h  what t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission r e f e r s  t o  a s  "nonparty" 
p o l i t i c a l  commit tees ,  which can t a k e  t h e  form of e i t h e r  d e f i n i t i o n  (A) o r  (B) .  
The e s s e n t i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between p o l i t i c a l  committee ( A )  and p o l i t i c a l  
committee (B) i s  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  a f f i l i a t i o n  wi th  an e x i s t i n g ,  sponsor ing  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  t h e  f o r m e r ' s  o s t e n s i b l y  independent  s t a t u s .  
It i s  p o l i t i c a l  committee (B), t h e  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund,  which h a s  
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  f o r e r u n n e r  and,  i n  a  s e n s e ,  t h e  moving f o r c e  behind t h e  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  PACs. U n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  t h e  term " s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund" 
was v i r t u a l l y  synonymous w i t h  t h e  term " p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee ," and ,  even 
t o d a y ,  w i t h  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  growth of  and a t t e n t i o n  focused on t h e  u n a f f i l i a t e d ,  
independent  PACs, s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  funds  accoun t  f o r  n e a r l y  80 p e r c e n t  of  
PAC s  . 
A s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund is  " l i t t l e  more than  a  bookkeeping concept  ," 
which i s  not  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  laws.  - 2 1  As w i l l  be  e x p l o r e d  
i n  Chapter  Two, i t  developed o u t  of t h e  l e g a l  p r o h i b i t i o n s  on t h e  spending of 
g e n e r a l  t r e a s u r y  funds  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by unions  and c o r p o r a t i o n s .  
Such p r o h i b i t i o n s  l e d  l a b o r  unions  (and u l t i m a t e l y  o t h e r s )  t o  e s t a b l i s h  and 
u n d e r w r i t e  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  expenses  of d i s t i n c t  commit tees  ( m a i n t a i n i n g  accoun t s  
s e p a r a t e  from t h e  u n i o n s ' )  t o  c o l l e c t  and d i s t r i b u t e  v o l u n t a r y  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from t h e i r  members, w i t h o u t  i n v o l v i n g  d i r e c t  union c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  I n  such a  manner,  t h e  concept  of a  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund 
came i n t o  b e i n g .  
The law a u t h o r i z e s  t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  which can be  
conducted w i t h  g e n e r a l  t r e a s u r y  funds  of unions  and c o r p o r a t i o n s .  While 
2  U.S.C. 441b(a )  p r o h i b i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  by  n a t i o n a l  
banks ,  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  S e c t i o n  4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 2 )  s t a t e s  t h a t  
t h i s  p r o h i b i t  i o n  s h a l l  not  include--  
(A) communications by a  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  i t s  s t o c k h o l d e r s  
and e x e c u t i v e  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  pe r sonne l  and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  
o r  by a  l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  i t s  members and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  
on any s u b j e c t ;  
(B) n o n p a r t i s a n  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and get -out- the-vote  campaigns 
by a  c o r p o r a t i o n  aimed a t  i t s  s t o c k h o l d e r s  and e x e c u t i v e  o r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  pe r sonne l  and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s ,  o r  by a  l a b o r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  aimed a t  i t s  members and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s ;  and 
21 S p r o u l ,  C o r p o r a t i o n s  and Unions i n  F e d e r a l  P o l i t i c s ,  p.  4 9 3 .  - 
( c )  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and s o l i c i t a t i o n  
of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  a  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund t o  be u t i l i z e d  
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  purposes  by a  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
membership o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  o r  c o r p o r a t i o n  w i t h o u t  
c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  
P a r t  C t h u s  s a n c t i o n s  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  funds  by 
c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  u n i o n s ,  membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  
wi thou t  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ;  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  a r e  g r a n t e d  t h e  same 
r i g h t  i n  2  U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 4 ) ( ~ ) .  These e n t i t i e s  r e p r e s e n t  s i x  of t h e  seven 
t y p e s  o f  PACs recogn ized  under law, and t h e y  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  
Chap te r  T h r e e ,  which p r e s e n t s  d a t a  on spend ing  by t h e  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  of  PACs. 
A  key f e a t u r e  of  a l l  t h r e e  s a n c t i o n e d  a c t i v i t i e s  ( p a r t s  A, B, and C o f  s e c t i o n  
4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 2 ) )  i s  t h a t  t h e y  must b e  conf ined  t o  t h e  a u d i e n c e s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  
law; t h i s  h a s  an impor tan t  b e a r i n g  on t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  of  PACs and t h e i r  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p rocess .  
The k i n d s  of  expenses  which may be paid  ou t  of  t h e  g e n e r a l  t r e a s u r i e s  of  
t h e  s p o n s o r i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  e l a b o r a t e d  upon i n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  promulgated 
by t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commmission. 11 C.F.R. 1 1 4 . l ( b )  s t a t e s :  
"Es tab l i shment ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and s o l i c i t a t i o n  cos t s ' '  means 
t h e  c o s t s  of  o f f i c e  s p a c e ,  phones,  s a l a r i e s ,  u t i l i t i e s ,  s u p p l i e s ,  
l e g a l  and accoun t ing  f e e s ,  f u n d r a i s i n g  and o t h e r  expenses  
i n c u r r e d  i n  and running a  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund . . . . 
These c o s t s  need no t  b e  r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commmission. 
Having d e s c r i b e d  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  PACs which a r e  s e p a r a t e  
s e g r e g a t e d  f u n d s ,  one  must t a k e  n o t e  of  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees  which a r e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  independen t ,  p o l i t i c a l  f u n d r a i s i n g  and spending v e h i c l e s .  These 
commit tees  must s imply meet t h e  c r i t e r i a  o f  r a i s i n g  o r  spend ing  over  $1,000 
i n  a  c a l e n d a r  year  and then  f i l e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  forms w i t h  t h e  F e d e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  Commission. These u n a f f i l i a t e d  PACs a r e  not  governed by t h e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  funds ,  i n  terms o f  whom 
t h e y  may s o l i c i t  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  nor a r e  t h e y  a b l e  t o  r e l y  upon a  s p o n s o r i n g  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  b e a r  t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and f u n d r a i s i n g  c o s t s ;  such c o s t s  
must be  paid  o u t  o f  t h e  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t h e y  r a i s e .  T h e r e i n  l i e s  t h e  
paramount advan tage  and d i s a d v a n t a g e  a c c r u i n g  t o  what t h e  FEC d e s c r i b e s  a s  t h e  
"non-connected" PACs, t h e  s e v e n t h  and f i n a l  PAC c a t e g o r y .  As w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  
l a t e r  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  t h e  u n a f f i l i a t e d  ( o r  non-connected) g roup ing  i s  l a r g e l y  
comprised o f  i d e o l o g i c a l  and i s s u e - o r i e n t e d  i n t e r e s t  g roups .  
One a d d i t i o n a l  b i t  of  l e g a l  terminology-- the  term " m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  
p o l i t i c a l  commit tee1'--needs t o  b e  e x p l a i n e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  round o u t  o n e ' s  
fundamental  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  what a  PAC i s  and why i t  i s  such a  much-discussed 
v e h i c l e .  T h i s  t e rm a r i s e s  from t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  p laced  on p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by i n d i v i d u a l s  and groups  under S e c t i o n  441a of t h e  FECA. 
S u b s e c t i o n  ( a )  ( 1 )  l i m i t s  "persons"  t o  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  $1,000 per e l e c t i o n  
t o  any F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e  o r  h i s  a u t h o r i z e d  commit tees ,  $20,000 pe r  year  t o  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  commit tees ,  and $5,000 a  yea r  t o  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  
commit tees .  As d e f i n e d  i n  2 U.S.C. 4 3 1 ( 1 1 ) ,  t h e  t e rm "person" i n c l u d e s :  
an  i n d i v i d u a l ,  p a r t n e r s h i p ,  commit tee ,  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  o r  any o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o r  group of p e r s o n s ,  
b u t  such term does  no t  i n c l u d e  t h e  F e d e r a l  Government o r  any 
a u t h o r i t y  of  t h e  F e d e r a l  Government. 
Thus,  t h e  l i m i t s  above a p p l y  t o  an  i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  o r  group.  
The law makes p r o v i s i o n ,  however,  f o r  a  s p e c i a l  type  of  p o l i t i c a l  
commit tee ,  t o  which d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  a p p l y ;  t h i s  t y p e  o f  PAC 
i s  t h e  " m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  p o l i t i c a l  committee," which i s  d e f i n e d  i n  S e c t i o n  
4 4 1 ( a ) ( 4 )  a s :  
a  p o l i t i c a l  committee which h a s  been r e g i s t e r e d  under s e c t i o n  433 
of  t h i s  t i t l e  f o r  a  p e r i o d  of  no t  l e s s  t h a n  6 months,  which h a s  
r e c e i v e d  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from more than  50 p e r s o n s ,  and,  excep t  f o r  
any S t a t e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  h a s  made c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
5  o r  more c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  F e d e r a l  o f f i c e .  
By meeting these three additional criteria, the multicandidate PAC may, under 
2 U.S.C. 441a(2), contribute $5,000 per election to a Federal candidate, 
$15,000 to a national political party cornittee, and $5,000 to any other 
political committee. 
Whereas the last limitation is the same as for the basic political 
committee and the second is actually lower, the $5,000 limit on contributions 
to candidates, in contrast with the $1,000 limit applicable to basic political 
committees and individuals, provides greater opportunities for influence and, 
hence, greater incentive for a political committee to attempt to meet the 
three additional criteria for multicandidate status. With these criteria 
being relatively easy to meet, it is hardly surprising that most nonparty 
committees today are multicandidate committees. What this means is that, 
for all intents and purposes, most PACs may contribute more money to Federal 
candidates than can individual citizens (this difference is accentuated by 
the imposition of a $25,000 aggregate limit on political contributions by 
individuals, with no such limit on political committees). This distinction 
has had a significant bearing on the growth of PACs, as well as on the debate 
surrounding their influence on American politics. 
In summary, virtually all PACs are political committees, most, but not 
all, are separate segregated funds, and most, but not all, are multicandidate 
political committees. Because of the implications for public policy and in 
the interests of greatest consistency with common usage, the term "PAC," for 
purposes of this report, will generally refer to nonparty, multicandidate 
political committees which may be either separate segregated funds or 
unaffiliated entities. The sections which follow in this chapter will have 
particular applicability to separate segregated funds, although they will 
be broadly relevant to all types of PACs. 
11. HOW A PAC OPERATES 
A. Organization 
A PAC is required to file a statement of organization with the Federal 
Election Commission within ten days after its establishment. - 3 /  For a 
separate segregated fund, the regulations suggest several alternative events 
which can be considered to constitute "establishment": 
a vote by the board of directors or comparable governing body 
of an organization to create a separate segregated fund to be 
used wholly or in part for federal elections; selection of 
initial officers to administer such a fund; or payment of the 
initial operating expenses of such a fund. - 41 
For an unaffiliated PAC, "establishment" is considered to have occurred when 
it meets the requirements of a political committee (i.e., when an organization 
or group raises or spends more than $1,000 in a year). - 51 
In order to register with the FEC, the newly-formed PAC must file a 
Statement of Organization, FEC Form 1 [a copy is provided in Appendix A ] ,  
which contains the following information: 
(1) name, address, and type of committee; 
(2) name, address, relationship, and type of connected 
organization; 
(3) name, address, and committee position of custodian 
of records (may be the treasurer); 
( 4 )  name and address of treasurer; 
3/ 11 C.F.R. 102.1 - 
4 /  11 C.F.R. 102.l(c) - 
5 /  11 C.F.R. 100.5(a); 102.l(d) - 
( 5 )  listing of depositories used by committee (at least 
one must be designated) - 61; 
The one officer required by law in a PAC is the treasurer, who plays a pivotal 
role in the committee. As stated in 2 U.S.C. 432(a): 
Every political committee shall have a treasurer. 
No contribution or expenditure shall be accepted or 
made by or on behalf of a political committee during 
any period in which the office of treasurer is vacant. 
In selecting the name, a separate segregated fund must include the name of its 
connected organization in its Statement of Organization, on all reports filed, 
and in all advertisements and communications. 7/ - 
Beyond the requirements above, there are virtually no other steps required 
for the establishment of a PAC. Those in charge of the PAC may or may not 
decide to incorporate. By-laws which set forth the goals, organizational 
structure, and guidelines for PAC operations are recommended by many 
authorities, but they are not required by law. - 81 
Regarding the tax status of a PAC, the law states that political 
organizations are not entirely exempt from income taxation and are required to 
file tax returns. - 91 However, a PAC qualifies for a limited tax-exempt status 
"as long as it is organized and operated primarily for the purpose of receiving 
contributions and making expenditures within the meaning of the Act." - 101 
61 11 C.F.R. 102.2(a) - 
7/ 11 C.F.R. 102.14 - 
8/ Sudow, Organization and Administration, p. 199-200. - 
9/ 26 U.S.C. 6012(a)(6) - 
lo/ Sudow, Organization and Administration, p. 207. Although money 
raiserfrom contributions for political expenditures is tax-exempt, political 
organizations must pay taxes on income from investments. 
B. Records and Reports  
Under 2  U.S.C. 432, t h e  t r e a s u r e r  i s  requi red  t o  keep an account 
of t h e  PAC's f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  and t o  s t o r e  t h e s e  records  fo r  t h r e e  
years  a f t e r  t h e  r e l evan t  r e p o r t s  a r e  f i l e d .  In  terms of r e c e i p t s ,  t h e s e  
r eco rds  must inc lude :  
( 1 )  an account of a l l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  r ece ived ;  
( 2 )  t h e  name and address  of persons who c o n t r i b u t e  more than $50; 
( 3 )  employment s t a t u s  of persons c o n t r i b u t i n g  over $200 i n  a  year ;  
( 4 )  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of any c o n t r i b u t i o n  by a  p o l i t i c a l  c o r n i t t e e .  
For i tems 2-4, t h e  d a t e  and amount of c o n t r i b u t i o n  must be inc luded ,  a s  
wel l .  For a l l  PAC disbursements ,  t h e  records  must provide: 
( 1 )  name and address  of every r e c i p i e n t ;  
(2 )  d a t e ,  amount, and purpose; 
(3 )  name of candida te  (and o f f i c e  sought)  on whose beha l f  
disbursement was made. 
A r e c e i p t ,  i nvo ice ,  o r  cance l l ed  check i s  requi red  t o  be kept for  disbursements  
exceeding $200. 
Sec t ion  434 of t h e  FECA r e q u i r e s  PACs t o  r e p o r t  information on t h e i r  
f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Commission a t  r egu la r  i n t e r v a l s ;  
2 U.S.C. 439 a l s o  r e q u i r e s  r e l evan t  s e c t i o n s  of r e p o r t s  t o  be f i l e d  wi th  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e  i n  those  S t a t e s  where candida tes  have received PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Current  r e g u l a t i o n s  r e q u i r e  them t o  use FEC Form 3-X. (See 
Appendix B) . 
These r e p o r t s  e l i c i t  information on PAC r e c e i p t s  through two methods. 
The f i r s t ,  c a t e g o r i e s  of r e c e i p t s ,  r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  of t o t a l  amounts 
i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from i n d i v i d u a l s ,  p a r t y  committees,  o the r  p o l i t i c a l  committees, 
and a l l  t h e s e  s o u r c e s  combined; i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t o t a l  amounts of  t r a n s f e r s  from 
a f f i l i a t e d  commit tees ,  l o a n s ,  o f f s e t s  t o  o p e r a t i n g  expenses ,  and o t h e r  r e c e i p t s  
must be r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  s e c t i o n .  The second s e c t i o n  of t h e  r e c e i p t s  
r e p o r t  p r o v i d e s  a n  i t emized  account  ( w i t h  d a t e s  and amounts) of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
from i n d i v i d u a l s  who c o n t r i b u t e  more than  $200 i n  a  yea r  and from a l l  commit tees  
( p o l i t i c a l  and o t h e r w i s e )  ; i n  a d d i t  i o n ,  i t e m i z e d  accoun t ing  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  
t r a n s f e r s  from a f f i l i a t e d  commit tees ,  a l l  l o a n s  t o  t h e  PAC, a l l  r e b a t e s  t o  
o f f s e t  o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s  i n  e x c e s s  of  $200, and d i v i d e n d s  o r  i n t e r e s t  i n  amounts 
over  $200. E/ 
With r e g a r d  t o  PAC d i s b u r s e m e n t s ,  t h e  same two methods a r e  used.  The 
c a t e g o r i e s  of  d i sbursements  p rov ide  t h e  t o t a l  amounts s p e n t  on o p e r a t i n g  
expenses ,  t r a n s f e r s  t o  a f f i l i a t e d  commit tees ,  l o a n  repayments ,  o f f s e t s ,  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees ,  l o a n s  made by t h e  PAC, independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  and o t h e r  expenses .  An i t emized  accoun t ing  ( w i t h  d a t e s  and 
amounts) i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  each d i sbursement  of more than  $200 i n  a  y e a r  ( s t a t i n g  
t h e  purpose of  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e ) ,  each t r a n s f e r  t o  an a f f i l i a t e d  commit tee ,  
each loan  repayment,  each re fund  o r  o f f s e t ,  each c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  a  p o l i t i c a l  
committee ( w i t h  name and o f f i c e  s o u g h t ,  i f  t o  a  c a n d i d a t e ' s  a u t h o r i z e d  
commi t t ee ) ,  each l o a n ,  and each independent  e x p e n d i t u r e  of more than  $200. - 12/  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  r e p o r t s  f i l e d  must a l s o  d i s c l o s e  such i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  c a s h  
on hand,  o u t s t a n d i n g  d e b t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s ,  and summaries of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
and o p e r a t i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  - 131 
11/ 11 C.F.R. 1 0 4 . 3 ( a ) ( 2 )  and ( 4 )  -
12/ 11 C.F.R. 1 0 4 . 3 ( b ) ( l )  and ( 3 )  -
13/  11 C.F.R. 1 0 4 . 3 ( a ) ( l ) ,  ( c ) ,  and ( d )  -
PACs may choose one of two schedules  f o r  f i l i n g  t h e i r  d i s c l o s u r e  r e p o r t s .  
The f i r s t  op t ion  r e q u i r e s  e lec t ion-year  r e p o r t s  on a  q u a r t e r l y  b a s i s  (due 
January 31, Apr i l  15, J u l y  15,  and October 1 5 ) ,  a  p re -e lec t ion  r e p o r t  (due 
12 days be fo re  a  primary o r  genera l  e l e c t i o n ) ,  and a  pos t - e l ec t i on  r e p o r t  
(due 30 days a f t e r  a  gene ra l  e l e c t i o n ) ;  i n  non-elect ion y e a r s ,  two semi-annual 
r e p o r t s  a r e  requi red  under t h i s  system (due J u l y  31 and January 31).  The 
second r e p o r t i n g  op t ion  r e q u i r e s  monthly r e p o r t s  (due by t h e  20th day of t he  
fol lowing month) i n  both e l e c t i o n  and non-elect ion years ;  dur ing  e l e c t i o n  
y e a r s ,  however, pre- and pos t - e l ec t i on  r e p o r t s  and a  year-end r epo r t  (due 
January 31) a r e  requi red  i n  l i e u  of t h e  November and December monthly 
r e p o r t s .  141 
S o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  Cont r ibu t ions  
A t  t h e  c o r e  of a  PAC's e x i s t e n c e  is i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  r a i s e  money. The FECA 
and i t s  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f f e r  d e t a i l e d  g u i d e l i n e s  which must be 
followed by t h e  var ious  types  of s e p a r a t e  segregated funds i n  t h e i r  appea ls  
f o r  vo lun ta ry  con t r ibu t ions .  One ove r r id ing  r u l e ,  a t  l e a s t  with r e spec t  t o  
union o r  co rpo ra t e  employers who s o l i c i t  t h e i r  subord ina tes ,  i s  t h a t  a l l  
s o l i c i t a t i o n s  must inform t h e  employee of t he  p o l i t i c a l  purposes of t he  PAC 
and of h i s  r i g h t  t o  r e fuse  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  without f e a r  of r e p r i s a l .  151 -
Corporat ions may s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  PACs only  from t h e i r  
s t ockho lde r s ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o r  execut ive  personnel ,  and f a m i l i e s .  161 The -
- 
141 11 C.F.R.  104.5(c) -
151 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 3 ) ( ~ )  and ( c )  -
161 2 U.S.C. 441b(b) (4) (A)( i )  -
law defines "executive or administrative personnel" as: 
individuals employed by a corporation who are paid on a 
salary, rather than hourly, basis and who have policymaking, 
managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities. - 171 
Labor unions may only solicit contributions from their members and their 
families. - 181 Such solicitations by unions and corporations may be in written 
or oral form and may occur at any time, with no 1imitatioh.on the number of 
times per year. 
In addition to the above guidelines, the law permits corporations and 
unions to solicit each other's solicitation pools twice a year. This type 
of solicitation must be in writing and be sent to the residence of the 
prospective donor. - 191 The regulations further require that these written 
solicitations inform the reader that a custodial arrangement exists to protect 
the anonymity of those who do not contribute, those who make a single 
contribution of $50 or less, and those whose aggregate contributions in a year 
do not exceed $200; the corporation or union may not be informed of those who 
fail to contribute, and those who contribute less than $50 at a time or $200 
in the aggregate may send their contributions to the custodian. - 201 
The law requires that whatever methods a corporation uses in its 
fundraising efforts must be made available at cost to a labor union which 
represents its employees. 2 1  The regulations suggest that such methods of 
171 2 U.S.C. 441b(7) -
181 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii) -
191 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(B) -
201 11 C.F.R. 114.6(c) and (d) -
211 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(6) -
s o l i c i t a t i o n  i n c l u d e  b u t  a r e  no t  l i m i t e d  t o  a  p a y r o l l  d e d u c t i o n  o r  check-off  
sys tem,  computers  f o r  a d d r e s s i n g  enve lopes  f o r  home s o l i c i t a t i o n s ,  and t h e  use  
of c o r p o r a t e  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  f u n d r a i s i n g  e v e n t s .  221 
The r u l e s  govern ing  s o l i c i t a t i o n  by membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( o t h e r  than  
t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ) ,  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  w i t h o u t  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  a r e  
much s i m p l e r  than  t h o s e  f o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and un ions .  Any o f  t h e  t h r e e  former 
t y p e s  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  may s o l i c i t  i t s  members a t  any t ime  and i n  any manner,  
w i t h o u t  any r e s t r i c t i o n  on number of  s o l i c i t a t i o n s  per y e a r .  231 -
The g u i d e l i n e s  govern ing  a  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n  permit  i t  t o  s o l i c i t  t h e  
s t o c k h o l d e r s  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o r  e x e c u t i v e  pe r sonne l  (and f a m i l i e s )  of  member 
c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  provided t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  g r a n t s  s p e c i f i c ,  p r i o r  approva l  and 
t h a t  i t  n o t  permit  such s o l i c i t a t i o n s  by any o t h e r  a s s o c i a t i o n  t h a t  y e a r .  
The c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  f r e e  t o  l i m i t  t h e  number of  s o l i c i t a t i o n s  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r  
by  t h e  a u t h o r i z e d  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n  and t o  f u r t h e r  r e s t r i c t  t h e  s o l i c i t a t i o n  
poo l .  241 -
The law h a s  l i t t l e  t o  s a y  r e g a r d i n g  s o l i c i t a t i o n s  by non-connected PACs, 
excep t  t h a t  t h e y  must i d e n t i f y  any communications a s  b e i n g  pa id  f o r  by 
them. 251 Beyond t h a t ,  a s  p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d ,  t h e y  may s o l i c i t  anyone f o r  -
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  th rough  any v e h i c l e ,  any number of  t i m e s .  
One f i n a l  comment r e g a r d i n g  PAC s o l i c i t a t i o n  of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  d e s e r v e s  
ment ion h e r e .  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  a  PAC a r e  g e n e r a l l y  e l i g i b l e  f o r  t h e  50 pe rcen t  
221 11 C.F.R. 114 .5 (k )  -
231 2  U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 4 ) ( C ) ;  11 C.F.R. 114.7 -
241 2 U.S.C. 4 4 1 b ( b ) ( 4 )  (Dl; 11 C.F.R. 114.8  -
251 11 C.F.R. 110.11 -
t a x  c r e d i t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;  a  maximum c r e d i t  of 
$50 may be  t aken  by a  s i n g l e  t axpayer  and $100 by t h o s e  f i l i n g  a  j o i n t  r e t u r n .  
T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  commonly mentioned by PACs i n  t h e i r  f u n d r a i s i n g  a p p e a l s .  
D .  The Decision-Making P r o c e s s  
Of a l l  t h e  a s p e c t s  of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees ,  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n  and 
t h e i r  r o l e  i n  our  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem,  t h e  one which i s  probably  t h e  l e a s t  
unders tood i s  t h e  PAC decision-making p r o c e s s .  There  i s  a  d e a r t h  of l i t e r a t u r e  
on how PACs a r r i v e  a t  d e c i s i o n s  on which c a n d i d a t e s  t o  s u p p o r t ,  and t h e r e  i s  
no s y s t e m a t i c ,  comprehensive examina t ion  of t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  What l i t e r a t u r e  
does  e x i s t  i s  l a r g e l y  conf ined  t o  examples of s e l e c t e d  PACs and i s  h e a v i l y  
a n e c d o t a l  i n  n a t u r e .  Fur the rmore ,  t h e  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  i n n e r  workings  of  
PACs focus  e s p e c i a l l y  on c o r p o r a t e  PACs. T h i s  i s  perhaps  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  
e f f o r t s  of  c o r p o r a t e  spokesmen t o  p u b l i c i z e  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
h e l p  shape a  sympathe t i c  p u b l i c  p e r c e p t i o n  of  them. Thus,  not  o n l y  a r e  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  accoun t s  o r i e n t e d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r  b u t  they  may be l a c k i n g  
i n  o b j e c t i v i t y ,  a s  w e l l .  Although t h i s  s e c t i o n  a t t e m p t s  t o  p rov ide  some u s e f u l  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  on t h e  PAC decis ion-making p r o c e s s ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  l i m i t e d  
by t h e  aforement ioned c o n s t r a i n t s .  
The fundamental  r eason  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  vague p e r c e p t i o n  of PAC i n t e r n a l  
workings i s  t h e  absence of d e t a i l e d  l e g a l  g u i d e l i n e s  and d i s c l o s u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  
such a s  t h o s e  t h a t  a p p l y  t o  t h e  PAC's f i n a n c i a l  o p e r a t i o n s .  In  t h e  c a s e  of 
t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  PACs which a r e  a f f i l i a t e d ,  it i s  known t h a t  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  
of  t h e  sponsor ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n  h a s  broad a u t h o r i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  spending 
d e c i s i o n s  of  t h e i r  PACs. A board of  d i r e c t o r s  i s  u s u a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  decis ion-making body of t h e  PAC, and management-level o f f i c e r s  of  t h e  
company or union typically serve on the PAC board. The day-to-day operations 
of the PAC are generally handled by a designated manager, who may serve only 
part-time in that capacity and whose principal occupation might be government 
affairs specialist of the connected organization. - 261 The PAC board may also 
rely on standing comrnittees to assist with such specific tasks as fundraising, 
monitoring legislators' votes, or voter education. - 271 
The number of people actually involved in the decision-making process will 
also vary. It appears that some actively encourage input from the contributors, 
which may involve an earmarking system, while others reserve the decisions on 
whom to support to the PAC board of directors or a subgroup thereof. Some may 
place particular emphasis on the advice of Washington representatives of the 
connected organization; others may solicit input from local affiliates before 
making decisions for the national body. - 281
Most of the literature stresses the wide number of options open to PAC 
decision-makers. Some of these options are summarized below as a means of 
illustrating how varied the operations and foci of PACs are likely to be. 
Through these choices, a PAC assumes its own identity: 
(1) to limit contributions to local races or to support 
candidates across the Nation; 
(2) to pursue an incumbent-oriented approach or to take 
more risks on challengers; 
261 Cohen, Richard E. Congressional Democrats Beware--Here Come the 
corpo=te PACs. National Journal, v. 12, August 9, 1980: 1306. 
271 Sudow, Organization and Administration, p. 197. -
281 Budde, Bernadette. Business Political Action Committees. In 
~ i c h a x  J. Malbin (ed. ) . Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance 
Laws. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1980. p. 22-23. 
( 3 )  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  on incumbents i n  
l e g i s l a t i v e l y  s t r a t e g i c  p l a c e s ,  such a s  key committee 
p o s i t  i o n s ;  
( 4 )  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  e a r l y  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  (pe rhaps  
t a k i n g  more r i s k s )  o r  w a i t  u n t i l  l a t e r  i n  t h e  campaign 
(pe rhaps  t o  a s s e s s  who i s  most l i k e l y  t o  win) ;  
( 5 )  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  i n  p r i m a r i e s  o r  on ly  i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ;  
( 6 )  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  g i v i n g  w i t h  o t h e r  PACs o r  t o  work a l o n e ;  
( 7 )  t o  g i v e  a  smal l  number of l a r g e  d o n a t i o n s  o r  t o  g i v e  a  
l a r g e r  number of token  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ; 
( 8 )  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  t o  p a r t i e s ,  t o  
o t h e r  PACs, a s  w e l l  a s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s ;  
( 9 )  t o  g i v e  t o  S t a t e  and l o c a l  o r  o n l y  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s ;  
( 1 0 )  t o  a l l o w  c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  earmark c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
d e s i g n a t e d  c a n d i d a t e s ;  
( 1 1 )  t o  make p o s t - e l e c t i o n  d o n a t i o n s  t o  h e l p  e a s e  a  
c a n d i d a t e ' s  campaign d e f i c i t ;  
( 1 2 )  t o  make in-kind d o n a t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  ( such  a s  
p rov id ing  goods and s e r v i c e s )  o r  o n l y  f i n a n c i a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ; 
( 1 3 )  t o  make independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o r  l i m i t  spending t o  
d i r e c t  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  - 291 
One f i n a l  p o i n t  might be  made h e r e  r e g a r d i n g  PAC dec i s ion-making .  O f t e n ,  
i f  not  most of t h e  t i m e ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  s u g g e s t i o n  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
291 K e n d a l l ,  Don R.  Corpora te  PACs: Step-by-step Formation and 
~ r o u b z f r e e  O p e r a t i o n .  Campaigns and E l e c t i o n s ,  v .  1, S p r i n g  1980: 18;  
Kayden, Xanda. The Impact of  t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  of  
P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees. I n  U.S. Congress.  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  
Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  An A n a l y s i s  of t h e  Impact o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  Campaign Ac t ,  1972-1978. From t h e  I n s t i t u t e  of P o l i t i c s .  John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .  Committee P r i n t ,  96 th  Cong., 
1 s t  S e s s .  Washington,  U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1979. p. 101.  w  ere after c i t e d  
a s  U.S. Congress.  An A n a l y s i s  of  t h e  Impact of t h e  FECA) 
c a n d i d a t e  emanates  from t h e  c a n d i d a t e  h i m s e l f .  301 The p r a c t i c e  of  c a n d i d a t e s  
- making a p p e a l s  f o r  PAC money h a s  become s o  widespread t h a t  a d v i c e  on how t o  
maximize t h e i r  chances  f o r  o b t a i n i n g  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a p p e a r s  t o  have become 
a  s t a n d a r d  p a r t  of  t h e  t r a i n i n g  f o r  modern-day c a n d i d a t e s .  - 31/
E. R e g u l a t i o n  o f  PACs 
PACS a r e  F e d e r a l l y  r e g u l a t e d  by t h r e e  p r imary  s o u r c e s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h e  
F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of  1971 and i t s  1974, 1976, and 1979 Amendments: 
P u b l i c  Laws 92-225, 93-443, 94-283, and 96-187, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The FECA i s  
c o d i f i e d  i n  law a s  2  U.S.C. 431 e t  seq .  Secondly ,  T i t l e  11 of t h e  Code o f  
F e d e r a l  R e g u l a t i o n s  i n c l u d e s  r e g u l a t i o n s  promulgated by t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  
Commission which a r e  based on t h e  s t a t u t e s  and which s e r v e  a s  more d e t a i l e d  
g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  p r o c e s s ;  t h e s e  a l s o  have 
t h e  advan tage  o f  be ing  w r i t t e n  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t  o f  e a s i e r  c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y  
t h a n  s t a t u t o r y  language.  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  FEC i s  a u t h o r i z e d  under 2  U.S.C. 437f 
t o  i s s u e  a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n s ,  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  of  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  c a n d i d a t e s ,  o r  
commit tees ,  which a r e  in tended  t o  c l a r i f y  q u e s t i o n s  o r  pe rce ived  a m b i g u i t i e s  
about  t h e  law. These a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n s  a r e  compiled and indexed by t h e  FEC; 
t h e  index  i s  updated p e r i o d i c a l l y  and i s  a v a i l a b l e  from t h e  Commission. 
301 Kayden, Xanda. Campaign F inance :  The Impact on P a r t i e s  and -
PACs. I n  U.S. Congress.  An A n a l y s i s  of t h e  Impact of  t h e  FECA, p. 86.  
31/ How t o  S o l i c i t  PACs. Campaigning R e p o r t s ,  v .  1, J u l y  26, 1979: -
7-9. 

CHAPTER TWO: EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES 
Although t h e y  have o n l y  r e c e n t l y  become a  major s o u r c e  of  campaign fund ing  
i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  a r e  not  a  r e c e n t  phenomenon. 
Fur the rmore ,  i n t e r e s t  group involvement i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s  i s  n o t  a  new 
development.  Groups have a lways  s o u g h t - - l e g a l l y  and i l l e g a l l y ,  d i r e c t l y  and 
i n d i r e c t l y - - t o  maximize t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  over  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s .  
The f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of  t h i s  c h a p t e r  o u t l i n e s  t h e  laws govern ing  group involvement 
i n  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1971 and 
d i s c u s s e s  t h e  t y p e s  of a c t i v i t i e s  i n  which t h e  groups  were engaged. The second 
s e c t i o n  t r a c e s  t h e  key laws and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and j u d i c i a l  r u l i n g s  of  t h e  1970 ' s  
which s e r v e d  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  PACs a s  t h a t  decade advanced.  
GROUP INVOLVEMENT PRIOR TO THE 1970s 
A .  Lega l  R e s t r i c t i o n s  
D i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  e l e c t i o n s  by c o r p o r a t i o n s  and l a b o r  un ions ,  t h e  
foremost t y p e s  of  i n t e r e s t  g roups ,  has  been c i r c u m s c r i b e d  f o r  much of t h i s  
c e n t u r y .  The T i l lman  Act of  1907 321 p r o h i b i t e d  a l l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and n a t i o n a l  -
banks from making "money c o n t r i b u t i o n [ s l "  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .  
It was e n a c t e d  a t  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  of  P r e s i d e n t  Theodore Rooseve l t  i n  t h e  wake 
of c h a r g e s  d u r i n g  h i s  1904 campaign t h a t  he had r e c e i v e d  l a r g e  c o r p o r a t e  
321 34 S t a t .  864 (1907)  -
contributions from prospective government contractors and in light of increased 
public cynicism over the role of large corporations in the electoral process. 33/ -
This prohibition was extended by the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 34/ to all -
contributions (not just monetary ones). That law, however, excluded primary 
elections and nominating conventions from its restrictions, in accordance with 
the prevailing interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision in Newberry 
v. United States. 351 -
The role of labor unions in election campaigns was not circumscribed until 
1943, with the enactment of the War Labor Disputes (or Smith-Connally) Act. 36/ -
Prior to that, most labor campaign contributions had come from union dues of 
members. What had prompted the move to curtail labor's political giving was 
the marked upsurge of such activity in and following the 1936 elections, as 
described in the following account: 
The 1936 elections saw an eruption of political activity by 
organized labor. Reported political expenditures by interstate 
labor organizations ran to over $750,000. This exceeded by 
eight times the sum raised by the American Federation of Labor 
for political purposes during the previous 30 years. Labor dove 
into active campaigning and into campaign contributing on behalf 
of Democratic candidates. The move provoked a fierce howl that 
clearly marked 1936 as a watershed year, in the political 
alignment of social and economic interests. - 371 
331 Epstein, Edwin M. Corporations, Contributions, and Political 
campaZns: Federal Regulation in Perspective. Berkeley, Institute of 
Governmental Studies, May 1968. p. 11-12. 
341 43 Stat. 1074 (1925) -
351 256 U.S. 232 (1921); the Newberry decision was seen as placing 
limitson the Federal Government ' s authority to control party primaries 
and conventions. 
361 57 Stat. 167 (1943) -
371 Heard, Alexander. The Costs of Democracy. Chapel Hill, The 
university of North Carolina Press, 1960. p. 169. 
In addition to the concern over the growing power of unions among opponents 
of labor's political philosophy, there developed a desire to protect the rights 
of union members from having their dues monies given to candidates with whom 
they differed politically. - 381 Consequently, the 1943 Act prohibited unions 
from making contributions in connection with elections for Federal office. An 
important distinction to note is that although unions were barred from using 
their treasuries for campaign contributions, they interpreted the law as not 
applying to their separate segregated funds. 
The 1943 Act was in effect only until six months after the end of World 
War 11, and, in 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations (or Taft- 
Hartley) Act which made permanent the restrictions on labor's political 
activities. 391 Furthermore, it extended the ban for both corporations and 
labor unions to expenditures as well as contributions, in light of efforts by 
the CIO's Political Action Committee in 1944 to circumvent the Smith-Connally 
prohibition on union contributions. - 401 The 1947 Act also extended coverage 
(for corporations and unions) to primaries and conventions. This appeared to 
be consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Classic, - 41/ 
which was interpreted as overruling the Newberry decision by sanctioning Federal 
regulation of the nominating process. - 421 
381 Ibid., p. 190. -
391 61 Stat. 159 (1947) -
401 Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns, 
p. 147 
411 313 U.S. 299 (1941) -
421 Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Campaigns, 
p. 15r152 [fn. 431 
The 1925 Cor rup t  P r a c t i c e s  Act ,  a s  amended by t h e  1947 T a f t - H a r t l e y  Act 
and c o d i f i e d  a t  18 U.S.C. 610, was t h e  p r i n c i p a l  law govern ing  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  of  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and l a b o r  unions  u n t i l  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign 
Act took  e f f e c t  i n  1972. The 1925 law, however, was wide ly  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  
vague,  whi le  t h e  j u d i c i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  were seen t o  be  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  p r e c i s e  
t o  o f f e r  a  c l e a r  " l i n e  o f  demarcat ion"  between p e r m i s s i b l e  and impermiss ib le  
c o r p o r a t e  and l a b o r  a c t i v i t i e s .  - 431 Fur the rmore ,  r u l i n g s  by t h e  Supreme Court  
and lower c o u r t s  i n  s i x  c a s e s  d u r i n g  t h e  25-year pe r iod  had c a s t  s u f f i c i e n t  
doubt  on t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of  18 U.S.C. 610 t h a t  t h e  J u s t i c e  Department was 
r e l u c t a n t  t o  p r o s e c u t e  presumed o f f e n d e r s  of  t h e  law. - 441 A s  d e p i c t e d  by one 
o b s e r v e r  : 
V i r t u a l l y  no c o r p o r a t i o n  o r  l a b o r  union t h a t  wished t o  do  s o  
was d e t e r r e d  d e  f a c t o  from making campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and 
e x p e n d i t u r e s .  - 451 
B. How I n t e r e s t  Groups Made P o l i t i c a l  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  
1. Labor -- 
Labor unions  had been engaged i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  f o r  q u i t e  some 
t i m e ,  b u t  u n t i l  1936,  unions  had c o n t r i b u t e d  o n l y  smal l  amounts d i r e c t l y  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  campaigns.  The American F e d e r a t i o n  of  Labor (AFL),  t h e  
major umbre l l a  l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a t  t h a t  t ime ,  ma in ta ined  a  p r a c t i c e  o f  
------- 
431 I b i d . ,  p. 56-57. -
441 E p s t e i n ,  Edwin. C o r p o r a t i o n s  and Labor Unions i n  E l e c t o r a l  
~ o l i t z s .  I n  Alexander ,  Herber t  ( e d . ) .  P o l i t i c a l  Finance:  Refonn and 
R e a l i t y .  P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  The Annals of t h e  American Academy of  P o l i t i c a l  
and S o c i a l  S c i e n c e ,  v .  425,  May 1976. p. 37. 
451 I b i d . ,  p. 39.  -
not using its general funds for political purposes. 461 The enormous increase 
in union contributions in 1936 (noted earlier) emanated almost exclusively 
fr& unions affiliated with the more politically aggressive Committee for 
Industrial Organization (CIO), established in 1935. The preponderance of 
contributions by the CIO affiliated unions were made from union funds, as 
1 ,  
authorized by convention votes. - 471 
In response to the Smith-Connally Act's prohibition on labor contributions 
in 1943, the Congress of Industrial Organization--as the CIO was later called-- 
made the first foray into the field of political action committees, as we now 
know them. Labor unions had operated political committees in the past (most 
notably Labor's Non-Partisan League, which began a brief existence in 19361, 
but the CIO-PAC, established in July 1943, constituted the earliest effort at 
successfully maintaining what is today known in law as a "separate segregated 
fundH--a separate account for transfering voluntary contributions from members 
to political candidates. In addition to the CIO-PAC, the CIO, under the direction 
of Sidney Hillman, established the National Citizen's Political Action Cornittee 
(NC-PAC) in 1944, in order to collect political funds from progressive individuals 
outside of labor's ranks. 481 -
The CIO-PAC entered the political arena during the election of 1944. Prior 
to the Democratic Convention, it raised $647,903 from the general funds of its 
af filiated unions, of which it spent $478,499 on primary campaigns and "political 
education" of its members on issues. Given that the 1943 law did not cover 
461 Overacker, Louise. Presidential Campaign Funds. Boston, 
~oston~niversit~ Press, 1946. p. 50. 
Ibid., p. 50-51. 
481 Ibid., p. 57-58. -
primary elections, it was an allowable expenditure for CIO-PAC. But once the 
convention was held and the general election campaign was considered to have 
begun, the existing PAC funds were frozen. Thereafter, the CIO-PAC launched 
its "A Buck for Roosevelt" drive to collect one dollar in voluntary contributions 
from its five million members; half of the money was to be used by the PAC and 
the other half was to be channeled to the union's State or local political action 
committees. The PAC raised $470,852 in this manner. 491 -
It is important to bear in mind that the CIO-PAC's activities were 
controversial at the time (indeed the primary contributions led to the tighter 
restrictions in the 1947 Act), but they played a major role in establishing 
precedents for later--and modern--modes of political activity by labor unions 
(and other groups). As the following passage reveals, the principal focus was, 
from the outset, on the maintenance of separate and distinct accounts for 
channeling political contributions: 
The status of the PAC committees also posed some legal 
conundrums. Union officials argued that these were not 
"labor organizations" within the meaning of the Smith-Connally 
Act as they were separately organized, under different sets of 
officers, and maintained independent treasuries. Nevertheless, 
the connection between the PAC and the CIO was very close on 
every level of organization. Sidney Hillman, President of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, an important CIO 
affiliate, was chairman of both the CIO-PAC and the NC-PAC; 
the State political action committees frequently utilized the 
existing mechanism of CIO State councils; and local political 
action committees were similarly set up as cormnittees of CIO 
locals. At the national level, and in most of the States, 
financial separation was strictly observed, and at the local 
level union personnel assigned to full-time PAC work were 
transferred to the PAC payroll. But when CIO personnel were 
assigned to the PAC on a part-time basis it was frequently 
impossible to distinguish the services which were political 
and which should be charged to the PAC. In California the 
separation between CIO and CIO-PAC was never very clearly 
defined. The State PAC was set up as a subcommittee of the 
49/ Ibid., p. 57-59. -
CIO, funds were not separate, and no separate records were kept. 
After the trade union fund was "frozen," the financial support 
of the CIO-PAC came from individual trade union members. CIO 
membership lists were, of course, used in soliciting contributions, 
and in some instances the "voluntary" character of these gifts 
was questioned. However, the modest size of the funds would seem 
to indicate that if compulsion was used, it was surprisingly 
ineffective. - 50/
With the CIO breaking ground in establishing and operating separate political 
funds in order to comply with Federal law, other labor unions followed suit. 
The AFL, the other major labor organization, set up its Labor's League for 
Political Education in 1947. - 51/ In 1955, these two umbrella organizations merged 
to become the AFL-CIO, and their PACs were united as the Committee on Political 
Education (COPE). COPE quickly established itself as the foremost source of 
labor-oriented political giving, although other national unions added considerably 
to the overall political war chest of the American labor movement. 
In 1956, seventeen national labor political committees made disbursements 
of some $2.1 million; in addition, 155 State and local union affiliates had 
political committees in operation that year, although much of the local groups' 
funds constituted transfers from the national committees. - 52/ By 1968, there 
were 37 national labor political committees making disbursements of $7.1 
million. 531 -
The most visible manifestation of labor's political giving took the form 
of "free fundsu--direct contributions to candidates from voluntary donations 
501 Ibid., p. 60-61. -
511 Heard, The Costs of Democracy, p. 192 (fn). -
52/ Ibid., p. 189. -
531 Alexander, Herbert. Financing the 1976 Election. Washington, 
~on~rzsional Quarterly Press, 1979. p. 559. 
by union members. C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  F e d e r a l  o f f i c e  by i n t e r s t a t e  
committees ( l i m i t e d  t o  amounts of  $5000) were r e q u i r e d  t o  be  r e p o r t e d  under 
t h e  F e d e r a l  Cor rup t  P r a c t i c e s  Ac t ,  t h u s  making i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  gauge (however 
i n e f f e c t i v e l y )  t h e  l e v e l  of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by such groups  a s  l a b o r  un ions .  
But f r e e  funds  a l o n e  d i d  not  r e f l e c t  t h e  t r u e  l e v e l  of l a b o r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  
g i v i n g ,  and t h r e e  o t h e r  major avenues were wide ly  used--a l l  of which were funded 
from t h e  g e n e r a l  t r e a s u r i e s  of unions:  
( 1 )  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  S t a t e  and l o c a l  o f f i c e s  could  be 
made from union t r e a s u r i e s  i n  t h o s e  S t a t e s  which d i d  not p r o h i b i t  such p r a c t i c e s  
( f ew d i d ) .  I n  some S t a t e s ,  Democratic c a n d i d a t e s  could  expect  t o  r e c e i v e  10-20 
pe rcen t  of t h e i r  campaign funds  from unions .  
( 2 )  Union t r e a s u r i e s  were used f o r  "educa t iona l "  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  which were 
t e c h n i c a l l y  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  ( t h u s  not  s u b j e c t  t o  F e d e r a l  laws p r o h i b i t i n g  union 
dues  money f o r  p o l i t i c a l  purposes )  but  which t y p i c a l l y  invo lved  such a c t i v i t i e s  
a s  get -out- the-vote  d r i v e s ,  v o t e r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  d r i v e s ,  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of v o t i n g  
r e c o r d s  o f  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s .  The fo l lowing  passage i n d i c a t e s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of t h i s  c a t e g o r y  of l a b o r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  c a n d i d a t e s :  
Organized l a b o r ' s  r e g i s t r a t i o n  d r i v e s  may be of  more v a l u e  t o  
t h e  Democrats than  d i r e c t  money c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  I n  1968 COPE 
s p e n t  more than  $1 m i l l i o n  on r e g i s t r a t i o n  a l o n e ,  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  
on m a r g i n a l  Congress iona l  d i s t r i c t s .  Local  and s t a t e  l a b o r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t r i e d  t o  match t h i s  n a t i o n a l  o u t l a y .  L a b o r ' s  
r e g i s t r a t i o n  d r i v e s ,  n a t u r a l l y ,  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  s e l e c t i v e l y  i n  
h e a v i l y  Democratic p r e c i n c t s .  - 541 
( 3 )  P u b l i c  s e r v i c e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  such a s  union newspapers and r a d i o  
programs, could  be funded from t h e  union t r e a s u r i e s ,  and they  were a b l e  
541 Alexander ,  Herber t  E .  Money i n  P o l i t i c s .  Washington,  P u b l i c  
~ f f a i z  P r e s s ,  1972. p. 170. 
t o  d i ssemina te  information and views suppor t i ve  of t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
philosophy. 551 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t he  channels  of a c t i v i t y  open t o  labor  unions d i scussed  
above, t h e  unions enjoyed wide l a t i t u d e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  a s  a  r e s u l t  of 
va r ious  Supreme Court dec i s ions .  Common p r a c t i c e s  included union employees' 
r ece iv ing  compensation while  providing s e r v i c e s  t o  cand ida t e s  and advocat ing 
cand ida t e s '  e l e c t i o n  o r  d e f e a t  i n  TV or  r a d i o  time paid from union funds.  - 561 
The above d i scus s ion  r e v e a l s  t h e  range of op t ions  open t o  labor  unions 
which sought t o  i n f luence  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process  p r i o r  t o  t h e  campaign f i nance  
laws enacted du r ing  t h e  1970s. While pioneering i n  t h e  f i e l d  of s e p a r a t e  
segrega ted  funds and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees f o r  d i r e c t  candida te  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  t h e  unions found many o the r  va luab le  means of making t h e i r  
i n f luence  f e l t .  A s  t h e  c o s t s  of many of t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  were not  r equ i r ed  
t o  be r epo r t ed  under t h e  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c l o s u r e  laws i n  e x i s t e n c e  through 1972, 
i t  was exceedingly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  accu ra t e  d a t a  on t h e  degree of l abor  
unions '  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  Federa l  e l e c t i o n s .  This  d i f f i c u l t y  was compounded 
by t h e  ease  with which t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  laws could be l e g a l l y  circumvented, 
a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  by n a t i o n a l  l abor  committees of t r a n s f e r r i n g  funds 
t o  S t a t e  a f f i l i a t e s ,  not sub j ec t  t o  Federa l  r e p o r t i n g  requirements .  - 571 However 
unce r t a in  one may be a s  t o  t h e  ex t en t  of labor  spending i n  t h e  yea r s  lead ing  
up t o  t he  FECA of  1971, one may s a f e l y  conclude t h a t  t h e  unions were playing 
a  v i t a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  f inanc ing  of e l e c t i o n  campaigns. 
5 5 1  I b i d . ,  p. 170-171; and Heard, The Costs  of Democracy, p. 177-178. -
561 Alexander,  Money i n  P o l i t i c s ,  p. 171. -
5 7 1  I b i d . ,  p. 172. -
2.  B u s i n e s s  
The c h a n n e l s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  by t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r  p r i o r  t o  t h e  
1970s were a l s o  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  even more d i f f i c u l t  t o  gauge 
t h e  l e v e l  of b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d  a c t i v i t y  than  i t  i s  f o r  l a b o r  a c t i v i t y .  C o r p o r a t e  
i n t e r e s t s  d i d  no t  e n t e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee f i e l d  u n t i l  t h e  1960s ,  
hav ing  i n s t e a d  become accustomed t o  d o n a t i n g  l a r g e  amounts of  money t o  campaigns 
through c o r p o r a t e  e x e c u t i v e s  and o t h e r  wea l thy  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  581 While t h i s  was perhaps  t h e  most v i s i b l e  way of  spend ing  -
p o l i t i c a l  money i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of b u s i n e s s ,  i t  was by no means t h e  o n l y  way. 
C o r p o r a t i o n s  themse lves  were p r o h i b i t e d  from spending t r e a s u r y  money 
on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  b u t ,  a s  w i t h  l a b o r  un ions ,  t h e r e  was 
a  wide range  of a c t i v i t i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  on which g e n e r a l  
funds  cou ld  b e  s p e n t .  Here a g a i n ,  t h e  l i n e  between p a r t i s a n  and b i p a r t i s a n ,  
p e r m i s s i b l e  and i m p e r m i s s i b l e ,  was o f t e n  b l u r r e d  enough t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  
under tak ing  of  a c t i v i t i e s  by a  c o r p o r a t i o n  which had a  d i s t i n c t  s l a n t  toward 
an in tended  b e n e f i c i a r y  o r  p o i n t  of view. Such e l e c t i o n - r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  
a s  v o t e r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and get -out- the-vote  d r i v e s  among employees,  p r o v i s i o n  
o f  employee and s t o c k h o l d e r  l i s t s  t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  p a y r o l l  d e d u c t i o n  
systems f o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  and campaign f u n d - r a i s i n g  d r i v e s  among 
employees were conducted by v a r i o u s  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  a p p a r e n t l y  not  i n  v i o l a t i o n  
of 18 U.S.C. 610. 591 -
Aside from t h e  above-mentioned " e d u c a t i o n a l "  a c t i v i t i e s ,  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
had some leeway i n  engaging i n  more p a r t i s a n  endeavors ,  such a s  t o :  
581 E p s t e i n ,  Edwin M. An I r o n y  of E l e c t o r a l  Reform. R e g u l a t i o n ,  v .  3 ,  
~ a ~ / ~ = e  1979. p. 35. 
591 E p s t e i n ,  C o r p o r a t i o n s ,  C o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  and P o l i t i c a l  Campaigns, p. 45. -
( 1 )  s u p p o r t  o r  oppose c a n d i d a t e s ,  p a r t i e s  and i s s u e s  i n  t h e i r  regu 
p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  c i r c u l a t e d  t o  t h e i r  employees,  s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  s u p p l i e r s  and 
cus tomers ;  
( 2 )  d i s t r i b u t e  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  l i t e r a t u r e  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  which 
s t a t e d  t h e  i s s u e s  and c a n d i d a t e s '  r e c o r d s ,  b u t  which d i d  not  advoca te  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  o r  d e f e a t  of  c a n d i d a t e s ;  
( 3 )  engage i n  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  a d v e r t i s i n g  on p u b l i c  i s s u e s ;  
( 4 )  wage a d v e r t i s i n g  campaigns wi th  r e g a r d  t o  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  not  
on t h e  b a l l o t  a s  r e f e r e n d a  o r  i n i t i a t i v e s ;  
( 5 )  a d v e r t i s e  i n  program books of n a t i o n a l  p a r t y  convent ions--a  popu la r  
p r a c t i c e  f o r  which c o r p o r a t i o n s  cou ld  r e c e i v e  a  t a x  d e d u c t i o n ;  and 
( 6 )  u s e  c o r p o r a t e  f a c i l i t i e s  and pe r sonne l  t o  s e e k  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  an a f f i l i a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee ( d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  below).  - 601 
The d i s c u s s i o n  u n t i l  t h i s  p o i n t  h a s  been conf ined  t o  c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  a p a r t  from d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  But t h i s  a s p e c t  was 
not  n e g l e c t e d  by t h o s e  s e e k i n g  t o  i n j e c t  b u s i n e s s '  p o i n t  o f  view i n t o  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  There  were b o t h  d i r e c t  (and l e g a l )  and i n d i r e c t  ( and  e x t r a -  
l e g a l )  methods f o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  
A s u r v e y  o f  t h e  N a t i o n ' s  businessmen i n  1959 found t h a t  h a l f  of  t h o s e  
i n t e r v i e w e d  c la imed t o  have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  e l e c t i o n  campaigns i n  1958--a h i g h  
f i g u r e  f o r  a  n o n - P r e s i d e n t i a l  yea r  and markedly h i g h e r  t h a n  t h a t  of t h e  o v e r a l l  
p o p u l a t i o n  i n  any y e a r .  - 611  C o r p o r a t e  o f f i c i a l s  gave c o n s i d e r a b l y  t o  e l e c t i o n  
campaigns,  w i t h  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  would r e c e i v e  t h e  c r e d i t  
i n  t h e  e y e s  of  t h e  campaign o f f i c i a l s .  The f o l l o w i n g  passage d i s c u s s e s  t h i s  
p r a c t i c e :  
--- 
601 I b i d . ,  pp. 46-55. -
6 1 1  I b i d . ,  p. 69 .  -
S i n c e ,  o b v i o u s l y ,  t h e r e  i s  no o f f i c i a l  r e c o r d  of " c o r p o r a t e  
g i v i n g , "  an index OF company c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i s  u s u a l l y  compiled 
by a g g r e g a t i n g  t h e  " i n d i v i d u a l "  d o n a t i o n s  of  c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c e r s  
and d i r e c t o r s .  The u n d e r l y i n g  assumpt ion of  such c o m p i l a t i o n s  
i s  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c i a l s  a c t  a s  c o n d u i t s  f o r  company 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  p a r t i e s  o r  c a n d i d a t e s .  - 621 
I n  1956, f o r  example,  199 o f f i c i a l s  of some of  t h e  225 l a r g e s t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
c o n t r i b u t e d  $1.9 m i l l i o n  i n  amounts of  $500 o r  more t o  i n t e r s t a t e  commit tees .  631 -
Both p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  made an e f f o r t  t o  a t t r a c t  wea l thy  ( o f t e n  c o r p o r a t e -  
a f f i l i a t e d )  d o n o r s ,  by c r e a t i n g  such p r e s t i g i o u s  c o n d u i t s  a s  t h e  Democrats '  
P r e s i d e n t ' s  Club--which r a i s e d  around $3.8 m i l l i o n  i n  1964--and t h e  Republ ican 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  B o o s t e r s  Club.  641 -
A s  i m p r e s s i v e  a s  t h e s e  and o t h e r  d a t a  may b e ,  t h e y  r e f l e c t  o n l y  a  s h a r e  
of  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from c o r p o r a t i o n - a s s o c i a t e d  i n d i v i d u a l s .  By g i v i n g  cash  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o r  g i v i n g  t o  i n t r a s t a t e  commit tees ,  donors  cou ld  and d i d  avoid  
F e d e r a l  r e p o r t i n g  requ i rements .  By g i v i n g  t o  i n t r a s t a t e  commit tees ,  wea l thy  
donors  cou ld  a l s o  c i rcumvent  t h e  F e d e r a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  of $5000. Th i s  
l i m i t  was a l s o  c i rcumvented th rough  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of g i v i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
th rough  members of  o n e ' s  own fami ly .  An example of  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  can be found 
i n  1956,  when 12 f a m i l i e s  commonly a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  p a r t i c u l a r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
gave over  $ 1 . 1  m i l l i o n  t o  i n t e r s t a t e  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees .  (The f a m i l i e s  were 
DuPont, F i e l d ,  Ford ,  Harriman, Lehman, Mel lon,  O l i n ,  Pew, Reynolds,  R o c k e f e l l e r ,  
V a n d e r b i l t ,  and Whitney.)  - 651 Hence, l a r g e  amounts of money could  be g iven  
l e g a l l y ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  l i m i t s ,  and l a r g e  amounts could  go unrepor ted  l e g a l l y ,  
d e s p i t e  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
621 I b i d . ,  p.  61.  -
631  I b i d . ,  p. 64. -
641 I b i d . ,  p. 67.  -
651  I b i d . ,  p. 68.  
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The i n d i r e c t  co rpo ra t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  those  made i l l e g a l l y  with co rpo ra t e  
t r e a s u r y  funds,  a r e ,  not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  gauge. 
Such donat ions  d id  not  appear on any l i s t s  f i l e d  wi th  governmental 
agenc ies ,  nor were they  mentioned i n  annual r e p o r t s  t o  s tockholders .  
Most businessmen were understandably d i s i n c l i n e d  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e i r  
campaign a c t i v i t i e s .  661 
I n  1960, Alexander Heard wrote: 
It i s  not  unusual f o r  co rpo ra t e  funds t o  make up 10 percent  of t h e  
campaign fund of a  candida te  fo r  s t a t e  o r  l o c a l  o f f i c e ,  and t h e  
percentage has gone h ighe r .  In a l l ,  i n  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
yea r ,  s e v e r a l  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  of co rpo ra t e  money f i n d s  i t s  way by 
one process  o r  another  i n t o  p o l i t i c a l  campaigning. - 671 
When read i n  t h e  wake of t h e  experiences  of t h e  1972 Nixon r e - e l ec t i on  campaign, 
t h i s  passage unde r s t a t e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  channel l ing  co rpo ra t e  money i n t o  
p o l i t i c a l  campaigns. According t o  Edwin Eps t e in ,  an es t imated  $30 m i l l i o n  was 
con t r ibu t ed  t o  t h a t  campaign from t h e  bus iness  sector--through both l e g a l  and 
i l l e g a l  channels .  There were widespread a l l e g a t i o n s  of s t rong  pressure  t a c t i c s  
appl ied  t o  co rpo ra t e  o f f i c i a l s ,  and some 20 co rpo ra t i ons  and o f f i c i a l s  were 
i n d i c t e d  (with most pleading g u i l t y  o r  nolo contendere)  on charges  of  making 
i l l e g a l  co rpo ra t e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Thus, t h e  1972 campaign i l l u s t r a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  co rpo ra t e  s e c t o r  could be  a  l u c r a t i v e  source of campaign funds given 
a  sys temat ic  s o l i c i t a t i o n  e f f o r t  by a  campaign. 681 S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e  1972 -
exper iences  were a  major impetus i n  t h e  amending of t h e  campaign f inance  law 
- 
661 I b i d . ,  p. 69. -
671 Heard, The Costs  of Democracy, p. 130. -
68/  Eps t e in ,  Edwin M. Labor and Federa l  E l ec t ions :  The New Legal 
~ r a m e K r k .  I n d u s t r i a l  Re l a t i ons ,  v .  15, October 1976. p. 262. 
According t o  Heard,  t h e  v a r i o u s ,  commonly-used methods of  i n d i r e c t  
c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  s t r e s s e d  concealment of  c o r p o r a t e  funds:  
( 1 )  expense  accoun t s  were used t o  r e imburse  c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c i a l s  f o r  
campaign-re la ted  e n t e r t a i n i n g  and t r a v e l i n g ;  
( 2 )  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  " in-kind,"  whereby goods and s e r v i c e s  were loaned 
o r  donated by a  b u s i n e s s  t o  a  campaign ( e . g . ,  o f f i c e  equipment,  company 
a i r p l a n e s ,  e t c .  ) ; 
( 3 )  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  j o u r n a l s ,  pa id  f o r  from c o r p o r a t e  
funds  b u t  w i t h  t h e  s o u r c e  concea led ;  
( 4 )  c o r p o r a t e  money " laundered"  through p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  f i r m  on 
r e t a i n e r ,  w i t h  money then  funne led  i n t o  campaigns;  
( 5 )  f e e s  t o  lawyers  r e - rou ted  t o  campaigns;  
( 6 )  s a l a r i e s  and bonuses t o  employees,  g iven w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  
t h a t  t h e y ,  i n  t u r n ,  w i l l  make p o l i t i c a l  d o n a t i o n s  ( s a i d  t o  be a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
n o t o r i o u s  p r a c t i c e ) ;  
( 7 )  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  channeled through o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  such a s  
t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ;  and 
(8) d i r e c t  c o r p o r a t e  payments, e .g . ,  from p e t t y  c a s h .  - 691 
One p r a c t i c e  o m i t t e d  i n  Heard ' s  l i s t  was t h a t  of  c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c i a l s '  r e c e i v i n g  
remunera t ion  whi le  do ing  campaign work, a  widespread o c c u r r e n c e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
most a c c o u n t s .  The p i c t u r e  t h a t  emerges i s  of c o r p o r a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  r e sembl ing  
t h o s e  of  l a b o r  unions  i n  e x p l o r i n g  avenues f o r  p o l i t i c a l  involvement .  
The f i n a l  avenue of  b u s i n e s s  a c t i v i t y  d u r i n g  t h e  pre-1970's  e r a  was t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee.  The f i r s t  major PAC i n  
p r o f e s s i o n a l )  s e c t o r  was t h e  American Medical  P o l i t  
t h e  b u s i n e s s  (and 
c a l  Ac t ion  Committee (AMPAC), 
691 Heard,  The Cos t s  of  Democracy, p. 133-134 -
founded in 1961 by the American Medical Association to further the goal of 
"minimizing government control over the medical profession." 701 It was 
followed in August 1963, by the Business-Industry Political Action Comnittce 
(BIPAC), which was established by the National Association of Manufacturers 
"to provide financial support to Congressional candidates who support the 
principles of constitutional government." 711 
Both of these PACs followed the lead of COPE and created two separate 
accounts--one for administrative costs for which corporate funds could be used 
and the other for the contributions themselves for which only voluntary funds 
could be sought. The system was described by the then-President of BIPAC, 
Robert Humphrey, before House hearings in the 89th Congress: 
[ ~ l e  have two distinct funds. We have two distinct divisions 
of operation. One is political education, and the other is 
political action. We maintain separate bank accounts. The 
political education funds are used for our administrative 
overhead. We do not intermingle the funds. We have a small 
political education budget and the money in our education account 
comes from corporate contributions and from subscriptions to our 
publication. - 72/ 
During the 1964 elections, BIPAC spent $203,283 and AMPAC spent $402,052 (compared 
with the $988,810 spent that year by COPE). - 731 In 1968, B1PAC's spending jumped 
to $519,700 and AMPAC1s to $682,000 (COPE spent $1,207,000 that year). - 74/ BIPAC 
701 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1968 Election. Lexington, D.C. 
~eathynd Company, 1971. p. 202. 
711 Ibid., p. 201. -
721 U .S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. 
~ubcoGittee on Elections. Election Reform Act of 1966. Hearings, 89th Cong., 
2nd Sess., July 21, Aug. 17, 22, and 25, 1966. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1966. p. 120. 
731 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1964 Election. Princeton, 
citiz=s1 Research Foundation, 1966 [study number 91. p. 64-65. 
741 Alexander, Financing the 1968 ~lection, p. 195, 201-202. -
and AMPAC together accounted for 61 percent of total expenditures by the 33 
national business and professional committees then in existence. 751 -
Those 33 represented a three-fold increase in the number of business and 
professional committees registered in 1964, - 761 and by 1972, there were some 
200 such committees. - 771 Furthermore, as more business-oriented groups were 
formed, the enormous gap between reported business and labor spending (nationally) 
was narrowed significantly. Gross disbursements by the 37 national-level labor 
committees totaled $7.1 million in 1968; a little over $2 million was spent by 
the 33 business and professional committees that year--a gap of around three 
and one-half in labor's favor. 781 By 1972, the national labor committees spent -
$8.5 million, while the business/professiona1 committees spent $6.8 million--an 
advantage by labor of around 33 percent. 791 Of course, the labor totals do -
not reflect the substantial value in additional services which unions have 
traditionally provided, as indicated in this 1972 account: 
. . . it would be difficult to exaggerate the political value of 
labor's enormous manpower pool, particularly for voter registration 
and get-out-the-vote activities on election day. The AFL-CIO 
Industrial Union Department and affiliates may put as much as $4 
to $5 million into citizenship activities, including registration 
drives. 801 -
By the same token, the spending data do not reflect the additional resources 
of the business sector which was channeled into political campaigns through 
- 
751 Ibid., p. 200-201. -
761 Ibid., p. 200. -
771 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, 
D.C. Heath and Company, 1976. p. 461. 
781 Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election, p. 194, 201. -
791 Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election, p. 504, 461. -
801 Ibid., p. 506. -
t h e  many avenues descr ibed  above. The d a t a  i s  i n d i c a t i v e ,  however, of t h e  
growing, open r o l e  of co rpo ra t i ons  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process  dur ing  the  decade 
preceding t h e  Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act. 
3 .  Conclusion -
Business  and labor  have,  a s  no ted ,  long sought t o  i n f luence  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
process .  I n  examining t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of PACs i n  t h e  1970s and beyond, i t  
i s  important t o  bear  i n  mind t h a t  t h e i r  underlying r a i s o n  d 'e t re - - the  f u r t h e r i n g  
of t h e  group ' s  po l i cy  goa l s  and t h e  maximizing of i t s  in f luence  through t h e  
e l e c t i o n  of sympathet ic  publ ic  o f f i c i a l s - - h a s  been a  guiding p r i n c i p l e  long 
before  t h e  modern-day e r a  of PACs. Groups sought i n f luence  and spent  money i n  
l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s ,  through l e g a l  and ex t r a - l ega l  channels .  The PAC evolved a s  
a  means of l e g a l l y  circumventing the  p r o h i b i t i o n  on co rpo ra t e  and, l a t e r ,  union 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  candida tes .  Once labor  unions were forced t o  t u r n  t o  t h i s  
method, they quick ly  developed a  p a t t e r n  of e f f e c t i v e  ope ra t i ons  through t h e  
use of s e p a r a t e  segregated funds.  It was on ly  a  mat te r  of time be fo re  t h e  
bus ines s  co rnun i ty  began t o  emulate l a b o r ' s  successes .  The fundamental po in t  
i s  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  group involvement g e n e r a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee 
a c t i v i t y  s p e c i f i c a l l y  pre-dated t h e  campaign f inance  reforms of t h e  1970 ' s .  
Indeed, they  s e t  t h e  precedents  f o r  today ' s  PACs. 
11. STIMULI TO PAC GROWTH I N  THE 1970s PROVIDED BY LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
A number of a c t i o n s  by t h e  t h r e e  branches of t h e  Federa l  Government s e t  
t h e  s t a g e  fo r  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees du r ing  t h e  1970's.  
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h i s  s e c t i o n  p rov ides  a  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  of  t h e  impor tan t  PAC 
p r o v i s i o n s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o c u s i n g  on t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1971 
and i t s  1974 and 1976 Amendments. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ' s  1971 d e c i s i o n  
i n  P i p e f i t t e r s  Loca l  562 v. Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  i t s  1976 d e c i s i o n  i n  Buckley v .  Valeo,  
and t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission's 1975 a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n  i n  t h e  Sun O i l  Company 
c a s e  w i l l  be examined, f o r  t h e i r  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  and t h e i r  
r o l e  i n  PAC growth of  t h e  1970s.  
These a c t i o n s  occur red  a g a i n s t  a  backdrop i n  which PACs had e x i s t e d  and 
were growing i n  number b u t  i n  which u n c e r t a i n t y  e x i s t e d  over  what t y p e s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  were p e r m i s s i b l e .  Such concerns  were he igh tened  by i n c o n c l u s i v e  
j u d i c i a l  r u l i n g s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of t h e  law (18  U.S.C. 610) ,  and t h e y  s e r v e d  
t o  hamper i n t e r e s t  groups  i n  e x p l o r i n g  t h e  f u l l  p o t e n t i a l  of  t h e  PAC v e h i c l e .  
By c l a r i f y i n g  t h e  a m b i g u i t i e s  i n  t h e  law and by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  PAC a s  
a  r ecogn ized  v e h i c l e  under t h e  law, t h e s e  l e g i s l a t i v e  and o t h e r  a c t i o n s  c r e a t e d  
t h e  c l i m a t e  i n  which p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  conunit tees could  f l o u r i s h .  
A. The F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act o f  1971 
The F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1971 ( P u b l i c  Law 92-225) - 811 marked 
t h e  f i r s t  t ime  t h e  concept  of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee was c o d i f i e d  i n t o  
F e d e r a l  law. S e c t i o n  205 of t h a t  Act amended 18 U.S.C. 610 t o  exc lude  t h r e e  
s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t i e s  from t h e  l e g a l  r e s t r a i n t s  on c o r p o r a t e  and union p o l i t i c a l  
e x p e n d i t u r e s .  A s  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  amended v e r s i o n  of  S e c t i o n  610,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  cou ld  be  funded from c o r p o r a t e  o r  union g e n e r a l  t r e a s u r i e s :  
811 86 S t a t .  3 .  -
communications by a corporation to its stockholders and 
their families or by a labor organization to its members and 
their families on any subject; 
nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns 
by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and their families, 
or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their 
families; [and] 
the establishment, administration, and solicitation of 
contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for 
political purposes by a corporation or labor organization . . . . 
While thus opening the door for the political action committee, the amended 
section added the following language to ensure that only truly voluntary 
contributions be made to the PAC: 
. . . . Provided, that it shall be unlawful for such a fund 
to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or 
anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, 
or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other monies required 
as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a 
condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial 
transaction. 
The above amendments to 18 U.S.C. 610 were initially offered as an 
amendment to H.R. 11060 (the House version of the FECA) by Representative 
Orval Hansen. The Hansen amendment passed the House by a 233-147 vote, 821 
replacing a section of the House Administration Committee's bill which also 
sanctioned the separate segregated fund but which was seen as prohibiting the 
use of union (and corporate) funds in registration and get-out-the-vote drives. 
Supporters of the Hansen amendment argued that its intended effect was 
to codify in law what 18 U.S.C. 610 had been interpreted to mean. - 831 Describing 
his amendment as consistent with the then-existing statute, Hansen stated: 
For the underlying theory of section 610 is that substantial 
general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political 
821 Federal Election Reform. [Vote in the House] Congressional 
~ e c o r K  v. 117, November 30, 1971. p. 43391. 
831 Steiger, William. Federal Election Reform. Remarks in the 
~ouse: Congressional Record, v. 117, November 30, 1971. p. 43388. 
purposes ,  both because of t he  e f f e c t  on t he  p o l i t i c a l  process  
of  such aggregated weal th  and out  of concern f o r  t he  d i s s e n t i n g  
member o r  s tockholder .  Obviously,  n e i t h e r  of t he se  considera-  
t i o n s  c u t s  aga ins t  a l lowing vo lun ta ry  p o l i t i c a l  funds.  For no 
one who o b j e c t s  t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  p o l i t i c s  has t o  lend h i s  
suppor t ,  and t h e  money c o l l e c t e d  i s  t h a t  intended by those  who 
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  be used fo r  p o l i t i c a l  purposes and not money 
d i v e r t e d  from another  source .  841 -
The S e n a t e ' s  ve r s ion  of t h e  FECA--S. 382--had contained no p rov i s ion  
comparable t o  t h e  Hansen amendment, and t h e  conferees  on t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  
accepted t h e  House-passed language. 851 Thus t h e  Hansen amendment became law. -
Sec t ion  206 of t h e  FECA amended 18 U.S.C. 611, which p roh ib i t ed  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by Government c o n t r a c t o r s ,  t o  extend t h e  ban t o  i n d i r e c t ,  a s  w e l l  
a s  d i r e c t ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  861 Because PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  could be viewed a s  -
i n d i r e c t l y  emanating from t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  t r e a s u r y  funds,  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
appa ren t ly  had a  c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t  on Government c o n t r a c t o r s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  PACs. Furthermore, t he  f a c t  t h a t  many of t h e  most important  
co rpo ra t i ons  and unions were engaged i n  some form of Government c o n t r a c t i n g  
meant t h a t  t h e  new provis ions  of 18 U.S.C. 611 would conceivably a f  f e c t  a 
wide range of i n t e r e s t  groups. - 871 It was i r o n i c  t h a t ,  whi le  one s e c t i o n  
of t h e  new campaign f inance  law provided t h e  l e g a l  foundat ion fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees,  t h e  next  s e c t i o n  may have caused s u f f i c i e n t  confusion so  
a s  t o  i n h i b i t  many p o t e n t i a l  sponsors  of PACs from e s t a b l i s h i n g  them. 
841 Hansen, Orval .  Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Reform. Remarks i n  t h e  House. 
~ o n ~ r z s i o n a l  Record, v .  117, November 30, 1971. p. 43381. 
851 U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federa l  E l e c t i o n  
campaZn Act of 1971. Conference Report t o  accompany S. 382. House Report 
No. 92-752, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1971. 
p. 30-31. 
861 E p s t e i n ,  Corporat ions and Labor Unions, p. 40-41. -
871 Alexander, Financing t h e  1976 E l e c t i o n ,  p. 560. -
B. P i p e f i t t e r s  Loca l  562 v .  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
The Supreme C o u r t ' s  June  1972 r u l i n g  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  
v .  Uni ted  S t a t e s  - 881 provided t h e  f i r s t  l e g a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  r e v i s e d  
18 U.S.C. 610,  and i t  v a l i d a t e d  t h e  concept  of u n i o n s '  and c o r p o r a t i o n s '  
m a i n t a i n i n g  s e p a r a t e  v o l u n t a r y  funds  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  The c a s e  
invo lved  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  of  t h e  union and t h r e e  o f f i c e r s  f o r  t h e i r  m a i n t a i n i n g  
c o n t r o l  over  a s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund f o r  which s o l i c i t a t i o n s  were 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  made a t  job s i t e s .  The Cour t  of Appeals  had upheld t h e i r  
c o n v i c t i o n  - 891 on t h e  grounds t h a t  t h e  fund was compulsory and union-f inanced 
r a t h e r  than v o l u n t a r y  and member-financed. - 901 
The Supreme C o u r t ' s  6-2 r e v e r s a l  of t h e  Court  of Appeals r u l i n g  c o i n c i d e d  
w i t h  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  of o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r ,  which had played a  key r o l e  i n  t h e  
passage of t h e  Hansen amendment, a p p a r e n t l y  w i t h  t h e  pending Supreme Court  
r u l i n g  i n  mind. According t o  one accoun t :  
U n c e r t a i n  a s  t o  what d i r e c t i o n  t h e  Supreme Court  would t a k e ,  t h e  
AFL-CIO sought  l e g i s l a t i v e  l e g i t i m i z a t i o n  of t h e  key a s p e c t s  of  
i t s  e l e c t o r a l  r o l e  s i n c e  t h e  1940s:  u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committee d e v i c e  t o  r a i s e  and d i s t r i b u t e  p o l i t i c a l  monies;  
communicating p o l i t i c a l l y  wi th  i t s  members; and,  f i n a l l y ,  member- 
o r i e n t e d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and get -out- the-vote  a c t i v i t i e s .  - 911 
Thus,  t h e  P i p e f i t t e r s  c a s e  s e r v e d ,  w h i l e  i t  was s t i l l  pending,  a s  t h e  c a t a l y s t  
f o r  t h e  passage of  t h e  Hansen amendment and,  l a t e r ,  a s  t h e  f i r s t  j u d i c i a l  
d e c i s i o n  t h a t  o b s e r v e r s  saw a s  l e g i t i m i z i n g  t h e  t h r u s t  of  t h e  Hansen amendment. 
- 
881 407 U.S. 385 (1972) .  -
891 434 F. 2d 1127 (CCA 8 t h ,  1970) .  -
901 E p s t e i n ,  Labor and F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n s ,  p. 261. -
911  E p s t e i n ,  Edwin M. The Emergence of  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees. I n  
~ l e x a z e r  , Herber t  ( e d .  ) . P o l i t i c a l  F i n a n c e .  Bever ly  H i l l s ,  Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s ,  
1979. p. 265. 
The Supreme Court  h e l d  t h a t  no v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  (amended) law had o c c u r r e d ,  
i n  view of  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were sought  f o r  t h e  PAC on a  v o l u n t a r y  
b a s i s  ( w i t h  no r e p r i s a l s  t h r e a t e n e d  1, t h a t  t h e  in tended  p o l i t i c a l  purpose 
of  t h e  d o n a t i o n s  was c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e d ,  and t h a t  t h e  money was kep t  s e g r e g a t e d  
from t h e  union t r e a s u r y  (dues  money). That  t h e  union o f f i c i a l s  were invo lved  
i n  c o l l e c t i n g  t h e  funds  and r e t a i n e d  c o n t r o l  over  t h e i r  d i s p o s i t i o n  was not  
viewed by t h e  Cour t  a s  a  v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  law. 
Nowhere, however, has  Congress r e q u i r e d  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  be f o r m a l l y  o r  f u n c t i o n a l l y  independent  of 
union c o n t r o l  o r  t h a t  union o f f i c i a l s  be  b a r r e d  from 
s o l i c i t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o r  even precluded from d e t e r m i n i n g  
how t h e  monies r a i s e d  w i l l  be s p e n t  . . . . 921 -
By g i v i n g  i t s  s a n c t i o n  t o  t h e  v o l u n t a r y ,  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund,  t h e  Cour t  
accorded primacy t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s t o c k h o l d e r  o r  union 
member from having t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  opposed t o  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  
p h i l o s o p h i e s  over  t h e  sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g  g o a l  of l i m i t i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  
unions  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  e l e c t i o n s  th rough  t h e i r  aggrega ted  w e a l t h .  931 The -
Court  s t a t e d :  
When Congress p r o h i b i t e d  l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  from making 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o r  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  connec t ion  w i t h  f e d e r a l  
e l e c t i o n s ,  i t  was, of c o u r s e ,  concerned no t  o n l y  t o  
p r o t e c t  m i n o r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n  t h e  union b u t  t o  e l i m i n a t e  
t h e  e f f e c t  of aggrega ted  wea l th  on e l e c t i o n s .  But t h e  
aggrega ted  w e a l t h  i t  p l a i n l y  had i n  mind was t h e  g e n e r a l  
union t r easury- -no t  t h e  funds  donated by union members of 
t h e i r  own f r e e  and knowing c h o i c e .  941 -
Although i t  r e f u s e d  t o  d e a l  wi th  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s ,  - 951 t h e  C o u r t ' s  
- 
921 407 U.S., a t  415.  -
931 E p s t e i n ,  C o r p o r a t i o n s  and Labor Unions,  p. 42 .  -
941 407 U.S., a t  415-416. -
951 407 U.S., a t  407. -
ruling in the Pipefitters case nonetheless offered a sense of legitimacy to 
the operation and concept of the separate segregated fund--the essence of 
the PAC--and particularly to the practice of union (or corporate) control 
over the disposition of the funds. Without the right to involve themselves 
in this aspect of the process, the political influence of business and labor 
would be sharply curtailed. 
C. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (public Law 93-443) - 96/ 
constituted a response of Congress to the Watergate scandal and is principally 
remembered for its imposition of limitations on campaign contributions and 
expenditures, and the establishment of the Federal Election Commission. With 
regard to PACs, the FECA Amendments of 1974 made three changes, relating to 
penalties, contribution limits, and Government contractors; the basic intent 
of 18 U.S.C. 610, as amended by the 1971 Act, was not affected by the 1974 
legislation. 
Section 101(a) of Public Law 93-443 amended 18 U.S.C. 608 to impose a 
limitation of $5000 on the amount a "political committee" (other than a 
candidate's principal campaign committee) could donate per election to a 
candidate for Federal office, while any other "person" was limited to giving 
$1000. As defined in the amended section (b)(2), a "political committee" met 
the criteria of what the 1976 Amendments later defined as a "multicandidate 
committee"--one that is registered for at least six months with the FEC, 
receives contributions from more than 50 persons, and makes contributions to 
96/ 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). -
five or more Federal candidates. Hence, the term "political committee" under the 
1974 Amendments can be read as "multicandidate committee" or "political action 
committee ," the terms used today; the term "person" under the 1974 Amendments 
would today refer to both an "individual" or a (non-multicandidate) "political 
committee." Thus, the 1974 Amendments made the critical distinction for 
purposes of the contribution limit between the political action committee and 
the individual. The opportunity for greater leverage accorded the PAC has had 
a definite impact on the financing of congressional elections, as will be 
discussed later. 
The second PAC-related provision in the 1974 Amendments was in Section 101(e) 
which amended 18 U.S.C. 610 to impose higher penalties for violations of the ban 
on corporate and union contributions. The penalty for organizations convicted 
of violating the ban was raised from $5000 to $25,000 and from $10,000 to $50,000 
for officers of those organizations who were found guilty of such violations. 
The third provision, and the one which may well have had the biggest impact 
on PAC development in the 1970s, was the authorization for Government contractors 
to set up PACs. The confusion over this question steming from the 1971 Act was 
exacerbated by a 1972 law suit by Common Cause against TRW, Inc., which alleged 
that the company, a major Government contractor, violated the law by setting 
up a PAC. 971 Both the House Administration Committee, in its report on H.R. -
16090, - 981 and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, in its report on 
------- 
971 Epstein, Corporations and Labor Unions, p. 49. -
981 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. 
~ e d e r x  Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Report to accompany 
H.R. 16090. House Report no. 93-1239, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 20-21. 
S. 3044, - 991 recommended amending 18 U.S.C. 611 to allow Government contractors 
to establish separate segregated funds. These provisions were passed by the 
respective chambers, and the following language was reported by the conference 
committee - 1001 and was written into Public Law 93-443 as Section 103, amending 
18 U.S.C. 611 to read: 
This section does not prohibit or make unlawful the 
establishment or administration of, or the solicitation of 
contributions to, any separate segregated fund by any corporation 
or labor organization for the purpose of influencing the 
nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal 
office, unless the provisions of section 610 of this title 
or make unlawful the establishment or administration 
of, or the solicitation of contributions to, such fund. 
This provision removed a major stumbling block to the establishment of PACs 
by those companies and unions doing business with the Federal Government. 
The FEC's SUN PAC Advisory Opinion 
On November 18, 1975, the newly-created Federal Election Commission issued 
an advisory opinion in response to a request from the Sun Oil Company which 
had a dramatic effect on the rise of the corporate political action committee. 
Sun Oil had requested permission from the FEC to expend corporate funds in seeking 
employee and stockholder contributions to two separate political programs: a 
trustee payroll deduction plan (SUN EPA), which would act as a conduit for 
political contributions to candidates designated by the donor, and a political 
991 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. 
~ederar~lect ion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Report to accompany S . 
3044. Senate Report no. 93-689, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1974. p. 17. 
1001 U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federal Election 
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Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Conference Report to accompany S. 3044. 
House Report no. 93-1438, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1974. p. 67-69. 
a c t i o n  committee (SUN PAC), through which c o n t r i b u t i o n s  would be g iven  t o  
c a n d i d a t e s  a t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of company o f f i c i a l s .  
I n  Advisory  Opinion 1975-23, t h e  FEC approved t h e  proposed Sun O i l  Company 
programs a n d ,  i n  s o  d o i n g ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  s e v e r a l  impor tan t  p r e c e d e n t s :  
( 1 )  t h a t  g e n e r a l  t r e a s u r y  funds  cou ld  be  used t o  e s t a b l i s h ,  a d m i n i s t e r ,  
and s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  b o t h  SUN PAC and SUN EPA; 
( 2 )  t h a t  Sun cou ld  s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  SUN PAC from employees,  a s  
w e l l  a s  s t o c k h o l d e r s ;  
( 3 )  t h a t  Sun cou ld  e s t a b l i s h  m u l t i p l e  PACs wi th  s e p a r a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
and e x p e n d i t u r e  l i m i t s  ( a s  long a s  t h e  funds  came s o l e l y  from v o l u n t a r y  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s )  ; - 1011 and 
( 4 )  t h a t  t h e  p a y r o l l  d e d u c t i o n  ( a u t o m a t i c  check-off )  p l a n  was a  
l e g i t i m a t e  v e h i c l e  wi th  which t h e  company could  seek  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  
w i t h  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  on such a  p lan f o r  l a b o r  unions  engendered i n  t h e  1947 
T a f t - H a r t l e y  Act .  - 1021 
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  major ground broken by' t h e  SUN PAC r u l i n g  was t h e  pe rmiss ion  
g r a n t e d  f o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  s o l i c i t  employees,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  ( a s  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  p e r m i t t e d  i n  18 U.S.C. 610) .  T h i s  was seen  by l a b o r  unions  and 
t h e  two d i s s e n t i n g  FEC Commissioners a s  u p s e t t i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  b a l a n c e  Congress 
had sought t o  e s t a b l i s h  between c o r p o r a t i o n s  and un ions .  Sun O i l ,  f o r  example,  
had 126,555 s t o c k h o l d e r s  and 27,707 employees,  few of whom were un ion ized ;  t h u s ,  
w h i l e  t h e  company could  s o l i c i t  over  150,000 p e r s o n s ,  t h e  union cou ld  s o l i c i t  
j u s t  a  s m a l l  f r a c t i o n  of  t h a t .  1031 The FEC d i d  seek  t o  a l l e v i a t e  some of  t h e  -
1011 E p s t e i n ,  The Emergence of P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees,  p. 167.  -
1021 E p s t e i n ,  Labor and F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n s ,  p. 268. -
L03/ E p s t e i n ,  The Emergence of P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees,  p. 168.  -
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p o t e n t i a l  problems caused by a l lowing  employees t o  be s o l i c i t e d  by t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n ,  and i t  recommended t h e  f o l l o w i n g  g u i d e l i n e s  i n  i t s  opininr l :  
F i r s t ,  no s u p e r i o r  should  s o l i c i t  a  s u b o r d i n a t e .  Second, t h e  
s o l i c i t o r  should  inform t h e  s o l i c i t e d  employee of t h e  p o l i t i c a l .  
purpose  of t h e  fund f o r  which t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  i s  s o l i c i t e d .  
T h i r d ,  t h e  s o l i c i t o r  should  inform t h e  employee of t h e  employee ' 
r i g h t  t o  r e f u s e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  w i t h o u t  r e p r i s a l  of any k i n d .  - 104/ -- - ~ .  
The g u i d e l i n e s  a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  l i t t l e  t o  a s suage  t h e  concerns  of organized l n b n r  
t h a t  employees would be  p r e s s u r e d ,  however s u b t l y  by t h e i r  employers ,  111 g ~ r l c ~  s L ,  
un ions  were d i s t r e s s e d  by t h e  SUN PAC (and SUN EPA) r u l i n g ,  whi le  t h e  b L ~ s i ~ l c ~ c s  
s e c t o r  h a i l e d  i t .  
I n  i t s  d e t a i l e d  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and o p e r a  t i o n  o f  
c o r p o r a t e  PACs, t h e  FEC he lped  c r e a t e  a  c l i m a t e  more conducive  t o  t h e i r  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  As one account  s t a t e d  : 
While it was t h e  1971 and 1974 amendments t h a t  provided t h e  leg?.l 
a u t h o r i t y  f o r  b u s i n e s s  PACs, i t  was SUN PAC t h a t  provided t h e  
imprimatur f o r  t h e  e x p l o s i o n  i n  t h e i r  s i z e  and numbers. 105/ 
E. The Supreme C o u r t ' s  Buckley v .  Valeo D e c i s i o n  
On J a n u a r y  30,  1976, t h e  Supreme Court  i s s u e d  i t s  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  
of Buckley v .  Valeo,  106/ i n  which t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of many cE t h e  c ~ ~ r r ~ p a i g n  -- 
f i n a n c e  re fo rms  of 1974 were a t  i s s u e .  Most n o t a b l y ,  t h e  Cour t  upheld t h e  1;mlr.s 
on c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  whi le  n u l l i f y i n g  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e  l i m i t s .  Although 18 IT.!; I : ,  
610 and 611 were no t  d i r e c t l y  a t  i s s u e ,  t h e  Buckley d e c i s i o n  d i d  have  a bent i v g  
on p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  i n  t h r e e  a r e a s .  
1041 F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. Advisory  Opinion 1.975-23. F ' e d e ~ a ~  -
R e g i s t e r ,  v .  40,  no. 233, Dec. 3 ,  1975. p. 56584-56588. 
1051 E p s t e i n ,  An I r o n y  of  E l e c t o r a l  Reform, p. 36. -
106/ 424 U.  S. 1 (1976) -
I n  two i n s t a n c e s ,  t h e  Cour t  r e l i e d  upon, and i t s  d e c i s i o n  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h ,  
t h e  FEC's r u l i n g  i n  t h e  SUN PAC c a s e .  I n  i t s  d e f e n s e  of  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  on 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  t h e  Court  argued t h a t  ample o p p o r t u n i t i e s  remained f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
and groups  t o  have an impact on t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p rocess .  The PAC was he ld  up 
a s  an example i n  t h e  fo l lowing  f o o t n o t e ,  i n  which t h e  Court  made r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  a b i l i t y  of  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  s o l i c i t  employees ( t h e  prime c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  
t h e  SUN PAC d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  view of many commentators) :  
While p r o v i d i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  a b i l i t y  of 
a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  and groups  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  l a r g e  amounts of  money 
t o  c a n d i d a t e s ,  t h e  A c t ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  c e i l i n g s  do not f o r e c l o s e  
t h e  making of s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  by some 
major s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  groups  th rough  t h e  combined e f f e c t  of  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from a d h e r e n t s  o r  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t  i o n  
of p o l i t i c a l  funds  each a u t h o r i z e d  under t h e  Act t o  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  As a  prime example,  5610 p e r m i t s  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
and l a b o r  unions  t o  e s t a b l i s h  s e g r e g a t e d  funds  t o  s o l i c i t  
v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  be u t i l i z e d  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  purposes .  
C o r p o r a t e  and union r e s o u r c e s  wi thou t  l i m i t a t i o n  may b e  employed 
t o  a d m i n i s t e r  t h e s e  funds  and t o  s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from 
employees,  s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  and union members. Each s e p a r a t e  fund 
may c o n t r i b u t e  up t o  $5,000 per c a n d i d a t e  per e l e c t i o n  so  long 
a s  t h e  fund q u a l i f i e s  a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  committee under 5608(b) (2 )  
. . . 1071 -
A s  t h e  f o o t n o t e  c o n t i n u e d ,  t h e  Cour t  appeared t o  adopt a n o t h e r  a s p e c t  of t h e  
SUN PAC rul ing--concerning t h e  q u e s t i o n  of p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of 
m u l t i p l e  PACs w i t h i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n :  
The Act p l a c e s  no l i m i t  on t h e  number of funds  t h a t  may 
be formed through t h e  use  of s u b s i d i a r i e s  o r  d i v i s i o n s  of 
c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  o r  of  l o c a l  and r e g i o n a l  u n i t s  of a  n a t i o n a l  l a b o r  
union.  The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of t h e s e  s o u r c e s  of 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i s  not  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  I n  1972, approx imate ly  
1 ,824,000 a c t i v e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  f i l e d  f e d e r a l  income t a x  
r e t u r n s  . . . . I n  t h e  same y e a r ,  71,409 l o c a l  unions  were 
c h a r t e r e d  by n a t i o n a l  unions  . . . . 
The Act a l l o w s  t h e  maximum c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  be made by each 
u n i t ' s  fund provided t h e  d e c i s i o n  o r  judgment t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
p a r t i c u l a r  c a n d i d a t e s  i s  made by t h e  fund i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of c o n t r o l  
1071 424 U.S., a t  28 [ f n .  311. -
o r  d i r e c t i o n  by t h e  p a r e n t  c o r p o r a t i o n  o r  t h e  n a t i o n a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  
union.  1081 
The t h i r d  r e s p e c t  i n  which t h e  Buckley d e c i s i o n  had an impact on PACs 
concerned t h e  i s s u e  of  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  The Court  d e c l a r e d  
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t h e  FECA's l i m i t a t i o n s  on independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  t h o s e  
made i n  s u p p o r t  of  o r  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  approva l  of  o r  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  w i t h  a  c a n d i d a t e ' s  own campaign. 1091 By l i f t i n g  t h e  l i m i t s  on 
such e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  w h i l e  l e a v i n g  i n t a c t  t h o s e  on d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c a n d i d a t e s ,  t h e  C o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  c r e a t e d  a  major avenue f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
groups  s e e k i n g  t o  i n f l u e n c e  e l e c t i o n s  beyond t h e  l e v e l  p e r m i t t e d  under t h e  
FECA. I n  t h e  y e a r s  s i n c e  1976, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  1980 and 1982, t h e  independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e  r o u t e  h a s  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  p o p u l a r ,  w i t h  t h e  l e a d e r s  i n  t h e  
f i e l d  b e i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees .  These two v e h i c l e s - - t h e  PAC and 
t h e  independent  expend i tu re - -a re  changing t h e  way i n  which our  p o l i t i c s  a r e  
f inanced  i n  t h e  1980s.  And t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  convergence of  t h e  two methods have 
compounded t h e i r  impact on t h e  system. 
F. The F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act Amendments o f  1976 
On May 11, 1976, t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act Amendments of  1976 
( p u b l i c  Law 94-283) - 1101 were s igned  i n t o  law. Although t h e  new amendments were 
n e c e s s i t a t e d  by t h e  Supreme C o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  i n  t h e  Buckley v .  Valeo c a s e ,  which 
d i d  no t  d e a l  d i r e c t l y  wi th  PACs, t h e  1976 law c o n t a i n e d  numerous and impor tan t  
p r o v i s i o n s  which had a  d i r e c t  b e a r i n g  on PACs and t h e i r  e v o l u t i o n .  These p r o v i s i o n s  
1081 I b i d .  -
109/ I b i d . ,  a t  47-48. -
1101 90 S t a t .  475 (1976) .  -
. . , s 5 r ~ ~ e t ~  dli d i t t m p t  L O  c l a r i f y  t h e  laws r e l a t i n g  t o  PACs through g r e a t e r  
, . i I 1 [ il:: L W  who could  e s t a b l i s h  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  funds  and how t h e y  
1 - : 1 .  P~i~-Lhe~-more ,  t h e  PAC p r o v i s i o n s  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  compromise 
. i  w ~ : ~ : ~ ~   he I ~ t k e l  r2sLs of b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r ,  i n  v iew of c h a r g e s  by l a b o r  t h a t  
{I ,  L J ~ ~ I I L C  power between t h e  s e c t o r s  had been t i l t e d  toward b u s i n e s s  by 
I t ic  51l~;i PA( L t ~ l  l ~ i g  ; such concerns  by l a b o r  had been he igh tened  by t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
.,. . e.iat' I 1 1  L~~ p t ~ i  d ~ t j  PACS fo l lowing  t h a t  a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n .  - 111/ 
L ~ d  jar L l i d ~ l g ~ s  i e b u l t  ing from t h e  1976 Amendments inc luded  : t h e  e x p l i c i t  
L L  k T I I I  I L y  gdiilte,: f to t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  membership o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  and o t h e r  
,31 ,jtl!,., 1 ,, ~ b t  d l ) ~  i sh  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  funds ; t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  on t y p e s  of  
- ~ p J t ~  l :es , t # r  pot a t  ions could  s o l i c i t ;  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  s o l i c i t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
I . , ) ,  I : cgoi 1 e s  of s e g r e g a t e d  funds ;  a  l i m i t  on t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  PACs 
I [ l t  r i ,  ~ 1 1 ,  o r  g . c l t l i ~ d t  i o n ;  permiss  ion f o r  unions  t o  make use  of p a y r o l l  d e d u c t i o n  
, , i a l t t ,  t o  a i ~ l i ~ ~ t  ~ ~ n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  i t s  PACs; t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  term 
" I J ~  1 i t  J L I ~  ;Lint e ( ommi t t e e " ;  and,  new l i m i t s  a f f e c t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by bo th  a  
p o l  i t  l ~ d l  c o u m r i  [ . tee  and a  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  committee.  
k I L Y I  , t.hta t ampaign f i n a n c e  laws were r e c o d i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  removal of  a l l  
c l C ~ l a l i t  s c c  t i s  from T i t l e  18 of t h e  U.S. Code and t h e i r  r eass ignment  t o  
1'1 1 I,. L  be,.^ i o n  610 ,  d e a l i n g  wi th  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by un ions ,  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and 
i I S t  i , l l r d l  l ir i l t lcb became 2 U.S . C .  441b; S e c t i o n  6 1 1 ,  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t i t /  L,,, .!~',  m t ~ 1 1 t  L o n t r a c t o r s ,  became 2 U .S.C. 4 4 1 ~ .  
Irndei sec t   on 441b, t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  on p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and 
t?,peLlciit u ies  by  unions and c o r p o r a t i o n s  was r e c o d i f i e d  a s  s u b s e c t i o n  ( a ) .  
i'titz d L t l  r l l  I icjr l  o f  " c o n t r i b u t i o n  o r  e x p e n d i t u r e v t  and t h e  e x c l u s i o n s  became 
. - 
1 ! - 1 / k p s t e i r ~ ,  The Emergence of P o l i t i c a l  Act ion Committees, p. 169-170. 
subsection (b)(2), with alterations made in the wording of each of the three 
excluded activities--those that could be conducted with the organization's 
general treasury. The permission for internal communications [(b)(2)(A)] and 
nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives [(b)(2)(B)] were amended 
to allow corporations to direct such activities at executive or administrative 
personnel (and their families), in addition to stockholders (and their families); 
no change was made affecting the eligible pool for unions (members and their 
families) . The third exclusion--separate segregated funds--was amended to give 
specific authority for such funds to organizations other than unions and 
corporations; section 441b (b)(2)(C) excluded from the term "contribution or 
expenditure": 
. . . the establishment, administration, and solicitation of 
contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for 
political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership 
organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock. 
The original FECA prohibition against coercion in the solicitation of 
contributions to PACs was transferred intact to subsection (b)(3)(A). 
Furthermore, two prohibitions, based on the FEC's guidelines for solicitation 
in the SUN-PAC ruling, were added. Subsection (b)(3)(~) required employees to 
be informed of the political purposes of the fund when solicited, while 
subsection (b)(3)(~) required that the solicited party be informed of his right 
to refuse to contribute, without reprisal. (The FEC suggestion that supervisors 
not solicit their subordinates was not incorporated into the 1976 Amendments.) 
Subsection (b)(4)(A) made it unlawful, unless specifically permitted, for 
corporations to solicit anyone other than stockholders and executive or 
administrative personnel and their families [ (b)(4)(A)(i)] and for unions 
to solicit anyone other than union members and their families [(b)(4)(A)(ii)]. 
This provision was generally seen as a defeat for the business sector by 
curtailing the blanket permission to solicit all employees in a corporation. 
Subsection (b) (4) (B) granted permission for unions and corporations to make two 
written solicitations per year of each other's pool of potential contributors, 
the solicitations to be conducted by a third party to protect the confidentiality 
of membership lists. 
The guidelines for groups other than unions and corporations were outlined 
in subsection (b)(4)(C) and (D). In the former, membership organizations, 
cooperatives, and corporations without capital stock were authorized to solicit 
their members for contributions to a separate segregated fund. In the latter 
subsection, trade associations were granted permission to solicit the executive 
or administrative personnel and stockholders (and families) of member 
corporations, provided that the corporations gave prior approval and permitted 
no more than one affiliated trade association to make such solicitations a year. 
Organized labor received a substantial boost from subsections (b)(5) and 
( 6 ) ,  which gave them permission to solicit contributions in the same manner 
that corporations did and required corporations to make available such systems 
to unions at cost. This meant that the payroll deduction plan approved for 
corporations by the SUN PAC Opinion but denied to labor unions by the Taft-Hartley 
Act was now available to labor, as well. Thus, a fundraising system which greatly 
facilitated the collection of donations would be available to unions, with the 
corporations required to assist in the mechanics of the operation. 
The final subsection of the new 2 U.S.C. 441b defined what was meant by 
the terms "executive or administrative personnel." Subsection (b)(7) defined 
them as : 
individuals employed by a corporation who are paid on a salary, 
rather than hourly, basis and who have policymaking, managerial, 
professional, or supervisory responsibilities. 
Overall, Section 441b underscores one of the basic issues in the discussion 
of PACs--who can be solicited for contributions. Although PACs may accept 
contributions from any source generally permitted to contribute to American 
elections, they are strictly limited as to whom they may solicit to contribute. 
For example, organized labor has argued that the definition of "executive or 
administrative personnel" is so broad that the vast majority of corporate 
employees can be considered eligible to receive company solicitations. At issue 
is the potential for influence; the greater the audience to whom one can direct 
one's appeals and communications, the greater the potential harvest of funds 
and, in turn, political clout. 
The provisions relating to Government contractors were recodified as 
2 U.S.C. 441c. The prohibitions on political contributions and expenditures 
by contractors were moved to subsection (a), and the explicit authority for 
Government contractors to maintain separate segregated funds was placed in 
subsection (b). PACs set up by contractors would be treated as they would by 
any other organization and would abide by the same principles as elaborated in 
section 441b. 
The framework in which PACs were to operate following the 1976 Amendments 
was completed by that section of the new law which established the limitations 
on contributions and expenditures. Section 441a added new limits on contributions 
and expenditures, introduced the term "multicand\idate committee," and imposed 
anti-proliferation rules on PACs established withiq a single organization. 
Whereas the 1974 Amendments had already establis'hed three criteria which 
a political committee had to meet in order to qualify for the $5000 limit on 
contributions, the 1976 Amendments simply gave this preferentially-treated 
political committee a new name. For purposes of the contribution limitations, 
section 441a(a)(4) defined the term "multicandidate political committee" as: 
a political committee which has been registered under section 
433 of this title for a period of not less than 6 months, which 
has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except 
for any State political party organization, has made contributions 
to 5 or more candidates for Federal office. 
The distinctions between the multicandidate political committee and the 
political committee lies principally in the different contribution limits 
imposed on each. Section 441a(a)(2) imposed the following limits on 
multicandidate committees: 
(A) $5,000 to any candidate or his authorized political committee; 
(B) $15,000 to national political party committees; and 
(C) $5,000 to any other political committee. 
The $5,000 limit on candidate contributions was unchanged from the 1974 
Amendments, whereas the limits on national party committees and on other 
political committees were imposed for the first time in 1976. 
In contrast with the multicandidate committee, the limits on the ordinary 
political committee were, in all but one respect, the same as those imposed on 
the individual. Section 441a(a)(l) imposed the following limits on contributions 
by persons (including both an individual and a political committee): 
(A) $1,000 to any candidate or his authorized political committee; 
(B) $20,000 to national political party committees; and 
(C) $5,000 to any other political committee. 
The $1,000 limit remained unchanged from 1974, but the limits affecting national 
party committees and other committees were innovations of the 1976 legislation. 
While a multicandidate committee may give less than an individual or an ordinary 
political committee to national party committees, this feature imposed little 
hardship on the multicandidate committees which have strongly preferred 
contributing directly to candidates. The one distinction in limits which has 
had a  g r e a t  impact on t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s  i s  t h a t  a f f e c t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  t h e  $5,000 v e r s u s  t h e  $1,000 l i m i t .  
As mentioned above,  o n l y  i n  one r e s p e c t  a r e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and p o l i t i c a l  
commit tees  t r e a t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  under t h e  law f o r  purposes  of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
Under S e c t i o n  4 4 1 a ( a ) ( 3 ) ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  an a g g r e g a t e  of  $25,000 
f o r  a l l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  a  c a l e n d a r  yea r  ( t o  c a n d i d a t e s ,  p a r t i e s ,  PACs, e t c . ) .  
There  i s  no a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on p o l i t i c a l  commit tees ;  nor is  t h e r e  f o r  
m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  commit tees .  Thus, i n  t h i s  c r u c i a l  r e s p e c t ,  any p o l i t i c a l  
committee,  whether o r  no t  i t  q u a l i f i e s  a s  a  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  commit tee ,  i s  g i v e n  
a g r e a t e r  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  outcome of  e l e c t i o n s  t h a n  is  any i n d i v i d u a l  
( a t  l e a s t  th rough  t h e  d i r e c t  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  r o u t e ) .  
S e c t i o n  4 4 1 a ( a ) ( 5 )  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  r u l e s ,  which 
d e c l a r e d  t h a t :  
I n  any c a s e  i n  which a  c o r p o r a t i o n  o r  any of i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
b r a n c h e s ,  d i v i s i o n s ,  d e p a r t m e n t s ,  o r  l o c a l  u n i t s ,  o r  a  l a b o r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  and any of i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  b r a n c h e s ,  d i v i s i o n s ,  
d e p a r t m e n t s ,  o r  l o c a l  u n i t s  e s t a b l i s h  o r  f i n a n c e  o r  m a i n t a i n  o r  
c o n t r o l  more t h a n  one s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  fund,  a l l  such s e p a r a t e  
s e g r e g a t e d  funds  s h a l l  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  a  s i n g l e  s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  
fund f o r  purposes  of  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  provided by paragraph ( 1 )  
and pa ragraph  ( 2 ) .  
T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  o v e r r u l e d  t h e  SUN PAC Opinion which a l lowed s e p a r a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
l i m i t s  f o r  each PAC e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h i n  a  s i n g l e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  It was i n t e n d e d  
t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of b o t h  l a b o r  and b u s i n e s s .  As d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  
c o n f e r e n c e  r e p o r t  on t h e  1976 Amendments: 
The a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  r u l e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
s u b s t i t u t e  a r e  in tended  t o  p reven t  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  l a b o r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  o r  o t h e r  pe r sons  o r  groups  of  pe r sons  from 
evading t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  of t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  s u b s t i t u t e .  
Such r u l e s  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
1. A l l  of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees  s e t  up by a  s i n g l e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  and i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a r e  t r e a t e d  a s  a  s i n g l e  
p o l i t i c a l  committee.  
2. All of the political committees set up by a single 
international union and its local unions are treated as a 
single political committee. 
3. All of the political committees set up by the AFL-CIO 
and all its State and local central bodies are treated as a 
single political committee. 
4. All the political committees established by the Chamber 
of Commerce and its State and local Chambers are treated as a 
single political committee. 
5. The anti-proliferation rules stated also apply in the case 
of multiple committees established by a group of persons. 1121 -
The 1976 Amendments were considered at the time a victory for labor, 
whereas business groups expressed concern over their impact. 1131 In fact, -
II they gave the business community far greater running room in the electoral 
process than theretofore.'' 1141 Furthermore, the explicit authority given -
to trade associations, membership organizations and others to establish PACs 
adds to the overall impression that all types of PACs benefitted from the 
1976 Amendments. 
G. Conclusion 
Each law and judicial and administrative ruling discussed above added new 
and more detailed guidelines for the establishment and operation of PACs. 
Each one served to reduce barriers to their existence, thus individually and 
cumulatively contributing to their proliferation. 
1121 U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Federal Election -
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976. Report to accompany S. 3065. 94th Cong., 
2nd Sess., House Report no. 94-1057. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1976. p. 58. 
1131 Epstein, Labor and Federal Elections, p. 268. -
1141 Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, p. 37. -
CHAPTER THREE: GROWTH OF PACs SINCE 1972: 
THE NUMBERS, THE DOLLARS, AND THE REASONS 
The p rev ious  c h a p t e r  t r a c e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee a s  i t  evolved 
i n  F e d e r a l  law d u r i n g  t h e  1970s.  T h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  p r e s e n t  and a n a l y z e  t h e  
d a t a  which document t h e  PAC growth f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  changes i n  t h e  law. 
In f a c t ,  it must b e  remembered i n  r ev iewing  t h e s e  d a t a  t h a t  not  o n l y  was PAC 
growth made p o s s i b l e  by t h e  laws b u t  t h a t  t h e  laws were n e c e s s i t a t e d  by t h e  
growth i n  PACs; t h e  p rocess  of amending t h e  FECA was coupled wi th  t h e  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  PACs which t h e s e  s t a t i s t i c s  r e v e a l .  
S e c t i o n  I p r e s e n t s  t h e  growth of  PACs s i n c e  1974 i n  terms o f  t h e  numbers. 
S e c t i o n  I1 o f f e r s  ev idence  of  PAC growth i n  terms of f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y .  It 
examines t h e  l e v e l s  o f  PAC spend ing  i n  e v e r y  e l e c t i o n  from 1972 t o  1982, p l a c i n g  
t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of o v e r a l l  campaign spend ing  a c t i v i t y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
i t  p r o v i d e s  such i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  which t y p e s  of PACs have grown t h e  most r a p i d l y ,  
who h a s  b e n e f i t t e d  from t h e i r  growth,  and which PACs have s p e n t  t h e  most money 
i n  each e l e c t i o n  y e a r .  F i n a l l y ,  S e c t i o n  111 o f f e r s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e  r e a s o n s  
f o r  PAC growth i n  t h e  p a s t  decade ,  i n  l i g h t  of  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  documentat ion of  
t h e  l e g a l  and s t a t i s t i c a l  b a s e s  f o r  i t .  
I. PAC GROWTH SINCE 1974 
On A p r i l  6 ,  1972, t h e  day t h e  FECA o f  1971 took e f f e c t ,  t h e r e  were 113 
PAC9 i n  e x i s t e n c e  ( a c c o r d i n g  t o  unpubl ished FEC d a t a ) .  By J a n u a r y  1, 1975, 
when t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission was e s t a b l i s h e d  and began s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  
keep ing  t a b s  on PACs, t h e  number s tood  a t  608. I n  t h e  n i n e  y e a r s  s i n c e  t h e n ,  
the number of nonparty committees (PACs) registered with the FEC has nearly 
sextupled, increasing to 3,525 by the end of 1983. The following table 
presents the numbers of nonparty committees registered with the FEC from 1974 
through 1983. The data is broken down by type of PAC, using the categories 
the Commission devised in 1977: corporate, labor, trade/membership/ health, 
non-connected, cooperative, and corporation without stock. Prior to the 
year-end figures for 1977, all PACs other than corporate and labor were 
included in the trade/membership/health grouping (thus explaining the drop 
in that category from December 31, 1976, to December 31, 1977). 
TABLE 1. Number of Registered PACs: 1974-1983 - 1/ 
Corp. 89 
Labor 20 1 
Trade/ 
Memb.1 318 








11 Data as of December 31 for every year except 1975 (November 24). - 
2/ Includes all non-corporate and non-labor PACs through 12/31/76. - 
Source: U.S. Federal ~lection Commission. FEC Releases New PAC Figures 
(~ress release): Jan. 20, 1984. 
Although t h e  numbers r e l a t i n g  t he  n e t  growth i n  PACs shown i n  Table 1 a r e  
l a r g e l y  s e l f - exp lana to ry ,  some obse rva t ions  may be a p p r o p r i a t e .  The s h a r p e s t  
percentage i n c r e a s e  occurred between November 24, 1975, and December 31, 1976. 
The e a r l i e r  d a t e  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  because i t  marked t h e  i s suance  of  Advisory 
Opinion 1975-23--the SUN PAC r u l i n g .  I n  t h e  fo l lowing  1 3  months, PACs 
experienced a n e t  i n c r e a s e  of 59 pe rcen t ,  from 722 t o  1,146. T h e r e a f t e r ,  PACs 
grew i n  ever - increas ing  increments:  214 i n  1977, 293 i n  1978, 347 i n  1979, and 
551 i n  1980. The n e t  growth i n  1980, t h e  l a r g e s t  numerical  i n c r e a s e  du r ing  
t h e  s ix-year  pe r iod ,  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  i n  l a r g e  measure t o  t h e  enormous amount 
o f  p u b l i c i t y  accorded PACs i n  t h e  media s i n c e  t h e  1978 e l e c t i o n s .  
S ince  1980, t h e  r a t e  of PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n  has  slowed notab ly .  From a n  
average  annual  i n c r e a s e  of 21 percent  between 1974 and 1980, t h e  r a t e  f e l l  t o  
1 4  percent  i n  1981 ( an  i nc rease  of  352 PACs) and r o s e  s l i g h t l y  i n  1982 t o  16 
percent  ( an  i n c r e a s e  of 470 PACs). A t  t h e  end o f  1983, on ly  154 a d d i t i o n a l  
PACs had regis tered--an i nc rease  of  less than 5 percent  f o r  t h e  year .  It 
appea r s  t h a t  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of PACs has  tapered  o f f  from t h e  r a p i d  growth 
i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s ,  a l though one can ha rd ly  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  a s  an  i n d i c a t i o n  
o f  a dec rease  i n  importance of o r  i n t e r e s t  i n  PACs. 
Beyond t h e  o v e r a l l  growth i n  PACs, Table 1 r e p o r t s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  growth 
of t h e  v a r i o u s  c a t e g o r i e s  of PACs. C l e a r l y ,  t h e  co rpo ra t e  committees have 
demonstrated t h e  most enormous growth i n  t h e i r  ranks--with a n  i n c r e a s e  of 
more than 1600 percent  i n  n ine  y e a r s ,  from 89 i n  1974 t o  1,536 i n  1983. 
Here, t h e  SUN PAC r u l i n g  can be seen a s  having had a p a r t i c u l a r l y  s a l i e n t  
e f f e c t  on t he  w i l l i n g n e s s  of  co rpo ra t i ons  t o  e s t a b l i s h  s e p a r a t e  segrega ted  
funds;  co rpo ra t e  PACs more than  t r i p l e d  i n  number i n  t h e  13  months fol lowing 
t h a t  adv i so ry  op in ion .  A s  of  1983, 4 4  percent  of a l l  PACs were grouped i n  
t h e  "corpora te"  ca tegory .  
As n o t a b l e  a s  t h e  d r a m a t i c  i n c r e a s e  i n  c o r p o r a t e  PACs, t h e r e  has  been 
r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  a r e a  of l a b o r  PACs. Having i n c r e a s e d  j u s t  
88 pe rcen t  i n  n i n e  y e a r s ,  l a b o r  PACs a c t u a l l y  exper ienced  a  n e t  d e c l i n e  i n  
s e v e r a l  of t h o s e  y e a r s .  Unl ike  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
i n c r e a s e  i n  l a b o r  PACs i s  d i s t i n c t l y  l i m i t e d .  Most of t h e  l a r g e ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  
a c t i v e  unions  have o p e r a t e d  PACs f o r  many y e a r s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  most of  t h e  
remaining unions  a r e  e i t h e r  too  smal l  o r  not  s u f f i c i e n t l y  p o l i t i c a l  o r ,  as 
a f f i l i a t e s  of  n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  un ions ,  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  same 
s i n g l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  a s  t h e i r  pa ren t  b o d i e s ,  t h u s  reduc ing  t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  PACs. 1151 Thus,  t h e  d a t a  r e v e a l  t h a t  whi le  l a b o r  un ions  pioneered -
t h e  f i e l d  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees ,  e s t a b l i s h i n g  p r e c e d e n t s  f o r  o t h e r s  
t o  i m i t a t e ,  t h e y  have been i n c r e a s i n g l y  dwarfed by t h e  PAC growth i n  o t h e r  
s e c t o r s .  I n  1974, l a b o r  PACs c o n s t i t u t e d  o n e - t h i r d  of a l l  PACs; a t  t h e  end 
of  1983, t h e y  c o n s t i t u t e d  o n l y  one-ninth .  I n  1974,  t h e r e  were over  twice  a s  
many l a b o r  PACs a s  t h e r e  were c o r p o r a t e  PACs; by 1983, c o r p o r a t e  PACs exceeded 
t h o s e  of l a b o r  unions  by a  4 t o  1 r a t i o .  
The growth of t h e  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  c a t e g o r y  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  
document, i n  v iew of t h e  i n c l u s i o n  between 1974 and 1977 of PACs which were 
u l t i m a t e l y  a s s i g n e d  s e p a r a t e  c a t e g o r i e s .  None the less ,  it i s  f a i r  t o  s a y  t h a t  
t h e  growth h e r e  h a s  been s i g n i f i c a n t .  I f  a l l  318 PACs i n  t h e  t rade/membership/  
h e a l t h  c a t e g o r y  i n  1974 were a p p r o p r i a t e l y  l i s t e d  t h e r e  under t h e  s t a n d a r d s  
in t roduced  i n  1977, one can s a y  t h a t  they  i n c r e a s e d  by 94 pe rcen t  a s  of 1983. 
I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  138 PACs s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  new c a t e g o r i e s  i n  1977 were 
115/ E p s t e i n ,  Edwin M. Bus iness  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  -
Campaign Act of  1971. I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups,  and Campaign 
F inance  Laws, p. 143.  
i n  e x i s t e n c e  i n  1974, t h e  a c c u r a t e  1974 count  of t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs 
would be  180,  t h u s  i n d i c a t i n g  an i n c r e a s e  of  243 p e r c e n t  th rough  1983. I n  f a c t ,  
t h e  c o r r e c t  e s t i m a t e  of  growth i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  l i k e l y  f a l l s  somewhere between 
t h e  94 p e r c e n t  and t h e  243 p e r c e n t  f igures--not  a s  h i g h  a s  t h e  480 p e r c e n t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  PACs o v e r a l l ,  bu t  h i g h  enough t o  add measurably  t o  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  
b u s i n e s s  o r i e n t a t i o n  of  PACs today .  (See  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h i s  a s p e c t  
below. ) 
The "non-connected" c a t e g o r y  ( t h o s e  PACs no t  a f f i l i a t e d  w i t h  an e x i s t i n g  
o r g a n i z a t i o n )  h a s  exper ienced  ex t remely  r a p i d  growth i n  t h e  seven y e a r s  i t  h a s  
been used by t h e  FEC. As a  r e f l e c t i o n  of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  i n  which PACs 
o p e r a t e  today ,  t h e  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  of non-connected PACs i s  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g ,  
compr i sed ,  a s  t h e y  a r e ,  l a r g e l y  o f  i d e o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  groups .  In  j u s t  s i x  
y e a r s ,  PACs i n  t h i s  g roup ing  have more than  septupled--from 110 i n  1977 t o  821 
i n  1983, d u r i n g  which t ime  t h e  o v e r a l l  number of PACs i n c r e a s e d  by two-and- 
one-ha l f - fo ld .  
The d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  and d i s c u s s e d  above o f f e r s  p a r t i a l  ev idence  of  t h e  
growth of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees i n  g e n e r a l  and t h e  growth of c o r p o r a t e ,  
non-connected,  and t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  It a l s o  o f f e r s  
p a r t i a l  ev idence  of t h e  overshadowing of l a b o r  PACs by o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  groups .  
A l l  of  t h e s e  phenomena w i l l  be  f u r t h e r  developed a s  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  
d a t a  is  p r e s e n t e d  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  
The r e l a t i v e  power o f  l a b o r  and b u s i n e s s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  our  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  
i s  an age-old s t r u g g l e .  Thus, a  c l o s e r  look a t  r e l e v a n t  s t a t i s t i c s  which may 
shed l i g h t  on t h i s  s t r u g g l e  i s  w a r r a n t e d .  As b l e a k  a  p i c t u r e  a s  t h e  d a t a  d e p i c t  
f o r  o rgan ized  l a b o r ,  t h e y ,  i n  f a c t ,  do not  a d e q u a t e l y  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  magni tude 
of  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  gap between l a b o r  PACs and t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  b u s i n e s s  
s e c t o r .  A comparison of  t h e  numbers f o r  c o r p o r a t e  v s .  l a b o r  PACs does  not  t e l l  
the whole story. There is a strong business orientation in the trade/membership/ 
health category, as represented by such powerful trade groups as the National 
Association of Realtors and such important health groups (largely professional 
associations) as the American Medical Association. Among non-connected PACs, 
is the Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC), the first major 
business PAC. Among cooperatives are the PACs of the Associated Milk Producers, 
Inc. (AMPI), and the Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. The corporations without stock 
are, by definition, business-oriented, as exemplified by the California Almond 
Growers Exchange. - 1161 Thus, many business-oriented PACs are classified in 
categories other than the "corporate" one. 
In an attempt to construct a system which more accurately reflects the 
number of PACs which promote a basically pro-business philosophy, political 
scientist Edwin Epstein has estimated that one-half of all non-labor and 
non-corporate PACs under the FEC scheme can be classified as business-related, 
along with all of the "corporate" PACs. - 1171 Based on this system and using 
the data in Table 1, one can construct the following chart of labor and 
business-related PACs. 
116/ Ibid., p. 118. -
117/ Ibid., p. 116. -
TABLE 2. Numbers of  Labor and Business-Rela ted  PACs: 1974-1982 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 
Ca tegory  
Labor 20 1 224 21 7  297 3 80 
Business-  
o r i e n t e d 1 1  - 248 6  78 1100 1729 2229 
1/ B u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d  equa l  a l l  c o r p o r a t e  PACs p l u s  one-half  of a l l  t r a d e /  
m e m b e ~ s h i p / h e a l t h ,  non-connected,  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  wi thou t  s t o c k .  
While t h e s e  d a t a  do p r e s e n t  a  more a c c u r a t e  p i c t u r e  o f  b u s i n e s s  s t r e n g t h  i n  
t h e  PAC movement, t h e r e  a r e  many t o o l s  which o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r  u s e s  t o  compensate 
f o r  t h i s  pe rce ived  imbalance;  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r  h a s  o t h e r  
s t r e n g t h s ,  a s  w e l l .  These approaches  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chap te r  Four.  More 
fundamenta l ly ,  one may q u e s t i o n  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which i s s u e s  which f a c e  modern 
s o c i e t y  lend themselves  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  framework of  a  c o n f l i c t  e s s e n t i a l l y  
between b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  i n t e r e s t s  . I n c r e a s i n g l y ,  one f i n d s  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s  which p i t  v a r i o u s  i n t e r e s t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  combined f o r c e s  of  l a b o r  and 
b u s i n e s s ,  w i t h  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  r e s u l t s .  T h i s ,  t o o ,  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  i n  
Chap te r  Four .  
I n  conc lud ing  t h i s  s e c t i o n  on t h e  numer ica l  growth of  PACs, it i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  
t o  examine t h e  d a t a  i n  graph format  ( f rom 1974-19841, a s  prepared by t h e  FEC. 
Number of PACs PAC GROWTH 
Source: U.S. Federal Elect ion  Commission. FEC Record, March 1984, p .  6 .  
11. PAC GROWTH FROM 1972-1982: THE DOLLARS 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  of  t h e  r e p o r t  p l a c e s  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
cormni t t ees  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  
decade .  The t a b l e s  of  d a t a  and t h e  accompanying a n a l y s i s  w i l l  e x p l o r e  many 
fundamental  q u e s t i o n s  concern ing  PAC spend ing .  P a r t  A w i l l  examine t h e  
a g g r e g a t e  d a t a  on PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  s i n c e  1972, from t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  of b o t h  t h e  PACs and t h e  c a n d i d a t e s .  P a r t  B w i l l  a d d r e s s  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  where t h e  money o r i g i n a t e d ,  by  look ing  a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  l e v e l s  
o f  a c t i v i t y  among t h e  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  of  PACs and a t  t h e  l e a d i n g  PACs i n  each 
e l e c t i o n  y e a r .  P a r t  C w i l l  e x p l o r e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  where t h e  money h a s  been 
g o i n g ,  from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  of b o t h  t h e  PACs and t h e  c a n d i d a t e s .  F i n a l l y ,  
P a r t  D w i l l  summarize t h e  major f i n d i n g s  of  t h i s  (and t h e  p r e v i o u s )  s e c t i o n .  
The c o m p i l a t i o n  of  t h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ' s  t a b l e s  h a s  
been made d i f f i c u l t  by many f a c t o r s ,  no t  t h e  l e a s t  of which i s  t h e  absence 
of  a  s i n g l e ,  uniform s o u r c e  f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t i s t i c s .  The s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  
and t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  d a t a  has  i n c r e a s e d  enormously i n  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  
e l e c t i o n  c y c l e s ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  of t h e  e f f o r t s  by t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  C o m i s s i o n  
t o  impose s y s t e m a t i c  and comprehensive methods of compi l ing  t h e  v a r i o u s  
s t a t i s t i c s  from t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  s t a t e m e n t s  f i l e d  w i t h  t h a t  agency.  Before  
t h e  FEC was e s t a b l i s h e d  and b e f o r e  i t  e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s  primacy a s  t h e  s o u r c e  
of campaign f i n a n c e  d a t a ,  p r i v a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  assumed t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
o f  r e p o r t i n g  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  d a t a  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  Common Cause main ta ined  
campaign f i n a n c e  m o n i t o r i n g  p r o j e c t s  d u r i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n s  o f  1972,  1974,  
and 1976. The C i t i z e n s  Research Founda t ion ,  under t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  P r o f e s s o r  
Herber t  Alexander ,  compiled i t s  own d a t a  f o r  t h e  1972 and 1976 e l e c t i o n s .  
Each of  t h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  adopted i t s  own methods f o r  o r g a n i z i n g  d a t a ,  and,  
a s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e y  reached v a r y i n g  c o n c l u s i o n s  about spending l e v e l s  i n  t h e  
y e a r s  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  over lapped .  I n  1976,  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission 
was o p e r a t i o n a l ,  b u t  i t s  r e p o r t s  d i d  not  r e f l e c t  t h e  comprehensiveness  of  
i t s  more r e c e n t  s t u d i e s .  Thus, f o r  each of t h e  t h r e e  e a r l i e s t  e l e c t i o n s  
covered i n  t h i s  chapter--1972, 1974, and 1976--between one and t h r e e  
s o u r c e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
For  1972, t h e r e  i s  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  hand icap  of  two d i f f e r e n t  sys tems o f  
campaign d i s c l o s u r e  r e q u i r e d  d u r i n g  t h a t  yea r .  The F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign 
Act d i d  not  t a k e  e f f e c t  u n t i l  A p r i l  7 ,  1972, p r i o r  t o  which t ime  d i s c l o s u r e  
was governed by t h e  1925 Cor rup t  P r a c t i c e s  Act ,  which had long s i n c e  been 
regarded  a s  an  i n e f f e c t i v e  sys tem.  Fur the rmore ,  f i v e  changes i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
law over  t h e  p a s t  twelve  y e a r s  and t h e  concomitant  changes i n  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  
forms,  have made compi l ing uniform, comparable d a t a  even more d i f f i c u l t .  
In  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h r e e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  which compiled campaign f i n a n c e  d a t a  
d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  twe lve  y e a r s ,  s e v e r a l  s c h o l a r s  have a l s o  sought  t o  compi le  d a t a  
i n  u s e f u l  ways, o f t e n  b a s i n g  t h e i r  work on t h e  f i n d i n g s  of  t h e  t h r e e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
b u t  sometimes e x p l o r i n g  on t h e i r  own. The work of t h e s e  s c h o l a r s ,  n o t a b l y  among 
them Edwin E p s t e i n ,  Michael  Malbin ,  and Gary Jacobson ( a l l  c i t e d  i n  t h e  ensu ing  
p a g e s ) ,  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  c l a r i f i e d  t h e  d a t a  from o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  Sometimes, 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e i r  f i n d i n g s  appear  t o  c o n f l i c t ,  e i t h e r  w i t h  one a n o t h e r  o r  w i t h  
t h o s e  of  Common Cause ,  t h e  C i t i z e n s  Research Founda t ion ,  o r  t h e  FEC. J o u r n a l i s t s ,  
t o o ,  have p resen ted  u s e f u l  campaign f i n a n c e  d a t a ,  which o f t e n  h i g h l i g h t e d  e v e n t s  
o r  s t a t i s t i c s  a t  a  g iven  t i m e ,  wi thou t  a n a l y s i s  of o v e r a l l  t r e n d s ;  o f t e n  t h e y  
c l a r i f i e d ,  b u t  o t h e r  t imes  t h e y  confused ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e .  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  makes use o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s  of a l l  of t h e  above s o u r c e s .  I n  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  r e c o n c i l e  seemingly  c o n f l i c t i n g  d a t a ,  t h e  g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  have 
been s i m p l i c i t y ,  u n i f o r m i t y  of  d a t a ,  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of d a t a  i n  u s e f u l  breakdowns, 
and c o m p a r a b i l i t y  w i t h  o t h e r  d a t a  w i t h i n  a  t a b l e  o r  w i t h  d a t a  i n  o t h e r  t a b l e s .  
Because of  t h e  v a r i e t y  of  s o u r c e s  and t h e  d i f f e r e n t  methods of c a t e g o r i z i n g  
d a t a  from s o u r c e  t o  s o u r c e  o r  from year  t o  y e a r ,  f r e q u e n t l y  d a t a  w i t h i n  a  t a b l e  
a r e  no t  e x a c t l y  comparable w i t h  o t h e r  d a t a  i n  t h a t  t a b l e .  Consequent ly ,  t h e  
t a b l e s  a r e  f i l l e d  w i t h  e x p l a n a t i o n s  and c a v e a t s ;  t h e  accompanying a n a l y s i s  
o f f e r s  b r o a d e r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  and c a v e a t s .  Such q u e s t i o n s  a s  why some t a b l e s  
o f f e r  d a t a  f o r  o n l y  House r a c e s  o r  why some o f f e r  d a t a  o n l y  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  
i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  w i l l  be  e x p l a i n e d  w i t h i n  t h e s e  pages.  One obvious  and 
o v e r r i d i n g  r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  such t y p e s  of d a t a  may have been a l l  t h a t  were 
compiled by any of  t h e  v a r i o u s  s o u r c e s  c i t e d .  
I n  t e rms  o f  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s ,  t h i s  c h a p t e r  c o n f i n e s  
i t s e l f  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  S i n c e  1976, PACs (and o t h e r s )  
have been p r o h i b i t e d  from making c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  
a c c e p t i n g  p u b l i c  funds  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  Although t h e y  have been 
al lowed t o  c o n t r i b u t e  i n  t h e  p r i m a r i e s ,  t h e y  have not  t aken  much advan tage  
o f  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y ;  a s  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r ,  PACs g e n e r a l l y  s a v e  t h e i r  
money f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  c o n t e s t s .  I n  1980,  o n l y  3 p e r c e n t  of  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  went t o  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c o n t e n d e r s ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  FEC d a t a  on PAC a c t i v i t y .  For t h i s  r eason  and because  most 
PAC a c t i v i t y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  h a s  been d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
e l e c t i o n s ,  i t  i s  t h e  r o l e  of  PACs i n  t h o s e  e l e c t i o n s  on which t h i s  c h a p t e r  
w i l l  focus .  
A. PAC Spending S i n c e  1972: The Aggregate  Data  
T h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  p rov ides  t h e  broad overview of  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  
PAC phenomenon i n  American p o l i t i c s  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  twe lve  y e a r s .  Data and 
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a n a l y s i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  P a r t  1 o f f e r  t h e  spending f i g u r e s  from t h e  PACsl 
p e r s p e c t i v e :  "How much h a s  been s p e n t  by PACs?" The d a t a  and commentary i n  
P a r t  2  a d d r e s s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  from t h e  c a n d i d a t e s '  p e r s p e c t i v e :  "How r e l i a n t  
have c a n d i d a t e s  become on PAC money, i n  v iew of  t h e i r  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  of  funding?" 
A l l  of t h e  t a b l e s  and d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  f o l l o w  i n  Chapter  Three  must be  viewed 
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h i s  overview.  
The Overview from t h e  PAC P e r s p e c t i v e  
Tab le  3  p r o v i d e s  a g g r e g a t e  d a t a  on PAC r e c e i p t s ,  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  and 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  each e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  s i n c e  1972. 
Although some of  t h e  r e c e i p t  and e x p e n d i t u r e  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  e a r l i e r  
y e a r s  a r e  e i t h e r  non-ex i s t en t  o r  of l i m i t e d  r e l i a b i l i t y  ( a s  i n  t h e  1974 
e x p e n d i t u r e  f i g u r e ) ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  t r e n d  i s  unmis takab le .  PACs s p e n t  a lmost  
900 p e r c e n t  more i n  t h e  1982 e l e c t i o n s  than  they  d i d  i n  t h e  1972 e l e c t i o n s ,  
from $19.2 m i l l i o n  i n  1972 t o  $190.2 m i l l i o n  i n  1982. PACs c o n t r i b u t e d  n e a r l y  
900 pe rcen t  more t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1982 than  t h e y  d i d  i n  1972, 
from $8.5 t o  $83.6 m i l l i o n .  
I n  t e rms  o f  t h e  r a t e  of  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  r i s e  i n  bo th  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
and spending was t h e  s h a r p e s t  from 1974 t o  1976, an 80 pe rcen t  and 100 p e r c e n t  
i n c r e a s e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y - - c e r t a i n l y  a  f u n c t i o n  t o  some e x t e n t  of t h e  FEC's 1975 
SUN PAC r u l i n g .  The second h i g h e s t  jump was from 1978 t o  1980, when t h e  l e v e l  
of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  r o s e  by some 57 p e r c e n t  and t h e  
l e v e l  of a d j u s t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  r o s e  by an even h i g h e r  69 p e r c e n t .  The i n c r e a s e  
i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1974,  1978, and 1982 was i n  each c a s e  approx imate ly  
50 p e r c e n t - - s i g n i f i c a n t  r i s e s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t n e y  d i d  not e q u a l  t h e  
magnitude o f  i n c r e a s e  w i t n e s s e d  i n  1976 and 1980. 
TABLE 3. F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y  of  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees: 1972-1982 
( f u l l  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  d a t a )  
E l e c t i o n  Adjus ted Adjus ted C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c y c l e  - 1/ r e c e i p t s  - 21 e x p e n d i t u r e s  - 21 c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  
11 The p e r i o d s  covered by t h e  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e s  va ry .  Data f o r  1972 i s  
l i m i t F d  f o r  t h e  pe r iod  p r i o r  t o  A p r i l  7 ,  1972,  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  d a t e  f o r  d i s c l o -  
s u r e  under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1971. U n t i l  t h e n ,  campaign 
f i n a n c e  d i s c l o s u r e  was governed by t h e  F e d e r a l  Cor rup t  P r a c t i c e s  Act of  1925, 
under which much a c t i v i t y  went unrepor ted .  1974 d a t a  c o v e r s  S e p t .  1, 1973, t o  
Dec. 31,  1974. 1976 d a t a  c o v e r s  J a n .  1, 1975, t o  Dec. 31,  1976. 1978 d a t a  
c o v e r s  J a n .  1, 1977, t o  Feb.  22,  1980. 1980 d a t a  c o v e r s  J a n .  1, 1979, t o  Dec. 
31,  1980. 1982 d a t a  c o v e r s  J a n .  1, 1981, t o  Dec. 31,  1982. 1982 d a t a  c o v e r s  
J a n .  1, 1 9 8 1 , t o  Dec. 31,  1982. 
21 Adjus ted  d a t a  exc lude  monies t r a n s f e r r e d  between a f f i l i a t e d  committees 
and aFe t h u s  more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of l e v e l s  of f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y .  
* Excludes  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  d e f e a t e d  i n  p r i m a r i e s .  
** T h i s  i s  a  rough e s t i m a t e  and does  no t  co r respond  t o  t h e  d e t a i l e d  break-  
downs i n  T a b l e  8 .  
Source:  For 1972 e x p e n d i t u r e s :  Alexander ,  Herber t  E. F i n a n c i n g  
t h e  1972 E l e c t i o n .  Lex ing ton ,  D.C.  Heath and Company, 1976: p. 93,  95. 
T o t a l  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  sum o f  t h e  t o t a l s  f o r  l a b o r ,  o t h e r  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t ,  
and i d e o l o g i c a l  spending.  
For  1972 c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  Common Cause.  Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  
P r o j e c t .  1972 F e d e r a l  Campaign F inances :  I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i e s .  wasd ing ton ,  1974,  v .  1. p. v i .  
For 1974 e x p e n d i t u r e s :  [ N a t i o n a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  Cen te r  on P o l i t i c a l  
~ i q a n c e ] .  I n t e r e s t  Groups: Bigger  Spenders  on ' 74  Races.  Congress iona l  
Q u a r t e r l y  Weekly R e p o r t s ,  v .  31,  September 28,  1974: 2583-2584. E s t i m a t e  
r e f l e c t s  $13.3  m i l l i o n  i n  a d j u s t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  p l u s  t h e  g r e a t  b u l k  of 
t h e  $13.0 m i l l i o n  i n  c a s h  on hand. 
TABLE 3. F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y  of P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees: 1972-1982 
( f u l l  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  data)--Continued 
For  1974 C o n t r i b u t i o n s :  Common Cause.  Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  
P r o j e c t .  1974 Congress iona l  Campaign F i n a n c e s .  Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t  Groups 
and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .  Washington,  1976. p. x i i .  
For 1976 r e c e i p t s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s :  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission, 
unpubl ished d a t a .  
For  1976 c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  Common Cause d a t a .  I n  I n t e r e s t  Group G i f t s  
t o  1976 C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Campaigns. Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y  Weekly R e p o r t s ,  
v .  35 ,  A p r i l  16 ,  1977. p. 710. 
For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. F i n a l  Repor t .  P a r t y  and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l  Committees. 
Vol.  1--Summary T a b l e s .  A p r i l  1980. p. 138,  140,  142.  
For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Re leases  F i n a l  PAC 
Report  f o r  1979-80 E l e c t i o n  Cycle  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Feb. 21,  1982. 
For 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC P u b l i s h e s  F i n a l  1981-82 
PAC Study  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Nov. 29,  1983. 
The gap between a d j u s t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  i s  r e a d i l y  observed i n  Tab le  3. While t h e  gap widened s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
e v e r y  e l e c t i o n  i n  d o l l a r  amounts ($10.7 ,  $12.5,  $30.3,  $42.2,  $75.9,  and $106.6 
m i l l i o n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ,  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  of e x p e n d i t u r e s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  remained a t  a  r a t h e r  c o n s t a n t  l e v e l  i n  e v e r y  e l e c t i o n :  42-50 
percent- - the  low f i g u r e  i n  1980 and t h e  h igh  i n  1974, which, be ing  based on 
e s t i m a t e d  d a t a ,  i s  n o t  an e s p e c i a l l y  r e l i a b l e  f i g u r e .  The somewhat l e s s  than  
1 t o  2  r a t i o  of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i s  a  key f i n d i n g  of Tab le  3 ,  
one  which h a s  a  b e a r i n g  on d a t a  p resen ted  i n  t h e  pages t h a t  fo l low.  
The fo l lowing  l i s t  of commonly-made PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s  s p e c i f i e s  t h e  
components o f  PAC spending o t h e r  than  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  
It t h u s  h e l p s  account  f o r  t h e  gap d i s c u s s e d  above. 
( 1 )  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  S t a t e  and l o c a l  c a n d i d a t e s  ( t h e s e  must be  d i s c l o s e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  S t a t e s ,  b u t  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  t o  t h e  FEC); 
( 2 )  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  ( i n  p r i m a r i e s ) ;  t h e s e  p lay  a  
s m a l l e r  r o l e  than  t h e y  d i d  perhaps  i n  1972 and e a r l i e r ,  b e f o r e  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  
a g a i n s t  a c c e p t i n g  p r i v a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  was imposed on g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  
candidates taking public funds. As mentioned above, only 3 percent of PAC 
contributions to Federal candidates in 1980 went to Presidential contenders; 
(3) contributions to national party comittees and other political (non- 
candidate) comittees, including other PACs e.g., PACs gave $6 million to 
political parties in 1982); 
( 4 )  administrative costs--a particularly significant budget item for the 
non-connected PACs, which cannot have such costs borne by a sponsoring 
organization (as can corporate, labor, and trade/membership/health PACs); 
( 5 )  fundraising costs--again, a particularly large factor for non-connected 
PAC8 which are not limited in terms of who they may solicit to any sponsoring 
organization's membership lists. As they are permitted to solicit funds from 
the general population, they have turned increasingly to the direct-mail route-- 
a method of growing sophistication and growing costs, as well. Estimates of the 
cost of raising money through direct-mail range as high as 90 percent of the 
total receipts; - 1181 and 
(6) independent expenditures--funds spent directly on communication with 
voters, for or against candidates and without any advance consultation with 
candidates, are not subject to any limits under the Federal Election Campaign 
Act. Consequently, these have been a growing force in American politics in 
the past three elections. The FEC reported that a little over $2 million 
was spent independently in the 1976 elections; - 1191 the level of independent 
118/ Shaw, Robert D., Jr. Direct-Mail Pleas Raise Thousands for -
Fundraisers, Little for Causes. Miami Herald, March 30, 1981: LA, 4A. 
1191 U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Information on -
Independent Expenditures (press release): October 9, 1980. 
e x p e n d i t u r e s  r o s e  t o  $16.1  m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  1980 e l e c t i o n s .  120/ T h i s  l a r g e  -
i n c r e a s e  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  PACs s i n c e  a l l  b u t  about 
12 pe rcen t  of  t h e s e  funds  were s p e n t  by PACs. (The g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  of t h i s  
spend ing ,  however, was by a  h a n d f u l  of PACs, and most of i t  was c o n c e n t r a t e d  
i n  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c o n t e s t s . )  Of g r e a t e r  r e l e v a n c e  f o r  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  campaigns,  
t h e  l e v e l  of  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  House and Sena te  r a c e s  r o s e  from $2 .3  
m i l l i o n  i n  1980 t o  $5.8 m i l l i o n  i n  1982 ( a g a i n ,  mos t ly  by  PACs). - 121/ 
The growing amounts of  money s p e n t  on f u n d r a i s i n g  and independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  t h e  two most impor tan t  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  widening gap i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s  between PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s  and PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  
T h i s  i s  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g ,  i n  v iew of t h e  heavy use of  d i r e c t - m a i l  and independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  by t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  ( g e n e r a l l y  non-connected) PACs, which,  a s  w i l l  
be  demonstra ted  l a t e r ,  have c o n s t i t u t e d  of l a t e  t h e  f a s t e s t  growing component 
of  o v e r a l l  PAC spend ing .  
Tab le  4  t a k e s  t h e  l a s t  column of  t h e  p rev ious  t a b l e - - c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  candidates- -and p r e s e n t s  t h e  breakdown of how much of t h e  money 
(and what p e r c e n t a g e )  went t o  House v s .  Sena te  c a n d i d a t e s .  Fur thermore ,  because  
t h o s e  f i g u r e s  r e p r e s e n t  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  d u r i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  
( u s u a l l y  t h e  e l e c t i o n  year  and t h e  one p reced ing  i t ) ,  t h e  t a b l e  a l s o  p r e s e n t s  
t h e  d a t a  ( w i t h  s i m i l a r  House and Sena te  breakdowns) f o r  o n l y  t h o s e  c a n d i d a t e s  
who competed i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .  It exc ludes  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  
d e f e a t e d  i n  p r i m a r i e s  and,  i n  some of t h e  y e a r s ,  c a n d i d a t e s  who r a n  i n  s p e c i a l  
120/ U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Study Shows Independent  -
Expend i tu res  Top $16 ~ i l l i o n \ ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Nov. 29, 1981. 
- 
0 
1211 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC I s s u e s  F i n a l  Repor t  on 1981- 
82 Independent  Spending ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Oc t .  1 4 ,  1983. 
e l e c t i o n s ;  primary e l e c t i o n  con t r ibu t ions  a r e  included fo r  only those contenders  
who appeared on the  genera l  e l e c t i o n  b a l l o t .  
TABLE 4. PAC Cont r ibut ions  t o  House and Senate  Candidates i n  General 
E lec t ions  and i n  F u l l  E l e c t i o n  Cycles: 1972-1982 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  and percentages)  - I /  
F u l l  
E lec t ion  General 
Year Cycle - 2/ House Senate E lec t ion  - 3/  House Senate  
1/ Dol la r  amounts rounded o f f  t p  the  nea re s t  t e n t h ;  percentages a r e  
based-on rounded d o l l a r  amounts and a r e  rounded of f  t o  neares t  whole percent .  
2/ F u l l  e l e c t i o n  cyc le  inc ludes  d a t a  fo r  a l l  candida tes  i n  pr imaries  
and s p e c i a l  and general  e l e c t i o n s  for  the  e l e c t i o n  year and the year preceding 
i t  (except  f o r  1974 which.goes back t o  September 1, 1973).  These d a t a  
correspond t o  those i n  ~ a d l e  3 ,  i n f r a .  
3/ General e l e c t i o n  d a t a  excludes defea ted  candida tes  i n  pr imaries  (and,  
perhaps, candida tes  i n  s p e c i a l  e l e c t i o n s ) .  These d a t a  correspond t o  those i n  
Table 5,  i n f r a .  
TABLE 4. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  House and S e n a t e  Cand ida tes  i n  Genera l  
E l e c t i o n s  and i n  F u l l  E l e c t i o n  Cyc les :  1972-1982 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s  and p e r c e n t a g e s )  - 11--Continued 
Source:  For 1972: Common Cause. Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  
1972 F e d e r a l  Campaign F inances :  I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .  
Washington,  1974. v .  1. p. v i .  
1972 breakdowns e x t r a p o l a t e d  from: Jacobson ,  Gary C. The P a t t e r n  o f  
Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Cand ida tes  f o r  t h e  U.S. House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
1972-78. I n  U.S. Congress .  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  An 
A n a l y s i s  of t h e  Impact of t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act ,  1972-78. From 
t h e  I n s t i t u t e  of  P o l i t i c s ,  John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y .  Committee P r i n t ,  96th  Cong., 1st Sess .  Washington, U.S. Govt.  
P r i n t .  O f f . ,  October 1979. p. 25 (Tab le  6 ) .  
For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  1974 
Congress iona l  Campaign F inances .  Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i e s .  Washington,  1976. p. i x ,  x i i .  
For  1976 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  d a t a :  Common Cause.  1976 F e d e r a l  Campaign 
F i n a n c e s .  I n t e r e s t  Group and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Congress iona l  
Cand ida tes .  Washington,  1978. v .  1. p. v i i i .  
For 1976 f u l l  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e :  Common Cause d a t a .  I n  I n t e r e s t  Group G i f t s  
t o  1976 C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Campaigns. Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y  Weekly R e p o r t s ,  v .  
35,  A p r i l  16 ,  1977: p. 710. 
For 1978 f u l l  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. 
FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. F i n a l  Repor t :  P a r t y  and Non-Party 
P o l i t i c a l  Committees. Vol.  1--Summary T a b l e s .  Washington,  A p r i l  1980. p. 142. 
For 1978 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  d a t a  : U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. 
FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. I n t e r i m  Repor t  No. 5--U.S. 
Sena te  and House Campaigns. Washington,  June  1979. p. 32 ,  34. 
For  1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Re leases  F i n a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  on 1979-80 Congress iona l  Races ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  March 7 ,  1982. 
For  1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  Repor t  
on 1981-82 Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
Although t h e  gap between t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  and t h e  f u l l  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  
f i g u r e s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  s i n c e  1974, s i g n a l i n g  a  g r e a t e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  on t h e  p a r t  
o f  PACs t o  c o n t r i b u t e  i n  p r i m a r i e s ,  t h e  c h a r t  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t  b u l k  
of  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  c o n t r i b u t e d  ( d u r i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  two-year c y c l e s )  t o  
c a n d i d a t e s  who w i l l  be i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  ( t h i s  cou ld  be shown more c l e a r l y  
i f  i t  were p o s s i b l e  t o  s o r t  o u t  o n l y  t h o s e  funds  c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n ,  per s e ) .  I n  some of t h e  t a b l e s  which f o l l o w ,  d a t a  is  p r e s e n t e d  o n l y  
f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t  i o n  ( a g a i n ,  i n c l u d i n g  primary c o n t r i b u t i o n s  which may have 
been g iven  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  who l a t e r  appeared on t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  b a l l o t ) .  
Although i t  might have been p r e f e r a b l e  t o  s e e  t h e  r e l e v a n t  breakdowns on a  
p a r t i c u l a r  c h a r t  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e ,  i t  can b e  j u s t i f i e d  
n o n e t h e l e s s  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  d a t a  does  c o n s t i t u t e  most 
o f  t h e  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
The second s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e  i n  T a b l e  4 is  t h a t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of whether t h e  
d a t a  i s  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  o r  t h e  f u l l  c y c l e ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of funds  
go ing  t o  House v s .  Sena te  c a n d i d a t e s  remains  c o n s t a n t ,  a s  i t  h a s  rough ly  s i n c e  
1974. Approximate ly  70 p e r c e n t  o f  PAC money goes  t o  House c a n d i d a t e s ,  a s  
compared w i t h  30 p e r c e n t  t o  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s .  O f  c o u r s e ,  i t  must be noted 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many more House c a n d i d a t e s  t h a n  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  any g i v e n  
y e a r ,  t h u s  a c c o u n t i n g  i n  l a r g e  measure f o r  t h e  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  s h a r e  go ing  t o  
one of t h e  two b o d i e s .  The g r e a t e r  amounts of PAC money g iven  t o  House 
c a n d i d a t e s ,  combined w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  of House c a n d i d a t e s  on PAC 
money ( a s  w i l l  b e  demonstra ted  s h o r t l y ) ,  p rov ide  some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
f o c u s  on o n l y  House e l e c t i o n s  i n  some l a t e r  c h a r t s .  
2. The Overview from t h e  C a n d i d a t e s '  P e r s p e c t i v e  
While t h e  o v e r a l l  d o l l a r  f i g u r e s  r e f l e c t  t h e  magnitude of  PAC g i v i n g ,  
one must examine t h e  d a t a  from t h e  c a n d i d a t e s '  p e r s p e c t i v e  t o  round o u t  a 
b a s i c  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  t h e  r o l e  PAC money h a s  been p l a y i n g  i n  e l e c t i o n s .  
T a b l e s  5-7 o f f e r  ev idence  t h a t  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have grown s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  
r e l a t i v e  importance  among t h e  v a r i o u s  s o u r c e s  of  c a n d i d a t e  fund ing  and t h a t  
t h i s  t r e n d  h a s  been p a r t i c u l a r l y  pronounced i n  House r a c e s ,  and t h a t  1980 
marked a  n o t a b l y  i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l  of S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e  r e l i a n c e  on PAC g i v i n g .  
As Tab le  5 i n d i c a t e s ,  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n s  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  of  a l l  c a n d i d a t e  r e c e i p t s  h a s  r i s e n  from 13.7  p e r c e n t  
i n  1972 t o  26.6 p e r c e n t  i n  1982. The s h a r p e s t  pe rcen tage  i n c r e a s e  occur red  i n  
t h e  1980 e lec t ion- -5 .6  p e r c e n t  over  1978. The second h i g h e s t  i n c r e a s e  was 
t h e  3 .9  p e r c e n t  jump from 1974 t o  1976, which, a s  Tab le  3  r e v e a l e d ,  marked 
t h e  h i g h e s t  i n c r e a s e  i n  PAC spending and c o n t r i b u t i n g .  It i s  t o o  soon t o  
t e l l  whether t h e  l e s s  than  one pe rcen t  i n c r e a s e  i n  1982 may s i g n a l  a  l e v e l i n g  
o f f  of  t h i s  a s p e c t  of PAC growth.  
TABLE 5. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  a  P e r c e n t a g e  of  Congress iona l  C a n d i d a t e s '  
O v e r a l l  R e c e i p t s  i n  General  E l e c t i o n s :  1972-1982 11 - 
Candidate  PAC P e r c e n t  Given 
Year R e c e i p t s  - 21 C o n t r i b u t i o n s  21 31 - - by PACs 
11 Data combines House and S e n a t e  r e c e i p t s  ( a d j u s t e d ,  where p o s s i b l e )  
o n l y  Tor  c a n d i d a t e s  who ran  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ;  d a t a  f o r  d e f e a t e d  pr imary 
e l e c t i o n  c a n d i d a t e s  i s  excluded.  
21 I n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s  - 
31  These amounts co r respond  w i t h  t h o s e  i n  t h e  t h i r d  from l a s t  column i n  
 able-4, i n f r a .  
Source:  For 1972, 1974,  1976,  and 1978 r e c e i p t s :  Malbin ,  Michael  J. 
Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s :  PACs, Campaigns, and P u b l i c  P o l i c y .  I n  His 
P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups, and Campaign F inance  Laws. Washington,  American 
E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  P u b l i c  P o l i c y  Resea rch ,  1980. p .  154-155 (Tab le  1 ) .  
For  1972 c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  Common Cause.  Campaign F inance  Moni tor ing 
P r o j e c t .  1972 F e d e r a l  Campaign F inances :  I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i e s .  Washington,  1974. v .  1, p. v i .  
For  1974 c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  Common Cause. Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  
P r o j e c t .  1974 Congress iona l  Campaign F i n a n c e s .  Vol. 5 - - I n t e r e s t  Groups 
a d  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .  Washington,  1976. p. i x .  
TABLE 5. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  a  P e r c e n t a g e  of  Congress iona l  C a n d i d a t e s '  
O v e r a l l  R e c e i p t s  i n  General  E l e c t i o n s :  1972-1982 - 11--Continued 
For  1976 c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  Common Cause.  1976 F e d e r a l  Campaign F i n a n c e s .  
I n t e r e s t  Group and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  C a n d i d a t e s .  
wash ing ton ,  1978. v.  1. p. v i i i .  
For  1978 c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  
on F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. I n t e r i m  Repor t  No. 5--U.S. S e n a t e  and House 
Campaigns. Washington,  J u n e  1979. p. 3 4 .  
For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  on 1979-80 C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Races ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  March 7 ,  1982. 
For  1982: U S .  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  Report  
on 1981-82 C o n g r e s s i o n a l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
T a b l e  6  p r e s e n t s  f o r  each t h e  House and S e n a t e  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e s  of o v e r a l l  
r e c e i p t s  which were c o n s t i t u t e d  between 1972-1982 by t h e  f o u r  p r i n c i p a l  s o u r c e s  
of  c a n d i d a t e  funding:  PACs, i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  and 
c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  own campaigns.  Th i s  t a b l e  a m p l i f i e s  t h e  
f i n d i n g s  i n  Tab le  5 by showing how t h e  PAC component of  c a n d i d a t e  r e c e i p t s  
compared w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  key fund ing  s o u r c e s  and how t h a t  component f a c t o r e d  
i n t o  House v e r s u s  S e n a t e  campaigns.  It should  be  noted a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  
t h e  d a t a  i n  t h i s  t a b l e  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  d i s p u t e  among v a r i o u s  s o u r c e s  and may, 
i n  f a c t ,  b e  of  l i m i t e d  u t i l i t y  because  of changes i n  t h e  way i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  
r e p o r t e d  and d i v e r g e n t  t h e o r i e s  about t h e  c o r r e c t  way t o  compi le  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
Indeed ,  f o r  a l l  bu t  t h e  PAC and p a r t y  c a t e g o r i e s ,  t h i s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  a p p e a r s  
t o  b e  much l e s s  r e l e v a n t  today  t h a n  i t  d i d  f o u r  o r  s i x  y e a r s  ago.  Hence, t h e  
t a b l e  i s  o f f e r e d  f o r  purposes  of rough e s t i m a t i o n s  of r e l a t i v e  r o l e s  of fund ing  
s o u r c e s  and w i t h  o n l y  l i m i t e d  c l a i m  of a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s .  
(r 
At a  g l a n c e ,  one n o t i c e s  t h a t  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have c o n s i s t e n t l y  accounted 
Q 
f o r  a  g r e a t e r  s h a r e  of  House c a n d i d a t e  r e c e i p t s  t h a n  of S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e  r e c e i p t s .  
The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  PAC money among a l l  s o u r c e s  of  fund ing  has  i n c r e a s e d  s t e a d i l y  
f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s ,  from 14.0 p e r c e n t  i n  1972 t o  31.5 p e r c e n t  i n  1982--with 
t h e  s h a r p e s t  r ise o c c u r r i n g  i n  1976, fo l lowed by t h e  r i s e  i n  1980; a s  of 1982,  
n e a r l y  o n e - t h i r d  of  House c a n d i d a t e s '  funds  came from PACs. 
In  c o n t r a s t  wi th  t h e  House, no d e f i n i t i v e  t r e n d  on t h e  PAC r o l e  is  
r e v e a l e d  i n  t h e  d a t a  on Sena te  campaigns.  Although i t  appeared a f t e r  t h e  
1980 e l e c t i o n s  t h a t  PACs might p l a y  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  g r e a t e r  r o l e  than  i n  
t h e  pas t  ( t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e  a c t u a l l y  s u r p a s s e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  House i n  
19801, i t  was followed by a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  importance  of PAC money i n  1982. 
The 4 p e r c e n t  jump i n  1976 was i n  keeping w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  growth i n  t h e  
importance  and l e v e l  of PAC spending t h a t  y e a r ,  b u t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  was 
t r a n s i t o r y ,  a s  t h e  PAC percen tage  f e l l  a g a i n  i n  1978. ( S e n a t e  d a t a  i s  made 
even more d i f f i c u l t  t o  ana lyze  i n  view of a  much longer  f u n d r a i s i n g  pe r iod  
than  f o r  House r a c e s . )  
A commonly o f f e r e d  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i o n  of PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  House c a n d i d a t e s  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  lower v i s i b i l i t y  of House 
Members and campaigns v i s -a -v i s  t h e i r  S e n a t e  c o u n t e r p a r t s .  It i s  f a r  more 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  t y p i c a l  House Member t o  a t t r a c t  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  news 
media ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  view of t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of  s o  many Members i n  t h e  
same media m a r k e t s ,  than  i t  i s  f o r  t h e  t y p i c a l  Sena te  Member. As news of 
t h e  o f f i c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  and e l e c t i o n  c o n t e s t s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  more wide ly  
d i s semina ted  than  f o r  t h e i r  House c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  i t  g e n e r a t e s  a  g r e a t e r  
d e g r e e  of  c i t i z e n  i n t e r e s t  i n  and en thus iasm f o r  t h e  S e n a t e  e l e c t i o n  and 
i t s  c o n t e s t a n t s ;  from t h i s  en thus iasm f lows a  h i g h e r  l e v e l  of i n d i v i d u a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  which,  i n  t u r n ,  r e n d e r s  PAC d o n a t i o n s  l e s s  impor tan t  i n  t h e  
scheme of t h i n g s .  Fur the rmore ,  t h e  much l a r g e r  p o p u l a t i o n  of S t a t e s ,  a s  
compared t o  t h e  average  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i s t r i c t ,  combined wi th  t h e  g r e a t e r  
r e s o u r c e s  g e n e r a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  S e n a t e  c o n t e n d e r s ,  makes t h e  d i r e c t - m a i l  
sys tem of  f u n d r a i s i n g  more v i a b l e  i n  a  Sena te  j u r i s d i c t i o n  than  i n  a  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i s t r i c t .  D i rec t -mai l  i s  a  key component of modern e f f o r t s  
t o  r a i s e  smal l  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Lacking bo th  t h e  same d e g r e e  of  
c i t i z e n  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e i r  c o n t e s t s  and t h e  means t o  f i nance  c o s t l y  d i r ec t -ma i l  
campaigns, House cand ida t e s  may be more r e l i a n t  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from groups 
( p a r t i e s  o r  PACs), through which they  can r a i s e  money i n  l a r g e r  amounts from 
fewer sou rces .  
TABLE 6. Funding Sources f o r  Candidates i n  House and Senate General E l ec t ions :  
1972-1982 
Source ( i n  percentages)  
---- ----- 
Year Candidate 
Rece ip ts  - 1/ PACs P a r t i e s  - 21 I n d i v i d u a l s  Candidates - 3 1  Unknown 
House 
1972 $ 38.9 1 4  - 0  17 60 
1974 $ 45.7 17.1 4 7 3 
1976 $ 65.7 22.4 8 59 
1978 $ 92.2 24.8 5 6 1 
1980 $ 124.6 28.9 4 6 7 
1982 S 183.9 31.5 3 6 6 
Senate  
1982 $ 116.0 18.8 1 8 1 --- --- 
----.--.----- ----- 
1/ I n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s ,  ad jus t ed  where pos s ib l e  - 
21 Excludes pa r ty  expendi tures  on behalf  of  cand ida t e s .  Also,  some of  
t h e  f r g u r e s  h e r e i n  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  u n r e l i a b i e ,  most no t ab ly  t h e  17% i n  1972 
which exaggera tes  t h e  pa r ty  r o l e  because of  t he  l a r g e  amounts of unreported 
p r i v a t e  money p r i o r  t o  Apr i l  7 o f  t h a t  year  a s  compared wi th  pa r ty  money which 
i s  g e n e r a l l y  given l a t e r  i n  t h e  campaign season. 
TABLE 6. Funding Sources  of Cand ida tes  i n  House and Sena te  Genera l  E l e c t i o n s :  
1972-1982--Continued 
3 /  I n c l u d e s  c a n d i d a t e  l o a n s  unrepaid  a t  t ime of  f i l i n g .  - 
* I n c l u d e s  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  own campaign. 
** I n c l u d e s  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  l o a n s  and o t h e r  i t ems .  
Source:  For 1972 - 1976 r e c e i p t s  d a t a :  Malbin,  Michael  J .  Of Mountains 
and M o l e h i l l s :  PACs, Campaigns, and P u b l i c  P o l i c y .  I n  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups,  
and Campaign F inance  Laws. Washington,  American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
P u b l i c  P o l i c y  Research,  1980. p. 154-155 (Tab le  1 ) .  
For 1972 - 1978 d a t a :  Jacobson ,  Gary C.  The P a t t e r n  of Campaign 
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Cand ida tes  f o r  t h e  U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  1972-78. 
In  U.S. Congress .  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  An A n a l y s i s  
of  t h e  Impact of t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign A c t ,  1972-1978. From t h e  
I n s t i t u t e  of  P o l i t i c s ,  John F. Kennedy School o f  Government, Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y .  Committee P r i n t ,  96 th  Cong., 1st S e s s .  Washington,  U.S. Govt.  
P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1979. p. 20  able 1 ) .  
For 1980 - 1982 d a t a :  Jacobson ,  Gary C. "Money i n  t h e  1980 and 1982 
Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s . "  I n  Michael  J .  Malbin ( e d . ) .  Money and E l e c t i o n s :  
F inanc ing  Pol i t  i c s  i n  t h e  1980s.  American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t  i t u t e l c h a t h a m  House, 
for thcoming 1984. 
For 1972 - 1974 PAC d a t a  (House):  Jacobson,  The P a t t e r n  of Campaign 
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Cand ida tes  f o r  t h e  U.S. House, p. 20 (Tab le  1 ) .  
For 1972 - 1976 PAC d a t a  ( S e n a t e ) :  I b i d . ,  p. 24 (Tab le  5 ) .  
For 1976 PAC d a t a  (House):  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e  
S e r i e s .  No. 9:  1976 House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  Campaigns, R e c e i p t s  and 
E x p e n d i t u r e s .  Washington, September 1977. p. 4 .  
For 1978 PAC and r e c e i p t s  d a t a :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC 
Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. I n t e r i m  Report  No. 5.  U.S. S e n a t e  
and House Campaigns. Washington,  June  1979. p. 31-32. 
For 1980 PAC and r e c e i p t s  d a t a :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC 
Re leases  F i n a l  S t a t i s t i c s  on 1979-80 Congress iona l  Races ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Mar. 
7 ,  1982. 
For 1982 PAC and r e c e i p t s  d a t a :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC 
Re leases  F i n a l  Report  on 1981-82 Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  
Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
Because of t h e  problems wi th  t h e  c o m p a r a b i l i t y  of  d a t a  i n  t h i s  t a b l e  ( a s  
mentioned above) ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  t o  be  gained from any e x t e n s i v e  a n a l y s i s .  
S e v e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  can be drawn, however. F i r s t ,  by f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  s o u r c e  
of a l l  campaign funds  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  been i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n s  g i v i n g  d i r e c t l y  
t o  campaigns ( a s  opposed t o  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  such a s  PACs and 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ) .  Because t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission d i d  not  s e p a r a t e  
c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  i t s  c o m p i l a t i o n s  f o r  1980 and 1982, one cannot  
d e t e r m i n e  what p r o p o r t i o n  of  t h e  " i n d i v i d u a l s "  e n t r y  f o r  t h o s e  y e a r s  i s  
c a n d i d a t e  fund ing  and what p r o p o r t i o n  i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n s .  
Hence, we canno t  know f o r  s u r e  whether t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  r o l e  i n  funding 
campaigns h a s  d e c l i n e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  t e n  y e a r s .  I f  one assumes t h a t  
t h e  l e v e l  of c a n d i d a t e  s u p p o r t  h a s  remained a t  t h e  1978 l e v e l s ,  i t  would 
f o l l o w  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  component has  sh runk ;  t h i s  would make s e n s e  
g i v e n  t h e  demons t rab ly  i n c r e a s i n g  r o l e  of t h e  PACs. We can o n l y  say  f o r  
s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  g i v e r s  do  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  g r e a t e s t  s h a r e  of campaign 
funds  and t h a t  t h i s  component h a s  been a  g r e a t e r  f a c t o r  i n  S e n a t e  campaigns 
than  i n  House campaigns.  
The r o l e  of p a r t i e s  h a s  become an i s s u e  of  some c o n t r o v e r s y  i n  t h e  b roader  
campaign f i n a n c e  d e b a t e  i n  t h e  l a s t  few y e a r s .  C e r t a i n l y  c h a r t s  such a s  t h i s  
one show a  d e c l i n i n g  r o l e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  fund ing  of c a n d i d a t e s ,  
even d i s c o u n t i n g  t h e  wide ly  d i s c r e d i t e d ,  i n f l a t e d  f i g u r e s  f o r  1972 ( s e e  f o o t n o t e  
2  i n  t a b l e ) .  Rather  t h a n  a t t e m p t  t o  a n a l y z e  t h i s  a p p a r e n t  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  p a r t y  
fund ing  r o l e ,  i t  might b e  more h e l p f u l  t o  unders tand  more f u l l y  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  
computing t h i s  d e c l i n e  and t o  o f f e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  methods of such c a l c u l a t i o n .  
The F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act ( i n  2  U.S.C. 441a)  imposes l i m i t a t i o n s  
on p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  i t s  own c a n d i d a t e s - - e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same 
$5,000 per  c a n d i d a t e ,  per e l e c t i o n  a s  a p p l i e s  t o  PACs, excep t  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
commit tees  of  a p a r t y  may g i v e  a s  much a s  $17,500 t o  i t s  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s .  
These l i m i t a t i o n s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1974 and have never  been a d j u s t e d  f o r  
i n f l a t i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  Act c r e a t e d  a  s p e c i a l  c a t e g o r y  of  p a r t y  f i n a n c i a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  cand ida tes - -coord ina ted  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  i n  which t h e  p a r t y  pays 
f o r  c e r t a i n  campaign s e r v i c e s  on b e h a l f  of  and i n  c o o r d i n a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
a f f e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e .  As s u c h ,  t h e s e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  n e i t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  
wherein t h e  c a n d i d a t e  i s  g iven  a u t h o r i t y  t o  spend t h e  funds ,  nor  independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  wherein  no advance c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  is  p e r m i t t e d .  
These c o o r d i n a t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  which commonly i n c l u d e  such t h i n g s  a s  t h e  
~ r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  of TV commercials  o r  p o l l i n g  s e r v i c e s ,  a r e  l i m i t e d  by 2 U.S.C. 
441a(d)  t o  $10,000 p l u s  c o s t - o f - l i v i n g  a l lowance (COLA) i n  House r a c e s  and t h e  
g r e a t e r  of $20,000 o r  two c e n t s  t imes  t h e  S t a t e  v o t i n g  age p o p u l a t i o n  ( p l u s  
COLA) i n  S e n a t e  r a c e s ;  t h e s e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  may o n l y  be made i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  
and t h e  l i m i t s  a p p l y  s e p a r a t e l y  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  and t h e  S t a t e  p a r t i e s .  I n  
1982, f o r  example,  a  House c a n d i d a t e  cou ld  have b e n e f i t t e d  from a s  much a s  
$36,880 ($18,440 s p e n t  by each t h e  S t a t e  and n a t i o n a l  p a r t y  commi t t ees ) ,  w h i l e  
t h e s e  commit tees  may have s p e n t  between $73,760 and $1.3  m i l l i o n  on b e h a l f  of 
S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  (depending on t h e  s i z e  of t h e  S t a t e ) .  C l e a r l y ,  t h e  
c o o r d i n a t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  have become a  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  fund ing  of  
House and S e n a t e  campaigns. They a r e ,  however, not  accounted f o r  i n  t h e  t o t a l  
r e c e i p t s  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e s e  c a n d i d a t e s ;  t h e r e i n  l i e s  t h e  unders ta tement  of t h e  
p a r t y  r o l e  i n  Tab le  6 .  
The d a t a  i n  T a b l e  7  i s  d e r i v e d  from an a l t e r n a t e  method of c a l c u l a t i n g  
t h e  s o u r c e s  of fund ing  f o r  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  The p a r t y  c o o r d i n a t e d  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  were added t o  t h e  t o t a l  r e c e i p t s  a s  t h e  b a s e  f i g u r e ,  w h i l e  t h e  
p a r t y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were added t o  t h e  c o o r d i n a t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  t o  d e r i v e  t h e  
p a r t y  funding f i g u r e .  Because t h e  base  f i g u r e  h a s  changed from Tab le  6 t o  
Tab le  7 ,  a l l  of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  component pe rcen tages  a r e  changed,  a s  w e l l .  
T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  f o r  t h e  p a r t y  fund ing  f i g u r e s .  Only d a t a  f o r  t h e  
y e a r s  1978 through 1982 a r e  inc luded  i n  t h i s  c h a r t ,  because  FEC d a t a  i n  
u s e f u l  breakdowns were a v a i l a b l e  o n l y  f o r  those  y e a r s .  
TABLE 7. A l t e r n a t e  C a l c u l a t i o n  of Funding Sources  of Cand ida tes  i n  House 
and S e n a t e  Genera l  E l e c t i o n s  : 1978-1982* 
Source  ( i n  p e r c e n t a g e s )  
Cand ida te  
Year R e c e i p t s  - 11 PAC s P a r t i e s  
I n d i v i d u a l s ,  
C a n d i d a t e s ,  
and Other  
House 
1978 $ 93.6 24.5 
S e n a t e  
1978 68.9 12.9 
* I n c l u d e s  p a r t y  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on b e h a l f  of c a n d i d a t e s  (441a[d]  funds )  
i n  t h e  b a s e  . r e c e i p t s  f i g u r e  and i n  t h e  p a r t y  fund ing  pe rcen tage .  
11 I n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s ,  a d j u s t e d .  - 
Source:  For  1978: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. P r e s s  R e l e a s e ,  
Jun .  29,  1979. 
For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Re leases  F i n a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  on 1979-80 Congress iona l  Races ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Mar. 7 ,  1982. 
For  1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  Repor t  
on 1981-82 Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
The most s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two companion t a b l e s  i s  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  r o l e  i n d i c a t e d  f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  Whereas t h e  p a r t y  r o l e  i s  
shown t o  have d e c r e a s e d  t o  m i n i s c u l e  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t a b l e ,  t h e  second 
i n d i c a t e s  a  more c o n s t a n t  l e v e l  f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s  and a  d i s t i n c t l y  growing 
r o l e  i n  S e n a t e  r a c e s .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i s  t h e  gap between t h e  two; 
t h e  3 pe rcen t  f o r  t h e  House i n  1982 i n  Tab le  6 compares w i t h  a  6 .2  p e r c e n t  
f i g u r e  i n  Tab le  7 ,  w h i l e  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  i n  S e n a t e  r a c e s  i n  T a b l e  6 t h a t  same 
year  p a l e s  i n  comparison w i t h  t h e  n e a r l y  10 pe rcen t  l e v e l  i n d i c a t e d  i n  Tab le  7.  
When one c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  p rov ide  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e i r  c a n d i d a t e s  
even o u t s i d e  t h e  framework of t h e  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and t h e  c o o r d i n a t e d  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  e . g . ,  p a r t y - b u i l d i n g  TV a d v e r t i s e m e n t s ,  c a n d i d a t e  t r a i n i n g  s c h o o l s ,  
r e s e a r c h  a s s i s t a n c e ) ,  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  major p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
suppor t  of t h e i r  c a n d i d a t e s  looms even l a r g e r  than  Tab le  7 r e v e a l s .  Regarding 
t h e  o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s ,  t h e  PAC p r o p o r t i o n s  d e c l i n e  by one pe rcen t  o r  l e s s  f o r  
House r a c e s  and by l e s s  t h a n  two pe rcen t  i n  S e n a t e  races--not s i g n i f i c a n t  
enough a  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  undermine c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  r e s t  of  t h e  PAC d a t a  i n  
t h i s  r e p o r t  ( a l l  computed by t h e  method used i n  T a b l e  6 ) .  Regarding t h e  t h i r d  
c a t e g o r y ,  i t s  "ca tch-a l l1 '  n a t u r e  makes it ex t remely  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a n a l y z e .  
B. PAC Spending S i n c e  1972: Where Has t h e  Money Come From? 
This  s e c t i o n  examines t h e  components of t h e  v a s t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  PAC spend ing  
s i n c e  1972. S u b s e c t i o n  1 t r a c e s  t h e  growth of  each c a t e g o r y  of  PAC ( l a b o r ,  
c o r p o r a t e ,  e t c . ) ,  i n  terms of  a d j u s t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  S u b s e c t i o n  2  examines t h e  b i g g e s t  s p e n d e r s  and 
c o n t r i b u t o r s  among PACs between 1972 and 1982, p r i m a r i l y  a s  a  means of  
i l l u s t r a t i n g  b roader  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  PAC a r e n a .  
1. E x p e n d i t u r e s  and C o n t r i b u t i o n s  by PAC Groupings S i n c e  1972 
Tab les  8 and 9  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  an unders tand ing  of where t h e  PAC money h a s  
been coming from, by demons t ra t ing  t h e  t r e n d s  i n  spending and c o n t r i b u t i n g  among 
t h e  v a r i o u s  s e c t o r s  of  t h e  PAC community. Because of d i f f e r e n t  s o u r c e s  and 
s t a n d a r d s  f o r  g roup ing  PACs i n  t h e  t h r e e  e a r l i e r  y e a r s ,  t h e r e  e x i s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o m p a r a b i l i t y  of d a t a  w i t h i n  and between t h e s e  two t a b l e s .  
While a l l  of  t h e  breakdowns a r e  comparable f o r  1978-1982, o n l y  t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  
l a b o r  PACs a r e  based on f a i r l y  c o n s i s t e n t  s t a n d a r d s  of  i n c l u s i o n  i n  1972-1976. 
Conc lus ions  can be  drawn a f f e c t i n g  l a b o r  PACs and t h e  t o t a l  PAC community 
f o r  1972-1982 and a f f e c t i n g  e v e r y  PAC group ing  f o r  1978-1982, b u t  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
about  t h e  b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d ,  non-connected,  and o t h e r  PACs f o r  1972-1976 a r e  
s u b j e c t  t o  d i s p u t e .  A l l  of t h e  t o t a l s  i n  bo th  t a b l e s  co r respond  t o  t h o s e  i n  
Tab le  3,  excep t  f o r  t h e  1974 e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  which, a s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h e  n o t e s  t o  
T a b l e  8 ,  a r e  though t  t o  b e  low. D e s p i t e  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  Tab les  8  and 9 ,  
t h e y  p rov ide  impor tan t  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  s o u r c e s  of  PAC growth.  
According t o  Tab le  8 ,  spending by l a b o r  PACs quadrupled i n  t h e  s i x - e l e c t i o n  
p e r i o d .  However, w i t h  o v e r a l l  PAC spend ing  i n c r e a s i n g  by t e n - f o l d  d u r i n g  t h i s  
p e r i o d ,  one s e e s  f u r t h e r  ev idence  of t h e  e r o s i o n  of l a b o r ' s  preeminent r o l e  i n  
t h e  PAC community s i n c e  1972. While l a b o r  PACs accounted f o r  rough ly  h a l f  of  
PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  1972 and 1974, t h e i r  s h a r e  of t o t a l  spending f e l l  t o  
o n e - t h i r d  i n  1976,  one-four th  i n  1978, and l e s s  t h a n  o n e - f i f t h  i n  1980 and 
1982. Although l a b o r ' s  s h a r p e s t  spending i n c r e a s e  occur red  i n  1982,  a l l  o f  
t h e  o t h e r  t h r e e  major PAC group ings  e x h i b i t e d  an even h i g h e r  d o l l a r  r i s e  t h a t  
y e a r  over  t h e i r  1980 spend ing .  
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  l a b o r ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  PACs exper ienced  a  m e t e o r i c  r i s e  i n  
e x p e n d i t u r e  l e v e l s  i n  j u s t  t h e  l a s t  four  e l e c t i o n s ,  a  more than  seven-fold  
i n c r e a s e ,  which, i n  1980, a l lowed them t o  o v e r t a k e  l a b o r  PACs a s  a  group f o r  
t h e  f i r s t  t ime.  It i s  l i k e l y ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  1976 marked t h e  p o i n t  a t  which 
t h e  " b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d "  PACs f i r s t  o u t s p e n t  t h e  l a b o r  PACs. Recent c o r p o r a t e  
spend ing  i n c r e a s e s  a r e  a  r e f l e c t i o n ,  t o  some d e g r e e ,  of  changes i n  methods 
of  r e p o r t i n g  S t a t e  and l o c a l  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( i . e . ,  t h rough  t h e  
F e d e r a l  PAC, r a t h e r  through s e p a r a t e  S t a t e  PACs). 
The t r e n d  among t h e  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  grouping i s  made more d i f f i c u l t  
t o  d i s c e r n  because  of u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a  breakdown f o r  1976, a l though  one 
might e s t i m a t e  t h a t  between $15-$20 m i l l i o n  ( o f  t h e  amount l i s t e d  f o r  "other")  
was s p e n t  by t h e s e  PACs. They ranked f i r s t  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  1978, second i n  
1980, and a  c l o s e  t h i r d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  group i n  1982. 
E x p e n d i t u r e s  by t h e  non-connected PACs i n c r e a s e d  a t  an even g r e a t e r  r a t e  
from 1978-1982 than  d i d  those  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  PACs, a  $47 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r  
i n c r e a s e  and more than t h r e e  t imes  t h e  amount of spending i n  four  y e a r s .  It i s  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e i r  l e v e l  of e x p e n d i t u r e s  a s  much a s  doubled from 1976 t o  1978, 
a s  w e l l ,  b u t ,  a g a i n ,  t h e  absence of breakdowns makes such e s t i m a t e s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e .  Non-connected PACs r o s e  from t h i r d  t o  f i r s t  p l a c e  i n  spend ing  
by t h e  f o u r  major groups  i n  1980 and he ld  t h e  l ead  e a s i l y  i n  1982. 
TABLE 8 .  Adjus ted Expend i tu res  of PACs by Category:  1972-1982 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  - 11 
----.-------- ------- - -- 
19 72 19 74" 1976 1978 1980 1982 
Type of  PAC 
Labor $ 8.5  11 .O 17 .5  18.6 25.1 34.8 
Business-  8 .0  8 . 1  --- --- --- --- 
r e l a t e d  2 /  - 
Corpora te  --- --- 5 . 8  15.2 31.4 43.3 
Trade/  
Membership/ --- --- -- - 23.8 32 .O 41.9 
Hea l th  
Other  4 /  --- 1.1 29.6 2.4 4  .O 5.8 - 
-- -- -- --- -- ----.- 
T o t a l  51 - $19.2 $20.9 $52.9 $77.4 $131.2 $190.2 
TABLE 8. Adjus ted  E x p e n d i t u r e s  of  PACs by Category:  1972-1982 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  - 11--Continued 
1/ Adjus ted  e x p e n d i t u r e s  exc ludes  t r a n s f e r s  of  monies between 
a f  f i l T a t e d  commit tees .  
2/ T h i s  c a t e g o r y  i s  based on a  l a r g e  assumpt ion t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of 
PACs Tt encompasses do indeed have a  b a s i c a l l y  pro-business  o r i e n t a t i o n .  It 
i s  inc luded  h e r e  f o r  t h e  purpose of l i s t i n g  t h e  d a t a  f o r  1972 and 1974, b e f o r e  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  breakdowns were d e v i s e d  by t h e  FEC f o r  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  and o t h e r  
c a t e g o r i e s ,  and i t  i s  o n l y  rough ly  comparable t o  t h e  combined c o r p o r a t e  and 
t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  d a t a  i n  1978-1982. For  1972, it i n c l u d e s  PACs l i s t e d  
by  t h e  C i t i z e n s  Research Foundat ion a s  b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  d a i r y ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  
h e a l t h ,  and r u r a l ;  f o r  1974, it i n c l u d e s  t h o s e  PACs grouped by Common Cause 
under t h e  head ings  of b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  h e a l t h ,  and a g r i c u l t u r e / d a i r y .  
Most of  t h e s e  PACs would today f a l l  i n t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  and t rade/membership/  
h e a l t h  c a t e g o r i e s  used by t h e  FEC, a l t h o u g h  some would be be  s c a t t e r e d  i n  
t h e  non-connected,  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  and c o r p o r a t i o n  wi thou t  s t o c k  c a t e g o r i e s .  
3/  For  1972 and 1974, t h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  spend ing  by i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs, a s  
groupzd by t h e  C i t i z e n s  Research Foundat ion (1972) o r  Common Cause (1974) .  
A f t e r  1976, i t  c o r r e s p o n d s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  FEC c a t e g o r y  by t h a t  name (which 
i s  dominated by t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  g r o u p s ) .  
4 /  T h i s  is  a  c a t c h - a l l  c a t e g o r y ,  f o r  which o n l y  t h e  1978-1982 f i g u r e s  
a r e  comparable w i t h  one a n o t h e r .  For 1974, t h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  PACs grouped a s  
I I m i sce l l aneous1 '  by Common Cause and i n c l u d e s  such groups  a s  t h e  NEA (and 
a f f i l i a t e s ) ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ,  and some c o o p e r a t i v e s .  For 1976, it i n c l u d e s  
a l l  PACs now grouped by t h e  FEC a s  t rade/membership/  h e a l t h ,  non-connected,  
c o o p e r a t i v e ,  and c o r p o r a t i o n  wi thou t  s t o c k .  For 1978-1982, it combines t h e  
FEC c a t e g o r i e s  of  c o o p e r a t i v e s  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  wi thou t  s t o c k .  
5 1  T o t a l s  (which a r e  keyed t o  t h o s e  i n  Tab le  3 )  may not add up e x a c t l y  
because  of rounding o f f  . 
* Data  f o r  1974 does  n o t  co r respond  w i t h  t h a t  i n  Tab le  3 .  The l a t t e r  
r e f l e c t s  an e s t i m a t e d  amount, because  t h e  d a t a  i n  Tab le  8  was thought  t o  b e  
low. 
Source:  For 1972: Alexander ,  Herber t  E .  F i n a n c i n g  t h e  1972 E l e c t i o n .  
Lexington,  D . C .  Heath and Company, 1976. p. 93, 95. 
For  1974: Common Cause.  Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  1974 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Campaign F inances .  Vol.  5 - - I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i e s .  Washington,  1976. T o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  d e r i v e d  by adding t h e  
f i g u r e s  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  by each t y p e  of  
PAC (on page x i i )  t o  t h e  amounts each t y p e  gave t o  S t a t e  and l o c a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  and t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  a s  l i s t e d  on t h e  summary pages ( 1 ,  1 6 ,  
135,  214, 396,  and 425) .  
For 1976 ( l a b o r ) :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e  
S e r i e s .  No. 10: Labor-Related P o l i t i c a l  Committees. R e c e i p t s  and 
E x p e n d i t u r e s .  1976 Campaign. Washington,  J a n u a r y  1978. p. 6 .  
TABLE 8 .  Adjus ted Expend i tu res  of PACs by Category:  1972-1982 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s )  - 11--Continued 
For 1976 ( c o r p o r a t e ) :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e  
S e r i e s .  No. 8:  Corporate-Rela ted  P o l i t i c a l  Committees. R e c e i p t s  and 
E x p e n d i t u r e s .  1976 Campaign. Washington,  September 1977. p. 8 .  
For 1976 ( o t h e r ) :  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission, unpubl ished d a t a .  
For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. F i n a l  Repor t :  P a r t y  and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l  C o m i t t e e s .  
Vol.  1--Summary T a b l e s .  A p r i l  1980. p. 140.  ( a d j u s t e d  d i sbursements  column).  
For  1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Re leases  F i n a l  PAC 
Report  For 1979-80 E l e c t i o n  Cycle  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Feb. 21,  1982. 
For 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC P u b l i s h e s  F i n a l  1981-82 
PAC Study ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Nov. 29 ,  1983. 
Turning a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  growth of  PACs i n  terms of t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  Tab le  9  p rov ides  con t inued  ev idence  of t h e  s t r e n g t h  
of t h e  c o r p o r a t e  and t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs, of t h e  d iminished power of  
l a b o r  PACs ( a l b e i t  l e s s  d imin i shed  than  i t  appeared from t h e  o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e  
p a t t e r n s ) ,  and,  i n  t h e  one d ive rgence  from t h e  d a t a  i n  Tab le  8 ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  
smal l  r o l e  played by non-connected PACs i n  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s .  
As t h e y  d i d  i n  Tab le  8 ,  l a b o r  PACs exper ienced  a  s t e a d y  growth i n  t h e  amount 
of money t h e y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  even w h i l e  becoming 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  dwarfed by t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  of t h e  PAC community. 
The p e r c e n t a g e  of o v e r a l l  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  which was c o n s t i t u t e d  by l a b o r  
d e c l i n e d  s t e a d i l y  from t h e  h igh  p o i n t  i n  1974 (50 p e r c e n t )  t o  t h e i r  1980 l e v e l  
of n e a r l y  24 p e r c e n t ,  wi th  a  f r a c t i o n a l  i n c r e a s e  above 24 pe rcen t  i n  1982. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  l a b o r  accounted f o r  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  s h a r e  of a l l  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  than  of a l l  PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s .  It 
can be surmised from Table  9  t h a t  l a b o r  PACs were i n  f i r s t  p l a c e  a s  l a t e  a s  
1976 i n  terms of t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  whi le  r e t a i n i n g  t h i s  s t a t u s  o n l y  through 
1974 i n  terms of  o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  ( T h i s  i g n o r e s  t h e  " b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d "  
c a t e g o r y ,  b a s i n g  t h e  r a n k i n g  i n s t e a d  on t o d a y ' s  PAC g r o u p i n g s . )  By 1978, l a b o r  
PACs ranked second among c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  and ,  i n  1980 and 1982, t h e y  ranked t h i r d .  
A l i t t l e  more than  h a l f  of  l a b o r  e x p e n d i t u r e s  took t h e  form of  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  b o t h  1978 and 1980; an even g r e a t e r  s h a r e  of  t h e s e  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  took t h e  form of d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1982. 
Corpora te  PACs c o n t r i b u t e d  t h e  t h i r d  h i g h e s t  amount t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1978,  jumping t o  f i r s t  p l a c e  i n  1980 and 1982. Tab le  1 may 
p rov ide  some i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h i s  development ;  t h e  s h e e r  numbers o f  c o r p o r a t e  
PACs and t h e  growth t h e r e o f  account  i n  l a r g e  measure f o r  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  r ank  
f i r s t  i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  today .  I n  f a c t ,  o n e - t h i r d  of a l l  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  
1982 came from c o r p o r a t e  PACs. C o r p o r a t e  PACs s p e n t  about  t h r e e - f i f t h s  of 
t h e i r  money i n  1978,  1980 and 1982 on c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  a  h i g h e r  
p r o p o r t i o n  than  was g i v e n  by l a b o r .  
Trade/membership/heal th  groups  c o n t r i b u t e d  t h e  most i n  1978, f a l l i n g  t o  
second p l a c e  i n  1980 and 1982. I n  each of t h e  l a t t e r  y e a r s ,  about  one-hal f  of  
t h e i r  money was s p e n t  i n  t h e  form of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  
a  s m a l l e r  p r o p o r t i o n  than  was g i v e n  by e i t h e r  t h e  l a b o r  o r  c o r p o r a t e  PACs. 
Perhaps  t h e  most s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  a r i s i n g  from a  comparison of T a b l e s  8  
and 9  i s  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  rank ing  of t h e  non-connected PACs i n  terms of o v e r a l l  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  1982 and t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  low l e v e l  of d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t h a t  same y e a r .  I n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  spend ing  p a t t e r n s  of a l l  t h r e e  of 
t h e  o t h e r  major PAC g r o u p i n g s ,  o n l y  17 p e r c e n t  of non-connected e x p e n d i t u r e s  
took  t h e  form of  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e  d o n a t i o n s  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e  comparable 
f i g u r e  f o r  1980 was o n l y  13 p e r c e n t ) .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  once a g a i n  a h i g h e r  d e g r e e  
of spend ing  by t h e s e  PACs--largely i d e o l o g i c a l  i n  nature--on a c t i v i t i e s  such  
a s  f u n d r a i s i n g  by d i r e c t - m a i l  and independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  T h i s  w i l l  be 
conf i rmed i n  l a t e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of some of  t h e  l a r g e s t  non-connected PACs. 
TABLE 9. C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Congress iona l  Cand ida tes  of  PACs by Category:  
1972-1982 ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  - 1/ 
- --------- 
Type of PAC 1972 1974 1976 197 8  1980 1982 
Labor $3.6 6 . 3  8 . 2  10.3 13.2 20.3 
Business-  2.7 4.4 10  .O --- --- --- 
r e l a t e d  21 - 
Trade 
 embers ship/ --- --- --- 1 1 . 3  15 .9  21.9 
Hea l th  
Other  - 4 /  2.2 1 .O 2.8 1 .O 2  .O 3.2 
T o t a l  51 - $8.5 $12.5 $22.6 $35.2 $55.2 $83.6 
1 /  A l l  d a t a  i s  f o r  f u l l  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e ,  excep t  f o r  1972, wherein  pr imary 
l o s e r s  a r e  exc luded .  
2/ T h i s  encompasses t h e  Common Cause c a t e g o r i e s  f o r  b u s i n e s s ,  h e a l t h ,  and ,  
i n  1976,  lawyers .  T h i s  c a t e g o r y  i s  inc luded  h e r e  f o r  t h e  purpose  of l i s t i n g  t h e  
d a t a  f o r  1972-1976, b e f o r e  t h e  s p e c i f i c  breakdowns were d e v i s e d  by t h e  FEC f o r  
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  and o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s ,  and i t  i s  based on t h e  assumpt ion t h a t  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  of  PACs i t  i n c l u d e s  have a  b a s i c a l l y  p ro -bus iness  o r i e n t a t i o n .  It i s  
o n l y  roughly  comparable t o  t h e  combined c o r p o r a t e  and t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  
groups  i n  1978-1982, b u t  most of t h e  b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d  PACs would f a l l  i n t o  t h o s e  
two FEC c a t e g o r i e s  (some would be s c a t t e r e d  i n  t h e  non-connected,  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  
and c o r p o r a t i o n  wi thou t  s t o c k  g r o u p i n g s ) .  
Most of 
t h e  l a t  
For 1974 and 1976, t h e  non-connected c a t e g o r y ,  a s  d e f i n e d  by t h e  FEC, 
t e s  w i t h  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  group used by Common Cause f o r  t h o s e  two y e a r s .  
t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs a r e  today l i s t e d  i n  t h e  non-connected g roup ing ,  b u t  
t e r  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  PACs not i d e o l o g i c a l  i n  n a t u r e .  Thus,  t h e  d a t a  f o r  
1974 and 1976 a r e  no t  e x a c t l y  comparable t o  t h o s e  f o r  1978-1982, i n  v iew of  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  non-connected and t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  g roup ings .  
( I d e o l o g i c a l  PACs i n  1972 were lumped i n t o  Common C a u s e ' s  "miscel laneous"  group.)  
TABLE 9. C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Cand ida tes  of PACs by Category:  
1972-1982 ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  - 11--Continued 
4 1  T h i s  i s  a  c a t c h - a l l  c a t e g o r y ,  i n  which t h e  e a r l i e r  f i g u r e s  a r e  o n l y  
rough iy  comparable t o  t h e  l a t e r  ones .  For 1972-1976, t h e  d a t a  r e p r e s e n t s  
Common Cause ' s  "miscel laneous"  c a t e g o r y ,  which inc luded  such groups  a s  t h e  NEA 
(and a f f i l i a t e s ) ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ,  and some c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  and i t s  a g r i c u l t u r e 1  
d a i r y  c a t e g o r y .  I n  1972, Common Cause i n c l u d e d  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs under 
"misce l l aneous , "  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  l i s t i n g  i n  1974; t h u s  1972 i n c l u d e s  
more t y p e s  of PACs t h a n  t h e  1974 and 1976 d a t a  d i d .  For 1978-1982, t h e  
"other"  d a t a  e q u a t e s  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  t h e  FEC's c o o p e r a t i v e s  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  
w i t h o u t  s t o c k  g roups .  Thus, t h e  d a t a  f o r  1972 i s  n o t  e x a c t l y  comparable 
w i t h  t h o s e  f o r  1974 and 1976, which, i n  t u r n ,  a r e  not  h i g h l y  comparable w i t h  
t h o s e  f o r  1978-1982. The common t h r e a d  i s  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  major d a i r y  
PACs--ADEPT, C-TAPE, and SPACE--in "other"  f o r  a l l  s i x  e l e c t i o n  y e a r s .  
51  T o t a l s  (which a r e  keyed t o  T a b l e  3 )  may not  add up e x a c t l y ,  because  
of  roTnding o f f .  
Source:  For 1972: Common Cause.  Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  
1972 F e d e r a l  Campaign F inances :  I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .  
Washington,  1974. v. 1. p. v i .  
For  1974: Common Cause.  Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  1974 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Campaign F inances .  Vol.  5 - - I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .  
Washington,  1976. p. x i i .  
For 1976: Common Cause d a t a .  I n  I n t e r e s t  Group G i f t s  t o  1976 C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
Campaigns. Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y  Weekly R e p o r t s ,  v .  35 ,  A p r i l  16 ,  1977: 
p. 710. 
For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. F i n a l  Repor t .  P a r t y  and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l  Committees. 
Vol.  1--Summary T a b l e s .  Washington,  A p r i l  1980. p. 142.  
For  1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  PAC 
Repor t  For 1979-80 E l e c t i o n  Cycle  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Feb. 21,  1982. 
For  1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC P u b l i s h e s  F i n a l  1981-82 
PAC Study  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Nov. 29,  1983.  
T a b l e s  8  and 9  p r e s e n t  ev idence  of t h e  growing s t r e n g t h  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
and t r a d e  PACs, t h e  d imin i shed  b u t  r e s i d u a l  power of  l a b o r  PACs, and t h e  
"wild card" r o l e  l e f t  t o  t h e  non-connected PACs. Having a s s e s s e d  t h e  major 
components of  a g g r e g a t e  PAC spend ing ,  t h e s e  can next  be compared w i t h  t h e  
a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  major i n d i v i d u a l  PACs. 
2.  The L a r g e s t  PAC C o n t r i b u t o r s  and Spenders  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  p rov ides  f o r  each e l e c t i o n  s i n c e  1972 a  l i s t i n g  of t h e  
l a r g e s t  PACs i n  terms of  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  and,  f o r  
each e l e c t i o n  s i n c e  1976, a  l i s t i n g  of t h e  l a r g e s t  PACs i n  terms of t h e i r  
o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  T h i s  i n d i c a t e s  how l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t o r s  changed i n  rank  
over  t h e  s i x - e l e c t i o n  pe r iod  and how t h e  l a r g e  spenders  changed i n  rank  over  
t h e  l a s t  four  e l e c t i o n s ,  whi le  comparing t h e  l i s t i n g s  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  
of  PACs r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e s e  two arrangements .  
A t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  i t  must be s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  t o p  20 l i s t s  t e l l  o n l y  p a r t  o f  
t h e  o v e r a l l  PAC s t o r y .  They a r e  u s e f u l  in  unders tand ing  which PACs may have 
t h e  most power, i f  one e q u a t e s  power wi th  a  h igh  l e v e l  of f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y .  
They a l s o  h e l p  t o  demons t ra te  which s e c t o r s  of t h e  s o c i e t y  have most 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  employed t h e  PAC r o u t e .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e y  a r e  h e l p f u l  i n  i l l u s t r a t i n g  
i n  y e t  a n o t h e r  form t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a n d a r d s  which a r e  used t o  gauge PAC a c t i v i t y  
and t h e  shor tcomings  of t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  s t a n d a r d s .  
These l i s t s  c a n n o t ,  i n  and of themse lves ,  t e l l  t h e  r e a d e r  where power 
l i e s  i n  American p o l i t i c s  today.  The f a c t  t h a t  not  a  s i n g l e  c o r p o r a t e  PAC 
appears  on any of  t h e s e  l i s t s  i s  one of most impor tan t  o v e r a l l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
one can make. Bu t ,  r a t h e r  than  b e i n g  i n d i c a t i v e  of an absence of c o r p o r a t e  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  o r  i n f l u e n c e ,  i t  i s  more t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of 
PACs among a  wide number of c o r p o r a t i o n s .  While few c o r p o r a t e  PACs reach  
s i g n i f i c a n t  l e v e l s  of spending on an i n d i v i d u a l  b a s i s ,  t h e y  may have a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  combined e f f e c t  on b e h a l f  of p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r i e s .  Fur the rmore ,  
t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  some c o r p o r a t i o n s  sponsor  numerous PACs ( d e s p i t e  t h e  s i n g l e  
o v e r a l l  l i m i t a t i o n  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s ) ,  i t  goes unnot iced on c h a r t s  such a s  
t h e s e ,  a r ranged  by PAC i n s t e a d  of by sponsor ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The c o n c l u s i o n  
for  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  po in t ,  while  o f f e r i n g  comparative comments 
on t h e  two types  of l i s t i n g s  used i n  Tables  10-19. 
Top 20 PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s  from 1972-1982 
Tables  10-15 presen t  t he  l a r g e s t  20 PACs i n  each b i e n n i a l  e l e c t i o n  s i n c e  
1972, ranked i n  terms of t h e i r  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Federa l  candida tes .  The 
measurement of PACs according t o  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l s  i s  a  l e s s  r e l i a b l e  
i n d i c a t o r  of t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  and in f luence  today than it was e a r l i e r  
i n  t h i s  twelve-year per iod.  A s  l a t e r  t a b l e s  w i l l  r e v e a l ,  PACs have become 
inc reas ing ly  w i l l i n g  t o  spend money i n  o t h e r ,  perhaps more imagina t ive ,  ways 
than l i m i t i n g  themselves t o  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  cand ida t e s .  Nonetheless ,  
it can be argued t h a t  i f  one i s  seeking t o  determine which PACs have t h e  
g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  access  t o  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s ,  t h e  l e v e l  of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
s t i l l  may be t h e  most usefu l  s i n g l e  measure. This  d i s cus s ion  h i g h l i g h t s  some 
of the  most s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  of each y e a r ' s  l i s t ,  concluding wi th  obse rva t ions  
of t r ends  i n  t he  t op  20 grouping over t he  s ix -e l ec t i on  per iod.  
The 1972 group  able 10) covers  a  range of $137,500 t o  $824,301 i n  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  with t h e  AFL-CIO's COPE--the f a t h e r  of modern PACs--in f i r s t  
p lace  and the  UAW's V-CAP i n  second p lace .  Labor PACs c o n s t i t u t e  t en  of t he  
t op  twenty, not s u r p r i s i n g  i n  view of l a b o r ' s  undisputed predominance i n  t h e  
PAC a rena  a s  t h e  1970s began. Four t r a d e  assoc ia t ions- - those  connected with 
t he  r e a l t o r s ,  t h e  Associated General Con t r ac to r s ,  t h e  AMA, and t h e  Nat ional  
Assoc ia t ion  of Manufacturers (B1PAC)--were i n  t h e  t op  20. The l i s t  i nc ludes  
a l l  t h r e e  of t h e  major d a i r y  co-ops--Committee f o r  Thorough A g r i c u l t u r a l  
P o l i t i c a l  Education (c-TAPE), A g r i c u l t u r a l  and Dairy Educat ional  P o l i t i c a l  
T rus t  (ADEPT), and Trus t  f o r  Spec i a l  P o l i t i c a l  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Community 
Education (SPACE); i n  view of t he  l a t e r  r e v e l a t i o n s  about t h e i r  i l l e g a l  
contributions in 1972, the total of their contributions listed in Table 10 
actually understates the level of their financial giving that year. 1221 -
Finally, three unaffiliated PACs are included, one of which is Democratic in 
orientation--the DSG Campaign Fund--and the others are liberal--National 
Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC) and the Committee for Twelve. 
In 1974  able 111, the range of contributions was $134,100 (lower than 
in 1972) to $1,090,696 (the first PAC to top the million dollar mark in 
contributions during this period). COPE was again in first place, but the 
AMA's PAC supplanted the UAW in second place. Labor PACs increased their 
representation from 10 to 12 of the top 20, while none of three dairy co-ops 
were included at all, undoubtedly a result of the negative publicity they 
received in the wake of the disclosures of their illegal contributions in the 
previous election. The trade associations increased their ranks from 4 to 6, 
with the American Medical PAC (AMPAC), Business-Industry PAC (BIPAC), and 
the Realtors PAC remaining, and the PACs of the American Dental Association, 
the Trucking Association, and the California chapter of the AMA added. Two 
unaffiliated PACs were included, with the conservative Comittee for the 
Survival of a Free Congress joining (and surpassing) one of the liberal groups 
from 1972 (NCEC). 
In 1976 (Table 12), the cut-off level for inclusion more than doubled, 
in conjunction with the overall jump in PAC spending that year; the range in 
contributions was $290,125 to $1,167,365. Labor PACs remained at about the 
same level, with 11 included. The trade associations dropped to five--with 
AMPAC, Realtors PAC, BIPAC, and American Dental PAC (ADPAC) remaining, and 
the National Automobile Dealers Association's PAC added. Two of the dairy 
1221 Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election, p. 495. -
co-ops--C-TAPE and ADEPT--returned t o  t h e  l i s t ,  and t h e  number o f  u n a f f i l i a t e d  
PACs remained a t  two--NCEC, a g a i n ,  and Nat iona l  C o n s e r v a t i v e  PAC (NCPAC), 
r e p l a c i n g  t h e  C o r n i t t e e  f o r  t h e  S u r v i v a l  o f  a  F r e e  Congress (CSFC) a s  t h e  
l a r g e s t  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i d e o l o g i c a l  c o n t r i b u t o r .  
I n  1978 ( T a b l e  1 3 ) ,  t h e  cu t -o f f  l e v e l  i n c r e a s e d  s l i g h t l y - - t o  $307,902, 
w h i l e  t h e  maximum c o n t r i b u t e d  i n c r e a s e d  by a lmost  50 percent- - to  $1,639,795. 
AMPAC was a g a i n  i n  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  and f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime,  n e i t h e r  of t h e  t o p  
two were l a b o r  PACs. Fur thermore,  UAW V-CAP, i n  t h i r d  p l a c e ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  
t ime supp lan ted  COPE a s  t h e  l e a d i n g  l a b o r  c o n t r i b u t o r .  The t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
i n c r e a s e d  i n  number t o  six--with AMPAC, ADPAC, R e a l t o r s  PAC, and t h e  Automobile 
and Truck Dea le r s  EAC remaining (BIPAC l e f t  t h e  t o p  20 f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime)  and 
t h e  L i f e  Underwr i t e r s  PAC and t h e  T r i a l  Lawyers A s s o c i a t i o n  PAC added. I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  one membership o rgan iza t ion- - the  N a t i o n a l  R i f l e  A s s o c i a t i o n  (NRA)--had 
i t s  V i c t o r y  Fund added t o  t h e  l i s t ,  t h u s  b r i n g i n g  t h e  t rade/membership/heal th  
t o t a l  t o  seven,  and adding a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  s i n g l e - i s s u e  PAC (NRA) t o  t h e  t o p  
20--the f i r s t  s i n g l e - i s s u e  PAC t o  make t h e  l i s t s  a t  a l l  s i n c e  1972. The 
u n a f f i l i a t e d  PACs were down t o  o n l y  one ,  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  C i t i z e n s  f o r  t h e  
R e p u b l i c ,  which was o rgan ized  t o  promote t h e  phi losophy and p o l i t i c a l  f o r t u n e s  
of Ronald Reagan. C i t i z e n s  f o r  t h e  Republ ic  was t h e  f o r e r u n n e r  of t h e  cand ida te -  
o r i e n t e d  PACs, which many c a n d i d a t e s ,  o f t e n  P r e s i d e n t i a l ,  o rgan ized  t o  conduct 
t h e  e a r l y ,  pre-formal o p e r a t i o n s  of t h e i r  campaigns. F i n a l l y ,  t h e  1978 t o p  
20 l i s t  inc luded  one d a i r y  co-op--C-TAPE. 
The 1980 l i s t   able 14)  i n c l u d e s  PACs whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ranged between 
$424,008 ( a  40 p e r c e n t  r i s e  from t h e  1978 c u t - o f f )  and $1,536,573 ( a  s l i g h t  
drop from t h e  h igh  p o i n t  i n  1978) .  The R e a l t o r s  PAC was i n  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  
followed by t h e  UAW V-CAP, and then  AMPAC. The AFL-CIO's COPE dropped t o  
s i x t h  p l a c e ,  no longer  even among t h e  t o p  f i v e .  Labor PACs a g a i n  c o n s t i t u t e d  
11 of  t h e  t o p  20. The t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  group was a g a i n  r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
seven of  i t s  members--with AMPAC, R e a l t o r s  PAC, Automobile and Truck D e a l e r s  
EAC, ADPAC, L i f e  Underwr i t e r s  PAC, and t h e  NRA V i c t o r y  Fund inc luded  a g a i n ,  
and t h e  American Banking A s s o c i a t i o n  BANKPAC on t h e  l i s t  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  time--in 
1 3 t h  p l a c e .  C-TAPE was a g a i n  t h e  s o l e  d a i r y  co-op i n c l u d e d ,  and o n l y  one 
u n a f f i l i a t e d  PAC--NCEC--ranked among t h e  t o p  20. Thus,  t h e  o n l y  non-connected 
PAC was a  l i b e r a l  one ,  i n  a  year  i n  which c o n s e r v a t i v e  PACs r e c e i v e d  s o  much 
a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  media ( u n l e s s ,  of c o u r s e ,  t h e  NRA V i c t o r y  Fund i s  inc luded  a s  
a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PAC). Th i s  a p p a r e n t  i n c o n g r u i t y  w i l l  be  r e s o l v e d  
when t h e  t o p  20 PACs a r e  ranked by o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
The 1982 l i s t  (Tab le  1 5 )  i n c l u d e s  PACs whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ranged between 
$621,601 (47 p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  than  t h e  1980 c u t - o f f )  and $2,115,135 (38 p e r c e n t  
more than  t h e  b i g g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  of 1980).  The t o p  t h r e e  PACs were t h e  same 
a s  i n  1980, w i t h  t h e  R e a l t o r s  PAC a g a i n  f i r s t ,  and AMPAC s w i t c h i n g  p l a c e s  w i t h  
UAW V-CAP t o  become, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  second and t h i r d .  L a b o r ' s  r anks  grew from 
11 t o  12 ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h r e e  of  t h e  t o p  f i v e ;  t h e  AFL-CIO COPE f e l l  t o  t e n t h  p l a c e  
i n  1982. The t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  group was a g a i n  r e p r e s e n t e d  by seven PACs, 
a l t h o u g h  two from 1980--American Den ta l  PAC and t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  of  
L i f e  U n d e r w r i t e r s  PAC--were m i s s i n g  from t h e  l i s t .  They were r e p l a c e d  by two 
PACs which had not p r e v i o u s l y  made t h e  t o p  20 r a n k i n g s :  t h e  Assoc ia ted  General  
C o n t r a c t o r s  PAC was s e v e n t e e n t h  l a r g e s t ,  and Bui ld  PAC (of  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A s s o c i a t i o n  of Home B u i l d e r s )  was t h e  s i x t h  l a r g e s t .  A s  i n  1980, t h e  NRA 
P o l i t i c a l  V i c t o r y  Fund was t h e  o n l y  membership o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y .  
There  were no non-connected o r g a n i z a t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  1982 l i s t i n g ,  
and,  a s  i n  1978 and 1980, t h e  o n l y  co-op was C-TAPE. 
TABLE 10. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1972 
- .- 
Rank Committee (and ~£filiation*) Contributions 
,- -- 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Commit tee 
( AFL-CIO) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto Workers) 
American Medical Political Act ion Committee 
(American Medical ~ssociation) 
Business-Industry Political Action Committee 
(National Association of ~anufacturers) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
(non-connected) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
Agricultural & Dairy Educational Political Trust 
(Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.) 
Seafarers Political Activity Donation 
(Seafarers International Union of North America) 
Trust for Special Political Agricultural Community 
Education 
(Dairymen, Inc.) 
CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 
(Communication Workers of America) 
Active Ballot Club 
(Retail Clerks International Association) 
Machinists Non-Partisan League 
(International Association of Machinists) 
ILGWU Campaign Committee 
(International Ladies Garment Workers Union) 
Democratic Study Group Campaign Fund 
(non-connected) 
Committee for Twelve 
(non-connected) 




Connnittee for Action 
(Associated General Contractors) 
Real Estate PEC 
(National Association of Real Estate Boards) 
* Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status. 
Source: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 
Federal Campaign Finances : Interest Groups and Political Parties. 
Washington, 1974, v. 1-111. 
TABLE 11. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1974 
Rank Committee (and Affiliation*) Contributions 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 
( AFL-CIO) 
American Medical Political Action Committee 
(American Medical Association) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto Workers) 
Machinists Non-Partisan League 
(International Association of ~achinists) 
MEBA Political Action Fund 
(~arine Engineers Beneficial Association) 
United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
Active Ballot Club 
(Retail Clerks International Association) 
Business-Industry Political Action Committee 
(National Association of ~anufacturers) 
Real Estate Political Action Committee 
(National Association of Realtors) 
Laborers' Political League 
(Labor er s U~~O~/AFL-CIO) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(united Transportation union) 
NEA-PAC 
(National Education Association) 
Seafarers Political Activity Donation 
(Seafarers International Union of North America) 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
(non-connected) 
Railway Clerks Political League 
( ~ a i l w a ~ ,  Airline and Steamship Clerks) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
(non-connected) 
CAL-PAC 
(American Medical Association-~alifornia) 
Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee 
(Carpenters union) 
Truck Operators Non-Partisan Committee 
(Trucking Association,Inc.) 
American Dental Political Action Committee 
(American Dental Association) 
* Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status. 
Source: Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 
1974 Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and 
Political Parties. Washington, 1976. 
TABLE 12. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1976 
-- 
Rank Committee (and ~£filiation*) Contributions 
-- 
American Medical Political Action Cornittee $1,167,365 
(American Medical ~ssociation) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Commit tee 
(AFL-CIO ) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto Workers) 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(National Association of ~ealtors) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
NEA Political Action Committee 
(National Education Association) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(~nternational Association of ~achinists) 
Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust 
(Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.) 
United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(United Transportation union) 
National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(non-connected) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(National Automobile Dealers Association) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
(non-connected) 
CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 
(Communication Workers of America) 
Seafarers Political Activity Donation 
(Seafarers International Union of North America) 
American Dental Political Action Committee 
(American Dental Association) 
Business-Industry Political Action Committee 
(National Association of Manufacturers) 
Active Ballot Club 
(Retail Clerks International Association) 
MEBA Political Action Fund 
(Marine Engineers Beneficial Association) 
Laborers Political League 
(Laborers Union/ AFL-CIO) 
* Affiliation may not necessarily correspond to legal status. 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (from reports on file). 
TABLE 13. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1978 
- -- ---- P 
Rank Committee (and Affiliation) Contributions 
---- ------ - 
American Medical Political Action Committee $1,639,795 
(her ican Medical Association) 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(National Association of ~ealtors) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto Workers) 
Automobile & Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(National Automobile Dealers Association) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 
( AFL-CIO) 
United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(United Transportation Union) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(~nternational Association of Machinists) 
American Dental Political Action Committee 
(American Dental Association) 
CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 
(Communication Workers of America) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
Citizens for the Republic 
(non-connected) 
MEBA Political Action Fund 
(~arine Engineers Beneficial Association) 
Seafarers Political Activity Donation 
(Seafarers International Union of North America) 
Life Underwriters Political Action Committee 
(~ational Association of Life underwriters) 
NRA Political Victory Fund 
(~ational Rifle Association of America) 
Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust 
(Association of Trial Lawyers of America) 
NEA Political Action Committee 
(National Education Association) 
Railway Clerks Political League 
( ~ a i l w a ~ ,  Airline and Steamship clerks) 
Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee 
(United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of 
America) 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final 
Report on 1977-78 Financial Activity of Non-Party and Party Political 
Committees, press release: April 24, 1980. 
TABLE 14. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1980 
-- - 
Rank Committee (and ~ffiliation) Contributions 
- - --- 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(National Association of ~ealtors) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto workers) 
American Medical Political Action Committee 
(American Medical ~ssociation) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(~ational Association of Automobile ~ealers) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(International Association of ~achinists) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 
( AFL-CIO) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
Seafarers Political Activity Donation 
(Seafarers International Union of North America) 
United Steelworkers Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
National Association of Life Underwriters PAC 
(National Association of Life underwriters) 
American Dental Political Action Committee 
(American Dental ~ssociation) 
MEBA Political Action Fund 
(~arine Engineers Beneficial Association) 
American Bankers Association BANKPAC 
(American Bankers Association) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(United Transportation union) 
Active Ballot Club 
(Food & Commercial Workers International Union) 
Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee 
(united Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America) 
ILGWU Campaign Committee 
(International Ladies Garment Workers Union) 
CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 
(Comunicat ion Workers of America) 
NRA Political Victory Fund 
(National Rifle Association) 
National Commi,ree for an Effective Congress 
(non-connected) 
Source: U. S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC 
Report for 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982. 
TABLE 15: Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates: 1982 
Rank Committee (and Affiliation) Contributions 
Realtors Political Action Committee $2,115,135 
(National Association of Realtors) 
American Medical Association Political Action Committee 1,737,090 
(American Medical Association) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 1,628,347 
(United Auto Workers) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 1,445,459 
(International Association of Machinists) 
National Education Association PAC 1,183,215 
(~ational Education Association) 
Build Political Action Committee 1,006,628 
(National Association of Home Builders) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 962 ,450 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
American Bankers Association BANKPAC 947,460 
(American Bankers Association) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 917,295 
(National Association of Automobile Dealers) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 906,425 
( AFL-c 10) 
Seafarers Political Activity Donation 850,514 
(Seafarers International Union of North America) 
Active Ballot Club 729,213 
(United Food and Commercial Workers International Union) 
United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 715,757 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
Engineers Political Education Committee 711,535 
(International Union of Operating Engineers) 
NRA Political Victory Fund 7 10,902 
(National Rifle Association) 
MEBA Political Action Fund 701,153 
(Marine Engineers Beneficial Association) 
Associated General Contractors Political Action Committee 683,766 
(Associated General Contractors of America) 
CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 643,428 
(Communication Workers of America) 
Carpenters Legislative Improvement Committee 637,479 
(United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America) 
ILGWU Campaign Committee 621,601 
(International Ladies Garment Workers Union) 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 
PAC Study (press release): Nov. 29, 1983; and U.S. Federal Election 
Commission. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1981-1982. Final Report. 
Party and Non-Party Political Committees. Vol. 3--Non-Party Detailed Tables 
(Corporate and Labor). Washington, 1983. 
Looking a t  t h e  s i x  t a b l e s  a s  a  s e t ,  one can v e n t u r e  s e v e r a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
about  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g t h s  o f  t h e  major  PAC g r o u p i n g s :  
( 1 )  Labor PACs have c o n s i s t e n t l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  10-12 of t h e  t o p  20 PAC 
c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  each of  t h e  s i x  e l e c t i o n s .  They h a v e ,  i n  f a c t ,  made up around 
h a l f  of  t h e  t o p  1 0 ,  a l though  some d e c l i n e  h a s  been evidenced s i n c e  1974 when 
seven o f  t h e  t o p  10 were l a b o r  PACs; t h e  number f e l l  t o  s i x  i n  1976 and 1978, 
f i v e  i n  1980, and f o u r  i n  1982. Although l a b o r  PACs have remained r e l a t i v e l y  
c o n s t a n t  i n  number s i n c e  1972 and have been su rpassed  i n  a g g r e g a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
and e x p e n d i t u r e s  by b o t h  c o r p o r a t e  and t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  commit tees ,  
t h e i r  s t r e n g t h  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  been c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  number 
of  l a r g e ,  we l l -o rgan ized ,  p o l i t i c a l l y - m i n d e d  un ions .  
( 2 )  The r e v e r s e  of  t h e  above d e s c r i p t i o n  of l a b o r  PACs can be  a p p l i e d  
t o  c o r p o r a t e  PACs. No s i n g l e  c o r p o r a t e  committee achieved any predominance 
among c o r p o r a t e  PACs, w i t h  none a p p e a r i n g  on any o f  t h e  t o p  20 l i s t s .  R a t h e r ,  
c o r p o r a t e  PAC s t r e n g t h  h a s  been emanating from t h e i r  e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  which,  i n  t u r n ,  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e i r  h igh  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  
i n  a g g r e g a t e  l e v e l  of  e x p e n d i t u r e s - - t r i p l i n g  it from 1976 t o  1978 and more 
t h a n  d o u b l i n g  i t  a g a i n  i n  1980. The s lowing  of t h i s  growth r a t e  t o  37 p e r c e n t  
i n  1982 may s i g n a l  a  l e v e l i n g  o f f  i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  b u t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  PACs' p o s i t i o n  
remains  s t r o n g  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  g roup ings .  
( 3 )  The t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  commit tees  have modes t ly  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  among t h e  t o p  20 c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  from four  i n  1972 t o  seven i n  1982. 
These  commit tees  ranked second i n  terms of t h e i r  i n c l u s i o n  on t h e s e  l i s t s ,  a s  
t h e y  ranked second i n  terms o f  t h e i r  a g g r e g a t e  l e v e l  of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1982. 
(4) The non-connected PACs, d e s p i t e  t h e i r  a s t o n i s h i n g  growth i n  bo th  
numbers and f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  r e c e i v e  j u s t  token r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
among t h e  b ig  PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s .  And t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i d e o l o g i c a l  g roups ,  which 
have l e d  t h e  growth i n  t h e  non-connected c a t e g o r y ,  were no b e t t e r  r ep resen ted- -  
i f  a t  a l l - - t h a n  t h e  l i b e r a l  g roups .  
( 5 )  Only one s i n g l e - i s s u e  PAC--the NRA P o l i t i c a l  V i c t o r y  Fund--ranked 
among t h e  20 l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  any yea r .  T h i s ,  t o o ,  appeared t o  c o n f l i c t  
wi th  t h e  media - fos te red  impress ion  of  t h e  growth of s i n g l e - i s s u e  p o l i t i c s .  
( 6 )  The d a i r y  co-ops, once a  c o r n e r s t o n e  i n  t h e  PAC movement, have 
dwindled among t h e  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  from t h r e e  i n  1972 t o  one i n  1978-1982. 
( 7 )  Seven PACs were inc luded  among t h e  twenty  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  
i n  a l l  s i x  e l e c t i o n s ,  t h o s e  a f f i l i a t e d  wi th  t h e  AFL-CIO, t h e  UAW, t h e  R e a l t o r s ,  
t h e  AMA, t h e  S e a f a r e r s ,  t h e  S t e e l w o r k e r s  , and t h e  M a c h i n i s t s .  
Among t h e  f o u r  l a r g e s t  PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s  over  t h e  s i x - e l e c t i o n  p e r i o d ,  
t h e r e  have been some noteworthy developments.  The R e a l t o r s  PAC has  exper ienced  
a  m e t e o r i c  r i s e  from number twenty i n  1972 t o  number one i n  1980 and 1982. 
AMPAC, t h e  o l d e s t  major non-labor PAC, has  remained i n  t h e  t o p  t h r e e  i n  every  
e l e c t i o n .  COPE, t h e  modern p r e c e d e n t - s e t t e r  among PACs, d e c l i n e d  s t e a d i l y  
from f i r s t  p l a c e  i n  1972 and 1974 t o  t e n t h  i n  1982. COPE has  been supp lan ted  
s i n c e  1978 a s  t h e  foremost l a b o r  PAC--in terms of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  
candidates- -by UAW V-CAP. The l a t t e r  committee h a s  remained i n  t h e  t o p  t h r e e  
i n  e v e r y  e l e c t i o n  s i n c e  1972. F i n a l l y ,  whi le  t h e  t o p  t h r e e  PACs from 1972-1976 
inc luded  two l a b o r  and one t r a d e  PAC, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  s i n c e  1978 has  r e v e r s e d .  
b .  Top 20 PAC s p e n d e r s  from 1976-1982 
T h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  focuses  on Tab les  16-19, which l i s t  t h e  t o p  20 PACs ranked 
by t h e i r  a d j u s t e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  each of t h e  l a s t  four  e l e c t i o n s .  H i g h l i g h t s  
of each t a b l e  w i l l  be  d e s c r i b e d ,  a long  wi th  key d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  l a r g e s t  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  and t h e  l a r g e s t  spenders  i n  t h a t  y e a r .  The c o n c l u s i o n  of  t h i s  
s u b s e c t i o n  w i l l  r ev iew t h e  t r e n d s  over  t h e  four  e l e c t i o n s  covered .  
The twenty l a r g e s t  PACs i n  1976 (Tab le  1 6 )  s p e n t  between $512,844 and 
$2,878,490, w i t h  t h e  former 75 p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  and t h e  l a t t e r  150 p e r c e n t  
h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  and t h e  f i r s t  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  1976 (Tab le  
1 2 ) .  F i f t e e n  o f  t h e  committees i n  Tab le  16 a l s o  were l i s t e d  among t h e  
twenty l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  t h a t  y e a r ;  t h e  f i v e  not r ank ing  among t h e  l a r g e  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  inc luded  one union (ILGWU), one co-op (SPACE), two c o n s e r v a t i v e  
membership groups  (Gun Owners and ACU PAC), and one c o n s e r v a t i v e  u n a f f i l i a t e d  
group (CSFC). Among t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of PACs r e p r e s e n t e d  were n i n e  l a b o r  unions  
(compared w i t h  e l e v e n  on t h e  t o p  c o n t r i b u t o r s  l i s t ) ,  t h r e e  non-connected groups 
( t h e  same number a s  i n  T a b l e  1 2 ) ,  t h r e e  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  ( w i t h  f i v e  i n  Tab le  
121,  two membership commit tees ,  b o t h  c o n s e r v a t i v e  (compared wi th  none i n  Tab le  
1 2 ) ,  and t h r e e  co-ops (one  more t h a n  i n  Tab le  1 2 ) .  I n  t h e  t o p  f i v e  spenders  
were,  i n  o r d e r ,  two c o n s e r v a t i v e  u n a f f i l i a t e d  PACs, one c o n s e r v a t i v e  membership 
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  one l i b e r a l  u n a f f i l i a t e d  committee,  and one a s s o c i a t i o n .  The two 
most prominent l abor  PACs, COPE and UAW V-CAP, ranked seven th  and e i g h t h ,  
compared w i t h  rank ing  second and t h i r d  among t h e  PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s  t h a t  y e a r .  
The twenty l a r g e s t  1978 PACs (Tab le  1 7 )  s p e n t  between $658,236 and 
$4,509,074, r e s p e c t i v e l y  30 and 60 percen t  h i g h e r  than t h e  1976 range and 
114 p e r c e n t  more t h a n  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  and 175 p e r c e n t  
more than  t h e  t o p  c o n t r i b u t o r  i n  1978. Twelve PACs ranked among both  t h e  
l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  and t h e  l a r g e s t  s p e n d e r s ,  t h r e e  l e s s  than i n  1976, w i t h  
t h e  o t h e r  e i g h t  i n c l u d i n g  four  c o n s e r v a t i v e  non-connected PACs ( C i t i z e n s  f o r  
t h e  Republ ic ,  NCPAC, CSFC, and Conserva t ive  V i c t o r y  Fund) ,  one c o n s e r v a t i v e  
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membership group (Gun Owners), one l i b e r a l  u n a f f i l i a t e d  group (NCEC), and 
two a s s o c i a t i o n s  ( t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  and Texas c h a p t e r s  of t h e  AMA). Among t h e  
key t y p e s  of PACs, l a b o r  PACs dropped t o  o n l y  s i x  (down from n ine  i n  1976 
and compared w i t h  e l e v e n  among t h e  l a r g e s t  1978 c o n t r i b u t o r s ) ,  non-connected 
jumped t o  s i x  ( f rom t h r e e  i n  1976 and compared wi th  one among t h e  t o p  
c o n t r i b u t o r s ) ,  a s s o c i a t i o n s  r o s e  t o  s i x  ( f rom t h r e e  i n  1976 and t h e  same 
number a s  i n  t h e  t o p  c o n t r i b u t o r s  l i s t  i n  1 9 7 8 ) ,  membership groups  dropped 
t o  one ( f rom two i n  1976, and t h e  same number a s  i n  t h e  1978 l a r g e s t  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  l i s t ) ,  and co-ops dropped t o  one ( f rom t h r e e  i n  1976, and t h e  
same number a s  i n  Tab le  1 3 ) .  It should  be noted t h a t  two of t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
non-connected PACs ( C i t i z e n s  f o r  t h e  Republ ic  and t h e  John Connal ly  C i t i z e n s  
~ o r u m )  were ,  i n  f a c t ,  o r i e n t e d  h e a v i l y  t o  f u r t h e r i n g  t h e  c a n d i d a c i e s  of  two 
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  (Reagan and Conna l ly ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .  Also ,  t h e  r i s e  
among a s s o c i a t i o n s  was l a r g e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  of  two of  AMA's  S t a t e  PACs j o i n i n g  
i t  among t h e  t o p  20 spenders .  The two b i g  l a b o r  PACs ranked e i g h t h  (COPE) and 
n i n t h  (UAW) among s p e n d e r s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  r a n k i n g s  of f i f t h  
and t h i r d  among c o n t r i b u t o r s .  The t o p  f i v e  PAC spenders  were ,  i n  o r d e r ,  t h r e e  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  non-connected groups  and two a s s o c i a t i o n s .  
The range of  t h e  t o p  twenty PAC s p e n d e r s  i n  1980 (Tab le  1 8 )  r o s e  by 
r e s p e c t i v e l y  50 and 67 p e r c e n t  over  t h e  1978 l e v e l  t o  a  r ange  of  $995,501 t o  
$7,530,060,  134 pe rcen t  h i g h e r  than  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  and 
n e a r l y  400 p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  than  t h e  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  i n  1980. Again i n  
1980, twelve  committees were on bo th  t h e  t o p  spender  and t o p  c o n t r i b u t o r  l i s t s ,  
b u t ,  i n  1980,  a l l  e i g h t  of  t h e  t o p  spenders  t h a t  d i d  not  rank among t h e  t o p  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  were c o n s e r v a t i v e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs: seven non-connected (NCPAC, 
Congress iona l  Club,  Fund f o r  a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  M a j o r i t y ,  C i t i z e n s  f o r  t h e  R e p u b l i c ,  
Americans f o r  an  E f f e c t i v e  P r e s i d e n c y ,  CSFC, and Americans f o r  Change) and one 
membership group (Gun Owners). The non-connected PACs c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  l a r g e s t  
c a t e g o r y  of t h e  t o p  spenders  wi th  e i g h t  i n  number ( t h e  seven above p l u s  t h e  
l i b e r a l  NCEC), a  g a i n  of  two over  1978,  bu t  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  o n l y  one among 
t h e  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  1980--NCEC. Membership groups  added one over  
1978, giving them two top spenders (the Gun Owners and the NRA PAC), one more 
than on the top contributors list for 1980. Labor PACs declined in number to 
five (eleven on 1980's contributor list). Labor's big two PACs (UAW and COPE) 
ranked sixth and seventeenth among spenders, but second and sixth among 
contributors. Associations declined to four (six among the top contributors) , 
and co-ops remained constant with one (the same as in the contributors listing). 
The top five PAC spenders in 1980 included four conservative non-connected 
groups and one association. 
The 20 biggest PACs in 1982  able 19) spent between $1,202,475 and 
$10,404,521, 20 and 38 percent higher, respectively, than the 1980 range and 
twice and four times the respective amounts given by the twentieth largest and 
the largest PAC contributors that year. The number of PACs ranked in both the 
top contributors and spenders lists for 1982 fell to eight. Nine of the twelve 
top spenders not ranked among the largest contributors were non-connected, 
including four conservative groups (Congressional Club, NCPAC, FCM, and CSFC), 
one liberal group (NCEC), and four partisan/ideological groups (Citizens for 
the Republic, Fund for a Democratic Majority, Committee for the Future of 
America, and Republican Majority Fund) known for their close ties to prominent 
pol it ical figures (Ronald Reagan, Edward Kennedy, Walter Mondale, and Howard 
Baker, respectively). With nine PACs listed in Table 19, the non-connected PACs 
were the largest group, in contrast with none listed among the 20 largest 
contributors. Trade groups and co-ops remained constant in number in 1982 at 
four and one, respectively (six and one among top contributors). Membership 
groups rose to two, with the addition of the League of Conservation Voters; only 
the NRA was ranked in Table 15. Labor PACs declined from five to four in 1982, 
with the notable absence of the AFL-CIO COPE; this was in contrast with the twelve 
labor PACs among the top contributors. The top five spenders included three 
conservative and one liberal non-connected committees and one trade association. 
TABLE 16. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1976 1/ - 
National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(non-connected) 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
( non-connec ted) 
Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee 
(Gun Owners of America) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
(non-connected) 
American Medical Political Action Committee 
(American Medical Association) 
Committee for Thorough Political Agricultural Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 
( AFL-CIO) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto Workers) 
American Conservative Union Political Action Committee 
(American Conservative Union) 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(~ational Association of Realtors) 
NEA Political Action Committee 
(National Education Association) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(United Transportation Union) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(International Association of Machinists) 
Agricultural and Dairy Educational Political Trust 
(Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.) 
United Steelworkers Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
ILGWU Campaign Committee 
(International Ladies Garment Workers Union) 
Trust for Special Political Agricultural Community 
Education 
(Dairymen, Inc.) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(National Association of Automobile Dealers) 
Active Ballot Club 
(Retail Clerks International Association) 
MEBA Political Action Fund 
(Marine Engineers Beneficial Association) 
* Affiliation does not necessarily correspond to legal status. 
1/ Adjusted expenditures represents the gross disbursements of the 
comiTtee minus monies transferred to af filiated committees. 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission (unpublished data). 
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TABLE 17. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1978 - 1/ 
Rank Committee (and ~ffiliation) Expenditures 
-- - 
Citizens for the Republic 
(non-connected) 
National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(non-connected) 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
(non-connected) 
American Medical Political Action Committee 
(American Medical Association) 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(~ational Association of ~ealtors) 
Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee 
( ~ u n  Owners of ~rnerica) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(National Association of Automobile Dealers) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 
( AFL-CIO) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto workers) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
(non-connected) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers,Inc.) 
Transportat ion Political Education League 
(United Transportation Union) 
United Steelworkers of America Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
Texas Medical Political Action Committee 
(Texas Medical Association) 
The John Connally Citizens Forum 
(non-connected) 
Conservative Victory Fund 
(non-connected) 
California Medical Political Action Committee 
(~ali fornia Medical Association) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(International Association of Machinists) 
Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust 
(Association of Trial Lawyers of America) 
CWA-COPE Political Contributions Committee 
(Connnunication Workers of America) 
11 Adjusted expenditures represents the gross disbursements of 
the =&it tee minus monies transferred to af fi liated committees. 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Cornmission (press release): 
April 24, 1980. 
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TABLE 18. Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1980 1/ - 




Fund for a Conservative Majority 
(non-connected) 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(National Association of Realtors) 
Citizens for the Republic 
(non-connected) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto workers) 
Americans for an Effective Presidency 
(non-connected) 
American Medical Political Action Committee 
(American Medical Association) 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
(non-connected) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
( non-connec ted) 
Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee 
(Gun Owners of America) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(National Association of Automobile Dealers) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc .) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(United Transportation union) 
NRA Political Victory Fund 
(National Rifle Association) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(International Association of Machinists) 
AFL-CIO COPE Political Contributions Committee 
( AFL-CIO) 
Americans for Change 
(non-connected) 
Life Underwriters Political Action Committee 
(National Association of Life Underwriters) 
United Steelworkers Political Action Fund 
(United Steelworkers of America) 
1/ Adjusted expenditures represents gross disbursements of the 
committee minus monies transferred to affiliated committees. 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Releases Final PAC 
Report For 1979-80 Election Cycle (press release): Feb. 21, 1982. 
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TABLE 19: Top 20 PACs Ranked by Adjusted Expenditures: 1982 - 1/ 
-- -_---- I_yl_-- ------ - 
Rank Committee (and Affiliation) Expenditures 
-- -_I_ - I -  --- 
National Congressional Club $10,404,521 
(non-connected) 
National Conservative Political Action Committee 10,118,891 
(non-connected) 
Realtors Political Action Committee 
(National Association of Realtors) 
Fund for a Conservative Majority 
(non-connected) 
National Committee for an Effective Congress 
( non-connec t ed) 
American Medical Association Political Action Committee 
(American Medical ~ssociation) 
Citizens for the Republic 
(non-connected) 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
(non-connected) 
Fund for a Democratic Majority 
(non-connected) 
UAW Voluntary Community Action Program 
(United Auto Workers) 
Committee for the Future of America 
(non-connected) 
Republican Major it y Fund 
(non-connected) 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 
(International Association of Machinists) 
Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education 
(Associated Milk Producers, Inc.) 
National Education Association Political Action Committee 
(National Education Association) 
California Medical Political Action Committee 
(California Medical Association) 
NRA Political Victory Fund 
(National Rifle Association) 
Transportation Political Education League 
(United Transportation union) 
League of Conservation Voters 
(League of Conservation voters) 
Automobile and Truck Dealers Election Action Committee 
(National Association of Automobile ~ealers) 
1/ Adjusted expenditures represents gross disbursements of the committee 
minus-monies transferred to affiliated committees. 
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 
PAC Study (press release): Nov. 29, 1983. 
I n  r e v i e w i n g  t h e  l i s t s  o f  t h e  l a r g e s t  s p e n d e r s  among PACs from 1976- 1982,  
a p a r t  from any compar i sons  w i t h  t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t  l i s t s  of  l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  
s e v e r a l  s i g n i f i c a n t  t r e n d s  can  be  d i s c e r n e d .  The f i r s t  i s  t h e  enormous i n c r e a s e  
i n  j u s t  e i g h t  y e a r s  i n  t h e  amount o f  money s p e n t  by  t h e  PACs. Whereas t h e  
c u t - o f f  l e v e l  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  among t h e  t o p  20 was around h a l f  a  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  
i n  1976,  i t  more t h a n  doubled  t o  $1.2 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  1982. And w h i l e  t h e  
t o p  PAC i n  1976 s p e n t  an  i m p r e s s i v e  $2 .9  m i l l i o n ,  t h e  1982 h i g h  was more t h a n  
t h r e e  t i m e s  a s  much--$10.4 m i l l i o n .  
The second n o t a b l e  t r e n d  h a s  been  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  l a b o r  PACs among t h e  b i g  
s p e n d e r s  by  more t h a n  h a l f ,  from n i n e  i n  1976 t o  f o u r  i n  1982.  T h i s  d e c l i n e  
h a s  been  accompanied by a  t h i r d  t r e n d ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  non-connected PACs; 
t h r e e  were i n c l u d e d  i n  1976,  and ,  by  1982,  t h e i r  number had r eached  n i n e .  
C o n c o m i t a n t l y ,  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs ( c o n s i s t i n g  of  some from t h e  membership 
and some from t h e  non-connected c a t e g o r i e s )  have  doub led  i n  number s i n c e  1976,  
a n d ,  i n  1982,  more t h a n  h a l f  o f  t h e  l a r g e s t  PACs were  i d e o l o g i c a l  o r  i s s u e -  
o r i e n t e d  i n  n a t u r e  ( a s  opposed t o  t h e  economic o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  b u s i n e s s  and 
l a b o r  g r o u p s ) .  Whi le  c o n s e r v a t i v e  g roups  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  prominent  i n  1982,  
t h e y  d i d  no t  domina te  t h e  f i e l d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h e y  had i n  1980 when n i n e  o u t  
o f  t h e  t e n  such  PACs were c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n  n a t u r e .  A p p a r e n t l y ,  t h e i r  p e r c e i v e d  
s u c c e s s e s  i n  1980 had prompted s t r o n g e r  e f f o r t s  by  l i b e r a l  and Democra t ic -  
o r i e n t e d  g roups  i n  1982.  
The f i n a l  ma jo r  t r e n d  h a s  been  t h e  t endency  o f  a  few l a r g e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
PACs t o  skew t h e  o v e r a l l  spend ing  f i g u r e s .  The t o p  two PAC s p e n d e r s  i n  e a c h  
o f  t h e  f o u r  e l e c t i o n s  were c o n s e r v a t i v e  g roups  whose d o l l a r  t o t a l s  were 
d i s t i n c t l y  h i g h e r  ( and  more d r a m a t i c a l l y  s o  w i t h  each  s u c c e e d i n g  e l e c t i o n )  
t h a n  t h e  n e x t  o t h e r s  on t h e  l i s t .  I n  1976,  t h e  t o p  two PACs s p e n t  $2 .9  and 
$2 .2  m i l l i o n ,  w i t h  o n l y  $150,000 s e p a r a t i n g  t h e  second and t h i r d  h i g h e s t  
groups.  I n  1978,  t h e  t o p  two spen t  $4.5 and $3.0 m i l l i o n ,  w i th  t h e  second 
l a r g e s t  exceeding t h e  t h i r d  by 50 percent--a gap of $1  m i l l i o n .  I n  1980, t h e  
t o p  two groups spen t  $7.5 and $7.2 m i l l i o n ,  exceeding t h e  t h i r d  l a r g e s t  PAC 
by 129 pe rcen t ,  o r  $4 m i l l i on .  The two b i g  spenders  of  1982 ( t h e  same two a s  
i n  1980, i n  f a c t )  spen t  $10.4 and $10.1 m i l l i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  t h i r d  ranked group 
spending n e a r l y  $7 mill ion--or 222 percent-- less  than  t h e  second. For t h e  
f i r s t  t ime i n  1982, t h e  t h i r d  h ighes t  spender was no t  a l s o  a  conse rva t ive  
i d e o l o g i c a l  o r  i s s u e  o rgan iza t ion ;  t he  Rea l to r s  PAC spent  an  impressive $3.1 
m i l l i o n ,  r e p o r t e d l y  i n  p a r t  r e f l e c t i n g  stepped-up o p e r a t i o n s  by t h e  group and 
p a r t l y  because of  an  independent expendi ture  e f f o r t  by t h i s  major t r a d e  
o rgan iza t ion .  The next  subsec t ion  w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  skewing of  t h e  expendi ture  
s t a t i s t i c s  by t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs by explor ing  t h e  ques t i on  of  where 
t h e  enormous sums of  money have been going ,  a s  i t  i s  apparen t  t h a t  they 
have n o t  been spen t  i n  l a r g e  measure on candida te  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
c .  Comparison of t h e  l a r g e s t  spenders  and c o n t r i b u t o r s  among PACs 
The a t t e n t i o n  given t o  t he  b ig  PAC spenders  and c o n t r i b u t o r s  r e f l e c t s  a n  
i n t e r e s t  i n  determining which groups have acqui red  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
i n f luenc ing  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process .  This s e c t i o n  has  explored t h i s  t o p i c ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  con tex t  of  t h e  aggrega te  d a t a  presented f o r  c a t e g o r i e s  
of  PACs i n  Tables  8 and 9. Before a r r i v i n g  a t  some conc lus ions  about t h e  
l a r g e s t  PACs and t h e  s t anda rds  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t he  two d i f f e r e n t  schemes f o r  
a r ranging  them, one a d d i t i o n a l  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  gauging an i n t e r e s t  g roup ' s  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  i n f luence  should be noted. 
A s  mentioned e a r l i e r ,  some unions and co rpo ra t i ons  sponsor more than one 
PAC, d e s p i t e  t h e  a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  provis ions  of t h e  1976 FECA Amendments, 
which sub jec t ed  a l l  t h e  PACs e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  same paren t  o rgan iza t ion  t o  a  
s i n g l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  per  c a n d i d a t e  ($5000) .  It was in tended  t o  reduce  
t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  p r o l i f e r a t i n g  PACs w i t h i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n .  It a p p e a r s ,  
however, t h a t  t h e r e  may b e  o t h e r  i n c e n t i v e s  working i n  f avor  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  
m u l t i p l e  s e g r e g a t e d  funds--for example, g r e a t e r  e a s e  i n  avo id ing  d e t e c t i o n  
of t h e  p a r e n t  g r o u p ' s  accumulated power. P r o l i f e r a t i o n  may a l s o  a f f o r d  g r e a t e r  
e a s e  i n  f u n d r a i s i n g ,  by hav ing  d i f f e r e n t  PACs i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  b ranches  of a  
union o r  c o r p o r a t i o n .  Although t h e  s i n g l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  per  c a n d i d a t e  i s  
i n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  o r  union could  r e t a i n  t h e  power t o  
de te rmine  how t h e  funds  r a i s e d  by a l l  of i t s  a f f i l i a t e d  PACs w i l l  be s p e n t .  
I n  1980, f o r  example, American Telephone & Telegraph sponsored 23 PACs 
whose g r o s s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  were $893,637 and whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  t o t a l e d  $654,250.  While t h e  former amount would not  have p laced  
AT&T among t h e  t o p  20 spenders  even had t h e y  been a r ranged  by s p o n s o r i n g  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e  l a t t e r  f i g u r e  would l i k e l y  have l ed  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
i n c l u s i o n  a s  t h e  t e n t h  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  On a  
s m a l l e r  s c e l e  bu t  i l l u s t r a t i v e  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e  LTV C o r p o r a t i o n  sponsored 
s i x  PACs which s p e n t  $446,819 i n  1980, $229,430 of which went t o  F e d e r a l  
c a n d i d a t e s ,  and Dow Chemica l ' s  e i g h t  PACs s p e n t  $350,338,  of  which $270,700 
went t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  1231 -
These d a t a  r e v e a l  t h a t  by s p o n s o r i n g  s e v e r a l  PACs, t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which 
an o r g a n i z a t i o n  p l a y s  a  f i n a n c i a l  r o l e  i n  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  may b e  obscured .  
I t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  t o  b e a r  t h i s  phenomenon i n  mind when c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  
c a s e  of t h e  c o r p o r a t e  PACs, which, d e s p i t e  t h e i r  l a r g e  numbers and l a r g e  
a g g r e g a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  f a i l e d  t o  rank among t h e  l a r g e s t  spenders  o r  
1231 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  -
A c t i v i t y ,  1979-1980. F i n a l  Repor t :  P a r t y  and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l  
Committees. Vol.  3  - Non-Party D e t a i l e d  Tab les  ( C o r p o r a t e  and Labor ) .  
Washington,  J a n .  1982. 
c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  any yea r  examined he re in .  But,  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of PACs i s  not  
l i m i t e d  t o  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  The AFL-CIO, f o r  example, sponsored 17 PACs a p a r t  
from i t s  pre-eminent COPE P o l i t i c a l  Cont r ibu t ions  Committee. Undoubtedly, 
t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and expendi tures  would improve t h e  o v e r a l l  ranking o f  
t h e  AFL-CIO vis-a-vis  o t h e r  PAC sponsors .  Because t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e p o r t  
adopts  t h e  method of  ranking PAC spending by committee,  r a t h e r  than  sponsor ,  
i t  i s  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  r e v e a l  which PACs may be cons idered  t h e  most important  
r a t h e r  than  which i n t e r e s t  groups may be considered t h e  most important  
p o l i t i c a l l y .  Because few groups sponsor more than  one PAC, t h i s  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
is  n o t  o f  o v e r r i d i n g  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  
The two most noteworthy t r e n d s  evidencea from t h e  comparison between 
Tables  10-15 and Tables 16-19 a r e  very  much i n t e r r e l a t e d :  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  gap 
evidenced s i n c e  1976 i n  t h e  r a t i o  of  spenders  t o  c o n t r i b u t o r s  and t h e  
i n c r e a s i n g  predominance among top  PAC spenders  o f  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  (most ly  
conse rva t ive )  groups.  A s  demonstrated by t h e  aggrega te  d a t a  i n  Table 3 ,  
t h e  percentage of PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  ad jus t ed  PAC expend i tu re s  has  ranged 
s i n c e  1976 between t h e  4 2  and 4 6  percent  l e v e l  o r ,  i n  o t h e r  words, somewhat 
less than one PAC d o l l a r  i n  two has  been con t r ibu t ed  d i r e c t l y  t o  Federa l  
cand ida t e s .  The comparison between Tables  8  and 9 had shown t h a t  t h e  1 t o  2 
r a t i o  was roughly a p p l i c a b l e  between 1978 and 1982 t o  every  ca t ego ry  of PAC, 
except  f o r  t h e  non-connected grouping. I n  1982, between 52 and 63 percent  of 
expendi tures  by t h e  t h r e e  o t h e r  major types  of  PACs went i n t o  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  
bu t  on ly  17 percent  of  t h e  non-connected PAC expendi tures  took  t h a t  form; only 
one d o l l a r  i n  s i x  was spen t  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( i n  1980, t h e  r a t i o  was on ly  1 : 8 ) .  
For t h e  l a r g e s t  spenders  and c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  r a t h e r  than approximating the  
1 t o  2  r a t i o  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  most PAC groups,  t h e  gap  has  grown s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
wider s i n c e  1976. I n  1976, t h e  20th l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  gay? 5 6  percent  a s  
much in contributions as the 20th largest spender spent; this proportion 
dropped to 47 percent in 1978, and to 43 percent in 1980; this trend was 
reversed in 1982 with a 52 percent figure. At the other end of the range, 
of more interest here, the largest contributor in 1976 gave 40 percent as 
much to candidates as was spent by the largest spending PAC; the proportion 
dropped to 36 percent in 1978 and to only 20 percent in 1980 and 1982. 
The increasingly high levels of expenditures by the ideological, 
nonconnected PACs, in conjunction with their relatively low levels of 
direct support for candidates, have been responsible for this trend. While 
the nonconnected group increased their representation among top spenders 
from three to nine from 1976-1982, their numbers among top contributors 
fell from two to zero in that same period. !Jhile contributions to Federal 
candidates constituted at least half, and often well over half, of adjusted 
expenditures by virtually every other PAC on the top spenders lists, this 
was far from true for the nonconnected PACs. A look at financial activity 
of the large conservative PACs in 1980 and 1982 will highlight the major 
contributing factors. 
Of the $7.5 million spent by NCPAC in 1980, only $237,806 was given as 
contributions to Federal candidates, while $3.3 million was spent independently 
for and against candidates. - 124/ A Varch 1981 estimate placed NCPAC's operating 
expenses at $2.1 million and its direct-mail costs at $1.8 million. - 1251 In 
1982, NCPAC reported expenditures of $10.1 million, of which $264,357 (2.6 
124/ Ibid. Vol. 4 - Non-Party Detailed Tables (No Connected Organization, 
~rade/Membershi~/~ealth, Cooperative, Corporation Without Stock). p. CgO; 
U.S. Federal Xlection Commission. FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures 
Top $16 Million (press release): Mov. 29, 1981. 
125/ Shaw, New Right Gave Candidates Little, p. 20A. -
p e r c e n t )  was c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  and $3.2 m i l l i o n  (31 .4  p e r c e n t )  
was f o r  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  1261 
The Congress iona l  Club s p e n t  $7.2 m i l l i o n  i n  1980, of  which $72,3&3 went 
t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  and $4,601,069 was s p e n t  independen t ly .  - 1271 According 
t o  one a c c o u n t ,  t h e  $4.6 m i l l i o n  f i g u r e  f o r  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  g r e a t l y  
o v e r s t a t e d  t h e  l e v e l  of c a n d i d a t e - o r i e n t e d  a c t i v i t y ;  i n  f a c t ,  i t  a s s e r t e d ,  a s  
much a s  $3.9  m i l l i o n  of  t h e  $4.6 m i l l i o n  went f o r  d i r e c t - m a i l  f u n d r a i s i n g .  1281 
I n  1982, of  t h e  $10.4 m i l l i o n  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  C o n g r e s s i o ~ a l  
I 
Club ,  o n l y  $135,263 ( 1 . 3  p e r c e n t )  was c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s ;  no 
independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  were r e p o r t e d .  - 1291 
Such groups  a s  Americans f o r  Change and Americans f o r  an E f f e c t i v e  
P r e s i d e n c y  were o rgan ized  i n  1980 e x p r e s s l y  f o r  t h e  purpose  of conduc t ing  
independent  e x p e n d i t u r e  campaigns on b e h a l f  of  Ronald Reagan. Those two 
groups  s p e n t  n e a r l y  $2 m i l l i o n  independen t ly  and o n l y  $30,250 i n  d i r e c t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  - 1301 Thus,  t h e  gap between spending and c o n t r i b u t i n g  can s t i l l  
be seen  l a r g e l y  i n  terms of f u n d r a i s i n g  c o s t s  and independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
The a f o r e g o i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  not  i n t e n d e d  t o  imply t h a t  o n l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
groups  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e  l a r g e  gap between o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and d i r e c t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  I n  1982, s e v e r a l  l i b e r a l  o r  Democrat ic-or iented groups  s p e n t  
126/  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  -
A c t i v i t y ,  1981-1982. F i n a l  Repor t .  P a r t y  and Non-Party P o l i t i c a l  Comni t t ees .  
Vol.  I V .  Washington,  1983; U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC I s s u e s  
F i n a l  Repor t  on 1981-82 Independent  E x p e n d i t u r e s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  O c t .  14; 1983. 
1271 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  -
A c t i v i t i t y ,  1979-1980. Vol.  4.  p. C42. 
1281 Shaw, New Right  Gave Cand ida tes  L i t t l e .  -
1291 U.S. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y ,  1981-1982. Vol.  I V ;  and -
FEC I s s u e s  F i n a l  Repor t  on 1981-82 Independent  E x p e n d i t u r e s .  
130 /  U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  -
A c t i v i t y ,  1979-1980. Vol. 4 .  p. C12. 
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l a r g e  sums of money, w i t h  o n l y  a  f r a c t i o n  t h e r e o f  f o r  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  
Independent  Ac t ion  c o n t r i b u t e d  o n l y  9  p e r c e n t  of i t s  $1.2 m i l l i o n  ( w i t h  
ano the r  11 p e r c e n t  on independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s ) ,  whi le  t h e  two major cand ida te -  
o r i e n t e d  PACs--Fund f o r  a  Democratic M a j o r i t y  and Committee f o r  t h e  F u t u r e  of  
America--contr ibuted o n l y  8  and 10.5 p e r c e n t  of t h e i r  o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  - 1311 
However, i t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  focus  on t h e  l a r g e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  PACs 
i n  view of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  j u s t  two groups--NCPAC and t h e  Congress iona l  Club-- 
were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  more than  t e n  pe rcen t  of t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  by a l l  3 ,371 
PACs i n  1982, wi th  l e s s  than  one-half  pe rcen t  go ing  f o r  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  
and t h a t  one of  them--NCPAC--was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  more t h a n  h a l f  t h e  independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  t h a t  y e a r .  
With l a r g e  o r  u n l i m i t e d  poo l s  of p o t e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  t h e  non-connected 
PACs have i n c r e a s i n g l y  tu rned  t o  d i r e c t - m a i l  a s  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  way t o  r e a c h  
l a r g e  numbers o f  people  sympathe t i c  t o  t h e i r  ph i losophy .  For c o n s e r v a t i v e  
g roups ,  t h i s  t r e n d  h a s  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  t h e  p i o n e e r i n g  e f f o r t s  i n  t h e  d i r e c t - m a i l  
f i e l d  by conservat ives--most  n o t a b l y  Richard Viguerie--anxious t o  a s s i s t  
c a n d i d a t e s  of s i m i l a r  ideo logy  through s o p h i s t i c a t e d  d i r e c t - m a i l  t e c h n i q u e s  
and in-house l i s t s  of  m i l l i o n s  of l i k e l y  c o n t r i b u t o r s .  Only r e c e n t l y  have 
l i b e r a l  groups  begun t o  improve t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  d i r e c t - m a i l  f i e l d .  
Thus,  t h e  d i r e c t - m a i l  avenue i s  one t h a t  i s  conducive  t o  t h e  m i s s i o n  of 
i d e o l o g i c a l  g roups ,  and i t s  g r e a t e r  development t o  d a t e  by c o n s e r v a t i v e s  has  
made i t  an e s p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  method f o r  c o n s e r v a t i v e  PACs t o  a d o p t .  
The o t h e r  major f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  h i g h  expenses  of c o n s e r v a t i v e  
i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs h a s  been t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  o p e r a t e  o u t s i d e  of  more 
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  channe l s  f o r  i n t e r e s t  group i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
1311 U.S. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  A c t i v i t y ,  1981-1982. Vol.  I V .  -
p r o c e s s .  While o f f i c i a l s  of b o t h  major p a r t i e s  have expressed  concern  over  t h e  
t r e n d  toward more independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  c o n s e r v a t i v e  groups  have tended t o  
defend them a s  a  l o g i c a l  r e sponse  t o  what t h e y  s e e  a s  t h e  FECA's undue 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  Fur the rmore ,  independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e  campaigns,  a s  a  h i g h l y  v i s i b l e  endeavor ( i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  d i r e c t  
c a n d i d a t e  g i v i n g ) ,  have p robab ly  had some impact on t h e  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  groups  t o  r a i s e  money. =/ 
F i n a l l y ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  s p e n d e r - c o n t r i b u t o r  gap and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  spend ing  by c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  non-connected PACs, i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  
t o  o b s e r v e  t h a t  by e x c l u d i n g  t h e  t o p  two PAC s p e n d e r s  from 1976-1982, t h e  gap 
between s p e n d e r s  and c o n t r i b u t o r s  more n e a r l y  approx imates  t h e  1 t o  2 r a t i o  
d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r .  Not o n l y  have t h e  non-connected PACs skewed t h e  spend ing /  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  d a t a ,  b u t  t h i s  has  been e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  of  a  few major ,  h i g h l y  
v i s i b l e ,  l a r g e  spending PACs i n  each e l e c t i o n .  
Having exp lo red  t h e  growing gap between t h e  t o p  s p e n d e r s  and c o n t r i b u t o r s  
and t h e  dominance of  t h e  former by t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  non-connected PACs, t h e  
o t h e r  compara t ive  o b s e r v a t i o n s  appear  l a r g e l y  t o  be s imply by-products  o f  t h e  
o t h e r  t r e n d s .  Labor PACs dominated t h e  f i e l d  i n  t e rms  of  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  a l l  s i x  e l e c t i o n s ,  bu t  t h e y  i n c r e a s i n g l y  were unable  t o  
compete w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  f u n d r a i s i n g  a b i l i t y  of t h e  non-connected g roups .  Thus,  
t h e i r  r a n k s  d e c r e a s e d  among t h e  l a r g e s t  spenders .  Trade a s s o c i a t i o n s  grew 
among t h e  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  b u t  t h e i r  numbers remained c o n s t a n t  among t h e  
l a r g e  s p e n d e r s .  They, a l s o ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  g e n e r a l l y  i m p r e s s i v e  f u n d r a i s i n g  
r e c o r d ,  were unab le  t o  match t h e  fund ing  l e v e l s  of t h e  l a r g e ,  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs. 
1321 Independent  E x p e n d i t u r e s :  T a c t i c s  and S t r a t e g y .  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  -
R e p o r t ,  v.  3 ,  August 1 6 ,  1980: 9-10. 
PAC Spending S i n c e  1972: Where t h e  Money Has Gone 
The pr imary focus  of  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  on t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  of  PAC g i v i n g  
d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  s i x  e lec t ions--how PAC money h a s  been d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  
i n  t e rms  o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  and e l e c t o r a l  s t a t u s  (whether  incumbent,  
c h a l l e n g e r ,  o r  open-seat  c o n t e s t a n t ) .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  in tended  t o  promote a  
b e t t e r  unders tand ing  of  some of t h e  key p o i n t s  of  c o n t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  
d e b a t e  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of  PACs, s p e c i f i c a l l y  whether t h e r e  is  a  p a r t i s a n  s l a n t  
i n  PAC g i v i n g  (and whether i t  has  undergone a  s h i f t )  and whether an incumbency 
b i a s  does  e x i s t  among PACs. P a r t  1 examines t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  from t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  of  t h e  PACs (and a l s o  sheds  some l i g h t  on how t h e  s p e c i f i c  t y p e s  
of  PACs have been d i s t r i b u t i n g  t h e i r  money wi th  regard  t o  t h e  p a r t y  and 
s t a t u s  v a r i a b l e s ) .  P a r t  2 looks  a t  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  from t h e  c a n d i d a t e  
perspective--how much have PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  p layed a  r o l e  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  
of  campaigns,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  p a r t y  and c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s .  
1. Cand ida te  P r e f e r e n c e s  From t h e  PAC P e r s p e c t i v e  
Tab les  20 and 21 p r e s e n t  t h e  d a t a  on how PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have been 
d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  s i n c e  1972, accord ing  t o  p a r t y  and e l e c t o r a l  s t a t u s .  
They i n c l u d e  s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  bo th  House and Sena te  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n s  (p r imary  l o s e r s  a r e  exc luded) .  While Table  20 p r e s e n t s  a g g r e g a t e  
d a t a  f o r  a l l  PACs, Tab le  21 b reaks  t h e  d a t a  down by c a t e g o r i e s  of PACs. 
As evidenced i n  Tab le  20,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  has  s h i f t e d  
s i n c e  1972 from an overwhelming Democratic b i a s  t o  a  more c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n  
between t h e  two p a r t i e s '  c a n d i d a t e s .  I n  1972 and 1974, Democratic c a n d i d a t e s  
r e c e i v e d  over  twice  a s  much i n  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  d i d  Republ ican c a n d i d a t e s ;  
t h e  Democratic advan tage  d e c l i n e d  s l i g h t l y  i n  1976,  b u t  i t  remained i n  t h e  

TABLE 20. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Congress iona l  Cand ida tes  i n  Genera l  
E l e c t i o n s  by P a r t y  and S t a t u s  of  Cand ida tes :  1972-1982 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s  and p e r c e n t a g e s )  - 11--Continued 
For 1976: Common Cause. 1976 F e d e r a l  Campaign F inances .  I n t e r e s t  Group 
and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Congress iona l  C a n d i d a t e s .  Washington,  
1978. v .  1. p. v i i i .  
For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. I n t e r i m  Report  no. 5--U.S. Sena te  and House Campaigns. 
Washington,  J u n e  1979. p .  32 ,  34. 
For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Re leases  F i n a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  on 1979-80 Congress iona l  Races ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  March 7 ,  1982. 
For  1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Re leases  F i n a l  Repor t  
on 1981-82 Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
I n  terms o f  c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s ,  Tab le  20 r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e  incumbency b i a s  
among PACs i s  indeed p r e s e n t  and t h a t  i t  has  grown s i n c e  1972. I n  t h a t  y e a r ,  
rough ly  one-half  o f  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  went t o  incumbent Members of Congress ;  
t h i s  p r o p o r t i o n  cl imbed i n  1974 and a g a i n  i n  1976,  dropped i n  1978, and r o s e  
a g a i n  i n  1980,  t o  n e a r l y  t w o - t h i r d s .  By 1982, more than  two- th i rds  of  PAC 
money (68  p e r c e n t )  was g iven  t o  incumbents.  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  
c h a l l e n g i n g  incumbents h a s  f l u c t u a t e d  between t h e  one-quar te r  and o n e - f i f t h  
l e v e l ,  w i t h  a  f o u r  pe rcen t  r i s e  i n  1980 followed by a  seven pe rcen t  d e c l i n e  i n  
1982. Most of  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  incumbents h a s  come a t  
t h e  expense of open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s .  While such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  c o n s t i t u t e d  
one- four th  of  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1972, t h i s  p e r c e n t a g e  f e l l  i n  1974 and 
aga in  i n  1976, r o s e  i n  1978 (when incumbents '  s h a r e  d e c l i n e d ) ,  and f e l l  s h a r p l y  
i n  1980 t o  o n l y  12 p e r c e n t ;  t h e r e  was a  s l i g h t  i n c r e a s e  of one pe rcen t  i n  1982. 
A t  i s s u e  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  over  c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  t o  PAC 
spend ing  i s  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  pr imary g o a l  sought  by p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  
through t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  I s  money g iven  p r i m a r i l y  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
p h i l o s o p h i e s  and/or  economic i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  group,  o r  i s  i t  g i v e n  p r i m a r i l y  
a s  a  means of  g a i n i n g  t h e  goodwil l  of and t h e r e b y  a c c e s s  t o  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s ?  
I n  t h e  former c a s e ,  i t  would seem t o  f o l l o w  t h a t  t h e r e  would be  a  h i g h  
c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h i e s  of  t h e  PAC and t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  
i t  s u p p o r t s .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  it would appear  more l o g i c a l  t o  s u p p o r t  
c a n d i d a t e s  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  l i k e l i h o o d  of b e i n g  e l e c t e d ,  w i t h  t h e i r  
c o m p a t a b i l i t y  w i t h  o n e ' s  own phi losophy de-emphasized a s  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
Although incumbent S e n a t o r s  have n o t  f a r e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s ,  between 86 and 96 p e r c e n t  of incumbent House Members have been 
r e - e l e c t e d  i n  e v e r y  yea r  s i n c e  1950. E/ G e n e r a l l y ,  r a c e s  i n v o l v i n g  
incumbents a r e  not  a s  c o m p e t i t i v e  a s  open-seat  c o n t e s t s ;  t h e  open s e a t  
c o n t e n d e r s  t y p i c a l l y  spend much l a r g e r  sums of  money, a s  w e l l .  
Given t h e  d e c i s i v e  b i a s  of  PACs i n  f a v o r  of incumbents ,  who g e n e r a l l y  do 
n o t  need t h e  same d e g r e e  of  funding a s  do open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s ,  t h e  d a t a  i n  
Tab le  20 l e n d s  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  "access"  t h e o r y  behind PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  How 
t h i s  t h e o r y  h o l d s  up i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e r  f low of money t o  
Repub l icans ,  who, even a f t e r  1980, c o n s t i t u t e  a  s m a l l e r  s h a r e  of incumbents 
t h a n  do Democrats,  w i l l  be e x p l o r e d  i n  T a b l e  23,  which merges t h e  p a r t y  and 
c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s  v a r i a b l e s .  
The f i n d i n g s  i n  Tab le  20 a r e  a m p l i f i e d  i n  T a b l e  21 by t h e  breakdown of 
t h e  d a t a  i n t o  t h e  four  p r i n c i p a l  c a t e g o r i e s  i n t o  which PACs today a r e  grouped 
by  t h e  FEC. One can t h u s  examine t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n s  of  t h e  major 
s e c t o r s  of  t h e  PAC community, t h u s  g a i n i n g  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  t r e n d s  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  T a b l e  20. (As i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  n o t e s  t o  Tab le  21,  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  and t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs i n  
t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  d i f f e r s  from t h a t  used i n  T a b l e s  8  and 9 ;  t h e  pr imary v a l u e  of  
1331 R e - e l e c t i o n  Success  of Incumbents.  Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y  -
Weekly R e p o r t s ,  v.  38 ,  A p r i l  5 ,  1980: 908. 
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t h o s e  c a t e g o r i e s  i n  t h o s e  y e a r s  l i e s  i n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  r a t h e r  
than  t h e  d o l l a r  amounts.)  
I n  t e rms  of  p a r t y  b i a s e s ,  t h e  c l e a r e s t  p a t t e r n  i s  seen  i n  t h e  c o n s i s t e n t  
and overwhelming suppor t  which t h e  l a b o r  PACs have provided t o  Democratic 
c a n d i d a t e s ,  who r e c e i v e d  between 93-97 p e r c e n t  of  l a b o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  
every  e l e c t i o n .  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Democrats from organ ized  l a b o r  a p p a r e n t l y  
have enabled them t o  a t t r a c t  a  g r e a t e r  s h a r e  of  PAC money o v e r a l l  than 
Republ icans  have,  i n  s p i t e  of  t h e  enormous s t r i d e s  made by c o r p o r a t e  and t r a d e  
PACs i n  c h a n n e l i n g  money t o  Republ ican c a n d i d a t e s  i n  r e c e n t  e l e c t i o n s .  
No d e f i n i t i v e  p a t t e r n  emerges r e g a r d i n g  l a b o r  PACs' c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s  
o r i e n t a t i o n .  Whereas t h e y  were t h e  most d i s t i n c t l y  incumbent-or iented group 
i n  1980 (when t h r e e - f o u r t h s  of t h e i r  money went t o  incumbents ) ,  t h i s  was 
h a r d l y  t h e  c a s e  i n  1982 when 58 p e r c e n t  of l a b o r  money was g iven  t o  incumbents.  
The l a t t e r  d e c l i n e ,  accompanied by a  huge i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  of  s u p p o r t  f o r  
c h a l l e n g e r s  (29  p e r c e n t ) ,  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g y  of o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r  
i n  t h e  wake of  i t s  d e f e a t s  i n  1980. Although l a b o r  PACs have s h i f t e d  t h e i r  
funds  from incumbents t o  c h a l l e n g e r s ,  depending upon t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s e a s o n ,  
t h e i r  suppor t  f o r  t h e  open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s  has  t r ended  d i s t i n c t l y  downward. 
The c o r p o r a t e  ( b u s i n e s s )  PACs have c o n t r i b u t e d  most of t h e i r  money t o  
Republ ican c a n d i d a t e s  i n  a l l  of  t h e  e l e c t i o n s  examined, bu t  t h e r e  h a s  occur red  
a  s i g n i f i c a n t  s h i f t  i n  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n .  From 1972 t o  1976,  t h e  
s h a r e  of b u s i n e s s  PAC money c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  Democratic c a n d i d a t e s  i n c r e a s e d  
each y e a r ,  from 29 p e r c e n t  t o  43 p e r c e n t ,  w h i l e  t h e  Republ ican s h a r e  d e c l i n e d  
from 71 t o  57 p e r c e n t .  Although Democratic c a n d i d a t e s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  thought  
t o  be l e s s  pro-business  than  Repub l icans ,  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  appeared 
t o  be  based on t h e  d e s i r e  of b u s i n e s s  t o  s u p p o r t  incumbents;  t h i s  i s  r e f l e c t e d  
i n  t h e  n e t  growth i n  suppor t  o f  incumbents by c o r p o r a t e  PACs between 1972-1976. 
T h i s  tendency on t h e  p a r t  of  b u s i n e s s  PACs was r e p o r t e d l y  a  s o u r c e  o f  
annoyance t o  GOP l e a d e r s ,  who f e l t  t h a t  t h e  Repub l ican  c a n d i d a t e s  g e n e r a l l y  
had a  b e t t e r  c l a i m  t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  community's s u p p o r t  t h a n  d i d  Democrats.  - 1341 
T h i s  sen t iment  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  remarks made by Ronald Reagan t o  p o l i t i c a l l y -  
o r i e n t e d  b u s i n e s s  l e a d e r s  i n  1978: 
I d o n ' t  t h i n k  t h e  Republ ican P a r t y  h a s  r e c e i v e d  t h e  k ind  of 
f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t  from c o r p o r a t e  PACs t h a t  i t s  r e c o r d  d e s e r v e s .  
Why does  h a l f  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  PAC money go t o  c a n d i d a t e s  who 
may not  b e  f r i e n d s  o f  b u s i n e s s ?  The b e s t  t h i n g  you can hope 
f o r  by f o l l o w i n g  an a n t i - b u s i n e s s ,  incumbent c o n t r i b u t i o n  pol-  
i c y  i s  t h a t  t h e  a l l i g a t o r  w i l l  e a t  you l a s t .  - 1351 
Although c o r p o r a t e  PACs con t inued  t h e i r  p r a c t i c e  of f a v o r i n g  incumbents 
and,  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  o n l y  b a r e l y  f a v o r i n g  Repub l icans  th rough  much o f  1978, t h i s  
p a t t e r n  changed d r a m a t i c a l l y  i n  t h e  c l o s i n g  weeks o f  t h a t  e l e c t i o n .  P r i o r  
t o  October  1, 1978, 53 p e r c e n t  of c o r p o r a t e  PAC money was g iven  t o  Repub l icans  
and 47 p e r c e n t  t o  Democrats; incumbents r e c e i v e d  72 p e r c e n t  of  c o r p o r a t e  PAC 
money i n  t h a t  same p e r i o d .  Between October  1 and October  23,  t h e  p a r t y  s p l i t  
s h i f t e d  t o  71-29 i n  t h e  Repub l icans '  f a v o r ,  and t h e  incumbents '  s h a r e  dropped 
t o  o n l y  49 p e r c e n t .  - 136/ Consequent ly ,  Tab le  21 r e f l e c t s  t h e  s h a r p  r i s e  from 
1976 t o  1978 i n  t h e  Republ ican s h a r e  of c o r p o r a t e  money and t h e  s h a r p  d r o p  i n  
incumbents '  s h a r e  ( w i t h  c h a l l e n g e r s  and,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s  t h e  
b e n e f i c i a r i e s ) .  The Republ ican s h a r e  remained a t  a  c o n s t a n t  two- th i rds  l e v e l  
i n  1980 and 1982, w h i l e  t h e  suppor t  f o r  incumbents and c h a l l e n g e r s  f l u c t u a t e d .  
The huge s h i f t  toward c h a l l e n g e r s  i n  1980 (31 p e r c e n t )  r e f l e c t e d  a  g r e a t e r  
r i s k  s t r a t e g y  by c o r p o r a t e  PACs; t h i s  was fo l lowed i n  1982 w i t h  a  major s h i f t  
1341 G l e n ,  Maxwell. A t  The Wire,  Corpora te  PACs Come Through f o r  -
t h e  GOP. N a t i o n a l  J o u r n a l ,  v .  11, February  3 ,  1979: 174. 
1351 I b i d .  -
I b i d . ,  p. 
back to incumbents (75 percent), reflecting a more protective strategy on behalf 
of a larger number of Republican Members of Congress. 
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TABLE 21. PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates in General 
Elections by Type of PAC and by Party and Status of Candidate: 
1972-1982 (in millions of dollars and percentages) - 11--Continued 
Party Status 
- 
Amo un t 
Type Year Given Dem Re P Inc. Chall. Open 
Trade/ 
~emb.1 1972 
Health 3/ - 
Non- 4/ 1972 
connect. 
1974 
11 Contributions to candidates in millions of dollars, rounded off to 
nearest tenth. Percentages of overall group contributions given to a type 
of candidate are based on the rounded off dollars and are themselves rounded 
off to the nearest whole percentage. The exception to this is the party 
TABLE 21. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Congress iona l  Cand ida tes  i n  General  
E l e c t i o n s  by Type of  PAC and by P a r t y  and S t a t u s  of  Candidate :  
1972-1982 ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  and p e r c e n t a g e s )  - 11--Continued 
p e r c e n t a g e s  ( f rom 1974-1978) i n  t h e  non-connected c a t e g o r y ,  which a r e  based 
on t o t a l  d o l l a r s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  b e t t e r  r e f l e c t  t h e  s p l i t s  and t r e n d s  than  
would p e r c e n t a g e s  based on rounded d o l l a r  amounts. 
2/  For  1972-1976, t h e  FEC's "corpora te"  c a t e g o r y  c o r r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  
" b u s i ~ e s s "  c a t e g o r y  of Common Cause. Thus, t h e  d a t a  f o r  1972-1976 a r e  no t  
e x a c t l y  comparable t o  t h o s e  f o r  1978-1982, a s  d i f f e r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  governed 
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  PACs i n  t h e  "bus iness"  vs .  "corpora te"  g roups .  
3 /  For  1972-1976, t h e  "trade/membership/health" c a t e g o r y ,  a s  d e f i n e d  by 
t h e  FE, c o r r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  " h e a l t h "  and "lawyers" g roup ings  used by Common 
Cause f o r  each o r  some of  t h o s e  t h r e e  y e a r s .  Thus,  t h e  d a t a  f o r  1972-1976 
a r e  not  e x a c t l y  comparable f o r  t h o s e  i n  1978-1982 because  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
s t a n d a r d s  used t o  de te rmine  PACs i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  c a t e g o r i e s .  T h i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
h a s  a  b e a r i n g  on t h e  enormous r i s e  i n  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
from 1976 t o  1978, which,  i n  p a r t ,  can be  exp la ined  by t h e  a d d i t i o n  of  
non-heal th  and non-lawyers PACs t o  t h e  c a t e g o r y .  
41 For 1974-1976, t h e  "non-connected" c a t e g o r y  used by t h e  FEC c o r r e l a t e s  
t o  t h g  " i d e o l o g i c a l "  grouping of Common Cause.  Most of  t o d a y ' s  i d e o l o g i c a l  
PACs a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  non-connected c a t e g o r y ,  a l though  t h e  l a t t e r  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  
some which a r e  n o t  i d e o l o g i c a l  i n  n a t u r e .  Thus, t h e  d a t a  f o r  1974-1976 a r e  
not  e x a c t l y  comparable t o  t h o s e  f o r  1978-1982, i n  view of  d i f f e r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  
a p p l i e d  t o  i n c l u d i n g  PACs i n  e i t h e r  group.  ( I d e o l o g i c a l  PACs i n  1972 were 
lumped i n t o  Common Cause ' s  "miscel laneous"  group,  and a r e  t h u s  not  r e f l e c t e d  
i n  t h i s  c h a r t . )  
* Based on whole d o l l a r  amounts; s e e  n o t e  1, i n f r a .  
NOTES: T h i s  t a b l e  does  not  i n c l u d e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  FEC's 1978-1982 c a t e g o r i e s  
of  " c o o p e r a t i v e s "  and " c o r p o r a t i o n s  wi thou t  s tock"  o r  t h e  cor respond ing  d a t a  
from Common C a u s e ' s  1972-1976 c a t e g o r i e s  of "misce l l aneous , "  "da i ry , "  and 
" a g r i c u l t u r e "  because  of  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  low l e v e l s  of  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  of 
such groups  today  ( w i t h  some n o t a b l e  e x c e p t i o n s ) .  
The d a t a  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  and t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  g roup ings  f o r  1972- 
1976 a r e  based on d i f f e r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  from t h e  same g roup ings  i n  Tab les  8-9. 
Thus,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  comparable ,  even a p a r t  from t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  pe r iod  of  
t ime  covered by each.  Those s t a t i s t i c s  i n  t a b l e  20 should  be used p r i m a r i l y  
f o r  t h e  pe rcen tage  breakdowns, r a t h e r  than  t h e  d o l l a r  amounts. 
Source:  For  1972: Common Cause. Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  
1972 F e d e r a l  Campaign F inances :  I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .  
Washington,  1974. v .  1. p. v i .  ( p a r t y  breakdowns t aken  from summary pages 
f o r  each c a t e g o r y  i n  volumes 1-31 
For 1974: Common Cause. Campaign F inance  Moni tor ing P r o j e c t .  1974 
Congress iona l  Campaign F inances .  Vol.  5 - - I n t e r e s t  Groups and P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i e s .  Washington,  1976. p. i x .  
TABLE 21. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Cand ida tes  i n  Genera l  
E l e c t i o n s  by Type of  PAC and by P a r t y  and S t a t u s  o f  Cand ida te :  
1972-1982 ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s  and p e r c e n t a g e s )  - 11--Continued 
For 1976: Common Cause.  1976 F e d e r a l  Campaign F i n a n c e s .  I n t e r e s t  Group 
and P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Congress iona l  C a n d i d a t e s .  Washington,  
1978. v .  1. p. v i i i .  
For 1978: U.S.  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. I n t e r i m  Repor t  No. 5--U.S. S e n a t e  and House Campaigns. 
wash ing ton ,  J u n e  1979. p. 32 ,  34. 
For 1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  on 1979-80 Congress iona l  Races ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  March 7 ,  1982.  
For  1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  Repor t  
on 1981-82 Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
Among t rade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs, a  once-overwhelming Republ ican b i a s  
was weakened c o n s i d e r a b l y  from 1972 t o  1978. For t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  e l e c t i o n s ,  
t h e  b a l a n c e  between t h e  two p a r t i e s  h a s  remained a t  a  c o n s t a n t  l e v e l  of n e a r l y  
3-2 i n  t h e  Repub l icans '  f a v o r .  
I n  t e rms  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  by s t a t u s ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e s e  PACs 
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  second most incumbent-or iented g roup ing .  The p a t t e r n  h e r e  i s  
n o t  e a s i l y  d i s c e r n e d ,  w i t h  a  v e r y  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s h a r e  r e c e i v e d  by 
incumbents i n  1974, a  l a r g e  d r o p  i n  1976 and i n  1978,  and l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
1980 and 1982, when f u l l y  t h r e e - f o u r t h s  of  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PAC money 
went t o  incumbents--more than  f o r  any o t h e r  g roup ing .  The p r o p o r t i o n  of  money 
g i v e n  t o  c h a l l e n g e r s  h a s  f l u c t u a t e d  i n  t h e  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n  from t h a t  t o  
incumbents ,  wi th  t h e  huge d e c r e a s e  i n  1982 b e n e f i t i n g  t h e  incumbents.  Open-seat 
c a n d i d a t e s  s u f f e r e d  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  n e t  d r o p  i n  s u p p o r t  between 1972 and 1982, 
a l t h o u g h  t h e y  r e c e i v e d  a  c o n s t a n t  11 p e r c e n t  of  t h e s e  PACs' funds  i n  t h e  p a s t  
two e l e c t i o n s .  
The non-connected PACs have been t h e  o n l y  one of  t h e  f o u r  major g roup ings  
t h a t  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  g iven  most of  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  non-incumbents. 
U n t i l  1982, i t  was t h e  c h a l l e n g e r s  who were most h e a v i l y  f a v o r e d ,  w i t h  a s  much 
a s  51 pe rcen t  of  non-connected c o n t r i b u t i o n s  going t o  c h a l l e n g e r s  i n  1980. 
Open-seat c o n t e n d e r s  met wi th  d e c l i n i n g  f o r t u n e s  d u r i n g  t h e  pas t  d e c a d e ,  
a l though  t h e y  f a r e d  b e t t e r  h e r e  than  t h e y  d i d  i n  any o t h e r  c a t e g o r y .  
Incumbents r e c e i v e d  o n l y  o n e - t h i r d  of non-connected PAC money between 
1976 and 1980, b u t  t h e i r  s h a r e  jumped d r a m a t i c a l l y  t o  n e a r l y  one-half  i n  
1982; t h i s  i n c r e a s e  occur red  a t  t h e  expense  of t h e  c h a l l e n g e r s .  
I n  view of  t h e  predominance of  i d e o l o g i c a l  groups  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  it 
i s  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  money would favor  non-incumbents. It i s  
l o g i c a l  t h a t  PACs which a r e  not  a f f i l i a t e d  w i t h  e s t a b l i s h e d  lobbying 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  would be more l i k e l y  t o  r i s k  a l i e n a t i n g  incumbent Members of  
Congress t h a n  would t h o s e  t h a t  a r e  connected w i t h  lobbying arms. T h e i r  
pr imary commitment t o  ideo logy ,  i n  comparison w i t h  perhaps  t h e  more pragmat ic  
p h i l o s o p h i e s  of t h e  o t h e r  t y p e s  o f  PACs, a p p e a r s  t o  make t h e i r  c h o i c e s  of whom 
t o  suppor t  t h a t  much e a s i e r .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  among o t h e r s ,  t h e  non-connected 
PACs a r e  o f t e n  viewed a s  " l o o s e  cannons" w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem.  
I n  t e rms  o f  p a r t y  s u p p o r t ,  t h e  non-connected PACs were u n t i l  1980 t h e  
most Repub l ican-or ien ted  among t h e  f o u r  major g roup ings .  From 1974 and 1978, 
t h e i r  s i p p o r t  of  Republ icag c a n d i d a t e s  over  Democratic ones  i n c r e a s e d  from 
a  s l i g h t  p l u r a l i t y  t o  a  3 t o  1 r a t i o .  There  was a  marked r i s e  i n  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  
of  Democrats i n  1980,  and,  i n  1982,  t h e r e  was a  s h i f t  toward Democrats which 
was s u b s t a n t i a l  enough t o  g i v e  them a  s l i g h t  edge. One may v e n t u r e  a  g u e s s  
t h a t  t h i s  development ,  accompanied a s  i t  was by a  major s h i f t  toward incumbents ,  
was a  r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  overwhelming a t t e n t i o n  g iven  by c o n s e r v a t i v e  PACs t o  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  o t h e r  than  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  l e a v i n g  l i b e r a l  groups--which 
s t epped  up t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  a f t e r  1980--to c o n s t i t u t e  a  g r e a t e r  
p r o p o r t i o n  of  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  than  t h e y  o t h e r w i s e  would have.  I n  any c a s e ,  
i t  i s  u s e f u l  t o  remember t h a t  t h e  t r e n d s  i n  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by t h e  
non-connected PACs a r e  l e s s  impor tan t  than  t h e  o t h e r  forms of  p o l i t i c a l  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  which t h e y  have been engaged. 
Summing up t h e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  t o  t h e  t r e n d s  evidenced i n  Tab le  20 ,  
o n l y  one of t h e  f o u r  p r i n c i p a l  PAC groupings--labor--has c o n s i s t e n t l y  f a v c r e d  
Democratic c a n d i d a t e s ;  t h i s  s u p p o r t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l o p s i d e d  t o  e n a b l e  Democrats 
t o  r e t a i n  an o v e r a l l  edge over  Repub l icans  i n  a t t r a c t i n g  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
The non-connected PACs were t h e  most pro-Republican i n  t h e i r  g i v i n g ,  u n t i l  
1982, when t h e y  became t h e  second most pro-Democratic. I n  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  
e l e c t i o n s ,  c o r p o r a t e  PACs have been most pro-Republican ( b y  a  2-1 r a t i o ) ,  w i t h  
t h e  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs second ( a  n e a r l y  3-2 r a t i o ) .  The major 
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  Democrats '  s h a r e  of PAC money i n  1978 was l a r g e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  
of  a  s h i f t  among c o r p o r a t e  PACs, w h i l e  t h e  renewed s h i f t  t o  Democrats i n  
1982 may be  t r a c e d  t o  t h e  sudden change among non-connected PACs t h a t  y e a r .  
I n  t e rms  of  PAC money f a v o r i n g  incumbents ,  t h i s  h a s  been an i n c r e a s i n g  
phenomenon over  t h e  s i x - e l e c t i o n  p e r i o d .  The o v e r a l l  PAC t i l t  t o  incumbents 
i s  evidenced i n  t h e  g i v i n g  p a t t e r n s  o f  e v e r y  g r o u p i n g ,  d e s p i t e  a  d e c l i n e  i n  
c o r p o r a t e  PAC g i v i n g  t o  incumbents between 1974 and 1980 and t h e  secondary  
r o l e  o f  incumbents i n  t h e  g i v i n g  p a t t e r n s  of t h e  non-connected group u n t i l  
1982. The drop-off  i n  s u p p o r t  f o r  open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s  s i n c e  1972 h a s  been 
evidenced i n  t h e  p a t t e r n s  o f  e v e r y  one of  t h e  f o u r  PAC group ings .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  of  PAC g i v i n g  t o  c h a l l e n g e r s  u n t i l  
1982 masked s h a r p  i n c r e a s e s  i n  c o r p o r a t e  and non-connected PAC g i v i n g  t o  
c h a l l e n g e r s .  Sharp  d i v e r g e n c e s  i n  t h e  g i v i n g  p a t t e r n s  of  s e v e r a l  groups  i n  
1982 make o v e r a l l  a n a l y s i s  more d i f f i c u l t ,  a s  i t  i s  t o o  soon t o  t e l l  whether 
t h e y  may s i g n a l  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  new t r e n d s .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  worth  remembering 
t h a t  d e a l i n g  i n  t r e n d s  i n  a g g r e g a t e  t o t a l s  may mask t r e n d s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  many 
i n d i v i d u a l  PACs w i t h i n  a  g i v e n  c a t e g o r y .  
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T a b l e s  22-23 p l a c e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  PAC s u p p o r t  of c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  of t h e  c a n d i d a t e s '  o v e r a l l  campaign r e c e i p t s .  Whereas Tab le  20 showed 
how PAC money was d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  p a r t y  a f f i l i a t i o n  and 
e l e c t o r a l  s t a t u s ,  Tab les  22-23 show how impor tan t  a  r o l e  t h e s e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
played f o r  t h e  same c a n d i d a t e  breakdowns. The l a t t e r  t a b l e s  may y i e l d  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s  than  t h e  fo rmer ,  a s  t h e y  t a k e  i n t o  account  such 
a d d i t i o n a l  c r i t e r i a  a s  t h e  number of c a n d i d a t e s  PAC money was d i s t r i b u t e d  
among and t h e  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  of c a n d i d a t e  funding.  Although PACs may have 
favored a  p a r t i c u l a r  type  of c a n d i d a t e ,  t h o s e  c a n d i d a t e s  may have been l e s s  
r e l i a n t  on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  than  o t h e r  t y p e s  of c a n d i d a t e s .  The o t h e r  key 
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  t a b l e s  i n  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  i s  t h a t  they  c o n f i n e  t h e i r  focus  
t o  House c a n d i d a t e s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  combined House and Sena te  d a t a  i n  
Tab les  20-21. Table  22 p r e s e n t s  t h e  p a r t y  breakdowns s e p a r a t e  from t h e  s t a t u s  
breakdowns, w h i l e  Tab le  23 combines bo th  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  more d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s .  
As Tab le  22 i n d i c a t e s ,  Democratic House c a n d i d a t e s  have r e c e i v e d  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  more PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  fund ing  s o u r c e s  than  
have t h e i r  Republ ican c o u n t e r p a r t s .  I n  1982, j u s t  over  one- th i rd  of  Democrats '  
campaign fund ing  emanated from p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees ,  whereas PACs 
c o n t r i b u t e d  more than  one-four th  of Republ ican campaign funds .  The gap between 
t h e  l e v e l s  of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Democrats and Republ icans  of  PAC money d e c r e a s e d  
i n  1978,  p r i o r  t o  which PAC funds  c o n s t i t u t e d  about n i n e  p e r c e n t  more of 
Democrats '  t h a n  Repub l icans '  r e c e i p t s .  I n  1978,  i n  keep ing  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  
i n c r e a s e  i n  PAC g i v i n g  t o  Repub l icans ,  t h e  gap was narrowed t o  l e s s  t h a n  f i v e  
p e r c e n t .  The gap widened t o  5.6 p e r c e n t  i n  1980 and t o  6 pe rcen t  i n  1982. 
TABLE 22. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  a P e r c e n t a g e  of  House Cand ida te  R e c e i p t s  
by P a r t y  o r  S t a t u s  of Cand ida te :  1972-1982 Genera l  E l e c t i o n s  - 1/ 
P a r t y  S t a t u s  
------ ----- 
T o t a l  f o r  
Year House 2/ Dem Rep Inc  . C h a l l  . Open - 
1/ Based on f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  o n l y  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  who r a n  i n  t h e  
g e n e r z l  e l e c t i o n ;  pr imary l o s e r s  exc luded .  
2 /  T o t a l s  co r respond  w i t h  t h o s e  i n  Tab le  6 ,  i n f r a .  - 
Source :  For 1972 and 1974: Jacobson ,  Gary C. The P a t t e r n  of Campaign 
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Cand ida tes  f o r  t h e  U.S. House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  1972-1978. 
I n  U.S. Congress .  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  An A n a l y s i s  of  
t h e  Impact of  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign A c t ,  1972-1978. From t h e  I n s t i t u t e  
o f  P o l i t i c s ,  John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .  Committee 
P r i n t ,  96 th  Cong., 1st S e s s .  Washington,  U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1979. p. 25-26. 
( s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  t h i s  c h a r t  were e x t r a p o l a t e d  from t h e  d a t a  i n  J a c o b s o n ' s  
t a b l e s  6-7.) 
For 1976: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC D i s c l o s u r e  S e r i e s .  
No. 9: 1976 House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  Campaigns. R e c e i p t s  and E x p e n d i t u r e s .  
Washington,  September 1977. p. 4 ,  6 ( f o r  p a r t y  breakdown);  p. 7-8 ( f o r  s t a t u s  
breakdowns).  
For 1978: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1977-1978. I n t e r i m  Repor t  No. 5. U.S. S e n a t e  and House Campaigns. 
Washington,  J u n e  1979. p. 31-32 ( f o r  p a r t y  breakdowns);  p. 36 ,  51-52 ( f o r  
s t a t u s  breakdowns).  
For  1980: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1979-1980. F i n a l  Repor t .  U.S. S e n a t e  and House Campaigns. 
Washington,  J a n .  1982. p. 49-50 ( f o r  p a r t y  breakdowns);  p. 52-53 ( f o r  
s t a t u s  breakdowns).  
For 1982: U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1981-1982. F i n a l  Repor t .  U.S. S e n a t e  and House Campaigns. 
Washington,  Oct .  1983. pp. 33-36. 
With r e g a r d  t o  t h e  l e v e l  of  r e c e i p t  of  PAC money accord ing  t o  t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  s t a t u s  o f  c a n d i d a t e s ,  incumbents have c o n s i s t e n t l y  r e c e i v e d  more of  
t h i s  s o u r c e  of  fund ing  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  than  have t h e i r  c h a l l e n g e r s  
o r  t h o s e  competing i n  d i s t r i c t s  wi th  no incumbent runn ing .  Fur the rmore ,  t h e  
pe rcen tage  o f  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  incumbents among a l l  r e c e i p t s  has  i , . r e a s e d  
a t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f a s t e r  r a t e  than  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  two c a t e g o r i e s ,  b o t h  o f  
which exper ienced  an i n c r e a s e  d u r i n g  t h e  1972-1982 p e r i o d .  
Perhaps  t h e  most i n t e r e s t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s  d a t a  
i s  t h e  h i g h e r  d e g r e e  of  PAC money i n  t h e  campaign t r e a s u r i e s  of  open s e a t  
c o n t e n d e r s  t h a n  o f  c h a l l e n g e r s  t o  incumbents.  Th i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  h i g h e r  amount of  PAC d o l l a r s  which have been c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
c h a l l e n g e r s  over  t h e  open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s ,  a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  Tab le  20. Th i s  
a p p a r e n t  i n c o n g r u i t y  may r e s u l t  from t h e  h i g h e r  number of c h a l l e n g e r s  t h a n  
open-seat  c o n t e s t s ;  hence t h e  l e s s e r  s h a r e  of PAC money i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  among 
a  f a r  l e s s e r  number of  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a t e g o r y .  By 1982, one- four th  
of  t h e  House open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s '  funds came from PACs, whereas l e s s  than  
one- four th  of  t h e  c h a l l e n g e r s '  r e c e i p t s  were from PACs ( c h a l l e n g e r s '  s h a r e  of 
PAC money r o s e  n o t a b l y  i n  1982) ;  i n  t h e  c a s e  of House incumbents ,  PAC money 
c o n s t i t u t e d  more t h a n  o n e - t h i r d  of  o v e r a l l  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  r e c e i p t s .  
The t r e n d s  i n  PAC g i v i n g  by p a r t y  and c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s  a r e  exp lo red  i n  
g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  i n  Tab le  23,  which combines t h e  two v a r i a b l e s  f o r  t h e  1972-1982 
e l e c t i o n s .  It i s  r e a d i l y  observed t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
t h e  l e v e l  of  PAC s u p p o r t  between t h e  p a r t i e s  w i t h i n  each c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s  
c a t e g o r y .  
While T a b l e  22 po in ted  o u t  t h a t  PAC money p l a y s  t h e  l a r g e s t  r o l e  i n  
f i n a n c i n g  incumbent campaigns,  Tab le  23 demons t ra tes  t h a t  t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
t r u e  f o r  Democratic incumbents.  The l e v e l s  of PAC money among o v e r a l l  r e c e i p t s  
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i n c r e a s e d  a t  rough ly  t h e  same r a t e  f o r  b o t h  Democratic and Republ ican 
incumbents between 1972 and 1978,  w i t h  b o t h  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a  s h a r p  r i s e  i n  1976 
( a  r e f l e c t i o n  of  t h e  o v e r a l l  i n c r e a s e  t h a t  yea r  i n  t h e  PAC component). The 
Republ ican p e r c e n t a g e  r o s e  s h a r p l y  a g a i n  i n  1980 and a l s o  i n  1982. The 
Democratic f i g u r e  r o s e  much more modest ly  i n  each of  t h e  l a t t e r  e l e c t i o n s ,  
t h u s  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  o n l y  a  t h r e e  p e r c e n t  gap  between t h e  two p a r t i e s  i n  1982, 
w i t h  t h e  Republ ican incumbents a t  35.1  p e r c e n t  and t h e  Democratic incumbents 
a t  38.2 p e r c e n t .  The g r e a t e r  p e r c e n t a g e  of  PAC money i n  Democratic than  i n  
Republ ican incumbents '  campaigns i s  p a r t l y  a  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  g r e a t e r  
s h a r e  o f  t h e  l a t t e r s '  r e c e i p t s  c o n s t i t u t e d  by p a r t y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
While Democrats have c o n s i s t e n t l y  r e c e i v e d  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  more PAC money 
t h a n  Repub l icans  among incumbent c a n d i d a t e s ,  t h i s  h a s  no t  always been t h e  c a s e  
among c h a l l e n g e r s  and open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s .  Between 1978 and 1980, Republ ican 
c h a l l e n g e r s  and open-seat  c a n d i d a t e s  were d i s t i n c t l y  more r e l i a n t  on PAC money 
than  t h e i r  Democratic c o u n t e r p a r t s ;  t h i s  t u r n e d  around i n  1982,  when Republ ican 
c a n d i d a t e s  became l e s s  and Democratic c a n d i d a t e s  much more r e l i a n t  on PAC funds .  
Among Democratic c h a l l e n g e r s ,  PAC money played a  r a t h e r  s t a b l e  r o l e  from 
1972-1976, b e f o r e  d e c l i n i n g  s h a r p l y  i n  importance  i n  1978, o n l y  t o  r i s e  a g a i n  
i n  1980 and even more s h a r p l y  i n  1982. In  terms o f  PAC d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  f u n d s ,  
T a b l e  20 i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  c h a l l e n g e r s  o v e r a l l  r e c e i v e d  a  g r e a t e r  s h a r e  of  PAC 
money i n  1978 t h a n  t h e y  d i d  i n  1976, b u t  t h a t  Democrats o v e r a l l  r e c e i v e d  a  much 
lower p e r c e n t a g e  t h a t  y e a r .  I n  1982, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was r e v e r s e d ,  a s  c h a l l e n g e r s  
r e c e i v e d  a  much l e s s e r  s h a r e  of PAC funds  b u t  Democrats r e c e i v e d  a  g r e a t e r  s h a r e .  
Republ ican c h a l l e n g e r s '  r e c e i p t  of  PAC money s h a r p l y  i n c r e a s e d  i n  1976 
and 1978 and s l i g h t l y  i n  1980, and d e c l i n e d  i n  1982. I n  view of  t h e  i n d i c a t i o n s  
t h a t  1978 marked a  t u r n  toward i n c r e a s e d  PAC s u p p o r t  of Republ ican c h a l l e n g e r s  
o f  Democratic incumbents ,  i t  a p p e a r s  l o g i c a l  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were a  l a r g e r  
f a c t o r  f o r  Republ ican c h a l l e n g e r s  t h a t  year  than  f o r  Democratic c h a l l e n g e r s  
t o  Republ ican incumbents .  The d e c l i n e  i n  1982 a p p e a r s  l i k e l y  t o  have stemmed 
? 
from a  l e s s e r  s h a r e  of PAC money going t o  bo th  c h a l l e n g e r s  and Republ icans ,  
. . 
a s  b u s i n e s s  PAC s t r a a t e g i e s  emphasized de fend ing  t h e  GOP incumbents.  
TABLE 23. PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  a  P e r c e n t a g e  of House Cand ida te  R e c e i p t s  
by P a r t y  and S t a t u s  of  Candidate :  1972-1982 Genera l  E l e c t i o n s  11 - 
Incumbents Cha l l engers  Open S e a t s  
.---- ----- . -- - 
T o t a l  
Year House Dem Re P Dem Rep Dem Re P 
1/ Cand ida tes  competing i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  o n l y ;  pr imary l o s e r s  excluded - 
21 The 1980 f i g u r e s  a r e  based on g r o s s  House r e c e i p t s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  
t h e  n e t  r e c e i p t  b a s i s  f o r  o t h e r  d a t a  i n  t h i s  t a b l e ,  because  o n l y  such 
i n f o r m a t i o n  was a v a i l a b l e  wi th  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  breakdowns. The 28.7% h e r e  
compares w i t h  t h e  28.9% f i g u r e  used i n  Tab les  6  and 22; hence t h e  p e r c e n t a g e s  
f o r  each c a t e g o r y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  u n d e r s t a t e d  by around 115 of a  p e r c e n t .  
* Based on c a n d i d a t e s  wi th  major p a r t y  o p p o s i t i o n  o n l y  
Source:  For 1972-1978: Jacobson ,  Gary C .  The P a t t e r n  of  Campaign 
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Cand ida tes  f o r  t h e  U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  1972-1978. 
I n  U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  An A n a l y s i s  of 
t h e  Impact of  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Ac t ,  1972-1978. From t h e  I n s t i t u t e  
o f  P o l i t i c s ,  John F. Kennedy School of  Government, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .  Committee 
P r i n t ,  96 th  C o n g . , l s t  S e s s .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1979. p. 25-28. 
For 1980:. U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Repor t s  on F i n a n c i a l  
A c t i v i t y ,  1979?1980. F i n a l  Repor t .  U.S. Sena te  and House Campaigns. 
Washington,  J a n .  1982. p .  56 ,  65-66. 
For  1982: u;'s. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  Repor t  
on 1981-82 Congress iona l  E l e c t i o n s  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Dec. 2 ,  1983. 
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Open-seat c o n t e n d e r s  t y p i c a l l y  engage i n  t h e  most h e a t e d  e l e c t i o n s  and 
spend a  f a r  g r e a t e r  amount of  money t h a n  do incumbents o r  ( e s p e c i a l l y )  
c h a l l e n g e r s .  They r e c e i v e  l e s s  money a s  a  g roup  from PACs t h a q  do c h a l l e n g e r s  
o f  incumbents ,  b u t ,  because  of  t h e i r  fewer numbers, t h e y  b e n e f i t  .from PAC 
d o l l a r s  t o  a  g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  t h a n  do c h a l l e n g e r s .  
T a b l e  23 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  Republ ican c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  open House s e a t s  
r e c e i v e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s - - r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  
fund ing  sources--between 1972 and 1980, w i t h  a  s h a r p  d e c r e a s e  i n  1982, and 
t h a t  Democratic c a n d i d a t e s  i n  open d i s t r i c t s  r e c e i v e d  lower l e v e l s  between 
1974 and 1978 and i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l s  i n  1980 and 1982. 
D. Summary O b s e r v a t i o n s  on PAC Growth 
Fol lowing a  l e n g t h y ,  d e t a i l e d  p r e s e n t a t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  of  d a t a ,  i t  i s  
u s e f u l  t o  summarize t h e  key f i n d i n g s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and growth 
o f  PACs. These o b s e r v a t i o n s  should  be  viewed i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of an o v e r a l l  
i n c r e a s e  i n  PAC spend ing  from $19.2 m i l l i o n  t o  $190.2 m i l l i o n  and i n  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  from $8.5  m i l l i o n  t o  $83.6 m i l l i o n  between 
1972 and 1982. 
The two key e l e c t i o n s  i n  terms of  PAC growth were 1976 and 1980. The year  
1976 marked t h e  l a r g e s t  p e r c e n t a g e  growth i n  t h e  number of  PACs, w h i l e  1980 
saw t h e  l a r g e s t  numer ica l  i n c r e a s e .  The l a r g e s t  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  bo th  
PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  occur red  i n  1976, 
w i t h  t h e  second l a r g e s t  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  1980.  he l a r g e s t  d o l l a r  
i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  occur red  i n  1982.)  The s h a r p e s t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  PAC money among o v e r a l l  r e c e i p t s  of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  o c c u r r e d  i n  1980, fo l lowed by t h e  rise i n  1976. l n i & e s t i n g l y ,  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  1980 r e f l e c t e d  t h e  s t e e p e s t  r i s e  f o r  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s ,  w h i l e  
t h e  1976 i n c r e a s e  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  s t e e p e s t  r i s e  f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s .  
Some 70 pe rcen t  of  a g g r e g a t e  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t y p i c a l l y  i s  g iven  t o  
House c a n d i d a t e s ,  whi le  30 p e r c e n t  i s  g iven  t o  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s .  T h i s ,  of  
c o u r s e ,  does  not  mean t h a t  House c a n d i d a t e s  r e c e i v e  l a r g e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  on 
average  than  do t h e i r  S e n a t e  c o u n t e r p a r t s ;  t h e  r e v e r s e  is  p robab ly  t r u e .  PAC 
money does  p l a y  a  l a r g e r  r o l e  i n  t h e  campaigns o f  Hquse c a n d i d a t e s  than  of  
Sena te  c a n d i d a t e s ,  however. 
On an a g g r e g a t e  l e v e l ,  Democrats have been a b l e  t o  a t t r a c t  more PAC money 
than have Repub l icans ,  bu t  t h i s  advantage has  been narrowed i n  r e c e n t  e l e c t i o n s  
from t h e  2 : l  r a t i o  p r i o r  t o  1978 t o  t h e  54-46 s p l i t  i n  1982. The 52-48 s p l i t  
i n  1980 might have presaged an even s p l i t - - i f  not  a  GOP advantage--by 1982, 
b u t  t h i s  d i d  not m a t e r i a l i z e .  
PAC money c o n t i n u e s  t o  f avor  incumbents h e a v i l y ,  and t h i s  t r e n d  has  become 
more pronounced s i n c e  1972. Today, two- th i rds  of  PAC money goes t o  incumbents .  
I n  comparison wi th  t h e  o t h e r  t h r e e  major s o u r c e s  of  campaign funds ,  Democrats 
o v e r a l l  have r e c e i v e d  more PAC money t h a n  Republ icans .  PAC money has  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
played a  l a r g e r  r o l e  f o r  Democratic than  Republ ican incumbents and,  i n  1982,  
Democratic c h a l l e n g e r s  and open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s  r e l i e d  more on PAC money than  
d i d  t h e i r  Republ ican c o u n t e r p a r t s .  Regard less  of p a r t y  o r  c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s ,  
however, PAC money has  g e n e r a l l y  become more impor tan t  f o r  a l l  c a n d i d a t e s  ( t h e  
d e c r e a s e  i n  r e l i a n c e  on PAC money by GOP c h a l l e n g e r s  and open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s  
i n  1982 may s i g n a l  a  new t r e n d ,  bu t  i t  i s  too soon t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h i s ) .  
Looking a t  t h e  f o u r  major PAC g r o u p i n g s ,  s e v e r a l  impor tan t  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
can b e  made wi th  r e g a r d  t o  each.  Labor PACs have ,  a s  a  group,  d e c l i n e d  i n  
importance  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  o t h e r s .  While t h e y  accounted f o r  one- th i rd  of 
a l l  PACs i n  1972, they  account  f o r  l e s s  t h a n  one-ninth  today;  whereas t h e y  
s p e n t  and c o n t r i b u t e d  one-hal f  of  a l l  PAC money i n  1972,  t h e y  s p e n t  l e s s  t h a n  
o n e - f i f t h  and c o n t r i b u t e d  one- four th  of  a l l  PAC money i n  1982. They were 
s u r p a s s e d  a s  t h e  b i g g e s t  spend ing  c a t e g o r y  i n  1976 and a s  t h e  b i g g e s t  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  group i n  1978. Labor PACs a r e  t h e  most Democratic i n  t h e i r  
o r i e n t a t i o n ,  among a l l  t h e  t y p e s  of  PACs. F i n a l l y ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  overshadowing 
o f  l a b o r  PACs i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e ,  t h e y  remain a  p o t e n t  f i n a n c i a l  f o r c e  through 
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of a  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  number of l a r g e  PACs; l a b o r  PACs accounted 
f o r  more t h a n  h a l f  of  t h e  t o p  20 c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  e v e r y  e l e c t i o n  s i n c e  1972. 
The non-connected PACs have e x h i b i t e d  t h e  l a r g e s t  p e r c e n t a g e  growth i n  
number s i n c e  1976. They doubled t h e i r  l e v e l  of e x p e n d i t u r e s  from 1978 t o  1980,  
making them t h e  b i g g e s t  spend ing  c a t e g o r y  of PAC i n  t h e  1980 e l e c t i o n ,  and 
t h e y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  e x p e n d i t u r e s  by a n o t h e r  68 p e r c e n t  i n  1982, f a r  s u r p a s s i n g  
t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  of  any o t h e r  c a t e g o r y  i n  t h a t  e l e c t i o n .  T h e i r  s u c c e s s  i n  
f u n d r a i s i n g  h a s  been h i g h l i g h t e d  by s e v e r a l  e s p e c i a l l y  l a r g e  i d e o l o g i c a l  PACs 
w i t h i n  t h e i r  r a n k s .  The two l a r g e s t  s p e n d e r s  among PACs have been u n a f f i l i a t e d  
i n  t h e  1976,  1978, 1980 and 1982 e l e c t i o n s  ( t h e  t o p  t h r e e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  
e l e c t i o n s ) ;  t h e i r  spend ing  l e v e l s  have been d r a m a t i c a l l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  of  
most o t h e r  PACs. While they  have ach ieved  prominence f o r  t h e i r  spending l e v e l s ,  
t h e  non-connected group h a s  ach ieved  l i t t l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  among c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  
F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  T h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l s  have been low i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e ,  
and few of  t h e  g i a n t  s p e n d e r s  have recorded  v e r y  h i g h  l e v e l s  of  d i r e c t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  group was u n t i l  1982 t h e  most 
Republ ican i n  i t s  o r i e n t a t i o n  and h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  been t h e  l e a s t  incumbent- 
o r i e n t e d  among t h e  c a t e g o r i e s ;  it i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  o n l y  g roup ing  t h a t  g i v e s  
l e s s  t h a n  h a l f  of  i t s  money t o  incumbents.  T h i s  l a t t e r  f a c t  was o n l y  b a r e l y  
s o  f o r  1982, and i t  was o n l y  one f a c t o r  among s e v e r a l  t h a t  may por tend changes 
i n  t h e  way non-connected PACs behave i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  ( e . g . ,  more money i n  
d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  more l i b e r a l  groups  p l a y i n g  an a c t i v e  r o l e ,  e t c . ) .  
Corpora te  PACs today c o n s t i t u t e  44 pe rcen t  of a l l  PACs and have e x h i b i t e d  
t h e  l a r g e s t  numerical  growth s i n c e  1976. They s p e n t  23 pe rcen t  of a l l  PAC 
money i n  1982, up from j u s t  one- ten th  i n  1976, and they  c o n t r i b u t e d  o n e - t h i r d  
of  a l l  PAC money i n  1982,  n e a r l y  t h r e e  t imes  what t h e y  c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  1978. 
As of 1982, they  were t h e  most h e a v i l y  Republ ican i n  t h e i r  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  a  
f a c t  which i n f l u e n c e d  t h e i r  s t r o n g e r  suppor t  of incumbents than  i n  p rev ious  
e l e c t i o n s .  T h e i r  s t r e n g t h  l i e s  i n  a  l a r g e  number of  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  PACs, 
t h e  r e v e r s e  of l a b o r ' s  s i t u a t i o n .  
I n  terms of i t s  growth and i t s  spending p a t t e r n s ,  t h e  t rade/membership/  
h e a l t h  c a t e g o r y  h a s  e x h i b i t e d  l e s s  pronounced t r e n d s  than  have t h e  o t h e r  t h r e e  
g roup ings .  It was t h e  t h i r d  h i g h e s t  spending group and t h e  second h i g h e s t  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  group i n  1982,  i t  h a s  a  s t r o n g e r  b i a s  toward incumbents than  any 
non-labor group ( i n  1982,  it was even s t r o n g e r  than  l a b o r ' s ) ,  and i t  i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s  Repub l ican-or ien ted  than t h e  c o r p o r a t e  group.  I t s  growth 
i n  numbers and spending has  been s t e a d y ,  y e t  i m p r e s s i v e .  
The f i n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  concerns  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n - t o - e x p e n d i t u r e  r a t i o  
among PACs. A s  noted e a r l i e r ,  some 42-50 p e r c e n t  of  PAC e x p e n d i t u r e s  have 
t aken  t h e  form of d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  s i n c e  1972--a 
somewhat l e s s  than  1 t o  2  r a t i o .  The r a t i o  more n e a r l y  approximates  t h e  1 :2  
l e v e l  among l a b o r  PACs, c o r p o r a t e  PACs, and t h e  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs. 
The c o n t r i b u t i o n - t o - e x p e n d i t u r e  r a t i o  f o r  t h e  non-connected grouping was o n l y  
1 t o  6  i n  t h e  1982 e l e c t i o n  ( a l t h o u g h  t h i s  compares wi th  a  1 t o  8 r a t i o  i n  
1980) ,  w i t h  l a r g e  amounts of money s p e n t  on such t h i n g s  a s  f u n d r a i s i n g  and 
independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  The spending p a t t e r n s  of t h e  non-connected PACs 
have t h u s  p u l l e d  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  PAC community away from t h e  1 t o  2  r a t i o  and 
have,  i n  f a c t ,  skewed t h e  spend ing  d a t a  f o r  a l l  PACs. 
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Having examined a t  l eng th  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of PACs and t h e i r  increased  
l e v e l s  of  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  one i s  i n  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  comprehend t h e  
reasons  f o r  t h e s e  developments. The numbers and t h e  d o l l a r s  presented i n  
t h i s  chap te r  r e p r e s e n t  no t  on ly  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  PAC growth, bu t  a  cause 
t h e r e o f ,  a s  w e l l .  The p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  PACs and t h e  widespread a t t e n t i o n  
accorded i t  by t h e  media have undoubtedly provided impetus f o r  t h e i r  
f u r t h e r  growth and p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  With each i n t e r e s t  g roup ' s  s u c c e s s f u l  
exper ience  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  s e p a r a t e  segrega ted  fund ,  w i t h i n  t h e  con tex t  
o f  t h e  FECA, t h e  road has  been paved f o r  o t h e r  PACs t o  fol low.  The f a c t  
t h a t  s o  few groups t ook  advantage of  t he  PAC o p t i o n  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970s was 
probably i n d i c a t i v e  of  t h e i r  r e luc t ance  t o  t e s t  t h e  l e g a l i t y  of va r ious  PAC- 
r e l a t e d  p r a c t i c e s .  Those groups t h a t  d id  form PACs s e t  precedents  i n  t h e  f i e l d  
and ,  i n  t u r n ,  a c t e d  a s  c a t a l y s t s  f o r  congres s iona l  amendments t o  t h e  FECA 
which e l imina t ed  e x i s t i n g  ambigui t ies  and r e s t r a i n t s .  Thus, t h e  con t inu ing  
i n c r e a s e  i n  PAC numbers and d o l l a r s  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e ,  i n  p a r t ,  t o  t h e  r i p p l e  
e f f e c t  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i t s e l f .  
This  s e l f -gene ra t i ng  e f f e c t  accounts  f o r  on ly  p a r t  o f  PAC growth, and 
i t  does  n o t  begin t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  i n i t i a l ,  l a r g e  waves of  new PACs i n  1975 and 
1976. Rather ,  two d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  might be explored t o  approach an  exp lana t ion  
o f  t h e  r i s e  of PACs: t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  descr ibed  
i n  Chapter Two and t h e  circumstances a f f e c t i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process  i n  gene ra l .  
Chapter Two d i scus sed  t h e  b a r r i e r s  t o  PAC formation which were e l imina ted  
w i th  t h e  passage o r  i s suance  o f  each succes s ive  l e g i s l a t i v e ,  j u d i c i a l ,  o r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n .  These included t h e  o r i g i n a l  s a n c t i o n  f o r  PACs provided 
i n  t h e  1971 FECA, t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  presumed ban on PAC es tab l i shment  
by government c o n t r a c t o r s  i n  t h e  1974 Amendments, t h e  permission gran ted  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  s o l i c i t  employees f o r  PAC d o n a t i o n s  i n  t h e  FEC's 1975 SUN PAC 
Advisory  Opin ion ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l e g i t i m a c y  accorded s e p a r a t e  s e g r e g a t e d  
funds  i n  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ' s  1976 Buckley v .  Valeo d e c i s i o n ,  and t h e  1976 
FECA Amendment's g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  s o l i c i t a t i o n  by c o r p o r a t e  and l a b o r  PACs and 
i t s  e x p r e s s  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  fo rmat ion  of PACs by t r a d e  and o t h e r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Each of t h e s e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  an environment more h o s p i t a b l e  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees.  
S e v e r a l  p r o v i s i o n s  of  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  laws m e r i t  s p e c i a l  ment ion 
f o r  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  PAC s p i r a l .  F i r s t ,  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of  p u b l i c  fund ing  of P r e s i d e n t i a l  campaigns i n  t h e  1976 e l e c t i o n s  deemphasized 
t h e  r o l e  of p r i v a t e  ( i n c l u d i n g  group)  money i n  such r a c e s ,  l e a v i n g  PACs t o  
channe l  even more money t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  r a c e s .  While p r i v a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
a r e  sought  d u r i n g  P r e s i d e n t i a l  p r i m a r i e s  f o r  matching fund purposes ,  PACs 
have e x h i b i t e d  a  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  become d e e p l y  invo lved  i n  e l e c t i o n s  d u r i n g  
t h e s e  e a r l y  s t a g e s .  Whatever PAC money h a s  been for thcoming t o  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
c o n t e n d e r s  ( o n l y  t h r e e  p e r c e n t  of a l l  PAC d o n a t i o n s  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  
1980) has  been g iven  i n  t h e  p r i m a r i e s  s i n c e  1976; c a n d i d a t e s  a c c e p t i n g  F e d e r a l  
funds  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  ( a s  d i d  a l l  major c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1976 and 1980) 
a r e  b a r r e d  from t a k i n g  any p r i v a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Th i s  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  h a s  
undoubtedly  had an impact on t h e  growth of PAC money e n t e r i n g  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
a r e n a ,  a l t h o u g h  it may do l i t t l e  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  growth i n  PAC numbers 
o r  d o l l a r s .  
Another major f e a t u r e  of  t h e  FECA which h a s ,  by  a l l  a c c o u n t s ,  a f f e c t e d  
PAC growth has  been t h e  $1000 l i m i t a t i o n  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  
F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  Coupled w i t h  t h e  s t r i c t  d i s c l o s u r e  requ i rements  of t h e  
1971 Ac t ,  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  a p p a r e n t l y  s p u r r e d  wea l thy  d o n o r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  
a f f i l i a t e d  wi th  t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r ,  t o  seek  o t h e r  avenues f o r  p o l i t i c a l  g i v i n g ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  th rough  c o a l i t i o n s  w i t h  like-minded i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h i s  t h e o r y  i s  
e s p e c i a l l y  h e l p f u l  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  s u r g e  i n  b u s i n e s s  PACs, t h e  l e a d e r s  among 
a l l  PACs i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  The t r a n s f e r e n c e  of b u s i n e s s  money 
from i n d i v i d u a l  g i v e r s  t o  PACs i s  d e s c r i b e d  by P r o f e s s o r  Edwin E p s t e i n :  
. . . u n t i l  t h e  campaign f i n a n c i n g  laws were reformed i n  t h e  
1970s t o  impose s t r i c t  l i m i t a t i o n s  on i n d i v i d u a l  d o n a t i o n s  
and t o  p rov ide  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  p u b l i c  d i s c l o s u r e  of t h e  s o u r c e s  
o f  funds ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  need f o r  b u s i n e s s  PACs; money from 
b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d  s o u r c e s  cou ld  l e g a l l y  e n t e r  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
a r e n a ,  a lmost  u n d e t e c t e d ,  i n  a lmost  u n l i m i t e d  amounts i n  t h e  
form of i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by wea l thy  pe r sons  a f f i l i a t e d  
w i t h  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and o t h e r  b u s i n e s s  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  - 1371 
The view t h a t  PAC growth c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of one form of l a r g e  
c o n t r i b u t o r  f o r  a n o t h e r  i s  echoed i n  t h e  work of a n o t h e r  PAC o b s e r v e r ,  Michael  
Malbin ,  who wrote :  
The growth i n  PACs s i n c e  1974 h a s  been matched by a  d e c l i n e  
i n  t h e  importance  of l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from i n d i v i d u a l s .  Be- 
c a u s e  c o r p o r a t e  PACs a r e  i n c r e a s i n g  f a s t e r  t h a n  any o t h e r  PACs, 
and because  l a r g e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  t h e  p a s t  tended 
t o  come d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  from b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  r i s e  of 
one and d e c l i n e  of t h e  o t h e r  seem rough ly  t o  c a n c e l  each o t h e r  
o u t .  I n s t e a d  of s a y i n g  t h e  law h a s  f a i l e d  t o  a c h i e v e  i t s  pur- 
pose of c u r b i n g  t h e  power of t h e  " s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s , ' '  we should  
say--at  l e a s t  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s - - t h a t  t h e  law 
has  ach ieved  t h e  g o a l  of t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of b u s i n e s s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  p o l i t i c s  from t h e  u n d i s c l o s e d  and sometimes 
seedy form i t  took b e f o r e  1974 t o  t h e  more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  
and a c c o u n t a b l e  form we s e e  today .  1381 -
T h i s  t h e o r y ,  of  c o u r s e ,  i s  based on t h e  o v e r a l l  t r e n d s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  g i v i n g ,  
and an o b j e c t i v e  judgment a s  t o  i t s  v a l i d i t y  i s  handicapped by t h e  l a c k  of 
a d e q u a t e ,  a c c u r a t e  d i s c l o s u r e  r e c o r d s  p r i o r  t o  1974. It is  known t h a t  l a r g e  
d o n a t i o n s  were s h a r p l y  curbed by t h e  1974 FECA Amendments and t h a t  b u s i n e s s  
1371 E p s t e i n ,  Bus iness  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign -
Act of 1971, p. 111. 
1381 Malbin ,  Michael  J .  Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s :  PACs, Campaigns, -
and P u b l i c  P o l i c y .  I n  h i s  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups,  and Campaign F inance  
Laws, p. 152.  
PAC growth s i n c e  1976 has  been one o f ,  i f  not  t h e ,  most s t r i k i n g  a s p e c t s  of 
t h e  PAC s t a t i s t i c s  p resen ted  i n  Chapter Three .  There  i s  g e n e r a l l y  assumed t o  
be  a  c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e s e  two developments .  
Although t h i s  t h e o r y  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  when viewed from t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  g i v e r ' s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i t  i s  b o l s t e r e d  n o n e t h e l e s s  by t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  t h e  maximum c o n t r i b u t i o n  one may make t o  a  c a n d i d a t e  ($1000) 
v e r s u s  t o  a  m u l t  i c a n d i d a t e  committee ($5000) .  While t h e  i n t e n t  i n  a l l o w i n g  
t h e  h igher  l i m i t  f o r  d o n a t i o n s  t o  PACs was l i k e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l e s s e r  
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  g a i n i n g  undue i n f l u e n c e  by c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  an i n t e r m e d i a r y ,  
t h e  law a l l o w s  wea l thy  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  maximize t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  g i v i n g  by 
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  a  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  PAC of  l i k e  phi losophy r a t h e r  than  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
c a n d i d a t e .  The donor unders tands ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  o n l y  p a r t ,  i f  any,  of  t h a t  
d o n a t i o n  may reach  t h e  favored c a n d i d a t e  by g i v i n g  t o  t h e  PAC. The wea l thy  
g i v e r ' s  spending d e c i s i o n s  must a l s o  t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  o v e r a l l  $25,000 
l i m i t  on a l l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by an i n d i v i d u a l ,  p r o v i d i n g  perhaps  a  
f u r t h e r  i n c e n t i v e  t o  maximize h i s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  i n f l u e n c e  wi th  each 
c o n t r i b u t i o n .  
The t h i r d  major f e a t u r e  of t h e  FECA which h a s  a f f e c t e d  PAC growth i s  
c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  second. The same p r o v i s i o n  of t h e  FECA which imposes 
t h e  $1000 l i m i t  on i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  p l a c e s  a  $5000 l i m i t  
on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  committees [ 2  U.S.C. 441a l .  Fur the rmore ,  
t h e r e  i s  no a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on t h e  amount a  PAC can g i v e  i n  a  c a l e n d a r  y e a r ,  
such a s  t h e  $25,000 l i m i t  a f f e c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s .  By accord ing  a  g r e a t e r  
l a t i t u d e  t o  t h e  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  PAC than  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h e  FECA h a s  thus  
provided s t r o n g e r  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  t o  seek  funds  from t h e  former t h a n  
from t h e  l a t t e r .  Th i s  view p a r a l l e l s  t h e  f i n d i n g s  of t h e  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  
I n s t i t u t e  of P o l i t i c s  i n  i t s  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  FECA's impact :  
I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  law f o r c e s  cand ida t e s  t o  t u r n  t o  co rpo ra t e  
and l abo r  PACs a s  w e l l  a s  t o  t h e i r  personal  bank accounts  f o r  t h e  
needed funds no longer  a v a i l a b l e  through t h e  p a r t i e s  and from 
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t o r s .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  l i m i t s  on amounts 
i n d i v i d u a l s  can c o n t r i b u t e  d i r e c t l y  t o  cand ida t e s  have served 
p r imar i l y  t o  d i v e r t  money i n t o  channels  of  o rganized  g iv ing .  1391 -
P a r t i c u l a r l y  g iven  t h e  time-consuming n a t u r e  of f u n d r a i s i n g ,  i t  i s  e a s i e r  t o  
r a i s e  l a r g e  amounts of  money by d i r e c t i n g  appeals,  t o  PACs. This  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
t r u e  f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s ,  whose r a c e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  a s  w e l l  s u i t e d  
t o  d i r ec t -ma i l  e f f o r t s  a s  a r e  Senate r a c e s ,  t h u s ,  perhaps,  a  f u r t h e r  
exp lana t ion  f o r  t h e  g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  of House cand ida t e s  on PAC money 
than t h e i r  Senate c o u n t e r p a r t s .  By making PACs more a t t r a c t i v e  t o  cand ida t e s  
a s  a  source  of  funding ,  t h e  FECA has  added y e t  another  i n c e n t i v e  t o  
t h e i r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  The h igher  l i m i t  on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i s  among 
t h e  more important  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  growth of PACs i n  r e c e n t  years .  
The second a r e a  which o f f e r s  exp lana t ions  f o r  PAC growth i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
landscape i n  gene ra l .  One f i n d s  t h a t  PACs have s tepped i n  t o  f i l l  a  void 
c r ea t ed  by t h e  d e c l i n i n g  fo r tunes  of t h e  two major pa r ty  o rgan iza t ions .  One 
a l s o  f i n d s  t h a t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of PACs has  mirrored a  g e n e r a l  t r end  toward 
fragmentat ion of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system. One must a l s o  cons ider  t he  i n c r e a s i n g  
r o l e  government has  played i n  t h e  l i v e s  of  i t s  c i t i z e n s  and t h e  compet i t ion  
f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t he  Nat ion 's  economic r e s o u r c e s ,  thus  providing f u r t h e r  
i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  o rganiz ing  t o  a f f e c t  governmental d e c i s i o n s .  
The p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  served a s  a r b i t e r s  of competing 
i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  process  of welding c o a l i t i o n s  un i t ed  by c e r t a i n  underlying 
p r i n c i p l e s .  The p a r t i e s  provided cand ida t e s  wi th  a  g e n e r a l  platform on which 
t o  run and wi th  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and o t h e r  r e sou rces  necessary  f o r  a  campaign; 
1391 U.S. -
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t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  t u r n  exe rc i s ed  s t rong  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  recru i tment  o f  cand ida t e s  
and commanded a  h igh  degree of l o y a l t y  t o  t he  pa r ty  i s s u e  pos i t i ons  among t h e i r  
o f f  i c eho lde r s  . 
Most obse rve r s  contend t h a t  t he  par ty  o rgan iza t ions  have dec l ined  s i n c e  
t h e  1950s and a r e  no longer  a b l e  t o  i n f luence  t o  t h e  same degree a s  i n  the 
past  those  cand ida t e s  who become e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s .  Some, l i k e  David Broder,  
i n s i s t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  l a r g e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  of cand ida t e s  bypassing t h e  par ty  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  wage more independent campaigns; t he  s u c c e s s f u l  exper iences  wi th  
such campaigns r e s u l t e d  i n  t he  a t rophying  of t h e  pa r ty  o rgan iza t ions  and ,  
concomitant ly ,  a  l essened  a b i l i t y  t o  provide necessary  r e sou rces  f o r  f u t u r e  
campaigns. - 1401 The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  d e c l i n e  p a r a l l e l e d  a  weakening of  par ty  
l o y a l t i e s  among v o t e r s ,  a s  evidenced by survey r e sea rch  d a t a  on pa r ty  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  t r e n d s  and t h e  increased inc idence  of  v o t e r s  c r o s s i n g  pa r ty  
l i n e s  i n  s e l e c t i n g  t h e i r  p re fe r red  candida tes .  1 4 1 1  -
The weakening o f  t h e  power of par ty  o rgan iza t ions  and t h e  pa r ty  l o y a l t i e s  
anong v o t e r s  c r ea t ed  a  vaccuum which, i n  a  s ense ,  genera ted  t he  need f o r  new 
o rgan iza t ions  t o  provide f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  cand ida t e s  and 
i s s u e s  around which cand ida t e s  could r a l l y  v o t e r s .  The evidence i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  t o  some e x t e n t  PACs have proved t o  be such s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  t h e s e  pa r ty  
func t ions .  Regardless  of  hnw one i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  d a t a  i n  Tables  6 and 7 ,  i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  PACs do play a  g r e a t e r  r o l e  i n  campaign funding today than do t h e  
p a r t i e s .  
The exper iences  of  t h e  Republican Par ty  i n  t h e  1980 and 1982 e l e c t i o n s  
1401 Broder,  David. Let 100 Single-Issue Groups Bloom--The Pains  -
They Cause May Push P o l i t i c i a n s  Back t o  t h e  P a r t i e s .  The Washington Pos t ,  
Jan.  7,  1979: C1-2. 
1 4 1 /  Samuelson, Robert J. Fragmentation and Uncer ta in ty  L i t t e r  t h e  -
P o l i t i c a l  Landscape. Nat ional  Jou rna l ,  v .  11, Oct. 20,  1979: 1731. 
have r a i s e d  ques t i ons  a s  t o  t h e  cont inued v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  pa r ty  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
theory.  The impress ive  fund ra i s ing  record  of t h e  t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l  n a t i o n a l  
committees of  t h e  Republican Pa r ty  i n  1980 (when n e t  r e c e i p t s  t o t a l e d  $111 
m i l l i o n )  and 1982 (when t h e  t h r e e  GOP committees r a i s e d  a  n e t  of $190.5 
m i l l i o n ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  $28.4 m i l l i o n  by t h e  Democratic c o u n t e r p a r t s )  was a  
t a n g i b l e  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one of  t h e  two major p a r t i e s  had gone some 
d i s t a n c e  i n  improving i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  a s s i s t  i t s  cand ida t e s  f i n a n c i a l l y ;  t h i s  
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  included d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  coord ina ted  pa r ty  
expend i tu re s ,  and campaign a s s i s t a n c e  i n  such t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  a s  p o l l i n g  and 
media a d v e r t i s i n g .  - 1421 The high degree o f  cohesion among Republican Members 
of  Congress on t h e  Reagan budget and t a x  prosrams du r ing  1981 may be f u r t h e r  
i n d i c a t i o n  of  a  r ena i s sance  i n  t h e  GOP's p r e s t i g e  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r e n g t h .  
(The i s s u e s  a f f e c t i n g  perceived pa r ty  d e c l i n e  and t h e  causes  thereof  w i l l  be 
d i scussed  f u r t h e r  i n  Chapter Four.) 
The growth of  PACs can a l s o  be viewed a s  y e t  another  r e f l e c t i o n  of  t he  
g e n e r a l  f ragmenta t ion  of American s o c i e t y  and i t s  p o l i t i c a l  system which has  
been perceived s i n c e  t h e  1950s. Kevin P h i l l i p s  wrote  i n  1978 of  t h e  
"Balkaniza t ion"  of American s o c i e t y ,  i n  which: 
Small l o y a l t i e s  a r e  r ep l ac ing  l a r g e r  ones.  Small ou t looks  
a r e  a l s o  r e p l a c i n g  l a r g e r  ones.  1431 -
P h i l l i p s  saw t h e  " p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  decomposition" of America aggravated 
by such even t s  a s  t h e  Vietnam War and the  end of  Pax Americana, t h e  f a i l u r e  
of t h e  Great Soc i e ty ,  t h e  end of energy abundance, and Watergate and t h e  
p u b l i c ' s  l o s s  o f  confidence i n  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
1421 Cohen, Richard E. Democrats Take a  Leaf from t h e  GOP Book With -
Ear ly  Campaign Financing S t a r t .  Nat ional  J o u r n a l ,  v. 1 3 ,  May 23, 1981: 923. 
1431 P h i l l i p s ,  Kevin. The Balkaniza t ion  of America. FIarper ' s ,  May -
1978: 38. 
. . . t h e  breakdown o f  t he se  u n i t i e s ,  hopes,  and g l o r i e s  has  
been enough t o  send Americans . . . scrambling a f t e r  a  v a r i e t y  
of  l e s s e r  combinations and s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s :  e t h n i c i t i e s ,  
r e g i o n s ,  s e l f i s h  economic i n t e r e s t s ,  s e c t s ,  and neighborhoods. 1441 -
Other obse rve r s  d i f f e r  a s  t o  t h e  causes  of  f ragmentat ion and whether o r  no t  
i t  r e p r e s e n t s  the '  harmful phenomenon which P h i l l i p s  be l ieved  i t  d id .  One must 
a l s o  be c a u t i o u s  no t  t o  mistake c u r r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  t r e n d s  f o r  t h e  
merely contemporary man i f e s t a t i ons  of t h e  he t e rogene i ty  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a  p a r t  
o f  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
The evidence o f  s p l i n t e r i n g  and fragmentat ion i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system i s  
r e a d i l y  observable .  For example, Congress has  experienced an  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
growth s i n c e  1970 of informal  groups seeking t o  i n f luence  t h e  policy-making 
process  w i th in  t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n .  Such groups,  commonly known a s  caucuses ,  are 
no t  recognized i n , f h e  House o r  Senate Rules and a r e  no t  l ine- i tem a p p r o p r i a t i o n s .  
They a r e  formed;by like-minded Members who d e s i r e  t h e  developnent o f  common 
po l i cy  approaches t o  shared pol icy  concerns.  - 1451 
Only t h r e e  informal  groups e x i s t e d  i n  1970: t h e  Democratic Study Group, 
t h e  House Wednesday Group, and t h e  bicameral  Members of  Congress f o r  Peace 
Through Law. By 1984, more than n ine ty  informal  groups were i n  e x i s t e n c e ,  
inc lud ing  such groups a s  t h e  Congressional  Rural Caucus, Jewelry Manufacturing 
C o a l i t i o n ,  So la r  
Caucus, Pro-Life 
- 
1441 I b i d .  -
C o a l i t i o n ,  Senate S t e e l  Caucus, T e x t i l e  Caucus, Mushroom 
Caucus, and Automobile Task Force.  - 1461 These caucuses  can 
1451 U.S. L ibrary  of  Congress. Congressional Research Serv ice .  Formal -
and Informal  Congressional  Groups [by Paul Rundquist ] .  Report 78-172, October 
30, 1978. p. 16-17. 
1461 U.S. L ibrary  of Congress. Congressional Research Serv ice .  Caucuses -
and L e g i s l a t i v e  Serv ice  Organizat ions:  An Informat iona l  Di rec tory  [by Sula  P. 
Richardson] .  I s sue  Brief  No. I B  83193, Jan.  6, 1984. 
be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e i r  narrowly-focused agendas o r  bases  of  s u p p o r t ,  
and ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  among t h e  new informal  groups,  " t h e  major emphasis . . . 
has been a  s i n g l e  i s s u e  o r i e n t a t i o n  which underscores  economic and r e g i o n a l  
shared  i n t e r e s t s  over  p a r t i s a n  cons ide ra t i ons . "  - 1471 
J u s t  a s  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  narrowly-focused congres s iona l  caucuses  
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  mu l t i t ude  o f  l o y a l t i e s  and i n t e r e s t s  
which e x i s t  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  today,  s o  do PACs c o n s t i t u t e  one more form of  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r  America's d ive rgen t  i n t e r e s t s .  Their  
growth i n  number and in f luence  can thus  be viewed a s  a  r e f l e c t i o n  of  what 
appears  t o  be t h e  h igher  degree of  s o c i a l ,  p ~ l i t i c a l ,  and economic 
he t e rogene i ty  of t h e  American people today. When viewed i n  such an  o v e r a l l  
c o n t e x t ,  t h e  PAC phenomenon of  t h e  1970s and 1980s seems h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  i s s u e  of increased  government r e g u l a t i o n  'f s of  t e n  suggested 
a s  a  c a t a l y s t  f o r  PAC growth. The theory  ho lds  t h a t  t h e  more governmental 
d e c i s i o n s  a r e  perceived a s  having an impact on peoples '  l i v e s ,  t h e  more 
p o l i t i c i z e d  people become, i n  o rde r  t o  h e l p  shape t h e  outcome of  po l i cy  
dec i s ions .  This  view,  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  t o  government r e g u l a t i o n  of  b u s i n e s s ,  was 
wel l  expressed by a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  Business-Industry P o l i t i c a l  Action 
Committee (BIPAC): 
It was no t  t h e  Federa l  E l ec t ion  Campaign A c t  and t h e  Federa l  
E l e c t i o n  Commission t h a t  promoted t h e  PAC movement; i t  was every 
o t h e r  law and every  o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  body t h a t  began i n t r u d i n g  
i n t o  t h e  bus ines s  of bus iness .  A c l e a r  p a t t e r n  emerges when 
reviewing who does and who does no t  have a  PAC--the more r egu la t ed  
an  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  more obvious an  i n d u s t r y  i s  a s  a  congres s iona l  
t a r g e t ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i t  i s  t o  have a  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee 
w i th in  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o r  w i th in  t h e  c m p a n i e s  t h a t  make up t h a t  
i ndus t ry .  A s  t h e  government moves c l o s e r  and c l o s e r  t o  p a r t n e r s h i p  
1471 U.S. L ib ra ry  of  Congress, Formal and Informal Groups, p. 2 .  -
wi th  a n  i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  r e s u l t  of  t h a t  l i a i s o n  i s  a  PAC, mothered 
by i n d u s t r y  bu t  unmistakably s i r e d  by government. 148/ -
Apart from t h e  va lue  judgment a s soc i a t ed  wi th  government r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  argument i s  both widely-accepted and l o g i c a l .  The bus iness - re la ted  
examples c i t e d  by t h e  BIPAC spokesperson could be expanded cons iderab ly  by 
looking a t  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  PACs organized around such s o c i a l  i s s u e s  a s  
a b o r t i o n  and gun c o n t r o l .  Some may s e e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  f l aw  i n  t h e  above 
quo ta t i on  a s  t h e  d i s coun t ing  of  t h e  impact of t h e  FECA i t s e l f  on t h e  growth 
of  PACs. Government r e g u l a t i o n  o f  and involvement i n  peoples '  l i v e s  and 
bus inesses  i s  no t  j u s t  a  phenomenon of  t h e  1970s; c e r t a i n l y  t h e  a c t i v e  
involvement of government has  been a growing t rend  s i n c e  a t  l e a s t  t h e  New Deal 
e r a  of  t h e  1930s. While government r e g u l a t i o n  i s  no t  s o l e l y  r e spons ib l e  f o r  
today ' s  growth of PACs, i t  i s  nonethe less  an  important  cause t h a t  cannot be 
divorced from t h e  i s s u e  of PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  
1 4 8 /  Budde, Bernadet te  A. Business P o l i t i c a l  Action Committees. -
I n  Malbin, P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws, p. 11. 
CHAPTER FOUR: ISSUES SURROUNDING THE; PAC ROLE I N  THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
T h i s  c h a p t e r  f o c u s e s  on t h e  impact which PACs have had and a r e  c o n t i n u i n g  
t o  have on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem.  We l e a r n e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  t h a t ,  
s i n c e  1972, PACs have s t e a d i l y  and enormously i n c r e a s e d  bo th  t h e i r  numbers and 
t h e  amounts of money a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  spending and t h a t  t h e y  a r e  p l a y i n g  
an i n c r e a s i n g l y  impor tan t  r o l e  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s .  
How t h e  PAC phenomenon wi th  i t s  i n f u s i o n  of many m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s  i n t o  our  
e l e c t i o n  campaigns h a s  a f f e c t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem o v e r a l l  and t h e  v a r i o u s  
segments and v a l u e s  t h e r e o f  has  been a  m a t t e r  of s h a r p  c o n t r o v e r s y  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s  . 
The d e b a t e  over  PACs h a s  revolved around t h e  i s s u e  of whether o r  not  
i n t e r e s t  groups  have developed t o o  much power over  t h e  policy-making p r o c e s s ,  
t o  t h -  d e t r i m e n t  of o t h e r  s e c t o r s  o f  s o c i e t y  and t o  t h e  Nat ion a s  a  whole. 
While t h a t  i s  t h e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n ,  o t h e r  i s s u e s  have i n e v i t a b l y  become 
e n t a n g l e d  i n  t h e  ongoing d e b a t e .  Such f a c t o r s  a s  who h a s  b e n e f i t t e d  o r  who i s  
l i k e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  from t h e  growth of PACs have tended t o  c o l o r  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n s  
of  proponents  and opponents  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees .  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  o f f e r s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  major component i s s u e s  i n  t h e  
d e b a t e  over  PACs: t h e  r o l e  of i n t e r e s t  groups  i n  s o c i e t y  and whether o r  not  
t h e y  e x e r t  t o o  much power today ,  how PACs have a f f e c t e d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  how PACs have a f f e c t e d  t h e  r o l e  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  e f f e c t  of PACs on Congress ,  t h e  l e v e l  of  fund ing  f o r  
modern e l e c t i o n  campaigns,  t h e  e f f e c t  of  PACs on t h e  b a l a n c e  of  power between 
t h e  b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  s e c t o r s ,  and t h e  r e l a t i o n  of  PACs t o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  a c c o u n t a b i t y .  For each component i s s u e ,  t h e  views of PAC proponents  
and opponents w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  and ana lyzed .  
I. THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS 
The d e b a t e  over  PACs e s s e n t i a l l y  cor responds  t o  t h e  view one t a k e s  of 
t h e  r o l e  of i n t e r e s t  groups  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem,  whether o r  not  t h e  
power e x e r t e d  by i n t e r e s t  groups  today i s  d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  good. 
Opponents o f  PACs a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  sum t o t a l  of  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  do not 
always add up t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  w h i l e  d e f e n d e r s  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  i n e v i t a b l y  emerges o u t  of t h e  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .  
PAC opponents  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  have become t o o  powerful  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  ( t h e  PAC be ing  a  v e h i c l e  f o r  w i e l d i n g  t h a t  power) and t h a t  t h i s  
i s  making i t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f o r g e  c o h e s i v e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y .  They 
s e e  i n t e r e s t  groups  a s  hav ing  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  s t r i d e n t  and u n y i e l d i n g ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  advancing s i n g l e ,  " l i t m u s "  i s s u e s .  The end r e s u l t  of t h e i r  
i n p u t  i n t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem,  opponents s a y ,  has  been t o  undermine t h e  s p i r i t  
of  compromise and f l e x i b i l i t y  which i s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  a  democracy and t o  p a r a l y z e  
t h e  Congress.  I n  t h e  words of  Common Cause ' s  Fred Wertheimer:  
The PACs s t a n d  ou t  a s  one of  t h e  major c a u s e s  of  t h e  growing 
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  of  our  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem and a l s o  of t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  
d i f f i c u l t y  we e x p e r i e n c e  i n  our  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e a c h  n a t i o n a l  consensus .  
They a r e  a  key f a c t o r  i n  t h e  growth i n  America of t h e  s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t  
s t a t e .  1481 -
Although PAC c r i t i c s  acknowledge t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  r o l e  i n t e r e s t  groups and PACs , 
a s  t h e i r  a g e n t s ,  have t o  p l a y  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem,  they  argue t h a t  they  
1481 Wertheimer,  Fred.  Commentary. I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups,  -
and Campaign F inance  Laws, p .  199. 
must b e  kep t  i n  check,  l e s t  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of t h e  sys tem be t h r e a t e n e d .  It i s  
t h e i r  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  l a r g e  amounts of  money which PACs have i n t r o d u c e d  
i n t o  t h e  p rocess  over  t h e  p a s t  decade and t h e  i n c r e a s e d  c a n d i d a t e  r e l i a n c e  on 
PAC money have s i g n a l e d  t h e  u p s e t t i n g  of t h e  b a l a n c e  between o r g a n i z e d  i n t e r e s t  
groups  and t h e  r e s t  of s o c i e t y .  
The d e f e n d e r s  of  PACs i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a  m o n o l i t h i c  f o r c e  and t h a t  
t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  a  wide spect rum of p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h i e s .  Rather  than  e x p r e s s i n g  
a la rm a t  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of PACs, t h e y  s e e  it a s  a  h e a l t h y  development which 
c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  a  v i g o r o u s  democracy. P roponen t s  adopt t h e  Madisonian view, a s  
expressed  i n  F e d e r a l i s t  No. 1 0 ,  t h a t  t h e  way t o  p reven t  a  t y r a n n y  of  f a c t i o n s  i s  
t o  a l l o w  them t o  f l o u r i s h  and m u l t i p l y  so t h a t  no one f a c t i o n  cou ld  s o  dominate 
o t h e r s  a s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  compromise w i t h  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  of  t h e  
s o c i e t y ;  t h e y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  d i v e r s e  economic i n t e r e s t s  p r e s e n t  i n  America 
today  m a n i f e s t  such a  sys tem.  - 1491 
PAC s u p p o r t e r s  contend t h a t  t h e  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e s  i n  PAC spending l a r g e l y  
r e f l e c t  a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  methods which c o r p o r a t i o n s  fo rmer ly  used t o  
i n f l u e n c e  e l e c t i o n  outcomes.  They n o t e  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have 
r e p l a c e d  t h e  " l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from c o r p o r a t e  ' f a t  c a t s , '  'double-envelope '  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  c o l l e c t e d  and bound t o g e t h e r  i n  an o u t s i d e  enve lope  w i t h  
a  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  r e t u r n  a d d r e s s ,  and i l l e g a l  in-kind c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s . "  - 1501 
The g o a l  of t h e  FECA, Michael  Malbin o b s e r v e s ,  was not  t o  end t h e  r o l e  of  b u s i n e s s  
i n  p o l i t i c s ,  b u t  t o  t r a n s f o r m  i t .  And, a s  f u r t h e r  ev idence  of t h e  t r ans fo rmed  
n a t u r e  of  campaign f i n a n c i n g ,  he  c i t e s  t h e  d e c r e a s e d  s h a r e  of  l a r g e  i n d i v i d u a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  among House c a n d i d a t e  r e c e i p t s  between 1972 and 1978. 
149/ Malbin ,  Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s ,  p .  215-216. -
150/ I b i d . ,  p. 156. -
Because most of t h e  l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  have 
come from b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h i s  d r o p  seems more than  
adequa te  t o  account f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  growth of PACs. - 1511 
Thus,  PAC d e f e n d e r s  downplay t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  (which c r i t i c s  underscore )  on 
PAC spending.  They b e l i e v e  t h a t  s o  long a s  t h e  money comes from v o l u n t a r y  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  s u b j e c t  t o  d i s c l o s u r e  laws and l i m i t a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
r eason  f o r  concern .  
F i n a l l y ,  PAC s u p p o r t e r s  o b j e c t  t o  t h e  f r e q u e n t  p e j o r a t i v e  c o n n o t a t i o n  of  
t h e  term " s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t "  and t h e  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  of i t  w i t h  a n o t h e r  value- laden 
t e rm,  " p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t . "  They ho ld  t h e  view t h a t  a l l  f a c t i o n s  which advoca te  
s p e c i f i c  government p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  and t h a t  
no one group h a s  any more c l a i m  t o  t h e  r o l e  of  de fender  of  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  
than  any o t h e r  group.  
Both t h e  c r i t i c s  and t h e  d e f e n d e r s  of PACs make some v a l i d  p o i n t s  and 
some which r a i s e  l e g i t i m a t e  q u e s t i o n s .  Both s i d e s  c l a i m  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  r o l e  
3f i n t e r e s t  groups  i n  s o c i e t y  whi le  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h e  need f o r  some b a l a n c e ,  
l e s t  they  become o v e r l y  powerful .  The c r i t i c s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  b a l a n c e  has  
a l r e a d y  been upse t  by PACs, w h i l e  d e f e n d e r s  c l a i m  t h a t  PACs do not  e x e r t  a  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n f l u e n c e .  The q u e s t i o n  may be  addressed  t o  s u p p o r t e r s  a s  
t o  what l e v e l  of PAC fund ing  might cause  them concern:  i f  no t  t h e  20 pe rcen t  
of House and S e n a t e  r e c e i p t s  i n  1978 o r  t h e  n e a r l y  27 pe rcen t  i n  1982, what 
l e v e l  of PAC spend ing  a s  a  p r o p o r t i o n  of c a n d i d a t e  spending would s i g n a l  t o o  
g r e a t  a  r o l e  by i n t e r e s t  groups?  
PAC d e f e n d e r s  a r e  c o r r e c t  i n  t h e i r  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t ,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  what 
i s  o c c u r i n g  i s  a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of t h e  way i n  which b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d  money i s  
c o n t r i b u t e d .  Because o f  t h e  absence  of  comple te ,  thorough d i s c l o s u r e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  p r i o r  t o  1972,  it i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  whether t h i s  
accoun t s  f o r  most of t h e  PAC growth o r  i s  mere ly  one f a c t o r  among many. 
It i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  PACs a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of modern-day p l u r a l i s m ,  i n  
which a  wide-range of i n t e r e s t  groups  compete t o  win f r i e n d s  and i n f l u e n c e  
p o l i c i e s .  They a r e  n o t  a  m o n o l i t h i c  f o r c e .  However, t h e y  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  
v e h i c l e s  of  o r g a n i z e d  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h o s e  pe r sons  and groups  who a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
educa ted  and invo lved  i n  t h e  sys tem s o  a s  t o  have an impact on p o l i c i e s .  The 
concern  expressed  by c r i t i c s  may be  based ,  i n  p a r t ,  on t h e  comparison of t h e  
o r g a n i z e d  i n t e r e s t  groups  wi th  t h o s e  s e c t o r s  of  s o c i e t y  unab le  o r  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  
aware o r  mot iva ted  t o  b e  p o l i t i c a l l y  invo lved .  A t  t h e  r o o t  of  t h i s  concern  i s  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  whether e q u a l  a c c e s s  t o  government i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h o s e  s e c t o r s  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  which a r e  unable  t o  r a i s e  l a r g e  amounts of money; t h u s ,  PACs 
a r e  seen  a s  f u r t h e r i n g  an imbalance i n  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  po l i cy -making  p r o c e s s .  
A f u r t h e r  m i s g i v i n g  of c r i t i c s ,  a s  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r ,  i s  t h e  accumula t ion  
of  t o o  much power by p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r i e s  o r  s e c t o r s  of  s o c i e t y ,  which PACs 
may p lay  an impor tan t  r o l e  i n  h e l p i n g  them a c q u i r e .  
PAC d e f e n d e r s  make a  v a l i d  p r o t e s t  t o  t h e  p e j o r a t i v e  u s e  of  t h e  term " s p e c i a l  
i n t e r e s t . ' '  What a c t u a l l y  s e p a r a t e s  a  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  group from t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  group,  t h e y  a s s e r t ,  i s  t h e  p r i m a r i l y  economic agenda o r  focus  
which c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  former ( c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  u n i o n s ,  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s )  and t h e  
more i d e o l o g i c a l  n a t u r e  of t h e  l a t t e r ' s  agenda o r  f o c u s .  What may e x p l a i n  t h e  
p e j o r a t i v e  c o n n o t a t i o n  g iven  t h e  term " s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s "  i s  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  
t h e i r  m o t i v a t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  g r e e d ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  "nobler"  m o t i v a t i o n  
of commitment t o  an ideo logy  o r  s e t  of non-economic p r i n c i p l e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  t h r e a t  which c r i t i c s  f e e l  PACs 
c o n s t i t u t e ,  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  f r agmen ted  and p a r a l y z e d  government  may b e  b o t h  
f l e e t i n g  and i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  b e h o l d e r .  I n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  were  w i d e l y  
c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  t h e  o b s t a c l e s  t h e y  p l a c e d  i n  t h e  p a t h  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  e n e r g y  
p o l i c y  d u r i n g  t h e  C a r t e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  PAC money was s e e n  by  some a s  a  r o o t  
c a u s e  o f  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  omnipo ten t  i n t e r e s t  g roups  t o  t h w a r t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t .  T h i s  c a n  b e  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  t h e  s u c c e s s  e n c o u n t e r e d  by  t h e  Reagan 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  w inn ing  p a s s a g e  o f  i t s  f a r - r e a c h i n g  t a x  and budge t  programs 
i n  t h e  9 7 t h  C o n g r e s s ,  t h i s  d e s p i t e  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  from i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  which 
had a  s t r o n g  s t a k e  i n  t h e  outcome and whose PACs h a d ,  by 1981,  become an  even  
more i m p o r t a n t  component i n  t h e  f u n d i n g  o f  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  campaigns  t h a n  t h e y  
were  i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i f  o t h e r  s egmen t s  o f  t h e  power 
s t r u c t u r e  a r e  p e r f o r m i n g  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s  w e l l ,  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  
w i l l  be  k e p t  i n  c h e c k .  Thus ,  what some p e r c e i v e d  a s  gove rnmen ta l  p a r a l y s i s  
j u s t  a  few y e a r s  ago  may h a v e  had l e s s  t o  do  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  g roup  s t r e n g t h  t h a n  
w i t h  i n s u f f i c i e n t  power w ie lded  by o t h e r  f o r c e s .  R a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  s t a n d - o f f  
some p e r c e i v e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  1981 e x p e r i e n c e  may have  r a i s e d  an e n t i r e l y  
d i f f e r e n t  s p e c t r e - - t h e  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n f l u e n c e  which some saw a s  b e i n g  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  w i e l d e d  by  i n t e r e s t  g roups  which s t o o d  t o  g a i n  from t h e  outcome.  
11. PAC IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
One i s s u e  o f t e n  r a i s e d  by  c r i t i c s  i s  t h a t  PACs h a v e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
d e c l i n i n g  power o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  The t h e o r y  h o l d s  t h a t  by o f f e r i n g  
new s o u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  and l o g i s t i c a l  s u p p o r t  t o  c a n d i d a t e s ,  w h i l e  t h e  
p a r t i e s '  a b i l i t y  t o  p r o v i d e  such  s u p p o r t  h a s  l e s s e n e d ,  t h e  PACs have  r e n d e r e d  
t h e  p a r t i e s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  i m p o t e n t  i n  p e r f o r m i n g  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  a s  a g e n t s  
of  compromise and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .  P a r t y  t i e s  have become l e s s  impor tan t  t o  
e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s ,  who owe t h e i r  v i c t o r i e s  l e s s  t o  p a r t i e s  t h a n  t o  i n t e r e s t  
groups .  The p a r t i e s  a r e  t h u s  l e s s  a b l e  t o  a c t  a s  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  between 
i n t e r e s t  group demands and p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s ,  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  o v e r l o a d i n g  
of t h e  policy-making p rocess  and r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  above. 
There  i s  a  r e c i p r o c a l  n a t u r e  t o  t h i s  t h e o r y ,  i n  t h a t  PACs a r e  s e e n  a s  owing 
t h e i r  growth,  i n  p a r t ,  t o  weakened p a r t i e s  and t h a t  t h a t  growth,  i n  t u r n ,  h a s  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  f u r t h e r  e r o s i o n  of  p a r t y  s t r e n g t h .  
Most s c h o l a r s ,  however, appear  t o  adopt t h e  v iew t h a t  w h i l e  "PACs a r e  
g e t t i n g  s t r o n g e r  and t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  g e t t i n g  weaker . . . t h e  d i r e c t i o n s  a r e  
c o i n c i d e n t a l  f o r  t h e  most p a r t . "  - 1521 P o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  David Adamany a s s e r t s :  
The f o r c e s  r avag ing  American p a r t i e s  were s e t  i n  motion long 
b e f o r e  t h e  r e c e n t  emergence of  PACs. 1531 -
Adamany a t t r i b u t e s  p a r t y  d e c l i n e  e s s e n t i a l l y  t o  a  "media-or iented m i d d l e - c l a s s  
e l e c t o r a t e "  hav ing  become more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  i s s u e s  and c a n d i d a t e s  and l e s s  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p a r t i e s .  - 1541 As h i s  f e l l o w  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t ,  A u s t i n  Ranney, 
n o t e d ,  "any th ing  t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r o l e  of  TV i n  n a t i o n a l  campaigns d i m i n i s h e s  
t h e  r o l e  of t h e  p a r t i e s . "  1551 While t e l e v i s i o n  i s  w i d e l y  viewed a s  one -
c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  weakening of p a r t y  t i e s  and,  hence ,  power, such o t h e r  developments  
a s  i n t e r n a l  p a r t y  r e f o r m s ,  a  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of p r i m a r i e s ,  and p u b l i c  f i n a n c i n g  
1521 Kayden, Xandra. Campaign F inance :  The Impact on P a r t i e s  and PACs. -
I n  An A n a l y s i s  of t h e  Impact of t h e  FECA, p. 9 7 .  
1531 Adamany, David. PACs and t h e  Democratic F i n a n c i n g  of P o l i t i c s .  -
I n  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees and Campaign F inance :  Symposium, p. 593. 
1541 I b i d .  -
1551 Ranney, A u s t i n .  The P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s :  Reform and Dec l ine .  -
I n  Anthony King ( e d . ) .  The New American P o l i t i c a l  System. Washington,  
American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  P u b l i c  P o l i c y  Resea rch ,  1978. p. 244. 
o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  campaigns a r e  o f t e n  mentioned a s  o t h e r  impor tan t  
f a c t o r s .  1561 It can be  argued t h a t  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  have had a  d i r e c t  r o l e  i n  -
t h e  growth o f  PACs, a s  w e l l .  
Frank Sorauf  i s  a n o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  who t e n d s  t o  downplay t h e  
r o l e  o f  PACs i n  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  f o r t u n e s  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  " A t  most ,"  
he  s a y s ,  "PACs have o n l y  nudged t h e  p a r t i e s '  downward s l i d e . "  - 1571 He views 
PACs a s  a  major p a r t n e r  i n  a  new c o a l i t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  i n  America, one 
i n  which t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  l a r g e l y  exc luded .  He n o n e t h e l e s s  s u g g e s t s  one way i n  
which PACs have l i k e l y  worked t o  t h e  d e t r i m e n t  of  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  p a r t i e s .  
The a b i l i t y  of  PACs t o  r a i s e  i n c r e a s i n g  amounts of  campaign 
money s u p p o r t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e i r  r e l i a n c e  on 
new campaign t echno logy  and e x p e r t i s e .  Very s imply ,  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  h e l p  c a n d i d a t e s  r e t a i n  t h e  c o s t l y  s e r v i c e s  of 
o p i n i o n  p o l l e r s ,  campaign c o n s u l t a n t s ,  and t h e  media i t s e l f .  
It i s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  p o s s i b l e  t o  " ren t "  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  s u r r o g a t e ,  
b u t  t h e  p r i c e  i s  d e a r .  PAC money f o s t e r s  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of 
pe r sona l i sm i n  campaign p o l i t i c s  and s u p p o r t s  t h e  freedom of 
c a n d i d a t e s  from r e l i a n c e  on p a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  r e s o u r c e s ,  
and,  even a t  t i m e s ,  t h e  p a r t y  l a b e l .  - 1581 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  t h e  l a r g e  amounts of money n e c e s s a r y  t o  wage modern, media- 
o r i e n t e d  campaigns i s  wide ly  viewed a s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  s t r e n g t h  of  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  commit tees ,  and t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  modern campaigns promote a  c a n d i d a t e -  
o r i e n t e d  sys tem,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  may w e l l  s u f f e r .  In  t h i s  c r u c i a l  
r e s p e c t ,  PACs can be  seen  a s  i n d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  p a r t y  a t r o p h y .  
A f i n a l  c h a r g e  by PAC c r i t i c s  which p e r t a i n s  t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i s  t h a t  
1561 Kayden, Campaign F inance :  The Impact on P a r t i e s  and PACs, 
p. 97- 
1571 S o r a u f ,  Frank J .  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  and P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Comrnittes: -
Two L i f e  Cycles .  I n  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees and Campaign Finance:  Symposium. 
p. 454. 
I b i d .  p. 455. 
PACs a r e  drawing money away from t h e  p a r t i e s .  There  i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  view 
from former Republ ican N a t i o n a l  Committee Chairman B i l l  Brock who s a i d  t h a t  
PACs have t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  drawing suppor t  from t h e  p a r t y  because  o f  t h e  
t endency  of  Republ ican businessmen who might normal ly  be expec ted  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  t h e  p a r t y  t o  say  t h a t  t h e y  have " a l r e a d y  g iven  a t  t h e  o f f i c e . "  - 1591 
Although PACs and p a r t i e s  may indeed be competing f o r  money, we a r e  
reminded t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  appea l  of t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
h a s  been t h e i r  p r o v i s i o n  of  n o n f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .  1601 Adamany o b s e r v e s  
t h a t  p a r t i e s  were no t  good p r o v i d e r s  o f  campaign money long b e f o r e  PACs became 
a  growing f o r c e .  
P a r t i e s  have provided funds  o n l y  i n a d e q u a t e l y ,  f i t f u l l y ,  and 
unevenly i n  t h e  whole of  t h e  post-war p e r i o d .  The c o n t i n u i n g  
d e c l i n e  o f  p a r t y  f i n a n c i n g  i s  s u r e l y  not  due t o  t h e  r i s e  of  
PACs, a l t h o u g h  t h e  converse  may b e  t r u e .  1611 
Thus, even i f  one  s e e s  PACs a s  a t t r a c t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  which might o t h e r w i s e  
go t o  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t  p r o v i d i n g  money t o  c a n d i d a t e s  i s  t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  means by which p a r t i e s  induce  l o y a l t y  among t h e i r  c a n d i d a t e s  and 
e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s .  *It should  a l s o  b e  noted t h a t  t h e  FECA, d e s p i t e  c r i t i c i s m  
t h a t  i t  h a s  played a  r o l e  i n  p a r t y  d e c l i n e ,  i n  f a c t  encourages  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  by  imposing a  $20,000 l i m i t  on i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  committees of  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  $1,000 l i m i t  
on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  and t h e  $5,000 l i m i t  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  commit tees .  
One a d d i t i o n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  may be  a p p r o p r i a t e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
1591 Kayden, Campaign Finance:  The Impact on P a r t i e s  and PACs, p. 86. -
1601  S o r a u f ,  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  and P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Comnit tees :  Two L i f e  -
Cycles .  p. 451. 
1611 Adamany, PACs and t h e  Democratic F i n a n c i n g  of  P o l i t i c s ,  p. 593-594. -
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  d e c l i n e .  I n  l i n e  wi th  o t h e r  comments made i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  al.1 
such t h e o r i e s  may b e  proven i n v a l i d  i f  t h e  Republ ican s u c c e s s e s  i n  t h e  1980 
e l e c t i o n s ,  combined wi th  t h e  s i g n s  of p a r t y  cohes ion  i n  t h e  97 th  Congress and 
t h e  phenomenal GOP f u n d r a i s i n g  record  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  c o n t i n u e  unaba ted .  
P a r t y  d e c l i n e  may suddenly  be seen a s  be ing  r e v e r s e d .  
111. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS I N  THE POLITICAL PROCESS - 
S u p p o r t e r s  of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees c l a i m  t h a t  t h e y  perform a  
b e n e f i c i a l  f u n c t i o n  by promoting g r e a t e r  c i t i z e n  involvement i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
p rocess .  It i s  s a i d  t h a t ,  r a t h e r  than  c o n s t i t u t i n g  amorphous " s p e c i a l  
i n t e r e s t s  , ' I  PACs a r e  made up of m i l l i o n s  o f  people  and t h a t  t h e y  a r e  t h e  one 
v e h i c l e  f o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  making of p u b l i c  p o l i c y  open t o  t h o s e  who do not  
have l a r g e  amounts of  money t o  c o n t r i b u t e .  The opponents  of  PACs i n s i s t  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  b e i n g  crowded o u t  of t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  p rocess  by t h e  
o rgan ized  i n t e r e s t  g roups ,  o p e r a t i n g  through t h e i r  PACs. They s e e  t h e  average  
c i t i z e n  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  money b o t h  o u t  of f r u s t r a t i o n  over  h i s  
i n a b i l i t y  t o  compete wi th  l a r g e  sums of money which PACs can spend and ou t  of  
cyn ic i sm over  t h e  pe rce ived  dominance of s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  over t h e  po l i cy -  
making p r o c e s s .  
I n  t h e  absence of  comprehensive ,  r e l i a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  i n t e r n a l  
o p e r a t i o n s  o f  PACs, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  draw c o n c l u s i o n s  about t h e  accuracy  of  
t h e  above a s s e r t i o n s  on t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which PACs promote g r e a t e r  involvement 
i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess .  None the less ,  t h e r e  i s  some ev idence  t h a t  l e n d s  
s u p p o r t  t o  t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n .  A 1980 p o s t - e l e c t i o n  su rvey  by t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  of  
Mich igan ' s  Survey Research Cen te r  found t h a t  a  h i g h e r  p e r c e n t a g e  of  i n d i v i d u a l s  
p o l l e d  c la imed t h a t  they  had c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a  PAC t h a n  had c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  
e i t h e r  a  c a n d i d a t e  o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .  The q u e s t i o n  was asked:  
E12. Now what about p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  groups  such a s  groups  
sponsored by a  union o r  a  b u s i n e s s ,  o r  i s s u e  groups  l i k e  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  R i f l e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o r  t h e  N a t i o n a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n  of  
Women. Did you g i v e  money t h i s  e l e c t i o n  year  t o  a  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  group o r  any o t h e r  group t h a t  suppor ted  o r  opposed 
p a r t i c u l a r  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n ?  
The response  was 6.7 p e r c e n t  a f f i r m a t i v e  and 92.5 p e r c e n t  n e g a t i v e .  T h i s  
compared w i t h  5 .9  p e r c e n t  who r e p o r t e d  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  a  c a n d i d a t e  ( a t  any 
l e v e l )  and 3.6 p e r c e n t  who s a i d  t h e y  had c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .  - 1621 
One c a v e a t  t h a t  should  be added t o  t h i s  d a t a  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  p h r a s i n g  of 
t h e  q u e s t i o n  on PACs. The N a t i o n a l  R i f l e  A s s o c i a t i o n  and t h e  N a t i o n a l  
O r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  Women a r e  no t  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commi t t ees ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  bo th  
sponsor  PACs. Peop le  who gave money t o  i s s u e  groups  l i k e  NOW may have though t  
t h e y  were g i v i n g  t o  a  PAC; c l e a r l y  t h e r e  was a  m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  about t h e  
n a t u r e  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  even on t h e  p a r t  of t h o s e  who wro te  t h e  s u r v e y .  
Fur the rmore ,  t h e r e  a r e  people  who g i v e  money t o  t h e  sponsor ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
who do not  a l s o  g i v e  t o  t h e i r  PAC. T h i s  may have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  h i g h e r  
p e r c e n t a g e  f o r  PACs than  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  o r  p a r t i e s .  A second c a v e a t  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  Michigan d a t a  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  not p o s s i b l e  t o  de te rmine  t o  what e x t e n t  t h o s e  
who gave t o  PACs and t o  c a n d i d a t e s  were l a r g e l y  t h e  same group o f  peop le .  
T h i s  d a t a  n o n e t h e l e s s  p rov ides  an i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  PACs a r e  a t t r a c t i n g  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  l e v e l  of  c o n t r i b u t o r s .  
There  i s  a l s o  some e v i d e n c e ,  a l t h o u g h  h e r e  a g a i n  d a t a  i s  l i m i t e d ,  t h a t  
PACs g e t  most of t h e i r  money i n  s m a l l  d o n a t i o n s ,  t h u s  implying a  b r o a d ,  
democra t i c  base  of  s u p p o r t .  One s t u d y  shows t h a t  of  a l l  PACs i n  1976 w i t h  
r e c e i p t s  of more t h a n  $100,000,  87 p e r c e n t  of t h e i r  r e c e i p t s  were from 
1621 Cen te r  f o r  P o l i t i c a l  S t u d i e s .  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S o c i a l  Resea rch .  -
Cente r  f o r  P o l i t i c a l  S t u d i e s .  American N a t i o n a l  E l e c t i o n  S tudy ,  1980. 
T r a d i t i o n a l  Time S e r i e s .  Codebook. 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  $100 o r  l e s s .  A s  might be e x p e c t e d ,  t h i s  r e s u l t  was skewed 
by l a b o r  PACs, which go t  96 p e r c e n t  of  t h e i r  money i n  d o n a t i o n s  of $100 o r  
l e s s ;  t h e  pe rcen tage  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  PACs was 66 p e r c e n t  and f o r  a l l  o t h e r  
PACs, 82.5  p e r c e n t .  1631 -
The average  s i z e  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  PACs i s  a  much-disputed m a t t e r ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e g a r d i n g  t h o s e  t o  c o r p o r a t e  PACs. One l abor  union s t u d y  found 
t h e  average  d o n a t i o n  t o  a  c o r p o r a t e  PAC was $200; a n o t h e r  s t u d y ,  t h i s  by t h e  
b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d  P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  Counc i l ,  found t h e  f i g u r e  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  
PACs t o  be under $125. 1641 C l e a r l y ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  tendency f o r  p roponen t s  -
of  ( b u s i n e s s )  PACs t o  maximize t h e  appearance  of  smal l  g i v i n g ,  whereas c r i t i c s  
of  PACs may downplay any such e v i d e n c e .  
R e g a r d l e s s  of  t h e  ev idence  showing l a r g e  numbers of  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  PACs, c r i t i c s  contend t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  many c a s e s  i s  
b rough t  about  a s  a  r e s u l t  of  ~ e r c e i v e d  p r e s s u r e  by c o r p o r a t e  managers.  D e s p i t e  
t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  on c o e r c i o n  under t h e  FECA, r e p o r t s  p e r s i s t  t h a t  a  s u b t l e ,  
u n s t a t e d  p r e s s u r e  does  e x i s t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h i n  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  ' As t h e  Wall -
S t r e e t  J o u r n a l  wro te  i n  a  1980 a r t i c l e :  
Some middle  and s e n i o r  managers a t  t h e  900 o r  more 
companies wi th  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  PACs . . . a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
f e e l i n g  p r e s s u r e d  t o  cough up p a r t  of  t h e i r  paychecks t o  
s u p p o r t  "our way of l i f e , "  a s  one s o l i c i t a t i o n  l e t t e r  p u t s  i t .  
11 I know i t  i s n ' t  mandatory t o  g i v e , "  says  an employee 
o f  a  L i t t o n  I n d u s t r i e s  u n i t .  "But t h e  word around t h e  wa te r  
c o o l e r  i s  t h a t  i f  you d o n ' t  g i v e  o r  i f  you g i v e  l e s s  than  
t h e  amount expected based on your s a l a r y ,  y o u ' r e  l i a b l e  t o  
be  c a l l e d  i n  f o r  a  pep t a l k  from t h e  d i v i s i o n a l  p r e s i d e n t . "  1651 -
------- 
1631 Adamany, PACs and t h e  Democratic F i n a n c i n g  of P o l i t i c s ,  p. 590. -
1641  Discuss ion .  I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups,  and Campaign -
Finance  Laws, p. 226-227. 
1651 Sansweet ,  Stephen J .  P o l i t i c a l - A c t i o n  U n i t s  A t  Firms Are -
A s s a i l e d  by Some Over T a c t i c s .  Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  J u l y  24,  1980: 1, 12 .  
C r i t i c s  p o i n t  t o  comments l i k e  t h e  one by J u s t i n  D a r t ,  chairman o f  Dar t  
I n d u s t r i e s ,  who s a i d  i n  1978, r e g a r d i n g  h i s  p r a c t i c e  of  w r i t i n g  l e t t e r s  t o  
h i s  e x e c u t i v e s  s o l i c i t i n g  d o n a t i o n s  t o  t h e  company's PAC, " I f  t h e y  d o n ' t  g i v e ,  
t h e y  g e t  a  s e l l . "  - 1661 
Corpora te  PAC spokesmen i n s i s t  t h a t  c o e r c i o n  i s  a  r a r e  o c c u r r e n c e ,  a t  
most ,  and t h a t  such  c h a r g e s  r e a l l y  a r e  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  a t t e m p t s  by b u s i n e s s  
a d v e r s a r i e s  t o  d i s c r e d i t  them. For t h e  most p a r t ,  t h e y  contend t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
"100% s e r i o u s  about  a v o i d i n g  p r e s s u r e . "  1671 The f o l l o w i n g  s o l i c i t a t i o n  l e t t e r  
from a  c o r p o r a t i o n  chai rman i s  seen  by b u s i n e s s  e x e c u t i v e  C l a r k  MacGregor a s  
i n d i c a t i v e  of  t h e  g r e a t  l e n g t h s  c o r p o r a t i o n s  go t o  avoid  any s i g n  o f  c o e r c i o n :  
I hope you w i l l  d e c i d e  t o  t a k e  p a r t  i n  t h i s  program, bu t  
t h e r e  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  no p r e s s u r e  on you t o  do so .  Whether 
o r  not  you t a k e  p a r t  i s  up t o  you and w i l l  have no b e a r i n g  
on your p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n  o r  f u t u r e  w i t h  our  company. There  
w i l l  be n e i t h e r  rewards  nor  r e p r i s a l s  whatever your d e c i s i o n .  
Should anyone even imply a n y t h i n g  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  I ask  
t h a t  you immediate ly  b r i n g  t h i s  t o  my p e r s o n a l  a t t e n t i o n .  - 1681 
C r i t i c s  r e spond ,  w i t h  some j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  employees may f e e l  p r e s s u r e ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  of  what i s  a c t u a l l y  s a i d  t o  them. A s  d e s c r i b e d  by Common Cause 
s e n i o r  v i c e  p r e s i d e n t  Fred Wertheimer : 
T h e r e ' s  i m p l i c i t  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  sys tem t o  b e g i n  w i t h .  
When you have people  working t h e i r  way up t h e  l a d d e r  and 
t h e i r  boss  a s k s  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  PAC, many w i l l  
conc lude  t h a t  t h i s  an expec ted  a c t i v i t y .  - 1691 
Converse ly ,  unspoken,  s u b t l e  p r e s s u r e  i s  t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  t o  prove.  
1661 Ulman, N e i l .  Companies Organ ize  Employees and Holders  I n t o  a  -
P o l i t i c a l  Force .  Wall  S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  August 1 5 ,  1978: 1, 18.  
1671 Sansweet ,  P o l i t i c a l - A c t i o n  U n i t s  A t  F i rms Are A s s a i l e d .  -
1681 MacGregor, C la rk .  Commentary. I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  -
Groups,  and Campaign F inance  Laws, p. 207. 
1691  Sansweet ,  P o l i t i c a l - A c t i o n  U n i t s  A t  Firms Are A s s a i l e d .  -
Although t h e  i s s u e  of perceived coerc ion  may be too  nebulous t o  enable  
an  o b j e c t i v e  f i nd ing  on i t s  e x i s t e n c e ,  PAC defenders  c l a im  t h a t  such 
p r a c t i c e s  a r e  no t  unique t o  bus ines s ,  a s  such c r i t i c i s m  has  extended t o  l abo r  
un ions ,  a s  we l l .  I n  response t o  a  1979 s u i t  by t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Assoc ia t ion  o f  
Machinis ts  a l l e g i n g  coerc ion  among corpora te  PACs i n  t h e i r  f u n d r a i s i n g ,  t h e  
co rpo ra t i ons  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h a t  un ion ' s  own p r a c t i c e s  exh ib i t ed  t h e  same 
p a t t e r n s  which they  saw a s  i n d i c a t i v e  of  coerc ion  by t h e  co rpo ra t i ons .  170/ A -
more n e u t r a l  obse rve r ,  Edwin Eps t e in ,  main ta ins  t h a t ,  "upper- level  bus iness  and 
l a b o r  o f f i c i a l s  s t i l l  f a c e  s u b t l e  peer pressures  and psychological  arm- 
tw i s t i ng . "  - 1711 
A f i n a l  i s s u e  w i th  imp l i ca t i ons  f o r  t h e  r o l e  of  t h e  i nd iv idua l  i n  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  process  i s  t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of  campaign f i nanc ing ,  which i s  seen  
a s  being f o s t e r e d  by PACs. "Because money i s  r e a d i l y  t r a n s f e r a b l e , "  w r i t e s  
David Adamany, "PACs n a t i o n a l i z e  funding sources .  They c o l l e c t  ample t r e a s u r i e s  
i n  smal l  i n d i v i d u a l  g i f t s  from many l o c a l e s ,  c e n t r a l i z e  those  funds i n  t h e  hands 
of  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  o f f i c e r s ,  and then make l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  
important  r a c e s  anywhere i n  t h e  country."  - 1721 This t r end  toward 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i scerned  by obse rve r s  a s  a  major e f f e c t  of 
t he  PAC phenomenon, and i t  i s  a  cause of some cons t e rna t ion  among l o c a l  
p o l i t i c i a n s .  Consider t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  voiced by one S t a t e  pa r ty  chairman over 
t h e  "ou t s ide  money" coming i n t o  h i s  S t a t e :  
S i x t y  percent  of t h e  money i n  t h e  S t a t e  i s  from o u t s i d e  t h e  
State--on both s i d e s .  There ' s  no e l imina t ing  the  i n f luence  
of  t h e  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t .  Out-of-state s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  groups 
1701 I b i d .  -
1711 I b i d .  
172/ Adamany, PACs and t h e  Democratic Financing of P o l i t i c s ,  p. 596. -
a r e  working a s  a  c o a l i t i o n - - n o t  a  c o n s p i r a c y - - j u s t  a  oneness  of 
purpose  and t h e y ' r e  l o o k i n g  f o r  l ike-minded c a n d i d a t e s .  These 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  o r  l i b e r a l  PACs can g e t  t o g e t h e r  and i n  a  s m a l l  
S t a t e  they  can r e a l l y  make a  d e n t  i n  a  campaign. Yet t h e  guy 
i n  t h e  S t a t e  who l i v e s  t h e r e  can o n l y  c o n t r i b u t e  $1,000.  - 173/ 
As c a n d i d a t e s  r e c e i v e  g r e a t e r  s h a r e s  of t h e i r  fund ing  from o u t s i d e  of t h e i r  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  one l i n k  between t h e  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l  and t h o s e  he  r e p r e s e n t s  
may t end  t o  d i s i n t e g r a t e .  Again ,  t o  quo te  Adamany: 
These n a t i o n a l l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h u s  compete w i t h  
l o c a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  who s u p p l y  p o l i t i c a l  
r e s o u r c e s ,  f o r  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s .  I n  t h i s  
c o m p e t i t i o n ,  n a t i o n a l l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  a t  an advan tage  because  t h e  money t h e y  p r o f f e r  
i s  r e a d i l y  c o n v e r t i b l e  i n t o  t e c h n o l o g i e s  t h a t  a r e  ever  more 
e f f e c t i v e  i n  modern campaigns.  - 174/
With i n c r e a s i n g  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  t end  t o  become 
overshadowed i n  t h e  p rocess .  
I n  summary, t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  PACs bo th  promote and h i n d e r  
t h e  r o l e  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess .  By o f f e r i n g  a  
new, i s s u e - o r i e n t e d  v e h i c l e  th rough  which t o  become i n v o l v e d ,  PACs appear  t o  
be  b r i n g i n g  more people  i n t o  t h e  p r o c e s s .  S u b t l e  p r e s s u r e  may p lay  a r o l e  i n  
some of  t h e  PAC g i v i n g ,  b u t  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  a c c o u n t s  f o r  o n l y  a  smal l  
p o r t i o n  of t h e  money dona ted .  Fur the rmore ,  PAC s u p p o r t e r s  c o r r e c t l y  n o t e  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  s t i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  s i n g l e  l a r g e s t  component of 
campaign r e c e i p t s  f o r  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  arguments about 
i n d i v i d u a l s  be ing  crowded o u t  of  t h e  p r o c e s s .  
1731 Kayden, Campaign F inance :  The Impact on P a r t i e s  and PACs, 
p. 9 7 7  
1741 Adamany, PACs and t h e  Democratic F i n a n c i n g  of P o l i t i c s ,  p. 596. -
Based on i n t e r v i e w s  conducted w i t h  PAC managers,  t h e  Harvard s t u d y  on t h e  
FECAts impact concluded t h a t  t h e  encouragement of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by 
i t s  membership i s  a  major and s i n c e r e l y - h e l d  g o a l  of t h o s e  who e s t a b l i s h  PACs. 
There  a r e  two obvious  o b j e c t i v e s  o f t e n  c i t e d  by PACs: To s e e  
c a n d i d a t e s  e l e c t e d  t o  o f f i c e  who r e p r e s e n t  t h e i r  views . . . ; 
and t o  encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t h e i r  membership a s  p a r t  of  
t h e i r  c i v i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The l a t t e r  o b j e c t i v e  should  not  
be  u n d e r r a t e d  a s  a  f a c t o r  because  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  be v e r y  much 
i n  t h e  mind of many of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d .  Educa t ion  always 
h a s  been a  major emphasis of l a b o r ' s ,  and many b u s i n e s s  PACs 
a r e  not  run  by people  wi th  e i t h e r  s t r o n g  i d e o l o g i c a l  views o r  
much p o l i t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  - 1751 * * * 
As one b u s i n e s s  e x e c u t i v e  put i t ,  "Giving i s  a  way of g e t t i n g  
c i t i z e n s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e ,  t h e  PAC i s  a  c o n d u i t .  Our p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
premise i s  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t  i s  a s  important  as v o t i n g . "  
Labor l e a d e r s  would s a y  t h e  same t h i n g .  1761 -
Two s e r i o u s  concerns  a r e  r a i s e d  by PAC c r i t i c s  a s  t h e y  a f f e c t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r o l e .  One, a s  d i s c u s s e d  above,  i s  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  of  PACs w i t h  
t h e  t r e n d  toward n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of campaign funding s o u r c e s .  Th i s  cou ld  
s e r v e  t o  d i m i n i s h  t h e  importance  of  t h e  average  c i t i z e n  a s  c o n s t i t u t e n t ,  i n  
t h e  e l e c t o r a l  sys tem.  The o t h e r  i s  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t o r s  
f a c e  v i s - a - v i s  PACs i n  t h a t  whi le  " p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  may . . . have p o l i c y  
outcomes i n  mind when t h e y  make c o n t r i b u t i o n s  . . . t h e s e  a r e  r a r e l y  l i n k e d  
t o  an o rgan ized  lobbying e f f o r t . "  - 1771 I f  one views t h e  p rocess  of i n f l u e n c i n g  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a s  a  two-step p rocess  i n v o l v i n g  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  and o rgan ized  lobbying e f f o r t s  a f t e r w a r d s ,  t h e  tendency of PACs t o  b e  
l i n k e d  w i t h  lobbying arms of pa ren t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i m p l i e s  p o t e n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  
c l o u t  f o r  a  PAC t h a n  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  i n  a  g iven  i n s t a n c e .  
1751 Kayden, The Impact of  t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  of -
P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees, p. 111. 
1761 I b i d . ,  p. 103.  -
1771 U.S. Congress ,  An A n a l y s i s  of  t h e  Impact of t h e  FECA, p.  5. -
I V .  IMPACT OF PACs ON THE CONGRESS 
Perhaps  t h e  most fundamental  i s s u e s  a t  s t a k e  i n  t h e  d e b a t e  over  PACs 
concern  t h e  e f f e c t  PAC spend ing  h a s  had on t h e  Congress ,  g i v e n  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
r o l e  a s  c h i e f  policy-making body i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
o f  PAC r e s o u r c e s  i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s .  Those alarmed by PAC growth s e e  
t h e  a b i l i t y  of  Congress t o  a c t  d e c i s i v e l y  impeded by t h e  p r e s s u r e s  of  t h e  
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  which t h e y  f e e l  a r e  emboldened by t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  l a r g e s s e .  
And they  e x p r e s s  concern  t h a t  PAC money h a s  c r e a t e d  a  c l i m a t e  wherein  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  PAC r e c e i v e  s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  o r  a r e  pe rce ived  by t h e  
p u b l i c  a s  s u c h ,  when t h e  l e g i s l a t o r  d e c i d e s  h i s  p o s i t i o n  on a  r e l e v a n t  v o t e .  
They a r e  answered by o t h e r s  who i n s i s t  t h a t  PAC money f o l l o w s  i s s u e  p o s i t i o n s ,  
and not t h e  o t h e r  way a round ,  and t h a t  t h e  competing p r e s s u r e s  on Congress a r e  
an i n h e r e n t  p a r t  o f  our  governmental  p rocess .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  a  t h i r d  i s s u e  
a f f e c t i n g  Congress i s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which PAC money h e l p s  t o  l o c k  incumbents 
i n t o  o f f i c e ;  t h i s  i s s u e  c a u s e s  concern  among b o t h  d e f e n d e r s  and c r i t i c s  of 
PACs. Each of  t h e s e  t h r e e  i s s u e s  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
A. P a r a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Policy-Making P r o c e s s  
One of  t h e  f e a r s  most o f t e n  vo iced  by PAC c r i t i c s  i s  t h a t  PACs a i d  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  i n  g a i n i n g  a  s t r a n g l e h o l d  on t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o c e s s ,  
l e a v i n g  each Member beholden t o  c o n f l i c t i n g  and u n y i e l d i n g  p r e s s u r e s  and making 
compromise more d i f f i c u l t .  T h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  was b e s t  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  David Obey i n  1979, d u r i n g  h i s  d e f e n s e  o f  t h e  Obey-Railsback 
amendment t o  l i m i t  PACs ( t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  f i n a l  c h a p t e r ) .  A f t e r  commenting 
on t h e  d e c l i n e  of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a s  m e d i a t i n g  s t r u c t u r e s  f o r  competing 
i n t e r e s t s ,  Obey proceeded t o  ment ion t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o t h e r  c a u s e s  of t h e  
pe rce ived  l e g i s l a t i v e  p a r a l y s i s :  
When we add t o  t h a t  t h e  p r e s s u r e  of s i n g l e - i s s u e  groups  who 
want t o  judge t h i s  p l a c e  and judge us i n d i v i d u a l l y  o n l y  on t h e  
b a s i s  of  how we perform on t h e i r  own s i n g l e  i s s u e ,  and t o  b l a z e s  
wi th  what we do on any th ing  e l s e ,  we have a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which 
t h e  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  House t o  perform is  a t  b e s t  marg ina l .  
When you add t o  t h a t  t h e  a b i l i t y  of a l l  t h e s e  groups t o  now 
b e g i n  t o  i n j e c t  l a r g e  and ever  i n c r e a s i n g  amounts of d o l l a r s  
i n t o  each of  our  campaigns and i n t o  t h e  campaigns of our 
opponen t s ,  you have a  p r e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  making t h e  F e d e r a l  
Government one g i a n t  i s o m e t r i c  e x e r c i s e ,  because  you g r a d u a l l y  
f r e e z e  t h e  wheels i n  t h i s  p l a c e  because  you have such tremendous 
p r e s s u r e  be ing  put on t h i s  p l a c e ,  i t  i s  p u l l i n g  t h i s  p l a c e  a p a r t  
on e v e r y  s i n g l e  i s s u e  you can name. We almost  l o s e  our a b i l i t y  t o  
put t o g e t h e r  a  m a j o r i t y  . . . . 1781 -
As d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  of  governmental  
p a r a l y s i s  may b e  j u s t  tha t - -a  p e r c e p t i o n ;  even t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  r e a l ,  
i t  may be  o n l y  a  temporary c o n d i t i o n .  The d e f e n d e r s  of  PACs tend t o  s e e  them 
a s  merely  t h e  modern-day v e h i c l e s  of America ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  p l u r a l i s t i c  p o l i t i c s .  
The d i s c o m f o r t  they  c a u s e  l e g i s l a t o r s  i s  no t  o n l y  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  sys tem but  
may produce d e s i r a b l e  r e s u l t s ,  a s  w e l l .  By "keeping t h e  hea t "  on l e g i s l a t o r s ,  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  groups  s e r v e  t o  remind them of t h e i r  r o l e  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  who 
may i g n o r e  t h e  wishes  of  t h e  v o t e r s  o n l y  a t  t h e i r  own u l t i m a t e  p e r i l .  The 
compla in t s  by some Members of undue p r e s s u r e  from PACs may be viewed by PAC 
s u p p o r t e r s  a s  i n d i c a t i v e  of  d i scomfor t  over  be ing  fo rced  t o  c o n f r o n t  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e s  which t h e y  would r a t h e r  i g n o r e .  Thus, t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  of  
p a r a l y s i s  i n  t h e  Congress and t h e  v a l u e s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  i t  a r e  not e a s i l y  
r e c o n c i l e d .  
1781 Obey, David.  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1971 Amendments. -
Remarks i n  t h e  House. Congress iona l  Record,  v .  125,  October  1 7 ,  1979: 28644- 
28645. 
B. Linkage Between PAC Money and L e g i s l a t i v e  Votes  
The d e b a t e  over  whether PAC money i n f l u e n c e s  l e g i s l a t o r s '  v o t e s  o r  whether 
i t  merely  rewards  v o t e s  of sympathe t i c  Members i s  t h e  s i n g l e  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
e lement  of  t h e  e n t i r e  PAC phenomenon. It i s  a l s o  t h e  one which i s  most 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  e v a l u a t e  o b j e c t i v e l y ;  n e i t h e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  r i g h t  and n e i t h e r  i s  
wrong. At mos t ,  we can hope t o  unders tand  t h e  b a s i c  p e r s p e c t i v e s  of  t h e  
c r i t i c s  and t h e  d e f e n d e r s  on t h i s  impor tan t  i s s u e .  
The Harvard s t u d y  on t h e  impact of t h e  FECA d e c l a r e d :  
. . . PAC money i s  i n t e r e s t e d  money. While t h o s e  who run  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  may not  be  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  
accompl i sh ing  t h e i r  l e g i s l a t i v e  d e s i g n s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  
t h e y  do have s p e c i f i c  agendas f o r  p u b l i c  laws.  - 1791 
Concerning t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  be  no d i s p u t e .  The p o i n t  of  
d i v e r g e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  by some bu t  no t  o t h e r s  t h a t ,  th rough  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  i n t e r e s t  groups  g a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  l e v e r a g e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  v o t e s  t h a t  t h e y  might no t  o t h e r w i s e  have had and which g i v e s  them 
an u n f a i r  advan tage  over  t h o s e  w i t h  l e s s  o r  no money t o  spend.  
There  can b e  d i s c e r n e d  i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  of  PAC opponents  a  h i e r a r c h y  o r  
spec t rum of  pe rce ived  o b l i g a t i o n  a s  i t  p e r t a i n s  t o  t h i s  i s s u e .  Any o r  a l l  of  
t h e s e  v iews a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  h e l d  by PAC c r i t i c s .  A t  one l e v e l ,  t h e y  may p o i n t  
t o  examples i n  which s p e c i f i c  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  v o t e s  appeared t o  have been o v e r l y  
i n f l u e n c e d  by campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from PACs. (Common Cause i s  perhaps  t h e  
most prominent advoca te  of  t h i s  v i e w p o i n t ,  which i t  promotes th rough  i t s  many 
s t u d i e s  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  c o r r e l a t e  key v o t e s  o r  committee ass ignments  w i t h  PAC 
g i v i n g . )  A t  t h e  n e x t  l e v e l ,  t h e  argument i s  advanced t h a t  a  f e e l i n g  of 
o b l i g a t i o n  t e n d s  t o  be  c r e a t e d  by PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and,  whether o r  no t  a  
179/ U.S. Congress ,  An A n a l y s i s  of  t h e  Impact of t h e  FECA, p. 4-5. -
l e g i s l a t o r  a l t e r s  h i s  o r  h e r  v o t e  on a  g iven  m a t t e r  a s  a  r e s u l t ,  he h a s  been 
placed i n  an awkward p o s i t i o n .  The n e x t  l e v e l  of argument is  t h a t  even i f  no 
quid  pro quo r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  cumula t ive  e f f e c t  o f  a l l  t h e  PAC 
money i s  t o  make i t  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  Members t o  p l a c e  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  
above some s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t .  F i n a l l y ,  even i f  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between money 
and v o t e s  i s  ambiguous o r  n o n e x i s t e n t ,  t h e  p u b l i c  p e r c e p t i o n  of such a 
c o n n e c t i o n  j e o p a r d i z e s  t h e  appearance  of  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s '  o b j e c t i v i t y  
and thus  damages t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of t h e  e n t i r e  Congress .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  
appearance of i m p r o p r i e t y  may be a s  damaging a s  t h e  r e a l i t y .  
What most concerns  t h o s e  who a r e  s k e p t i c a l  of PAC power i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  
of i n t e r e s t  groups  t o  j o i n  f o r c e s  on p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e s ,  t h u s  overwhelming t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Obey d e s c r i b e d  t h i s  tendency a s  f o l l o w s :  
. . . t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s  f r e q u e n t l y  c o i n c i d e ,  
such a s  when an i s s u e  a f f e c t s  b u s i n e s s  a s  a  whole o r  an 
e n t i r e  i n d u s t r y  and a l l  of t h e  companies and l a b o r  unions  
i n  t h a t  i n d u s t r y .  
When t h a t  o c c u r s ,  when a  l a r g e  number of groups which have 
made s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Members a r e  a l l  lobbying on 
t h e  same s i d e  of  an i s s u e ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  g e n e r a t e d  from t h o s e  
a g g r e g a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i s  enormous and warps t h e  p rocess .  It 
i s  i f  they  had made a  s i n g l e ,  ex t remely  l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  - 1801 
Thus,  whi le  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  spending of  PACs i s  of  concern  l a r g e l y  because  of  
t h e  g e n e r a l  appearance of  i m p r o p r i e t y  o r  i n f l u e n c e  pedd l ing ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  of 
PACs t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  and t a r g e t  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  c a u s e s  concern  over  t h e  
a c t u a l i t y  of  such p r a c t i c e s .  
Defenders of  PACs adopt t h e  view t h a t  because  i n t e r e s t  groups  a r e  not  
i n h e r e n t l y  e v i l  o r  c o r r u p t ,  n e i t h e r  a r e  
i n h e r e n t l y  c o r r u p t i n g  o r  s i n i s t e r  t o o l s  
t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  
. With t h e  concept  of  a c c e s s  b e i n g  a  
- -- 
1801 Obey, F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campa - i g n  Act of 1971 Amendments, p. 28632. 
fundamental  e lement  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  democracy, t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  a l a r m i n g  
about  t h e i r  s e e k i n g  t o  maximize t h e i r  a c c e s s  t o  t h e i r  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  
While PAC s u p p o r t e r s  acknowledge t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  group t o  
g a i n  undue i n f l u e n c e  over  Members, i t  i s  a  r a r e  o c c u r r e n c e ,  g i v e n  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  
o f  i n t e r e s t s  competing w i t h  one a n o t h e r  and t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  laws which s e r v e  
a s  a  r e s t r a i n t  a g a i n s t  unseemly p r a c t i c e s .  These two f a c t o r s  a r e  seen  a s  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  accumula t ion  of  too  much 
power by any one group o r  s e c t o r .  
PAC proponen t s  a s s e r t  t h a t  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  g iven  t o  
c a n d i d a t e s  who a r e  b a s i c a l l y  sympathe t i c  w i t h  t h a t  g r o u p ' s  ph i losophy ;  
t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l  f o r  a  h i g h  c o r r e l a t i o n  t o  e x i s t  between PAC g i v i n g  
and Members' v o t e s .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Mendel Davis e x p l a i n e d  t h i s  p a t t e r n  i n  h i s  
f l o o r  s t a t e m e n t  opposing t h e  Obey-Railsback Amendment: 
I t h i n k  maybe we g e t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  because  of  t h e  way we 
v o t e ,  maybe f o r  f r e e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  maybe because  we a r e  
p ro - labor ,  o r  maybe because  we a d d r e s s  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  
But t o  s a y  t h a t  j u s t  because  we have t a k e n  money, we a r e  
c a s t i n g  v o t e s  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h a t  money, I t h i n k ,  i s  
unsound. 1811 -
Thus, t h e  money i s  seen  p r i m a r i l y  a s  an e f f e c t  o f  Members' i s s u e  p o s i t i o n s  
r a t h e r  than  a s  a c a u s e  of  them. 
PAC d e f e n d e r s  v iew campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  o n l y  one o f  many t o o l s  used 
by i n t e r e s t  groups  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  A s  Michael  
Malbin o b s e r v e s :  
1811 Davis ,  Mendel. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1971 Amendments. -
I n  Remarks t o  t h e  House. Congress iona l  Record,  v .  125,  O c t .  1 7 ,  1979: 28656. 
J u s t  a s  members do not depend on any one s e t  of groups  f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n s  of t h e i r  campaign funds ,  n e i t h e r  do 
t h e  most s u c c e s s f u l  groups  r e l y  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a s  t h e  
b a s i s  of  a n y t h i n g  more than  a  smal l  p a r t  of t h e i r  o v e r a l l  
lobbying s t r a t e g i e s .  - 1821 
The f a c t o r s  which de te rmine  a   ember' s  v o t e  on a  g iven  i s s u e  a r e  too  complex 
t o  be  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  p r i o r i t i z e d  by o b s e r v e r s .  Hence, t h o s e  who a r e  s u p p o r t i v e  
of  PACs c l a i m  t h a t  campaign d o n a t i o n s  p lay  no g r e a t e r  r o l e  i n  a  Member's v o t e  
than  do newspaper e d i t o r i a l s ,  o rgan ized  lobby ing ,  c o n s t i t u e n t  m a i l ,  o r  a  h o s t  
of o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  
C r i t i c s  o f t e n  charge  t h a t  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  c o n s t i t u t e  inves tments  i n  
p r o s p e c t i v e  Members of Congress.  T h i s  appears  t o  be an a c c u r a t e  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  
l e a v i n g  a s i d e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of whether o r  not  t h e  inves tment  should  be viewed 
i n  a  c y n i c a l  manner. A t  t h e  ve ry  l e a s t ,  PACs hope t o  g a i n  a c c e s s  t o  Members, 
t o  h e l p  e n s u r e  a  f a i r  h e a r i n g  of t h e i r  c o n c e r n s .  Beyond t h a t ,  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  
of t h e  v a r i o u s  PACs d i v e r g e ,  wi th  some emphasizing t h e  need t o  reward proven 
f r i e n d s  and t o  keep them i n  o f f i c e  and o t h e r s  embarking on a  s o - c a l l e d  
" r i s k - t a k i n g "  p o l i c y  i n  o r d e r  t o  e l e c t  new f r i e n d s  t o  Congress .  
C.  PACs a s  P r o t e c t o r s  of  Incumbents 
As was demonstra ted  i n  Chapter  T h r e e ,  PACs have a  s t r o n g  b i a s  toward 
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  incumbents ,  and t h i s  b i a s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  s i n c e  1972. I n  1982,  
more than two- th i rds  of  PAC money was c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  incumbent House and 
S e n a t e  Members. Among t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of  PACs i n  1982,  l a b o r  PACs gave 
58 p e r c e n t  of t h e i r  money t o  incumbents ,  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  groups 
----- 
1821 Malbin ,  Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s ,  p. 177.  -
76 p e r c e n t ,  and c o r p o r a t e  PACs 75 p e r c e n t ;  even t h e  non-connected PACs gave 
more of t h e i r  money t o  incumbents than  t o  any o t h e r  type  of c a n d i d a t e  
(48  p e r c e n t ) .  Fur the rmore ,  incumbents have r e c e i v e d  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  l a r g e r  
s h a r e  of t h e i r  funds  from PACs, r i s i n g  from 17 p e r c e n t  of House r e c e i p t s  i n  
1972 t o  n e a r l y  37 p e r c e n t  i n  1982; t h i s  l e v e l  f a r  exceeded t h a t  f o r  c h a l l e n g e r s  
and open-seat  c o n t e n d e r s .  Many o b s e r v e r s ,  c r i t i c s  and d e f e n d e r s  of PACs a l i k e ,  
f i n d  t h e  incumbency b i a s  d i s t u r b i n g ,  a l though  t h e i r  r e a s o n s  v a r y .  
PAC c r i t i c s  t end  t o  s e e  t h e  suppor t  f o r  incumbents a s  c o n f i r m a t i o n  of 
t h e i r  t h e o r y  t h a t  PACs seek  t o  buy i n f l u e n c e  and,  by g i v i n g  t o  incumbents--who 
g e n e r a l l y  do not  need a s  much money a s  t h e i r  opponents  t o  wage a  c r e d i b l e  
campaign--they a r e  maximizing t h e i r  chances  t o  win t h a t  a c c e s s .  Many PAC 
s u p p o r t e r s  f a v o r  a  more a g g r e s s i v e  s t r a t e g y  f o r  PACs, u r g i n g  them t o  back 
c a n d i d a t e s  more on t h e  b a s i s  of i s s u e  c o m p a t a b i l i t y  than  on t h e  s a f e r  c o u r s e  
of  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h o s e  most l i k e l y  t o  win--the incumbents ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  House c a n d i d a t e s ;  by g i v i n g  up t h e  c a u t i o u s ,  p a s s i v e  approach,  PACs 
would r i s k  a l i e n a t i n g  incumbents i n  f avor  of winning p o t e n t i a l l y  s t r o n g e r  
f r i e n d s  among t h e i r  c h a l l e n g e r s .  T h i s  a d v i c e ,  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  words of 
Ronald Reagan i n  1978 ( s e e  page 1 2 3 ) ,  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i r e c t e d  a t  c o r p o r a t e  
and t r a d e  PACs which a r e  seen  a s  too  w i l l i n g  t o  s u p p o r t  Democratic incumbents 
than  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  by backing t h e i r  Republ ican 
c h a l l e n g e r s  ( a l t h o u g h  t h i s  h a s  changed somewhat i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ) .  
R e g a r d l e s s  o f  o n e ' s  g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e s  about PACs, t h e r e  i s  t h e  concern  
t h a t  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  of  our e l e c t i o n s  i s  d imin i shed  by t h e  pe rce ived  
enormous advan tages  incumbents have over  t h e i r  opponen t s .  When PAC f i n a n c i a l  
s u p p o r t  i s  added t o  an incumbent ' s  p e r q u i s i t e s  of o f f i c e  and h i g h e r  v i s i b i l i t y  
( a s  compared wi th  non-incumbents) ,  t h e  c h a l l e n g e r ,  g e n e r a l l y  under f inanced  t o  
b e g i n  w i t h ,  may be overwhelmed by h i s  incumbent opponent and ,  t h u s ,  be unab le  
t o  compete e f f e c t i v e l y .  
Two f a c t o r s  may m i t i g a t e  t h e  pe rce ived  PAC b i a s  toward incumbents.  F i r s t ,  
i n s o f a r  a s  c o r p o r a t e  PACs--the l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  c a t e g o r y  of PACs--are concerned ,  
t h e y  have shown a  g r e a t e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  i n  r e c e n t  e l e c t i o n s  t o  suppor t  c a n d i d a t e s  
on t h e  b a s i s  of  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c o m p a t a b i l i t y ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of incumbency s t a t u s .  
Second, Malbin a s s e r t s  t h a t ,  i f  one f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
of a  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  and number of c a n d i d a t e s  i n  a  g iven  c a t e g o r y ,  t h e  
apparen t  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  s h a r e  of PAC money d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  incumbents i s  
d imin i shed .  He e x p l a i n s :  
. . . s i n c e  most c h a l l e n g e r s  have l i t t l e  r e a l i s t i c  chance 
of  winning a g a i n s t  most House incumbents i n  any g iven  y e a r ,  
and s i n c e  most people  a r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  "wastet t  money on a  
c a n d i d a t e  who has  no chance of winning,  i t  d i s t o r t s  t h e  
p i c t u r e  t o  t a l k  about t h e  r e c e i p t s  of  a l l  incumbents v e r s u s  
a l l  c h a l l e n g e r s .  A much c l e a r e r  p i c t u r e  can be ob ta ined  by 
c o n t r o l l i n g  f o r  bo th  p a r t y  and c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  . Second, 
p e r c e n t a g e  of c a n d i d a t e s  i n  a  g iven  c a t e g o r y :  i t  should  be 
obvious  t h a t  i f  s a f e  incumbents r e p r e s e n t  about 40 p e r c e n t  
of  a l l  House g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  c a n d i d a t e s  ( a s  they  do)  and 
i f  they  r e c e i v e  about 40 p e r c e n t  of a l l  nonpar ty  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  c a n d i d a t e s  ( a s  they  d o ) ,  
one cannot  use t h e  40 p e r c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  f i g u r e  t o  c l a i m  
t h a t  PACs favor  s a f e  incumbents d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y .  - 1831 
Although M a l b i n ' s  f i g u r e s  do l e s s e n  t h e  appearance  of incumbency b i a s ,  one 
f i n d s  i n  o t h e r  of  h i s  d a t a  t h a t  c o m p e t i t i v e  incumbents r e c e i v e d  23 p e r c e n t  of 
PAC money compared wi th  o n l y  13  p e r c e n t  t o  c o m p e t i t i v e  c h a l l e n g e r s .  - 1841 
Once a g a i n ,  t h e r e  i s  ev idence  of t h e  PAC b i a s  i n  f avor  of incumbents.  
---- 
1 8 3 1  I b i d . ,  p. 157. -
1 8 4 /  I b i d . ,  p. 160-161. -
V.  THE BUSINESS-LABOR BALANCE OF POWER 
The i s s u e  of how t h e  PAC phenomenon h a s  a f f e c t e d  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t i o n s  
i n  s o c i e t y  of t h e  b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  s e c t o r s  i s  one t h a t  i s  r a i s e d  r e p e a t e d l y .  
The p e r c e p t i o n  o f  how each h a s  e i t h e r  b e n e f i t t e d  o r  s u f f e r e d  h a s  a  b e a r i n g  on 
how many people  g e n e r a l l y  f e e l  about PACs; i t  might be  argued t h a t ,  whether 
spoken o r  n o t ,  i t  i s  a t  t h e  h e a r t  of  t h e  e n t i r e  PAC d e b a t e .  
A t  t h e  o u t s e t  of t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ,  i t  should  be  noted t h a t  t h e  concern  
over  t h e  b a l a n c e  of  power between b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  presupposes  t h a t  t h a t  
s p l i t  r e f l e c t s  t h e  p i v o t a l  focus  of power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  
A s  demonstra ted  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  i n  such i s s u e s  a s  d e f e n s e  spend ing ,  t r a d e  
p o l i c y ,  env i ronmenta l  r e g u l a t i o n ,  mar i t ime  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t r u c k i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
and n u c l e a r  power, t h e  convergence of  b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  p o l i c y  p o s i t i o n s  may 
c a l l  i n t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  of t h a t  dichotomy t o  t o d a y ' s  p o l i t i c s .  - 1851 
Because s o  much of  t h e  PAC d e b a t e  has  been i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  b u s i n e s s  v e r s u s  
l a b o r  c o n t e s t ,  however, it does  war ran t  e x p l o r a t i o n  h e r e ,  b e a r i n g  i n  mind 
t h a t  o t h e r  p e r s p e c t i v e s  may u l t i m a t e l y  prove t o  be of  g r e a t e r  u t i l i t y .  
While l a b o r  PACs once dominated t h e  f i e l d ,  s i n c e  1974 they  have been 
g r e a t l y  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  overshadowed by c o r p o r a t e ,  t r a d e ,  and o t h e r  PACs; 
o n e - t h i r d  of a l l  PACs i n  1974 were sponsored by l a b o r  un ions ,  b u t ,  by 1984, 
l a b o r  c o n s t i t u t e d  fewer than  one-ninth  o f  a l l  PACs. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  c o r p o r a t e  
PACs grew i n  number from o n l y  89 i n  1974 t o  1 ,536 i n  1984 and today  make up 
44 p e r c e n t  of  a l l  PACs i n  e x i s t e n c e .  Fur the rmore ,  l a b o r  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  accounted f o r  one-half  of  a l l  such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  
1974 bu t  o n l y  one- four th  i n  1982. Corpora te  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  which n e a r l y  
1851 Wertheimer,  F red .  Commentary. I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  -
Groups and Campaign F inance  Laws, p.  199-200. 
equaled l a b o r  g i v i n g  i n  1978, su rpassed  l a b o r ' s  a g g r e g a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by 
35 pe rcen t  i n  1982. One- thi rd  of a l l  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1982 came from 
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r .  
While t h e s e  d a t a  d e p i c t  a  r a t h e r  b l e a k  p i c t u r e  f o r  l a b o r  v i s - a - v i s  i t s  
t r a d i t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t e  r i v a l  (and not wi thou t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  
f a c t o r s  which work t o  l a b o r ' s  advan tage .  The i r  a d v e r s a r i e s  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
community a r e  qu ick  t o  p o i n t  ou t  t h e  l a r g e  sums of money expended by l a b o r  on 
i n t e r n a l  communications and o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ;  t h e s e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  
seen a s  keeping l a b o r  i n  a  more c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  than  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  d a t a  
r e f l e c t s .  
The e s t i m a t i o n  by spokesmen f o r  t h e  b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  s e c t o r s  of each 
o t h e r ' s  s t r e n g t h s  can be seen a s  p a r t  of t h e  propaganda b a t t l e  which ensues  
between them. As observed by  t h e  Harvard s t u d y  on t h e  FECA's impact:  
Each s i d e  assumes t h e  o t h e r  has  more power, more i n f l u e n c e ,  
and each s i d e  s e e s  i t s e l f  a s  a p p e a l i n g  t o  p o s i t i v e  v a l u e s  
such a s  t h e  c i v i c  p r i d e  t h a t  comes from p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  - 1861 
It i s  p o s s i b l e  and d e s i r a b l e  t o  a s s e s s  some of t h e  s t r e n g t h s  and weaknesses 
of b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  a s  i t  a f f e c t s  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  a b i l i t i e s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s .  
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  most i m p r e s s i v e  advantage possessed by t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r  
i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  numbers of i t s  PACs and t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  even g r e a t e r  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  As observed by Edwin E p s t e i n :  
The f i g u r e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  whereas growth o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a r e  
l i m i t e d  on t h e  l a b o r  s i d e ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  and 
1861 Kayden, The Impact of t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  -
of P o l i t i c a l  Act ion Committees, p. 103. 
o t h e r  b u s i n e s s  PAC format ion  and expansion i s  v i r t u a l l y  
u n l i m i t e d .  187/ -
One l a b o r  o f f i c i a l  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  were more than  4  m i l l i o n  b u s i n e s s e s  i n  
t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  ( w i t h  186,547 employing more than  50 p e o p l e ) ,  a s  compared 
w i t h  60,000 l o c a l  un ions .  - 188/ Fur the rmore ,  o n l y  20 p e r c e n t  of t h e  3,700 
c o r p o r a t i o n s  w i t h  a s s e t s  over  $100 m i l l i o n  had s e t  up PACs by 1978, and o n l y  
3 . 4  p e r c e n t  of  t h e  23,800 w i t h  a s s e t s  between $10 and $100 m i l l i o n  had PACs 
t h a t  y e a r ;  t h e s e  d a t a  po in t  t o  ample room f o r  f u r t h e r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  - 189/ 
Because of  t h e  growth i n  numbers, c o r p o r a t e  PAC g i v i n g  i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  h a s  
i n c r e a s e d  a t  an i m p r e s s i v e  r a t e ,  t r i p l i n g  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1982 over  i t s  1978 l e v e l ,  r a n k i n g  f i r s t  ( f o r  t h e  second yea r  i n  
a  row) among a l l  PAC c a t e g o r i e s .  A s  c o r p o r a t e  PACs grow i n  number, t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  spend w i l l  i n c r e a s e  a c c o r d i n g l y .  
The b u s i n e s s  advantage i n  o v e r a l l  spend ing  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  
i f  one views t h e  t r ade /membersh ip /hea l th  PACs l a r g e l y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  
b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r .  There  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  agreement t h a t  most of  t h e s e  groups  
d o ,  i n  f a c t ,  e x h i b i t  an e s s e n t i a l l y  pro-business  o r i e n t a t i o n .  A s  no ted  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of Chapter  Three ,  E p s t e i n  makes t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  e s t i m a t e  t h a t  
one-hal f  of  t h e  PACs i n  t h e  FEC's t r a d e / m e m b e r s h i p / h e a l t h  c a t e g o r y  can b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  b u s i n e s s  community. Thus, adding t h e  d o l l a r  
f i g u r e s  f o r  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  t o  t h o s e  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  g roup ing  shows o r g a n i z e d  
187/ E p s t e i n ,  Bus iness  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act -
of  1971,  p. 138. 
188/ J e s s u p ,  David. Can P o l i t i c a l  I n f l u e n c e  Be Democratized? A Labor -
P e r s p e c t i v e .  I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  Groups,  and Campaign F inance  Laws, 
p. 3 2 .  
189/ Tumin, J o n a t h a n .  How t o  Bury L i b e r a l s .  The New Republ ic ,  v. 182 ,  -
May 24,  1980: 14. 
l a b o r  i n c r e a s i n g l y  overwhelmed by t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r  i n  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  g i v e  t o  
c a n d i d a t e s .  Along t h e s e  l i n e s ,  t h e  Harvard s t u d y  obse rved :  
I f  one e x c l u d e s ,  f o r  t h e  purpose  of t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ,  membership 
a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  and c o n s i d e r s  o n l y  t h o s e  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  w i t h  
c o r p o r a t e  members, i t  seems c l e a r  t h a t  b u s i n e s s  has  i n c r e a s e d  
i t s  a r s e n a l  by doub l ing  t h e  number of avenues through which i t  
can p a r t i c i p a t e .  It i s  not  u n l i k e l y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  f o r  a  t r a d e  
a s s o c i a t i o n  PAC t o  s u p p o r t  a  c a n d i d a t e ,  f o r  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
which belong t o  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  t o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  and f o r  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e s  who work i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  make d o n a t i o n s  on 
t h e i r  own b e h a l f .  1901 -
The same s t u d y ,  however,  r e p o r t e d  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  of  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n  e x e c u t i v e s  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  between r e p r e s e n t i n g  an i n d u s t r y  and r e p r e s e n t i n g  
a  c o r p o r a t i o n ;  t h e y  n o t e  t h a t  t r a d e  groups  o f t e n  a l l y  themselves  wi th  l a b o r  
on p o l i c y  m a t t e r s .  - 1911 How one views t h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  o r i e n t a t i o n  of  t h e  
t r a d e  PACs i s  a  d e t e r m i n i n g  f a c t o r  i n  o n e ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  magnitude o f  
b u s i n e s s '  spending advantage over  l a b o r .  
Labor PACs, a l t h o u g h  fewer i n  number t h a n  t h e i r  c o r p o r a t e  c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  
a r e  g e n e r a l l y  l a r g e r  i n  s i z e  and tend t o  make l a r g e r  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
The l i s t s  of  t h e  l a r g e s t  PAC c o n t r i b u t o r s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Chapter  Three  r e v e a l e d  
t h a t  between 10 and 12 of t h e  t o p  20 were l abor  PACs i n  e v e r y  e l e c t i o n  s i n c e  
1 9 7 2 .  ( T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  l a b o r ' s  dwind l ing  p o s i t i o n  among t h e  
l a r g e s t  PAC s p e n d e r s  i n  t h o s e  e l e c t i o n s . )  And, d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  
PACs outnumbered l a b o r  PACs by 4 t o  1 i n  1982,  t h e i r  a g g r e g a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  were o n l y  35 pe rcen t  h i g h e r  t h a n  l a b o r ' s .  That  
l a b o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  comprised a s  much a s  one- four th  of  a l l  PAC g i v i n g  i n  1982, 
i n  t h e  f a c e  of o t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n s  of waning s t r e n g t h ,  b o r e  t e s t imony  t o  o rgan ized  
l a b o r ' s  s t i l l  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o l i t i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  s k i l l s .  
1901 Kayden, The Impact of t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  of  -
P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees, p. 104. 
1911 I b i d .  -
If corporations have the numbers in terms of their PACs, labor has the 
numbers in terms its membership base--one-fourth of the Nation's work force. 
It is this base to which the unions direct their ostensibly non-partisan voter 
registration and get-out-the-vote drives, which, in accordance with the FECA 
[2 U.S.C. 441b(2)(~)], may be conducted with general treasury funds 
(corporations have the same rights in this area). By targeting these appeals 
to individuals whose presumed political philosophies are in concert with 
those of organized labor, the unions have a potentially important vehicle for 
political impact. 
Beyond the non-partisan drives are the internal communications which, 
under the FECA [2 U.S.C. 441b(2)(A)], are allowed between unions and their 
members and families and between corporations and their stockholders and 
executives and families. These comunications may be political and partisan 
in nature, and their costs are paid out of the general treasuries of the unions 
and corporations. For the unions, with their enormous membership, these 
partisan communications represent an invaluable tool, comprising such tactics 
as mailings, phone banks, door-to-door canvassing, leaflets at factories, and 
rallies. In the words of AFL-CIO COPE'S David Jessup: 
Labor leaders are justifiably proud of this effort and do not 
rdemur when columnists or conservative journalists exaggerate 
its cost. Labor's strength does indeed rest with its membership 
communications. 1921 -
The combined value of the registration and get-out-the-vote drives, the 
partisan communications to the membership, and other goods and services provided 
to campaigns by unions is potentially enormous. (None of these expenditures 
1921 Jessup, Can Political Influence Be Democratized?, p. 32. -
i s  s u b j e c t  t o  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s ,  a l though  i n t e r n a l  cormnunication c o s t s  above 
$2,000 must be  r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e  FEC.) Malbin e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r  
s p e n t  $11 m i l l i o n  on such a c t i v i t i e s  on b e h a l f  of t h e  Carter-Mondale t i c k e t  
i n  1976, one-half  of t h e  amount C a r t e r  was g iven  i n  F e d e r a l  funds  w i t h  which 
t o  run h i s  e n t i r e  campaign. 1931 The c o s t  of t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  by l a b o r  i n  1978 -
was e s t i m a t e d  by E p s t e i n  a t  n e a r l y  $20 m i l l i o n ,  - 1941 and i n  1980 by Alexander 
a t  $15 m i l l i o n .  - 1951 While l a b o r  may j u s t i f i a b l y  p o i n t  t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r ' s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  network and i t s  numerous j o u r n a l s  and in-house p u b l i c a t i o n s  
wi th  which i t  can d i s s e m i n a t e  p a r t i s a n ,  p o l i t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
r eason  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  community i s  n e a r l y  a s  adep t  o r  s u c c e s s f u l  
a s  l a b o r  i n  u s i n g  such methods.  - 1961 I n t e r n a l  communications a r e  perhaps  t h e  
most - impor tan t  s i n g l e  d e v i c e  l a b o r  has  t o  keep i t s e l f  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  b u s i n e s s .  
Although l a b o r  h a s  t h e  membership b a s e ,  i t  c l e a r l y  needs i t  even more a s  
l a b o r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  spending i s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  overshadowed by t h a t  of t h e  b u s i n e s s  
s e c t o r .  And whi le  union members a r e  seen a s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  an environment t h a t  
h a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been conducive  t o  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  (by  themselves  and t h e i r  
f a m i l i e s ) ,  c o r p o r a t i o n s  have a  p o t e n t i a l  e l i t e  pool of b e t t e r  educated 
i n d i v i d u a l s  who might b r i n g  t o  bea r  even g r e a t e r  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l s  i f  they  
chose t o  become invo lved .  - 1971 I f  one s e e s  money a s  b u s i n e s s '  p r i n c i p a l  
1931 Malbin ,  Michael  J .  Labor ,  Business  and Money--A P o s t - E l e c t i o n  -
A n a l y s i s .  N a t i o n a l  J o u r n a l ,  v. 9 ,  March 19 ,  1977: 412. 
1941 E p s t e i n ,  Bus iness  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act -
of  1971, p. 125. 
1951 Alexander ,  Herber t  E. F inanc ing  t h e  1980 E l e c t i o n .  Lex ing ton ,  D.C. -
Heath & Co., 1983. p.  114. 
1961 J e s s u p ,  Can P o l i t i c a l  I n f l u e n c e  Be Democrat ized?,  p. 32. -
1971 Kayden, The Impact of t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  of -
P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees, p. 103,  109.  
p o l i t i c a l  c a p i t a l  and t h e  membership b a s e  a s  l a b o r ' s ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  momentum 
now may l i e  w i t h  b u s i n e s s ;  t h e  t r e n d  toward more c o r p o r a t e  g i v i n g  i s  c l e a r e r  
a t  t h i s  p o i n t  than  toward i n c r e a s i n g  cohes ion  i n  l a b o r ' s  membership b a s e .  
V I .  PACs AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
I n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  PACs a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  engaging i n  campaign a c t i v i t i e s  
i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of  e i t h e r  c a n d i d a t e s  o r  p a r t i e s  have r e s u l t e d  i n  c h a r g e s  t h a t  
PACs a r e  s e r v i n g  t o  weaken t h e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  deemed n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
system. As used h e r e i n ,  " a c c o u n t a b i l i t y "  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  p rocess  under which 
c a n d i d a t e s  assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  campaigns waged i n  t h e i r  b e h a l f  and 
by which t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  must answer t o  t h e  v o t e r s  on e l e c t i o n  day f o r  t h o s e  
campaigns and t a c t i c s .  Although independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  may be made by 
i n d i v i d u a l s  and g roups ,  a s  w e l l  a s  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees  and PACs, i t  i s  t h e  
PACs t h a t  have used them most h e a v i l y  and i n  a  h i g h l y  v i s i b l e  manner. As such ,  
t h e  terms " p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee" and " independent  expend i tu re"  have become 
l i n k e d  i n  t h e  e y e s  of  many. 
The FECA [2  U.S.C. 431 ( 1 7 ) ]  d e f i n e s  " independent  e x p e n d i t u r e "  a s :  
. . . . an e x p e n d i t u r e  by a  person e x p r e s s l y  a d v o c a t i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
o r  d e f e a t  of a  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  c a n d i d a t e  which i s  made wi thou t  
c o o p e r a t i o n  o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  any c a n d i d a t e ,  o r  any a u t h o r i z e d  
committee o r  agency of such c a n d i d a t e ,  and which i s  not  made i n  
c o n c e r t  w i t h ,  o r  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  o r  s u g g e s t i o n  o f ,  any c a n d i d a t e ,  
o r  any a u t h o r i z e d  committee o r  agen t  of such c a n d i d a t e .  
I n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  groups  d i r e c t l y  t o  
c a n d i d a t e s ,  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  may not be l i m i t e d  by law; t h i s  was a  
major component of  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  i n  Buckley v .  Valeo,  424 U.S. 1 
(1976) .  Not b e i n g  s u b j e c t  t o  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  t h e y  c o n s t i t u t e  a  major loopho le  f o r  
t h o s e  wish ing  t o  i n f l u e n c e  e l e c t i o n s  beyond t h e  scope a l lowed them under t h e  
FECA. 
Some $2 m i l l i o n  was s p e n t  independen t ly  i n  1976 and $317,455 i n  1978. 1981 -
I n  1980, t h e  l e v e l  o f  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  jumped dramat ical ly--$16.1  
m i l l i o n .  - 199/ Of p a r t i c u l a r  r e l e v a n c e  h e r e  i s  t h a t  some $14 m i l l i o n  was s p e n t  
independen t ly  by PACs, r e p r e s e n t i n g  12 p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  PAC spending i n  1980 and 
e q u a l i n g  a b o u t  one- four th  o f  t h e  amount PACs c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l  F e d e r a l  
c a n d i d a t e s .  2001 The v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e s e  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  were made 
by s o - c a l l e d  "New Righ t , "  non-connected PACs, a l t h o u g h  1980 a l s o  saw some 
prominent t r a d e  PACs, such as t h e  AMA's PAC and t h e  R e a l t o r s  PAC, e n t e r  t h e  
f i e l d .  I n  1982 ,  independent  spending i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  amounted t o  
$5.75 m i l l i o n ,  more t h a n  double  t h e  $2.3 m i l l i o n  s p e n t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  i n  t h e  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  r a c e s  o f  1980. Once a g a i n ,  PACs dominated t h e  independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e  a c t i v i t i e s  (over  90 p e r c e n t  of t h e  money was s p e n t  by PACs), w i t h  
one  group--NCPAC--spending more t h a n  h a l f  t h e  t o t a l  ($3.2 m i l l i o n ) .  And w h i l e  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  g roups  a g a i n  accounted f o r  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  spend ing ,  some l i b e r a l  
g roups  and t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  were a l s o  among t h e  t o p  independent  spenders .  2011 -
The c o n t r o v e r s y  over  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  was brought  t o  focus  i n  1980 
around a d v e r t i s e m e n t s  which NCPAC r a n  a g a i n s t  s e v e r a l  incumbent Democratic 
S e n a t o r s .  These a d s  were cons idered  by many o b s e r v e r s  t o  be  i n f l a m a t o r y  and 
t h e i r  a c c u r a c y  was c h a l l e n g e d  i n  some c a s e s .  Although t h e y  were i n t e n d e d  t o  
b e n e f i t  t h e  campaigns o f  t h e  incumbent S e n a t o r s '  opponen ts ,  t h e r e  was 
1981 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  I n f o r m a t i o n  -
on Independent  Expendi tu res  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  October 9 ,  1980. 
1991 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC Study Shows Independent  -
Expendi tu res  Top $16 M i l l i o n  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Nov. 29, 1981. 
2001 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC R e l e a s e s  F i n a l  Summary -
Data on PAC Giving ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  August 4 ,  1981. 
2011 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC I s s u e s  F i n a l  Report  on -
1981-82 Independent  Expendi tu res  ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Oct.  14,  1983. 
disagreement  w i t h i n  t h e  campaign o r g a n i z a t i o n s  of t h o s e  opponents  whether o r  
no t  such ads  would prove b e n e f i c i a l ;  some c a n d i d a t e s  r e q u e s t e d  t h a t  NCPAC 
d i s c o n t i n u e  i t s  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s ,  f e a r i n g  a  b a c k l a s h  e f f e c t  among v o t e r s .  I n  
f a c t ,  t h e r e  remains doubt  over  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s ;  NCPAC, 
p o i n t i n g  t o  t h e  v i c t o r i e s  of many of  t h e  incumbents '  opponen t s ,  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  
t h e i r  use  had been v i n d i c a t e d .  
The NCPAC a d s  and t h o s e  of  some o t h e r  groups  r e s u l t e d  i n  e d i t o r i a l s  and,  
u l t i m a t e l y ,  comments from l e a d e r s  of bo th  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  d e c r y i n g  t h e  t r e n d  
toward independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  m a i n l y  on t h e  ground t h a t  t h e y  i n v o l v e  spend ing  
by i n d i v i d u a l s  and groups  which a r e  not a c c o u n t a b l e  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  and which 
may not  a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t  c a n d i d a t e s '  v iews.  Even former Republ ican N a t i o n a l  
Chairman Richard  R i c h a r d s ,  whose p a r t y ' s  c a n d i d a t e s  were t h e  in tended  
b e n e f i c i a r i e s  of  most of  t h e  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  1980,  d e c l a r e d  about 
independent  spend ing  PACs: "They c r e a t e  a l l  k i n d s  of m i s c h i e f .  They ' r e  no t  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  anyone .I' 2021 -
By 1982, independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  had been p u b l i c i z e d  enough t h a t  they  
became an i s s u e  i n  t h e  campaigns of many i n t e n d e d  t a r g e t s  and b e n e f i c i a r i e s ,  
w i t h  many o f  t h e  former seek ing  t o  c a p i t a l i z e  on t h e  n e g a t i v e  p u b l i c i t y  t h e i r  
d e t r a c t o r s  had r e c e i v e d  and w i t h  many of  t h e  l a t t e r  prominent ly  d isavowing 
t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  appeared t o  v i n d i c a t e  
most of  t h e  prominent t a r g e t s  of  t h e  n e g a t i v e  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s ,  u n l i k e  i n  1980. 
A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chapter  T h r e e ,  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  r e p r e s e n t  a  
l o g i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  t o o l  f o r  non-connec t ed  PACs , which, u s u a l l y  not  b e i n g  l inked  
t o  o r g a n i z e d  lobbying e f f o r t s ,  may be l e s s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  g a i n i n g  a c c e s s  on 
C a p i t o l  H i l l  (and l e s s  concerned about a l i e n a t i n g  Members) than  i n  changing 
2021 Cannon, Lou. GOP Chief  D e c r i e s  t h e  Independent  E f f o r t s  To T a r g e t  -
Democrats on ' S i n g l e  I s s u e s . '  Washington P o s t ,  A p r i l  28 ,  1981: A3. 
t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  make-up of t h e  Congress a s  a  whole. Some a r g u e  t h a t  non- 
connected PACs and independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  undercu t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a  
r e s p o n s i b l e ,  a c c o u n t a b l e  p o l i t i c a l  system. Both r e p r e s e n t  l e g i t i m a t e  and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - p r o t e c t e d  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and i t  can  be argued t h a t  t h e y  promote 
e x p r e s s i o n  o f  d i v e r s e  and h i t h e r t o  ignored  v i e w p o i n t s  i n  Washington; some would 
sugges t  t h a t ,  i f  t h e y  s e r v e  t o  d i s r u p t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  and 
power s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e y  a r e  performing a  b e n e f i c i a l  f u n c t i o n .  
The f u t u r e  o f  t h e  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e  method i s  u n c e r t a i n .  Although 
t h e y  were pe rce ived  a s  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  1980,  t h e y  were s e e n  a s  e i t h e r  i n e f f e c t i v e  
o r ,  worse ,  hav ing  b a c k f i r e d ,  i n  1982. - 2031 None the less ,  t h e  non-connected 
g roups  have a g a i n  announced p lans  f o r  such  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  1984. What may be 
more i n t e r e s t i n g  from t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  
a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  AMA and t h e  R e a l t o r s  i n  1982,  which s p e n t  a combined t o t a l  o f  
more t h a n  $400,000 i n  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s - - a l l  o f  i t  i n  p o s i t i v e ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  n e g a t i v e ,  campaigns. - 2041 By emphasizing t h i s  approach ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  t h e  two l a r g e s t  t r a d e  PACs w i l l  h e l p  p o p u l a r i z e  t h i s  
d e v i c e  among t h o s e  PACs which a r e  sponsored by o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( i - e . ,  ones  
which lobby  Congress a n d ,  hence ,  have a  r e p u t a t i o n  t o  uphold i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
community). T h i s  w i l l  provide  f u r t h e r  ev idence  a s  t o  whether independent  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  i n h e r e n t l y  d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  - 2051 
2031 Alexander ,  Herber t  E. Financing P o l i t i c s :  Money, E l e c t i o n s ,  and -
P o l i t i c a l  Reform ( 3 r d  e d . ) .  Washington, Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y .  1984. p. 147. 
2041 U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC I s s u e s  F i n a l  Report  on 1981-82 -
Independent  Spending ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Oct.  14, 1983. 
2051 For a  more thorough d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e  i s s u e ,  -
s e e :  U.S. L i b r a r y  o f  Congress. Congress ional  Research S e r v i c e .  The E v o l u t i o n  
o f  and I s s u e s  Surrounding Independent Expendi tu res  i n  E l e c t i o n  Campaigns 
[by Joseph  E. C a n t o r ] .  Report  82-87, May 5 ,  1982. 78 p. 
V I I .  THE LEVEL OF MONEY I N  POLITICS 
A f i n a l  i s s u e  i s  one t h a t  perhaps  u n d e r l i e s  t h e  e n t i r e  PAC c o n t r o v e r s y .  
E l e c t i o n s  have become i n c r e a s i n g l y  expens ive ,  w i t h  an e s t i m a t e d  $1 b i l l i o n  
s p e n t  on e l e c t i o n s  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  combined i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  i n  1980, doub le  
t h e  amount s p e n t  f o u r  y e a r s  e a r l i e r .  - 2061 The c o s t s  o f  e l e c t i o n s  have ,  i n  
f a c t ,  r i s e n  f a s t e r  than  t h e  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  c o s t s  of such campaign- 
r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  a s  media a d v e r t i s i n g ,  d i r e c t - m a i l  f u n d r a i s i n g ,  and a i r  
t r a v e l  c o n t r i b u t i n g  h e a v i l y  t o  t h e  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e s .  =/ The c o s t  of  runn ing  
f o r  e l e c t i v e  o f f i c e  h a s  t h u s  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  expens ive .  
The l a r g e  amounts of money b e i n g  s p e n t  on campaigns have caused concern  
e s s e n t i a l l y  over  t h e  f e a r  t h a t  i t  i s  d i s t o r t i n g  o u r  democra t i c  sys tem by making 
t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  of  and /o r  a c c e s s  t o  l a r g e  sums of money a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  
runn ing  f o r  p u b l i c  o f f i c e .  A s  s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h i s  f e a r  i s  t i e d  t o  t h e  l a r g e r  
concern  t h a t  t h e  e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g  sums of money needed f o r  e l e c t i o n  campaigns 
may b e ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  c u r t a i l i n g  t h e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  by l a r g e  s e c t o r s  of  t h e  
e l e c t o r a t e .  By r a i s i n g  l a r g e  amounts of  p o l i t i c a l  money, PACs a r e  viewed a s  
t h e  new l e a d e r  i n  t h e  t r e n d  toward more expens ive  e l e c t i o n s .  The s k e p t i c i s m  
which many p e r c e i v e  among t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  over  t h e  l a r g e  amounts of  money s p e n t  
i n  e l e c t i o n s  i s  seen a s  p r o o f ,  i n  and of i t s e l f ,  of  money's c o r r o s i v e  e f f e c t  
on p o l i t i c s .  
The c y n i c a l  v iew of  money i n  p o l i t i c s  and t h e  h i g h  c o s t s  of  campaigning 
were d i s p u t e d  by t h e  Harvard s t u d y ,  which concluded t h a t :  
2061 E l e c t i o n  Tab: A B i l l i o n  D o l l a r s ,  and R i s i n g .  U.S. News & World -
R e p o r t ,  v .  8 9 ,  December 1 5 ,  1980: 32. 
2071 Clymer,  Adam. I n f l a t i o n  and a  L imi t  on C o n t r i b u t i o n s  S t r a i n  -
P r e s i d e n t i a l  Hopefu l s '  Budget. New York Times, February  4 ,  1980: A14. 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with campaign 
contributions and expenditures. Adequate campaign 
funds are essential to competitive congressional 
elections. The essence of an election campaign is 
to provide voters with a choice among alternative 
candidates. This process requires the communication 
to voters of some minimum quantity of information 
about the contestants. In contemporary America, 
providing that information to the voters costs 
substantial amounts of money. 
Every study based on the information available 
since 1972 has shown that most campaigns have too 
little, not too much money. 2081 
Placing the amount spent on elections in the context of the total expenditures 
by government at all levels, Dr. Herbert Alexander has written: 
In fiscal year 1980, government at all levels--national, 
state, county, and municipal--spent a total of 
$958,757,000,000 in taxpayer money. The $1,203,000,000 
spent on election campaigns, whose outcomes determined 
who will make decisions on, among other things, how such 
enormous sums of tax money are spent, amounts to only 
about one-tenth of 1 percent of that total. 2091 -
Furthermore, Alexander noted that the Nation's leading advertiser, Procter and 
Gamble Company, spent $649 million in advertising its products in 1980, far more 
than the $514 million he estimated in costs of electing the national government 
that year. 2101 Alexander's view appears to prevail today among political -
scientists, that the high cost of campaigns, while perhaps unfortunate, is not 
disproportionate to the costs of other goods and services available today. 
2081 U.S. Congress, An Analysis of the Impact of the FECA, p. 1. -
2091 Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1980 Election. Lexington, -
D.C. Heath and Company, 1983. p. 1. 
2101 Ibid. -
CHAPTER FIVE: CONGRESS' RESPONSE TO PACs AND THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE 
I n  view of  t h e  r a p i d  growth and p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  PACs i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
a  number of s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  c u r b i n g  PACs have been made, bo th  i n  and o u t  of 
Congress .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  d i s c u s s  r e c e n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  t h e  
a r e a  and w i l l  a n a l y z e  some of  t h e  c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  c u r t a i l i n g  t h e  r o l e  
of  PACs. P a r t  I d e s c r i b e s  b i l l s  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  9 5 t h  Congress through t h e  
F i r s t  S e s s i o n  of t h e  9 8 t h  Congress ,  wi th  a  focus  on t h e  96 th  Congress '  Obey- 
R a i l s b a c k  amendment. P a r t  I1 o f f e r s  an e v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  major PAC-related 
p r o p o s a l s  c u r r e n t l y  under d i s c u s s i o n  i n  Congress ,  t h e  media ,  and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
and academic communities.  F i n a l l y ,  P a r t  111 w i l l  conc lude  w i t h  a  b r i e f  
d i s c u s s i o n  and some o b s e r v a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  s c e n a r i o s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  of  PACs. 
I. LEGISLATION TO LIMIT PACs I N  THE 95TH THROUGH 98TH CONGRESSES 
9 5 t h  Congress  L e g i s l a t i o n  
S i x  b i l l s  i n  t h e  9 5 t h  Congress proposed v a r i o u s  forms of PAC l i m i t a t i o n  
measures .  An o u t r i g h t  ban on PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  was proposed i n  H.R. 6132, 
i n t r o d u c e d  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  John E r l e n b o r n  on A p r i l  6 ,  1977; i d e n t i c a l  b i l l s  
were l a t e r  in t roduced :  H.R. 7005 on May 9 ,  1977, by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  E r l e n b o r n ,  
M. Caldwel l  B u t l e r  , James C o l l i n s ,  John Duncan, M i l l i c e n t  Fenwick, Tom Hagedorn, 
Wi l l i am Ketchum, A l b e r t  Quie ,  and C.W. B i l l  Young; and H.R. 7585 on June  2 ,  
1977, by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Richard  S c h u l z e .  These b i l l s  banned c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by 
nonpar ty  p o l i t i c a l  committees t o  any F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e  o r  any o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  
committee, except to official party committees; they also imposed a $5,000 
limit on what a national, State, or local party committee could give to a 
Federal candidate. 
A ban on PAC contributions was also proposed in two bills introduced by 
Representative James A.S. Leach: H.R. 7966 on June 22, 1977, and H.R. 8092 
on June 29, 1977. In addition to proposing public funding of congressional 
elections, Leach's bills prohibited all contributions by nonparty political 
committees and limited congressional candidates to accepting only contributions 
from party committees and from individuals residing in a candidate's own 
district (State), the latter in amounts of $500 or less. In restricting 
contributions to within a candidate's State or district, Leach was apparently 
influenced by the argument (discussed in Chapter Four) that campaign funding 
sources have become increasingly nationalized, with potential damage to the 
ties between a Member and his constituents. 
Whereas none of the above measures received any action in the 95th 
Congress, a proposal to reduce the limit on PAC contributions was the subject 
of a floor vote in the Senate in the first session, and a similar proposal 
made it through a House committee in the second session, while failing on a 
floor vote. The Senate vote occurred during debate on S. 926, a bill to 
extend public financing to Senate election campaigns. On August 3, 1977, an 
amendment was offered by Senator Adlai Stevenson to reduce the contribution 
limit for multicandidate committees--both party and non-party committees--from 
$5,000 to $3,000 (the initial version of the amendment lowered it to $1,000, 
before it was modified). - 2111 Stevenson's expressed rationale was to bring the 
2111 Public Financing of Senate Elections. Debate and Vote in the -
Senate. Congressional Record, v. 123, Aug. 3, 1977: 26304. 
l i m i t  on  PACs and p a r t i e s  more i n t o  l i n e  w i t h  t h a t  on i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  
t h u s  g i v i n g  t h e  former a  l e s s  favored s t a t u s  over  t h e  l a t t e r .  S e n a t o r  C h a r l e s  
Math ias  o f f e r e d  an amendment t o  S t e v e n s o n ' s  amendment t o  lower t h e  l i m i t  f o r  
a f f i l i a t e d  PACs b u t  t o  l e a v e  i n t a c t  t h e  $5,000 l i m i t  f o r  non-connected PACs, 
on t h e  ground t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  were f i n a n c i a l l y  handicapped a l r e a d y  by hav ing  
t o  bea r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and f u n d r a i s i n g  c o s t s  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  - 2121 
The Math ias  amendment was t a b l e d  by v o i c e  v o t e ,  a f t e r  which t h e  S tevenson  
amendment was t a b l e d  by a  v o t e  of  63-33. - 2131 
I n  t h e  second h a l f  of  t h e  95 th  Congress ,  H .R .  11315, i n t r o d u c e d  by  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Frank Thompson on March 6 ,  1978, was r e p o r t e d  from t h e .  House 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Committee on March 1 6 ,  1978, by a  v o t e  o f  16-9. - 2141 Although 
i t  l a r g e l y  c o n s i s t e d  of  n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l  amendments t o  t h e  FECA, t h e  b i l l  
became embroi led  i n  a  h i g h l y  p a r t i s a n  c o n t r o v e r s y  over  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  
p r o v i s i o n s  reduc ing  t h e  amounts which p a r t y  and nonpar ty  commit tees  cou ld  
c o n t r i b u t e .  - 2151 With r e g a r d  t o  t h e  l a t t e r ,  t h e  b i l l ,  a s  r e p o r t e d ,  reduced 
from $5,000 t o  $2,500 t h e  amount which nonpar ty  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  commit tees  
cou ld  g i v e  t o  e i t h e r  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  o r  t o  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees .  
Fur the rmore ,  i t  reduced from $15,000 t o  $10,000 t h e  amount such commit tees  
2131 I b i d . ,  p. 26308. -
2141 U.S. Congress.  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  Committee on House -
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act Amendments of  1978; r e p o r t  
t o g e t h e r  wi th  m i n o r i t y ,  supp lementa l ,  and a d d i t i o n a l  v iews t o  accompany 
H.R. 13315, 9 5 t h  Cong., 2nd S e s s .  Washington,  U.S. Govt.  P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1978. 
123 p. ( 9 5 t h  Congress ,  2nd S e s s i o n .  House. Repor t  no. 95-982) 
2151 P u b l i c  F i n a n c i n g ,  Campaign Spending B i l l s .  Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y  -
Almanac, 1978. Washington,  Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y ,  I n c . ,  1979. v .  34 ,  p. 769- 
773. 
could give to the national committees of political parties. An attempt to 
delete these provisions failed by a 9-13 vote within the Committee. 2161 The -
bill also included a provision to tighten the prerequisites for multicandidate 
status by a political committee, adding the additional requirement that 
contributions in amounts of at least $500 be given to five Federal candidates 
(the introduction of the dollar amounts intended to "curb the creation of 
bogus PACs designed to aid only one candidate"). - 2171
By the time the Committee's bill reached the House floor, the controversy 
surrounding it had been heightened by the announced intentions of supporters 
to offer an amendment to institute public funding of congressional elections. 
Thus, the focus of debate was on the open rule for consideration of H.R. 11315, 
which had been reported by the Rules Committee. In a brief but heated debate 
on March 21, 1978, the House rejected the open rule--H. Res. 1093--by a vote 
of 198-209. - 2181 This killed not only the prospects for public financing but 
the bill itself, with its PAC and party limitation provisions. 
B. 96th Coneress Leeislation 
Five bills were introduced in the 96th Congress which sought to limit the 
opportunities for influence by political action committees. Two proposed a 
flat prohibition on PAC contributions to Federal candidates. S. 714, introduced 
by Senator Adlai Stevenson on March 21, 1979, banned contributions to Federal 
candidates by any political committee which received donations from at least 
2161 Ibid., p. 771. -
2171 Ibid. -
2181 Providing for Consideration of H.R. 11315, Federal Election Campaign -
Act Amendments of 1978. Debate and Vote in the House. Congressional Record, 
v. 124, Mar. 21, 1978: 7880. 
50 i n d i v i d u a l s  and which was no t  a  c a n d i d a t e ' s  a u t h o r i z e d  committee;  t h i s  would 
have a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  PACs and t h o s e  PACs which had a s  many as 
50 c o n t r i b u t o r s  b u t  d i d  n o t  meet t h e  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  f o r  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  s t a t u s .  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a t u r e  of t h i s  b i l l  was i t s  e x p l i c i t  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  purpose ,  
one which can  be  be  viewed a s  t h e  m o t i v a t i n g  f o r c e  behind most of  t h e  PAC 
l i m i t a t i o n  b i l l s :  
Sec .  2 .  The Congress f i n d s  and d e c l a r e s  tha t - -  
( a )  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  p o l i t i c a l  c o m i t t e e s  
h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  mass ive  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  amount and p r o p o r t i o n  of  
funds  c o n t r i b u t e d  by such e n t i t i e s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  e l e c t i o n  t o  
F e d e r a l  o f f i c e s ;  
( b )  such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  c r e a t e  a t  l e a s t  t h e  appearance  o f  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n f l u e n c e  stemming from t h e  dependence of  
c a n d i d a t e s  upon l a r g e  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from e n t i t i e s  w i t h  
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s ;  
( c )  i t  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  such a r t i f i c i a l  l e g a l  e n t i t i e s ,  
which a r e  not  pe rmi t t ed  t o  v o t e  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  F e d e r a l  o f f i c e ,  
t o  make p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o ,  o r  f o r  t h e  use  o f ,  such 
c a n d i d a t e s ;  and 
( d l  i t  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  e x e r c i s e  of  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  
Congress t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  r e a l i t y  o r  appearance  o f  improper 
i n f l u e n c e  upon i t s  d e c i s i o n s  by l i m i t i n g  t h e  p r i v i l e g e  of  making 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  e l e c t i o n  t o  F e d e r a l  o f f i c e  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l s  g e n e r a l l y .  
H.R.  5081,  i n t r o d u c e d  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  E r l e n b o r n  and Thomas R a i l s b a c k  on 
August 2 ,  1979, was i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  E r l e n b o r n  b i l l s  i n  t h e  95 th  Congress 
( p r o h i b i t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by n o n p a r t y  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees  t o  F e d e r a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  and o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees ,  whi le  a l l o w i n g  them t o  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  o f f i c i a l  p a r t y  commi t t ees ) .  
Three  b i l l s  i n  t h e  9 6 t h  Congress sought  t o  c u r t a i l  PACs by lower ing  t h e  
l i m i t  on how much t h e y  cou ld  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  F e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  r a t h e r  than  
p r o h i b i t i n g  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  e n t i r e l y .  H.R. 4768, i n t r o d u c e d  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
Joseph  Minish  on J u l y  1 2 ,  1979, proposed s lower ing  of  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  
same l e v e l  a s  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees  (such a s  n o n - m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  PACs) and 
i n d i v i d u a l s .  (Of c o u r s e ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  would have t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s t r a i n t  of 
t h e  o v e r a l l  $25,000 l i m i t  on a l l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s . )  
On August 3 ,  1979, S e n a t o r s  Edward Kennedy, Rober t  S t a f f o r d ,  and Pau l  
Tsongas i n t r o d u c e d  S. 1700,  which lowered t h e  l i m i t  on m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  committee 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o n l y  t o  Sena te  c a n d i d a t e s  ( l e a v i n g  a  d e c i s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  House 
c a n d i d a t e s  t o  t h a t  body) .  The b i l l  p laced a  $5,000 a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  a  c a n d i d a t e  i n  bo th  a  g e n e r a l  and pr imary e l e c t i o n  ( o r  s p e c i a l  
and pr imary e l e c t i o n ) ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  t h e  e x i s t i n g  $5,000 l i m i t a t i o n  per 
e l e c t i o n .  It a l lowed a  h i g h e r  l imit--$7,500--for c a n d i d a t e s  involved i n  a  
r u n o f f  e l e c t i o n ,  a s  w e l l ,  w h i l e  s p e c i f y i n g  t h a t  no more than  $5,500 could  be  
c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  one phase  of t h e  e l e c t i o n  c y c l e .  
The o n l y  PAC-related b i l l  t o  b e  a c t e d  upon d u r i n g  t h e  96 th  Congress was 
H.R. 4970, t h e  Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n  Reform Act of  1979,  which passed t h e  House 
i n  amendment-form b u t  was not  a c t e d  upon by t h e  S e n a t e .  The Obey-Railsback 
b i l l ,  a s  i t  came t o  b e  known, was t h e  p r i n c i p a l  focus  i n  t h e  96 th  Congress of  
t h o s e  s e e k i n g  t o  c u r t a i l  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of PACs. It h a s  remained t h e  ha l lmark  
of  such e f f o r t s  t o  d a t e ,  and i t  h a s  s e t  t h e  tone  f o r  t h e  d e b a t e  over  PACs which 
h a s  ensued.  
H.R.  4970 was in t roduced  on J u l y  26,  1979,  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  R a i l s b a c k  
and David Obey and co-sponsored by  more t h a n  120 o t h e r  House Members. I n  i t s  
i n i t i a l  form, i t  proposed lower ing t h e  l i m i t  on nonpar ty ,  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  
committee c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  any c a n d i d a t e  from $5,000 per  e l e c t i o n  t o  $5,000 
o v e r a l l ;  t h e  $5,000 would a p p l y  t o  pr imary and g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  bu t  would be 
r a i s e d  t o  $7,500 i f  a  c a n d i d a t e  w a s  invo lved  i n  a  r u n o f f ,  as w e l l  ($5,000 was 
t h e  most t h a t  cou ld  be g iven  i n  any one e l e c t i o n ,  however) .  The second major 
f e a t u r e  was an  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  of $50,000 on t h e  amount a  House c a n d i d a t e  
cou ld  a c c e p t  from a l l  PACs i n  an e l e c t i o n  c y c l e .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  b i l l  imposed a  
30-day l i m i t  on t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of c r e d i t  ( o f  more t h a n  $1,000)  t o  House 
c a n d i d a t e s  by campaign c o n s u l t a n t s  and o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  vendors ;  t h i s  was 
aimed a t  c u r t a i l i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of media and d i r e c t - m a i l  s p e c i a l i s t s .  
On October  17 ,  1979,  t h e  b i l l  was o f f e r e d  a s  an  amendment t o  S .  832,  t h e  
a u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission ( a l r e a d y  passed by t h e  
s e n a t e ) .  2191 An amendment was o f f e r e d  t o  t h i s  amendment which was des igned  
t o  improve i t s  chances  f o r  passage by t h e  House. It r a i s e d  t h e  proposed l i m i t  
from $5,000 t o  $6,000 ( r e t a i n i n g  t h e  $5,000 per  e l e c t i o n  l i m i t )  and r a i s e d  t h e  
l i m i t  on e l e c t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  a  r u n o f f  from $7,500 t o  $9,000.  It a l s o  r a i s e d  
t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on a l l  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from $50,000 t o  $70,000,  and t o  
$85,000 when t h e  c a n d i d a t e  f a c e s  a  runof f  e l e c t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  d e c l a r e d  
t h a t  a l l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  d e l i v e r e d  by a  PAC t o  a  c a n d i d a t e ,  i n c l u d i n g  earmarked 
d o n a t i o n s ,  would b e  counted a g a i n s t  t h e  PAC's c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t ;  t h i s  was 
i n t e n d e d  t o  p reven t  e v a s i o n  of  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t .  T h i s  amendment t o  t h e  
amendment had t h e  s u p p o r t  of t h e  s p o n s o r s  of  Obey-Railsback,  and it was adopted 
by v o i c e  v o t e .  2201 -
Before  proceeding t o  t h e  f i n a l  passage of t h e  Obey-Railsback amendment, 
s e v e r a l  a d d i t i o n a l  amendments were a t t a c h e d  t o  i t ,  i n c l u d i n g :  a  ban on t h e  
e x t e n s i o n  of  c r e d i t  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  by d i r e c t - m a i l  f i r m s ,  r a i s i n g  from 30 t o  60 
days  t h e  proposed l i m i t  on c r e d i t  e x t e n s i o n  by campaign c o n s u l t a n t s ,  and a 
$35,000 l i m i t  on t h e  amount of campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a  House c a n d i d a t e  could  
use  t o  r epay  h i s  own l o a n s  t o  h i s  campaign. I n  i t s  f i n a l  form, t h e  Obey- 
R a i l s b a c k  Amendment inc luded  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s ,  p l u s  t h e  $6,000 l i m i t  on PAC 
2191 F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of  1971 Amendments. Debate and Vote -
i n  t h e  House. Congress iona l  Record,  v .  125,  O c t .  1 7 ,  1979: 28644. 
2201 I b i d . ,  p. 28651. -
contributions ($9,000 with runoff) and the $70,000 aggregate limit on PAC 
contributions ($85,000 in cases of runoff elections). 
The debate over Obey-Railsback essentially involved the issues discussed 
in Chapter Four, although there was a qualitative difference in the thrust of 
arguments among supporters than among opponents of the amendment. Opponents 
largely centered their arguments on what they saw as the harmful consequences 
of specific features of the bill and appeared less inclined to address the 
overriding contention of the amendment's supporters that the relation between 
interest group money and politics was having a corrosive effect on the political 
system. In contrast, supporters based their positions primarily on that 
underlying issue and spent less of their time rebutting the specific flaws 
raised by amendment opponents. This difference in tone is exemplified in the 
excerpted floor statements of Representative Leach (in support) and 
Representative Bill Frenzel (in opposition). Leach focused on the damage to 
the system which he saw resulting from too much PAC money: 
The most effective way for a candidate to achieve support 
in a bid for legislative office is to isolate every identifiable 
group--especially moneyed groups--and announce support for the 
group's vested interest. Unfortunately, going along with the 
most powerful interest groups inevitably leads either to the 
proliferation of Federal programs or to the weakening of the 
tax structure. Fiscal balance and equitability are impossible 
to maintain after lawmakers, that is, the successful candidates, 
have committed themselves in advance to support specific tax 
advantages or Government programs favoring those having made 
generous campaign contributions. America may be a society of 
individuals, but power groupings--not individuals--are 
represented in legislative bodies where money is a key 
determinant of election outcomes. 
A government of the people, by the people, and for the people 
cannot be a government where influence is purchasable through large, 
private campaign contributions. The subordination of individual 
rights to indiscriminate moneyed influence is the subordination of 
representative democracy to institutional oligarchy. - 2211
Ibid., 
Opponents took i s s u e  w i t h  t h e  premise t h a t  s u p p o r t  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  p o s i t i o n s  
fo l lowed  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and t h a t  we have a r r i v e d  a t  a  p o i n t  where 
i n t e r e s t  group money i s  indeed dominat ing t h e  p rocess .  F r e n z e l  addressed  h i s  
remarks  t o  t h e  harm he saw r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  passage of t h e  amendment, w i t h  
t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  s u p p o r t e r s  were mot iva ted  by a  d e s i r e  t o  keep 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  b a l a n c e  t i l t e d  toward t h e i r  own p h i l o s o p h i e s  and i n t e r e s t s .  
Here i s  what t h e  s p o n s o r s  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  h i d e :  
F i r s t .  T h i s  i s  an  incumbent p r o t e c t i o n  b i l l .  A l l  t h e  
s o p h i s t r y  i n  t h e  world cannot  h i d e  t h a t  f a c t .  S u r e ,  incumbents 
r e c e i v e  more b u t  t h e y  do not  need i t .  They a l r e a d y  have t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  c h a l l e n g e r s  cannot  l i v e  w i t h o u t .  With l i m i t s  on 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  s e t  a t  a  t ime  when campaigns c o s t  o n e - t h i r d  a s  much 
a s  today,  c h a l l e n g e r s  cannot  make a  v i a b l e  campaign w i t h o u t  PACs. 
The r e a s o n  incumbents have wa i t ed  t h i s  long t o  smash PACs 
down i s  because  o n l y  now a r e  t h e y  beg inn ing  t o  f a v o r  c h a l l e n g e r s .  
T h i s  incumbents '  ~ r o t e c t i o n  b i l l  i s  a  s u r e  s i g n  of  t h a t .  
Second. It i s  a  r i c h  p e r s o n ' s  p r o t e c t i o n  b i l l .  The r i c h ,  
p r o t e c t e d  by t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  can spend u n l i m i t e d  p e r s o n a l  funds  
d e s p i t e  a  clumsy, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a t t e m p t  i n  Obey-Railsback.  
Because i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  $1,000,  PACs a r e  
t h e  o n l y  d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  r i c h  c a n d i d a t e s .  Those who c o n t r i b u t e  a  
l a r g e  s h a r e  t o  t h e i r  own campaigns w i l l  s u r e l y  want t o  v o t e  f o r  i t .  
T h i r d .  It i s  a  b i g  l a b o r  p r o t e c t i o n  b i l l .  It r e s t r i c t s  a l l  
PACs e q u a l l y ,  and l e a v e s  l a b o r ' s  enormous s p e c i a l  loopho les  t o  
communicate and t o  run r e g i s t r a t i o n  and get -out- the-vote  d r i v e s ,  
a l l  of which can be  done wi th  dues  money c o l l e c t e d  i n v o l u n t a r i l y .  
F o u r t h .  It i s  a  b i l l  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  people  from knowing v e r y  
much about  c a n d i d a t e s  o r  i s s u e s .  But ,  no t  t o  worry,  i t  w i l l  o n l y  
s t i f l e  t h o s e  campaigns t h a t  a r e  c l o s e ,  o r  have c o n t e s t e d  p r i m a r i e s .  
Only  where t h e r e  i s  r e a l  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  which we used t o  t h i n k  was 
t h e  l i f e ' s  blood o f  our  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem,  w i l l  t h i s  b i l l  have e f f e c t .  
The s p o n s o r s  a r e  incumbents.  Incumbents do not  l i k e  c o m p e t i t i o n .  
F i f t h .  But wors t  of  a l l ,  i t s  an a n t i p a r t i c i p a t i o n  b i l l .  
Hundreds of  thousands  of  t h o u g h t f u l  Americans,  no t  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  
p a r t i e s ,  t u r n e d  o f f  on p o l i t i c i a n s ,  f i n d  p o l i t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n  by 
c o n t r i b u t i n g  through a  r e f e r e n c e  group.  It may b e  a  union,  a  
c o r p o r a t i o n ,  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  o r  an i d e o l o g i c a l  
g roup .  Whatever i t  i s ,  t h e y  have some c o n f i d e n c e  i n  i t .  Yes,  
PACs a r e  growing because  peop le  l i k e  them. They f i n d  PACs a  
conven ien t  way t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  of  t h i s  
Nation.  They g i v e  t o  PACs f o r  some r e a s o n s  i n  t h e  same way a s  
peop le  g i v e  t o  campaigns d i r e c t l y .  So l e t  us throw them o u t ,  s a y  
t h e  Obey-Railsback sponsors .  Let  us  s t i f l e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Let  us 
keep  p o l i t i c s  f o r  t h e  e l i t e - - j u s t  f o r  us i n s i d e r s .  - 2221  
2 2 2 /  I b i d . ,  p. 2 8 6 2 8 .  -
S u p p o r t e r s  responded t o  t h e s e  p o i n t s  by n o t i n g  t h a t  PAC money goes  
overwhelmingly t o  incumbents,  t h e r e b y  s t i f l i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h a t  l a b o r  
PACs g i v e  l a r g e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  than  do c o r p o r a t e  PACs, and would t h e r e f o r e  
be  h u r t  by t h e  reduced PAC l i m i t ,  and t h a t  r a t h e r  than  enhancing t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r o l e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  PACs a r e  overshadowing him. 
Fol lowing d e b a t e ,  t h e  House passed t h e  amended v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  Obey- 
R a i l s b a c k  amendment by a  v o t e  of 217-198. 2231 Democrats s p l i t  188-74 i n  -
f a v o r  o f  t h e  amendment, w h i l e  Republ icans  s p l i t  29 i n  f avor  and 124 a g a i n s t  
i t .  A f t e r  an  u n s u c c e s s f u l  v o t e  t o  recommit t h e  amendment t o  t h e  House 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Committee, t h e  House approved S .  832 by a  v o i c e  v o t e ,  
r e q u e s t i n g  a  c o n f e r e n c e  w i t h  t h e  S e n a t e .  - 224/
No f u r t h e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n  was t aken  on t h e  S. 832 o r  t h e  Obey- 
R a i l s b a c k  Amendment. A t h r e a t e n e d  f i l i b u s t e r  kep t  t h e  measure from be ing  
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  S e n a t e  d u r i n g  t h e  96 th  Congress.  - 2251 
C .  97 th  Congress L e g i s l a t i o n  
Seven PAC l i m i t a t i o n  b i l l s  were proposed i n  t h e  97 th  Congress .  On J a n u a r y  
5 ,  1981, S e n a t o r  Robert  Byrd in t roduced  S. 9 ,  which was i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  Obey- 
R a i l s b a c k  amendment, a s  passed by t h e  House i n  1979. ( I t  a p p l i e d  o n l y  t o  
House e l e c t i o n s . )  On J u l y  8 ,  1981, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  Dan Glickman, James Leach,  
and Mike Synar in t roduced  H.R.  4070, which combined some f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  Obey- 
R a i l s b a c k  b i l l  w i t h  o t h e r s  not  p r e v i o u s l y  proposed i n  Congress.  Designed t o  
2231 I b i d . ,  p. 28659-28660. -
2241 I b i d . ,  p. 28661. -
2251 Buchanan, C h r i s t o p h e r .  Obey-Railsback P l a n  S t a l l e d  i n  t h e  S e n a t e  By -
T h r e a t  of  F i l i b u s t e r .  Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y  Weekly R e p o r t ,  v .  38 ,  J a n .  5 ,  
1980: 33. 
reduce  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  PACs w h i l e  enhancing t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  and of  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  i t  i n c l u d e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f e a t u r e s  : 
--an o v e r a l l  l i m i t  on how much House and S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  can a c c e p t  from 
from m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  PACs--$75,000 f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s  (and an a d d i t i o n a l  
$25,000 i n  c a s e  of  a  r u n o f f )  and between $75,000 and $500,000,  depending on 
t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  S t a t e ,  f o r  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  ( w i t h  an a d d i t i o n a l  $25,000 o r  
$12,500 t imes  t h e  number of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  t h e  h i g h e r  f i g u r e ,  i n  
t h e  c a s e  of a  r u n o f f ) ;  $500,000 would remain t h e  o u t s i d e  l i m i t  f o r  S e n a t e  
c a n d i d a t e s ,  i n  any c a s e ;  
--an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l i m i t  on i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  from $1,000 t o  $2,500; 
--an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  maximum a l l o w a b l e  t a x  c r e d i t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from $50 t o  $100 f o r  s i n g l e  r e t u r n s  and from $100 t o  $200 f o r  
j o i n t  r e t u r n s ;  and 
-- the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  s e p a r a t e  t a x  c r e d i t  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  committees--50 p e r c e n t  of t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  amount, wi th  a  
maximum of $100 f o r  s i n g l e  r e t u r n s  and $200 f o r  j o i n t  r e t u r n s .  
H.R. 4070 d i f f e r e d  from a l l  p r e v i o u s  PAC l i m i t a t i o n  b i l l s  i n  t h a t  it 
n e i t h e r  p r o h i b i t e d  such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  nor  reduced t h e  l i m i t  on PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  It d i d  r e t a i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  l i m i t  on a g g r e g a t e  PAC g i v i n g  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  Obey-Railsback, and i t  extended t h i s  l i m i t  t o  S e n a t e  r a c e s ,  a s  
w e l l .  Ra the r  t h a n  reduce  t h e  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t ,  H.R.  4070 sought  t o  
enhance t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  ' s p o s i t i o n  by r a i s i n g  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
l i m i t  and by r a i s i n g  t h e  maximum a l l o w a b l e  t a x  c r e d i t .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  sough t  
t o  encourage g i v i n g  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s  d i r e c t l y  th rough  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a  
s e p a r a t e  t a x  c r e d i t  s o l e l y  f o r  such c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
Introduced by Rep. James Howard on March 10, 1982, H.R. 5793 included all 
the features of the Glickman-Leach-Synar bill (H.R. 4070) except for the 
increase in the contribution limit. H.R. 5450, proposed by Rep. Joseph Minish 
on Feb. 3, 1982, would lower the limit on multicandidate committee contributions 
from $5,000 to $1,000. On April 1, 1982, Rep. Andrew Jacobs introduced H.R. 6047, 
a House public funding bill that included a provision prohibiting candidates who 
accept public funds from receiving PAC donations. 
On August 12, 1982, Representative Philip Sharp introduced H.R. 6988, 
which lowered the contribution limit for multicandidate committees from $5,000 
to $2,500 and placed a ceiling on PAC receipts by general election candidates 
of $75,000 for the House and the greater of $75,000 or $37,500 times the number 
of districts in the State, up to $500,000, for the Senate. Finally, 
Representative Obey introduced H.R. 7277, a public funding bill for House 
general elections, on October 1, 1982; it included a limit on PAC receipts of 
$90,000 per election cycle (with an additional $90,000 allowed if there were 
a special election, as well). 
The subject of political action committees received some attention at 
hearings held by the Senate Rules and Administration Committee in the first 
session of the 97th Congress. Although the focus of the hearings was the 
administration of the Federal Election Campaign Act, several witnesses devoted 
their comments to the role of PACs, both pro and con. 2261 Two days of -
hearings were also held by the House Administration Committee Task Force on 
2261 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. -
Application and Administration of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
As Amended. Hearings on S. 1550, S. 1766, and S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Nov. 20 and 24, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 369 p. 
E l e c t i o n s  i n  t h e  second s e s s i o n  of t h e  97 th  Congress .  2271 While t h e  second 
day  was l a r g e l y  devoted t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  t h e  r o l e  
of  PACs was a  main f o c a l  p o i n t  on t h e  f i r s t  day ,  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  PACs 
and of  " p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t "  groups  j o i n e d  Members of  Congress i n  t e s t i f y i n g  on 
b o t h  s i d e s  of  t h e  PAC d e b a t e .  No l e g i s l a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  from t h e s e  h e a r i n g s .  
D .  9 8 t h  Congress L e g i s l a t i o n  
The f i r s t  s e s s i o n  of  t h e  9 8 t h  Congress p robab ly  saw more l e g i s l a t i v e  
a c t i v i t y - - i n  terms o f  t h e  number of  proposed b i l l s  and days  of committee 
hearings--on b e h a l f  of campaign f i n a n c e  re fo rm than  i n  any Congress s i n c e  
t h e  post -Watergate  pe r iod  of t h e  mid-1970s. I n  t h e  wake of s h a r p l y  r i s i n g  
campaign c o s t s  and PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and widespread a t  t e n t i o n  t h e r e t o  i n  t h e  
media,  c a l l s  f o r  r e fo rm of t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  laws became more pronounced 
by t h e  s t a r t  o f  1983--both w i t h i n  t h e  Congress and w i t h o u t .  As a  r e f l e c t i o n  
of  t h i s ,  n e a r l y  50 b i l l s  were i n t r o d u c e d  i n  1983 and 12 days  of S e n a t e  and 
House h e a r i n g s  occur red  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of  amending t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  laws.  
Seventeen of  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  b i l l s  focused whol ly  o r  i n  p a r t  on 
r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  r o l e  of PACs i n  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  of campaigns.  Two of  these--  
S. 911 ( S e n a t o r  Lawton C h i l e s ;  March 23,  1983) and H.R. 2876 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
P a u l  Simon; May 3 ,  1983)--cal led  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  s t u d y  commission t o  
make recommendations f o r  changes  i n  t h e  r o l e  of PACs i n  f i n a n c i n g  campaigns.  
I n  t h e i r  s t a t e m e n t  of  f i n d i n g s ,  t h e s e  i d e n t i c a l  b i l l s  d e c l a r e d  t h e  s e n s e  of  
t h e  Congress t h a t  
227/ U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Task -
Force  on E l e c t i o n s .  C o n t r i b u t i o n  L i m i t a t i o n s  and Independent  E x p e n d i t u r e s .  
Hear ings ;  97 th  Cong., 2nd S e s s .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1982. 
437 p. 
. . . t h e  unprecedented growth i n  t h e  amount of c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaigns by nonpar ty  m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  commit tees ,  and i n  t h e  r a t i o  which such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  b e a r  
t o  t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  such campaigns-- 
(A) r e p r e s e n t s  a  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  and p u r i t y  of  t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s ;  
(B) undermines t h e  concept  of e q u a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
which i s  t h e  founda t ion  of  American democracy; 
(C) e r o d e s  t h e  a b i l i t y  of  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  r a t h e r  than  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s ;  and 
(D) e x e r c i s e s  a  c o e r c i v e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o c e s s .  
Although t h e s e  b i l l s  d e f e r r e d  a  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  changes ,  they  
d i d  not  d i s g u i s e  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n s  t o  l i m i t  t h e  r o l e  of  PACs. 
Three  b i l l s  proposed lower ing t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  f o r  nonpar ty  
m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  committees from $5,000 t o  $1,000.  These inc luded  H.R.  640 
( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Joseph  Minish;  J a n u a r y  6 ,  1983) ,  H . R .  1799 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
James McNulty; March 2 ,  1 9 8 3 ) ,  and H.R. 4157 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  James Howard; 
October  19 ,  1983) .  One bill--H.R. 1893--prohibi ted  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o u t r i g h t ,  
i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  a  p lan  f o r  p u b l i c  s u b s i d i e s  f o r  media a d v e r t i s i n g  
( ~ e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Andrew J a c o b s ;  March 3 ,  1983) ;  t h i s  was t h e  same p roposa l  
J a c o b s  had in t roduced  i n  each of t h e  p rev ious  Congresses .  
One of t h e  major i n n o v a t i o n s  i n  campaign f i n a n c e  re fo rm was H.R .  3737 
( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Matthew McHugh; August 2 ,  1 9 8 3 ) )  which proposed e l i m i n a t i n g  
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  c u r r e n t  t a x  c r e d i t  t o  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  PACs. Th i s  was 
done i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  wi th  a  p roposa l  f o r  a  100 p e r c e n t  c r e d i t  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  House and S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  o n e ' s  own S t a t e  and a  s e p a r a t e  50 p e r c e n t  
c r e d i t  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ;  t h u s ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by 
i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e i r  S e n a t o r s  and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
were encouraged,  w h i l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  PACs would not be encouraged through 
i n d i r e c t  p u b l i c  s u b s i d y .  
E igh t  of  t h e  PAC l i m i t a t i o n  b i l l s  sought  t o  a c h i e v e  t h a t  o b j e c t i v e  through 
caps  on PAC r e c e i p t s  (on  an e l e c t i o n  c y c l e  bas is- -pr imary and g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  
combined, with provis ion  for  a d d i t i o n a l  r e c e i p t s  i n  t h e  ca se  of  a  s p e c i a l  
e l e c t i o n ) .  I n v a r i a b l y  t he se  were pa r t  of reform packages, which might i nc lude  
publ ic  funding,  increased incen t ives  for  i nd iv idua l  and p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  g iv ing ,  
and/or  spending l i m i t s .  They a r e  l i s t e d  he re  i n  order  of t h e i r  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  
with b r i e f  comments about each: 
1 )  S. 151 (Sena tor  William Proxmire; January 26, 1983)--includes a  PAC 
r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  f o r  Senate  candida tes  of 30 percent  of t h e  b i l l ' s  spending 
l i m i t  f o r  t h a t  S t a t e ;  it provides  f o r  Federa l  matching funds i n  genera l  
e l e c t i o n s  along with an expendi ture  l i m i t  of $600,000 p lus  f i v e  c e n t s  per 
e l i g i b l e  vo t e r  ; 
2)  H.R. 2005 ( ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i v e  George Brown; March 9 ,  1983)--includes a  
$90,000 PAC r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  f o r  House cand ida t e s ,  along with Federa l  s u b s i d i e s  
f o r  pos t a l  c o s t s  i n  conjunc t ion  with agree ing  t o  ab ide  by expendi ture  l i m i t s ;  
3 )  H.R. 2490 (Represen t a t i ve  David Obey e t  a l . ;  Apr i l  12,  1983)--includes 
a  $90,000 PAC r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  f o r  House cand ida t e s ,  a long with a  matching fund 
system and expendi ture  l i m i t s  i n  t h e  genera l  e l e c t i o n ;  t h i s  was t h e  major PAC 
reform b i l l  f o r  most of t he  f i r s t  s e s s ion ;  
4 )  H.R. 2959 (Representa t ive  Lee Hamilton; May 10,  1983)--includes a  PAC 
r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  of $90,000 f o r  House candida tes  and the  g r e a t e r  of $200,000 
o r  $40,000 per congress iona l  d i s t r i c t  (wi th  a  maximum of $600,000) f o r  Senate  
cand ida t e s ,  along with i nc reases  i n  i nd iv idua l  and pa r ty  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  
and pa r ty  coordinated expendi ture  l i m i t s ;  
5 )  H.R. 3262 (Representa t ive  Mike Synar;  June 8 ,  1983)--includes a  PAC 
r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  of $75,000 f o r  House cand ida t e s  ($100,000 i f  they a r e  chal lenged 
i n  both t h e  primary and gene ra l  e l e c t i o n )  and t h e  g r e a t e r  of $75,000 o r  $25,000 
per congress iona l  d i s t r i c t  (wi th  a  maximum of $500,000) f o r  Sena te  cand ida t e s ,  
a long with an i nc rease  i n  t h e  i nd iv idua l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t ;  
6 )  S. 1433 ( S e n a t o r  David Boren; June  8 ,  1983) - - iden t i ca l  t o  H.R. 3262; 
7 )  H.R.  3610 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Tom Lan tos ;  J u l y  20,  1983)-- includes  a  PAC 
r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  of $75,000 f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s  and t h e  g r e a t e r  of  $75,000 o r  
$37,500 per  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i s t r i c t  ( w i t h  a  maximum of $500.,000) f o r  S e n a t e  
c a n d i d a t e s ,  a long  wi th  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  and 
a  doub l ing  of  t h e  maximum t a x  c r e d i t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;  and 
8 )  H.R.  4428 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  David Obey e t  a l . ;  November 21, 1983)--the 
r e v i s e d  focus  f o r  t h e  PAC re fo rm movement i n  t h e  98 th  Congress ;  it i n c l u d e s  
a  $90,000 PAC r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s  ( indexed f o r  i n f l a t i o n ) ,  
a long  wi th  a  new 100 p e r c e n t  t a x  c r e d i t  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  House c a n d i d a t e s  
who agree  t o  a b i d e  by s p e c i f i e d  campaign and p e r s o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  l i m i t s .  
Sena to r  Warren Rudman in t roduced  ano the r  b i l l - - S .  1185 (May 2, 1983)-- 
which c o n t a i n e d  a  p r o v i s i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  engendered i n  t h e  e i g h t  b i l l s  
d i s c u s s e d  above.  Rather  than  l i m i t i n g  PAC r e c e i p t s ,  t h e  b i l l  p l a c e s  a  l i m i t  
on t h e  amount of PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  which may be s p e n t ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  
g r e a t e r  of  25 c e n t s  per e l i g i b l e  v o t e r  o r  20 p e r c e n t  of  o v e r a l l  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
The b i l l  a l s o  p rov ides  f o r  a  s i m i l a r  l i m i t  ( b u t  w i t h  a  h i g h e r  maximum amount) 
f o r  p a r t y  commit tees  and i n c r e a s e d  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s .  
F i n a l l y ,  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  James Cour te r  in t roduced  one of  t h e  more unusual  
PAC l i m i t a t i o n  b i l l s .  H i s  H .R .  1379 (February  10 ,  1983) would e s t a b l i s h  a  
b l i n d  t r u s t  through which PACs may c o n t r i b u t e  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  
The money would be funneled through t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission, which 
would, i n  t u r n ,  d i s t r i b u t e  i t  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  d e s i g n a t e d  by t h e  PACs. No one 
would be pe rmi t t ed  t o  d i s c l o s e  t h e  amounts of t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e  
a g g r e g a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  s p e c i f i c  PACs, t h e  names of t h e  PACs g i v i n g  t o  
each c a n d i d a t e ,  and t h e  a g g r e g a t e  PAC r e c e i p t s  by each c a n d i d a t e  would be 
d i s c l o s e d  p u b l i c l y .  By p r e v e n t i n g  d i s c l o s u r e  of t h e  s p e c i f i c  amounts g i v e n  
by a  PAC t o  a  c a n d i d a t e ,  t h e  b i l l  s e e k s  t o  c o r r e c t  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  PAC 
money buys v o t e s  o f  Members of Congress .  
Apar t  from t h e  s e v e n t e e n  b i l l s  d i s c u s s e d  above were many o t h e r s  which 
sough t  t o  make a d j u s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  l aws ,  th rough  changing 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  o r  t a x  c r e d i t s ,  b o o s t i n g  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r o l e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  and o t h e r  methods w i t h  o t h e r  g o a l s .  Most of t h e s e  n e a r l y  50 b i l l s  
came under d i s c u s s i o n  d u r i n g  two s e t s  of  h e a r i n g s  d u r i n g  1983. The S e n a t e  
Rules  and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Committee h e l d  h e a r i n g s  on J a n u a r y  26-27 and 
May 1 7  on a  broad range  o f  campaign f i n a n c e  i s s u e s  and on September 29 
on t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  media i s s u e s  i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s .  - 2281 The House 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Committee Task Force  on E l e c t i o n s  held  h e a r i n g s  on June  9 ,  16 ,  
21, and 23, J u l y  8 ,  August 22 and 23,  and October  12 on such campaign f i n a n c e  
t o p i c s  a s  PACs, t h e  r o l e  of p a r t i e s ,  t h e  c o s t  of  campaigns,  and t h e  r o l e  of  
media a d v e r t i s i n g .  - 2291 By t h e  end of 1983, a f t e r  twe lve  days of committee 
h e a r i n g s ,  Congress appeared no c l o s e r  t o  consensus  about t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  
problems, much l e s s  about  t h e i r  s o l u t i o n ,  than  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  of t h e  y e a r .  
2281 U.S. S e n a t e .  Committee on Rules  and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Campaign -
Finance  Reform P r o p o s a l s  of 1983. Hear ings ,  98 th  Cong., 1st S e s s .  Washington,  
U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1984. 783 p. 
2291 U.S. House. C o r n i t t e e  on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Task Force  on 
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E l e c t r o n s .  Campaign F inance  Reform. Hear ings ,  98 th  Cong., 1st S e s s .  
Washington,  U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1984. 837 p. 
11. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO LIMIT PAC INFLUENCE 
The major c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l s  in tended  t o  reduce t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees can b e  o rgan ized  around f o u r  b a s i c  themes: t h o s e  which 
d i r e c t l y  r educe  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  PACs, t h o s e  which reduce  t h e  l e v e l  
of c a n d i d a t e  dependence on a l l  PACs, t h o s e  which i n d i r e c t l y  a t t e m p t  t o  r educe  
PAC i n f l u e n c e  by enhancing t h e  f i n a n c i a l  power of o t h e r  f u n d r a i s i n g  components, 
and t h o s e  which seek  t o  e l i m i n a t e  most forms of p r i v a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  th rough  
p u b l i c  f i n a n c i n g  of e l e c t i o n s .  Th i s  s e c t i o n  o f f e r s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  
s t r e n g t h s  and weaknesses of t h e  key p r o p o s a l s  w i t h i n  t h e s e  f o u r  c l u s t e r s .  
A.  Reduce PAC C o n t r i b u t i o n  L i m i t s  
As was seen i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  i t  h a s  been proposed 
t h a t  t h e  l i m i t  on m u l t i c a n d i d a t e  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  be  lowered from $5,000 t o  
e i t h e r  $3,000 o r  $1,000,  o r  t h a t  such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  be banned e n t i r e l y .  The 
common t h r e a d  i n  a l l  of t h e s e  s u g g e s t i o n s  i s  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  r educe  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  undue i n f l u e n c e  by any one PAC; i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  t o  
lower t h e  l i m i t  appear  t o  b e  mot iva ted  by a  d e s i r e  t o  make PAC d o n a t i o n s  more 
i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  l i m i t s  on i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t o r s  ( c e r t a i n l y  t h e  p roposa l  
f o r  a  $1,000 l i m i t  would do p r e c i s e l y  t h a t )  and t h u s  make PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
l e s s  v a l u a b l e  v i s -a -v i s  t h o s e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n s .  The concept  of  a  l i m i t  
on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f i n d s  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  Buckley v .  Valeo r u l i n g .  Th i s  passage 
c o n f i n e s  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  $1,000 i n d i v i d u a l  l i m i t  bu t  may be  a p p l i e d  a s  w e l l  a s  
t o  l i m t s  on group c o n t r i b u t i o n s :  
It i s  unnecessa ry  t o  look  beyond t h e  A c t ' s  pr imary purpose-- 
t o  l i m i t  t h e  a c t u a l i t y  and appearance  of  c o r r u p t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  
from l a r g e  i n d i v i d u a l  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t  ions-- in  o r d e r  t o  f i n d  
a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  s u f f i c i e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  $1000 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t a t i o n  . . . . To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  l a r g e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  g iven  t o  s e c u r e  p o l i t i c a l  quid  pro quos 
from c u r r e n t  and p o t e n t i a l  o f f i c e  h o l d e r s ,  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of 
our  sys tem of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  democracy i s  undermined . . . . 
O f  a lmost  e q u a l  concern  a s  t h e  danger  of a c t u a l  quid  pro quo 
arrangements  i s  t h e  impact of t h e  appearance  of  c o r r u p t i o n  
stemming from p u b l i c  awareness  of t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  abuse  
i n h e r e n t  i n  a  regime of l a r g e  i n d i v i d u a l  f i n a n c i a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  2301 -
Thus,  t h e  appearance  o r  a c t u a l i t y  of quid  pro quo r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between donor 
and r e c i p i e n t  a r e  seen  a s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s .  C l e a r l y ,  t h e  
s e t t i n g  o f  more r e s t r i c t i v e  l i m i t s  on what a  PAC can  g i v e  would c r e a t e  o b s t a c l e s  
t o  i t s  g a i n i n g  what may be  pe rce ived  a s  a  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  l e v e l  of i n f l u e n c e  
th rough  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
Three  problems might h e  r a i s e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  PAC l i m i t  
o r  t h e  o u t r i g h t  ban on PAC g i v i n g .  F i r s t ,  i n f l a t i o n  h a s  made t h e  $5,000 l i m i t  
imposed i n  1974 a  l e s s  meaningful  boundary between proper  and improper l e v e l s  of  
p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e .  It might be sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  f a c t o r  a l o n e  has  
o b v i a t e d  any pe rce ived  need t o  reduce  t h e  l i m i t  a s  a  means of r e d u c i n g  t h e  
accumula t ion  of  t o o  much power by any g roup .  (Using t h e  i m p l i c i t  p r i c e  d e f l . a t o r s  
f o r  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  product  i n  t h e  1984 Economic Repor t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  one f i n d s  
t h a t  $5,000 i n  1974 would be  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  of  o n l y  $2,668 i n  1983 d o l l a r s . )  
A second p o t e n t i a l  problem w i t h  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  of f u r t h e r  l i m i t s  on PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  might b e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b j e c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  Buckley c a s e ,  t h e  
Supreme Court  sugges ted  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  were t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
a j u s t i f i a b l e  i n s t r u m e n t  of p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  they  could  pose problems depending - 
upon t h e  e x a c t  l e v e l s  of  c o n t r i b u t i n g  a l lowed:  
Given t h e  impor tan t  r o l e  of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  f i n a n c i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  campaigns,  c o n t r i b u t i o n  r e s t r i c t i o n s  could  have 
a  s e v e r e  impact on p o l i t i c a l  d i a l o g u e  i f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
p reven ted  c a n d i d a t e s  and p o l i t i c a l  committees from amassing 
t h e  r e s o u r c e s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  advocacy.  2311 -
231/ I b i d . ,  a t  21. -
With regard to imposing a lower limit on PAC contributions (e.g., $3,000 or 
$1,000), a CRS legal analysis in 1979 stated: 
While the proposal would render the limit which is applicable 
to separate segregated funds more restrictive of pertinent 
First Amendment freedoms than the limits upheld in Buckley 
which formerly applied to separate segregated funds, the newer 
limit might still not be too restrictive. That is, it might -
yet be justified by the relevant counterbalancing governmental 
interest (i.e., the prevention of both actual and apparent quid -
pro quo arrangements between donors and recipients of campaign 
contributions). Unfortunately, the Buckley decision provides 
little guidance in this connection. 2321 -
If the reduced PAC limit might raise constitutional questions, the proposed 
ban on PAC contributions would likely raise even more such objections. The 
same CRS study declared: 
Demonstrably restrictive of both political expression and 
political association, the proposed ban could survive First 
Amendment scrutiny only if justified by a sufficiently strong 
and directly served governmental interest. Inasmuch as a total 
ban is necessarily more restrictive than a mere limit on amount, 
it seems clear that the requisite governmental interest would 
have to be one which would not be satisfied by the imposition of 
a limit. That is so since in the case of so-called "fundamental" 
rights generally (and First Amendment rights in particular) a 
pertinent governmental interest justifies only the least 
restrictive option. Consequently, the governmental interest 
isolated in the Buckley case as sufficient to justify amount 
limits on contributions (i.e., an interest in preventing actual 
and apparent quid pro quo arrangements between donors and 
recipients of campaign contributions) would not suffice to 
justify the proposed ban. No suitable governmental interest seems 
immediately apparent. - 2331
Potential constitutional questions aside, there is a third problem 
inherent in lowering the PAC limits, one which may have become sufficient to 
squelch further consideration of such proposals. The perceived likelihood 
2321 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. -
Restricting "PAC" Involvement in Federal-Office Political Campaigns: Some 
Constitutional Consideration [by Robert B. ~urdette]. May 25, 1979. p. 3. 
2331 Ibid., p. 6-7. -
t h a t  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  of  f u r t h e r  r e s t r a i n t s  on PACs would l ead  t o  o t h e r ,  l e s s  
c o n t r o l l a b l e ,  forms o f  PAC a c t i v i t y  h a s  been i n c r e a s i n g l y  recogn ized  a s  v a l i d  
even by t h o s e  seek ing  t o  l i m i t  PAC i n f l u e n c e ;  indeed ,  it h a s  g iven  pause t o  
many PAC opponents  who have advocated t h i s  approach .  
Opponents of Obey-Railsback had charged t h a t  a  lower PAC l i m i t  would 
r e s u l t  i n  PACs s e e k i n g  o t h e r  avenues f o r  spend ing ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
of  PACs w i t h i n  an  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  i n c r e a s e d  use of  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
T h i s  c h a r g e  was suppor ted  by t h e  Harvard s t u d y ,  which s t a t e d :  
. . . . t h e  s t u d y  g roup  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  most p robab le  r e s u l t s  of 
r educ ing  l e g i s l a t i v e l y  t h e  amount of money which PACs can 
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  p o l i t i c a l  c a n d i d a t e s .  That  change w i l l  mere ly  
d i v e r t ,  but  not  stem, t h e  f low of money. P r o l i f e r a t i o n  of 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees ,  p e r f e c t l y  l e g a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  among 
PACs, and a  r a p i d  expans ion  i n  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  by PACs 
a r e  t h e  c l e a r l y  p r e d i c t a b l e  consequences .  - 234/ 
Whereas t h e r e  e x i s t  c e r t a i n  r e s t r a i n t s  on p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  PACs w i t h i n  a  
company o r  union ( l i m i t i n g  a l l  a f f i l i a t e d  PACs t o  a  s i n g l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t ) ,  
independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a p p a r e n t l y  cannot  be  capped,  i n  accordance  w i t h  t h e  
Buckley d e c i s i o n .  The i n c i d e n c e  of  PACs engaging i n  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e  
campaigns i n c r e a s e d  d r a m a t i c a l l y  d u r i n g  r e c e n t  e l e c t i o n s ,  and many of t h e i r  
o r g a n i z e r s  f l a t l y  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  they  were d r i v e n  t o  such forms of spend ing  by 
what t h e y  saw a s  t h e  unduly r e s t r i c t i v e  l i m i t s  on d i r e c t  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
f o r  ( $ 5 , 0 0 0 ) .  Many went s o  f a r  a s  t o  p ledge con t inued  and expanded use  of t h e  
independent  e x p e n d i t u r e  r o u t e ,  i n  view of t h a t  l i m i t a t i o n .  235/ Thus,  t h e  -
t h r e a t  of g r e a t e r  l e v e l s  of  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a s  a  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of 
l i m i t a t i o n s  on d i r e c t  c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by PACs a p p e a r s  t o  have a l r e a d y  
been r e a l i z e d ,  t o  some e x t e n t .  
234/ U.S. Congress ,  An A n a l y s i s  of t h e  Impact of t h e  FECA, p. 5 .  -
235/ Dionne, E . J . ,  J r .  Campaign Spending B a t t l e .  New York Times, -
Aug. 8 ,  1980. p. A15. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of  lower ing t h e  l i m i t  even f u r t h e r  i s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s e e n  by  
opponents of PACs a s  l i k e l y  t o  be  c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e  t o  t h e i r  u l t i m a t e  g o a l  of  
r educ ing  PAC i n f l u e n c e .  The f a c t  t h a t  such a  p roposa l  was not  inc luded  i n  t h e  
major PAC reform b i l l s  of t h e  most r e c e n t  Congresses  (H.R. 4070 i n  t h e  97 th  
and H.R. 2490 and H.R.  4428 i n  t h e  9 8 t h )  may be  seen a s  i n d i c a t i v e  of  such a  
r e a l i z a t i o n .  I f ,  however, one e q u a t e s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  i n f l u e n c e  o n l y  w i t h  d i r e c t  
c a n d i d a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( a s  opposed t o  independent  e f f o r t s ) ,  one may be  more 
l i k e l y  t o  a c c e p t  such a  r i s k  i n  imposing t i g h t e r  l i m i t s  on PAC g i v i n g .  Three  
b i l l s  i n  t h e  98 th  Congress (H.R. 640,  H .R .  1799,  and H.R. 4157) would lower 
t h e  PAC l i m i t - - t o  $1,000.  
B. Reducing Cand ida te  Dependence on PACs 
The goa l  of  r educ ing  t h e  l e v e l  of c a n d i d a t e  dependence on PAC money i s  
behind t h e  p roposa l  t o  impose an a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on t h e  amount of  PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a c a n d i d a t e  may a c c e p t .  No such l i m i t  e x i s t s  today ,  and 
p r o p o s a l s  f o r  such a  l i m i t  va ry .  The Obey-Railsback b i l l  sugges ted  a  $70,000 
l i m i t  on House c a n d i d a t e s  ($85,000 i f  they  faced a  r u n o f f )  and d i d  no t  make a  
recommendation f o r  Sena te  c a n d i d a t e s .  The b i l l s  i n  t h e  98 th  Congress propose  
e i t h e r  $75,000 (K.R. 3262, S. 1433,  H . R .  3610) o r  $90,000 ( H . R .  2005, H.R.  
2490, H.R.  4428, H.R .  2959) f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s ,  w i t h  H . R .  3262/S. 1433 
a l lowing  an a d d i t i o n a l  $25,000 i f  t h e r e  i s  o p p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  pr imary and 
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  and wi th  H.R .  4428 index ing  t h e  f i g u r e  f o r  i n f l a t i o n .  
Those b i l l s  a f f e c t i n g  Sena te  PAC r e c e i p t s  p l a c e  a  cap  i n  accordance w i t h  t h e  
s i z e  of  t h e  S t a t e .  One b i l l - - S .  151-- p l a c e s  a  f l a t  l i m i t  of 30 p e r c e n t  of  
t h e  concomitant  spending l i m i t ,  bu t  t h i s  l i m i t  i s  based on t h e  v o t i n g  age  
p o p u l a t i o n  of  t h e  S t a t e ;  t h e  o t h e r s  a l lowed a  c h o i c e  of  t h e  g r e a t e r  of  some 
minimum amount ($75,000 i n  H . R .  3262, S. 1433,  and H.R .  3610 and $200,000 i n  
H.R.  2959) o r  a  c e r t a i n  amount per c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i s t r i c t  i n  t h e  S t a t e  
($25,000 i n  H.R. 3262 and S. 1433,  $37,500 i n  H . R .  3610,  and $40,000 i n  H.R.  
2959) ,  w i t h  a  maximum l e v e l  of  $500,000 i n  a l l  b u t  H.R. 2959, which a l lowed up 
t o  $600,000.  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  l i m i t i n g  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which c a n d i d a t e s  cou ld  
fund t h e i r  campaigns w i t h  PAC money, t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  would have t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
g o a l  of " r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  by many PACs a c t i n g  i n  c o n c e r t  . I1  - 2361 
Two p r i n c i p a l  o b j e c t i o n s  a r e  r a i s e d  t o  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on PAC 
d o n a t i o n s ,  one p o l i t i c a l ,  t h e  o t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  Of a  p o l i t i c a l  n a t u r e  is  
t h e  c h a r g e ,  a s  a r t i c u l a t e d  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  F r e n z e l  d u r i n g  t h e  d e b a t e  over  
Obey-Railsback,  t h a t  t h i s  p roposa l  would pose an undue burden t o  c h a l l e n g e r s  
of  incumbent Members, t h u s  i m p a i r i n g  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  of  t h e  c o n t e s t :  
. . . . l i m i t i n g  t h e  amount of  moneys c a n d i d a t e s  can r e c e i v e  
and t h e r e f o r e  spend d r a s t i c a l l y  h u r t s  t h e  chances  of  c h a l l e n g e r s  
of  b o t h  p a r t i e s  wi thou t  hav ing  much of an impact on incumbents.  2371 -
S u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  might respond t h a t  c h a l l e n g e r s  would s t i l l  
b e  f r e e  t o  seek  o u t  funding from o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  by t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  may p r e s e n t  
more of  an  o b s t a c l e  t o  i t s  enac tment .  These were addressed  i n  an a n a l y s i s  
by U n i v e r s i t y  of  I l l i n o i s  law p r o f e s s o r  John Nowak ( h i s  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  a  
$50,000 l i m i t  were based on t h e  i n i t i a l  l i m i t  proposed i n  Obey-Railsback) : 
T h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  of dub ious  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t a t u s ,  a t  b e s t .  
The $50,000 l i m i t a t i o n  may be seen a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  imposing a  
c e i l i n g  on t o t a l  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and c a n d i d a t e  
e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
I n  Buckley v. Valeo t h e  Supreme Court  found t h a t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  might be  r e a s o n a b l y  l i m i t e d  i n  o r d e r  
t o  f i g h t  bo th  t h e  r e a l i t y  and appearance  of  improper i n f l u e n c e  
.---------- 
2361 Adamany, P A C s  and t h e  Democratic F i n a n c i n g  of  P o l i t i c s ,  p. 599. -
2371 F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act o f  1971 Amendments. Debate and -
Vote i n  t h e  House. 28631. 
by l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  bu t  t h a t  a  c e i l i n g  on c a n d i d a t e  spend ing  
was a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  i n v a l i d  a t t empt  t o  r e s t r i c t  speech 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  campaigns . . . . 
The proposed law may reduce  t h e  r o l e  t h a t  some p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees may p l a y  i n  a  g iven  e l e c t i o n ,  b u t  it w i l l  
n o t  f u r t h e r  a  government i n t e r e s t  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  " r e a l i t y  o r  
appearance  o f  improper i n f l u e n c e  stemming from t h e  dependence 
o f  c a n d i d a t e s  on l a r g e  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s , "  which was t h e  
o n l y  b a s i s  accep ted  by t h e  Supreme Court  i n  Buckley f o r  
r e s t r a i n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
T h i s  b i l l  may be seen a s  imposing an e f f e c t i v e  c e i l i n g  
on campaign spending because ,  a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  it w i l l  
l i m i t  t h e  amount of money t h a t  can come i n t o  a  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
campaign. 2381 -
S u p p o r t e r s  of  t h e  l i m i t ,  l i k e  Fred Wertheimer of  Common Cause,  i n s i s t  t h a t  
it w i l l  not  l i m i t  t h e  f r e e  speech r i g h t s  of  c a n d i d a t e s ,  n o t i n g  t h e  Buckley 
d e c i s i o n ' s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  of  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  was "merely t o  
r e q u i r e  c a n d i d a t e s  . . . t o  r a i s e  funds  from a  g r e a t e r  number of  persons" 
r a t h e r  than  reduce  t h e  amount of  p o l i t i c a l  spending.  239/ -
Beyond t h e  i s s u e  of whether t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  would c o n s t i t u t e  a  
c e i l i n g  on c a n d i d a t e  spending i s  t h e  d e b a t e  over  whether i t  would i n f r i n g e  
on, t h e  r i g h t s  of  a s s o c i a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s .  The Nowak s t u d y  observed:  
. . . . t h e  b i l l  goes beyond t h e  mere l i m i t a t i o n  o f  campaign 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and d i r e c t l y  r e s t r a i n s  a s s o c i a t i o n a l  freedom. 
To examine t h a t  problem one needs  o n l y  t o  h y p o t h e s i z e  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  where a  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e  has  r e c e i v e d  $50,000 
from p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees when ano the r  committee comes 
on t h e  scene t h a t  wishes  t o  d o n a t e  money t o  t h e  c a n d i d a t e .  
Under H.R.  4970 t h a t  " e x t r a "  p o l i t i c a l  committee would be 
p r o h i b i t e d  from g i v i n g  even $1.00 t o  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  and a l l  
o f  t h e  persons  w h o ~ e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h a t  
a s s o c i a t i o n a l  e n t i t y  a r e  den ied  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  the  c a n d i d a t e .  2401 -
2381 Nowak, John.  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t he  Obey-Railsback -
B i l l .  I n  Ex tens ion  of  remarks of  Guy Vander J a g t .  Congress iona l  Record,  v .  
125,  September 25,  1979: 26229. 
2391 Wertheimer , Fred .  The PAC Phenomenon i n  American P o l i t i c s .  I n  -
P o l i t i c a l  Act ion Committees and Campaign Finance:  Symposium , p. 625. 
2401 Nowak, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R a m i f i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  Obey-Railsback -
B i l l ,  p. 26229. 
T h i s  argument would no doubt  be  answered by s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  l i m i t  by n o t i n g  
t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  PACs have o t h e r  o u t l e t s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
e x p r e s s i o n ,  such a s  th rough  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  d i r e c t l y  t o  c a n d i d a t e s .  
A s  David Adamany o b s e r v e d ,  PACs a l s o  have o t h e r  o u t l e t s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them: 
The c a s e  f o r  s u s t a i n i n g  such a  l i m i t  i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  because  
PAC speech i s  n o t  c u t  o f f  by such a  c e i l i n g :  a  PAC which 
cou ld  not  c o n t r i b u t e  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t  cou ld  s t i l l  make i t s  
views known th rough  d i r e c t  independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  - 2411 
C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e r e  i s  room f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  over  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of 
t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  on PACs. Such q u e s t i o n s  may o r  may no t  s e r v e  t o  p reven t  
f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ;  t h e  Obey-Railsback amendment passed 
t h e  House i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  such o b j e c t i o n .  Fur the rmore ,  t h e  PAC r e c e i p t s  l i m i t  
h a s  emerged a s  t h e  most popular  remedy sugges ted  by PAC c r i t i c s  i n  t h e  Congress .  
C. Enhancing t h e  Role  o f  Other  P a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  P r o c e s s  
The t h i r d  g e n e r a l  approach t o  c u r b i n g  PAC i n f l u e n c e  r e v o l v e s  around 
a d d i t i o n a l  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by i n d i v i d u a l s  and p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
a s  a  means of  c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g  t h e  r o l e  p layed by PACs i n  t h e  fund ing  of  
p o l i t i c a l  campaigns. A s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  a  number of s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s ,  i t  i s  
based on an a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  growth and s t r e n g t h  of  PACs and t h e  
b e l i e f  t h a t  f u r t h e r  d i r e c t  l i m i t a t i o n s  on PAC f i n a n c i a l  g i v i n g  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  
l e a d  t o  f u r t h e r  a t t e m p t s  by PACs t o  evade t h e  l i m i t s  t h rough  v a r i o u s  loopho les  
i n  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  laws.  By s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  of  i n d i v i d u a l s  
and p a r t i e s  t o  boar  t h e  fund ing  c o s t s  of  e l e c t i o n  campaigns,  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  
seek  t o  c u r b  PACs i n  an i n d i r e c t ,  r a t h e r  than  d i r e c t ,  manner; i n  t h i s  way, 
t h e y  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from t h e  p r o p o s a l s  o u t l i n e d  above.  
-------- 
2411 Adamany, PACs and t h e  Democratic F i n a n c i n g  of P o l i t i c s ,  p. 600. -
One of t h e  most wide ly  sugges ted  p r o p o s a l s  i s  t o  r a i s e  t h e  l i m i t  on 
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from $1,000 t o  some h i g h e r  amount. I n  t h e  9 8 t h  
Congress ,  t h e  d o u b l i n g  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i m i t  was proposed i n  S e n a t o r  G o r t o n ' s  
S. 732 and S e n a t o r  Humphrey's S. 810 ( t h e  l a t t e r  indexed a l l  l i m i t s  t o  account  
f o r  i n f l a t i o n ) .  A $2,500 l i m i t  was sugges ted  i n  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  S y n a r ' s  H.R.  3262 
and S e n a t o r  Boren ' s  S. 1433 ( f o r  House and S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s ) ,  i n  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
L a n t o s '  H.R. 3610 ( f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s ) ,  and i n  S e n a t o r  Rudman's S. 1185 ( f o r  
a l l  c a n d i d a t e s ) .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Corcoran proposed a  $3,000 f i g u r e  i n  H.R. 2976, 
and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Hami l ton ' s  H.R.  2959 s e t  t h e  f i g u r e  a t  $3,500.  The Harvard 
s t u d y  noted ' t h a t  t h e  $1,000 c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t  was s e t  i n  1974 and had been 
rendered a  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  f i g u r e  by i n f l a t i o n .  It d e c l a r e d :  
I n f l a t i o n  a l o n e  d i c t a t e s  r a i s i n g  t h e  l i m i t  t o  $1,500 f o r  t h e  
1980 campaign. - 2421
I n  announcing i t s  suppor t  f o r  r a i s i n g  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i m i t ,  a  b i p a r t i s a n  group 
of  former P r e s i d e n t i a l  campaign f i n a n c e  o f f i c e r s  convened under t h e  a u s p i c e s  
of  t h e  C i t i z e n s '  Research Foundat ion sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t  might be  indexed 
f o r  i n f l a t i o n  and rounded t o  t h e  n e a r e s t  $500 ( t h i s  t o  avoid  some c o n f u s i o n  
r e s u l t i n g  from a  s imple  index ing  fo rmula ) .  - 2431 
Beyond t h e  i n f l a t i o n  f a c t o r ,  i t  i s  sugges ted  t h a t  a s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i m i t  
i s  r a i s e d  t o  more c l o s e l y  approximate  t h e  c u r r e n t  $5,000 PAC l i m i t ,  i t  would 
e s t a b l i s h  i n d i v i d u a l s  and PACs on a  more e q u a l  f o o t i n g .  The presumption i s ,  
f i r s t ,  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  would be more l i k e l y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  c a n d i d a t e  
--- 
2421 U.S. Congress ,  An A n a l y s i s  of t h e  Impact of  t h e  FECA, p. 3 .  -
2431 C i t i z e n s '  Research Foundat ion.  Amending t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  -
Campaign Act:  A S ta tement  o f  Recommendations by Former P r e s i d e n t i a l  Campaign 
F i n a n c e O f f i c e r s ,  J u n e  1, 1981. p. 2. 
than a PAC if they had more leeway to do so (they can currently give as much 
as $5,000 to a multicandidate PAC) and, second, that candidates would be more 
inclined to give priority to raising money from individuals than from PACs if 
they could raise as much money with as few a number of solicitations. Little 
other than supposition has been offered to support the former suggestion. 
The vast majority of individual contributions to both candidates and PACs 
fall well below the current limits, thus detracting from the theory that large 
numbers of individuals are being stifled by those limits and that they would 
give directly to candidates if given a more flexible upper limit. The 
principal incentive to give to a PAC--the added weight attached to a specific 
policy goal through the collective resources of like-minded individuals--would 
appear to remain unaffected by raising the individual limit. When viewed 
from the candidate's perspective, however, it does appear that such an increase 
would further the goal of lessening candidate dependence on PAC money. Therein 
lies the principal merit to this argument and the likely reason behind the 
increasing popularity of the proposal. 
Another proposal advanced to encourage individuals to play a greater role 
is to remove the aggregate $25,000 a year limitation on all political 
contributions. This was endorsed by the conference of former Presidential 
campaign officers, which included persons across both partisan and ideological 
lines, thus adding to the weight carried by its recommendations. 2441 In -
addition to the fact that abolishing the limit would accord the individual 
citizen more opportunity to contribute money, it may be further argued that 
the average citizen is placed at a disadvantage by the aggregate limit, in 
view of there being no such limitation on political giving by PACs and other 
2441 Ibid. -
fund ing  s o u r c e s .  Thus f a r  i n  t h e  98 th  Congress ,  t h e r e  have been no p r o p o s a l s  
t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t ,  b u t  p r o p o s a l s  t o  r a i s e  i t  i n c l u d e  S e n a t o r  
Rudman's S. 1185 ( t o  $30,000) ,  S e n a t o r  Humphrey's S. 810 ( t o  $48,900,  a s  
indexed f o r  i n f l a t i o n  s i n c e  1974) ,  Sena to r  G o r t o n ' s  S. 732, and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
C o r c o r a n ' s  H.R.  2976 ( t o  $50,000) .  
The drawback t o  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n s  o f  r a i s i n g  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i m i t  and 
a b o l i s h i n g  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  l i m i t  l i e s  i n  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  u p s e t t i n g  t h e  
d e s i r a b l e  b a l a n c e  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem between a l l o w i n g  and encourag ing  
a c c e s s  and impeding t h e  accumulat ion of a  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  d e g r e e  of i n f l u e n c e  
by any one i n d i v i d u a l  o r  i n t e r e s t .  It i s  undoubtedly  an unders ta tement  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  b a l a n c e  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  gauge,  g iven  i t s  s u b j e c t i v e  n a t u r e  
which l e n d s  i t s e l f  t o  d i f f e r i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e s .  It i s  a l s o  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e ,  a s  
many have c h a r g e d ,  t h a t  i n  t h e i r  a t t empt  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t o r s  
of t h e  p a s t ,  t h e  sponsors  of  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act and i t s  
amendments have helped t o  p rov ide  t h e  impetus f o r  t h e  PACs o f  today ,  t h u s  
r e p l a c i n g  one type  of " f a t  c a t s "  w i t h  a n o t h e r ,  a l l e g e d l y  more p e r n i c i o u s  t y p e .  
One may view t h e  laws governing t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p rocess  a s  an amorphous 
mechanism i n  which a l l  i t s  p a r t s  a r e  r e l a t e d ,  perhaps  i m p e r c e p t i b l y ,  and under 
which e v e r y  b i t  of  t i n k e r i n g  i n  one s e c t o r  may have profound r a m i f i c a t i o n s  
f o r  o t h e r  s e c t o r s .  I n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  p o l i c y  g o a l ,  t h e  p o s s i b l e  consequences  
f o r  o t h e r  g o a l s  must b e  cons ide red .  I f  t h e  g o a l  i s  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  l e v e l  
of  i n f l u e n c e  which may a c c r u e  t o  l a r g e  campaign c o n t r i b u t o r s ,  one must c o n s i d e r  
how s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s  may a f f e c t  such o t h e r  c h e r i s h e d  p o l i c y  g o a l s  a s  
encourag ing  c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  promoting t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
p r o c e s s ,  e t c .  Converse ly ,  i f  t h e  g o a l  i s  t o  a l l o w  g r e a t e r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
c i t i z e n s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  p rocess  through f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  one 
may have t o  c o n s i d e r  how t h i s  can be  accomplished wi thou t  t i l t i n g  t h e  b a l a n c e  
s o  f a r  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  i t  impedes t h e  o r i g i n a l  g o a l s  which mot iva ted  t h e  
pol icymakers  i n  imposing l i m i t s .  The q u e s t i o n  h e r e  would be:  c a n  t h e  l i m i t s  
b e  r a i s e d  o r  a b o l i s h e d  wi thou t  opening t h e  door t o  l a r g e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of a  
s u f f i c i e n t  number s o  a s  t o  l e a d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  c y n i c i s m  which l ed  t o  t h e  
r e s t r a i n t s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ?  T h i s  d e l i c a t e  b a l a n c i n g  a c t  i s  a  fundamental  
p a r t  of  such p o l i c y  changes .  
S t i l l  o t h e r  p r o p o s a l s  des igned  t o  encourage i n d i v i d u a l  g i v i n g  focus  on 
t h e  t a x  laws.  C u r r e n t l y ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  may r e c e i v e  a  50 p e r c e n t  t a x  c r e d i t  
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  up t o  a  maximum c r e d i t  of $50 ( o r  $100 on j o i n t  
r e t u r n s ) .  2451 P r o p o s a l s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  maximum c r e d i t  i n  t h e  98 th  Congress 
i n c l u d e  H.R. 3610 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  ~ a n t o s ) ,  which doub les  i t  t o  $100 ($200 on 
j o i n t  r e t u r n s ) ;  H . R .  2976 ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Corcoran) ,  which quadrup les  i t  t o  
$200 ($400) ;  and H.R. 3172 ( ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i v e  McCollum), which i n c r e a s e s  i t  t e n f o l d  
t o  $500 ($1000) .  S e v e r a l  o t h e r  b i l l s  i n  t h e  98 th  Congress o f f e r  a  100 p e r c e n t  
c r e d i t  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  House (and S e n a t e )  c a n d i d a t e s ,  i n  t h e  
hope t h a t  t h e  p r o s p e c t  of  a  f u l l  r e t u r n  of t h e  d o n a t i o n  w i l l  b e  a  major 
i n c e n t i v e  t o  wider  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  funding p r o c e s s .  Such a  c r e d i t  i s  
proposed i n  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  P e a s e ' s  H.R. 2833, which a l l o w s  a  maximum c r e d i t  
o f  $10 ($20)  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  House and S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  d o n o r ' s  
home S t a t e ;  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c r e d i t  would remain u n a f f e c t e d .  Only c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  home s t a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  a r e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  t h e  100 p e r c e n t  i n  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
McHughls H.R. 3737, a s  w e l l ;  t h e  maximum c r e d i t ,  however, i s  $50 ( $ l o o ) ,  and 
t h e  e x i s t i n g  c r e d i t  i s  e l i m i n a t e d  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  o u t - o f - s t a t e ,  S t a t e  and 
l o c a l ,  and P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  and t o  PACs and n e w s l e t t e r  funds  ( a  s e p a r a t e  
c r e d i t  i s  s e t  up f o r  d o n a t i o n s  t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ) .  A d i f f e r e n t  approach i s  
t aken  i n  H.R. 4428 ( ~ e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Obey),  which p rov ides  t h e  c r e d i t  o n l y  f o r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  House c a n d i d a t e s  who a g r e e  t o  a b i d e  by a  $240,000 spending 
l i m i t  ( w i t h  a  maximum of $20,000 i n  p e r s o n a l  f u n d s ) .  The maximum c r e d i t  would 
be  $100 ($200)  per  c a n d i d a t e  and $200 ($400)  f o r  a l l  q u a l i f i e d  House c a n d i d a t e s .  
The l i m i t a t i o n s  of  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  might l i e ,  f i r s t ,  i n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  revenue 
l o s s e s  f o r  t h e  F e d e r a l  Government and,  second,  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
c r e d i t s  a r e  used by o n l y  around four  pe rcen t  of t a x p a y e r s ,  not  i n d i c a t i v e  of 
an overwhelming d e g r e e  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Of c o u r s e ,  a  broadened c r e d i t  ( such  
a s  t h e  100 p e r c e n t  approach)  would presumably i n c r e a s e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  l e v e l .  
The t a x  laws a r e  a l s o  t h e  focus  of some s u g g e s t i o n s  in tended  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  The p roposa l  f o r  a  s e p a r a t e  t a x  c r e d i t  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  o f f i c i a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  committees inc luded  i n  H.R. 3737 ( 9 8 t h  Congress)  
i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of o t h e r  p r o p o s a l s  advanced i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  By c r e a t i n g  
a  s e p a r a t e  c r e d i t ,  wi th  such generous  terms a s  proposed i n  H.R.  3737 (50 
p e r c e n t  of t h e  v a l u e  of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  up t o  $50 f o r  s i n g l e  r e t u r n s  and $100 
on j o i n t  r e t u r n s ) ,  i t  i s  expected t h a t  more people  would choose t o  make d i r e c t  
d o n a t i o n s  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s .  As wi th  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  c r e d i t ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
might be  r a i s e d  a s  t o  whether t h e s e  c r e d i t s  would be used l a r g e l y  by r e l a t i v e l y  
e l i t e ,  a f f l u e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  who have s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i t i c s  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  
even wi thou t  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  of  a  t a x  s a v i n g .  
With regard  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  p r o p o s a l s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n ,  it might 
be  noted t h a t  many of them a r e  made i n c r e a s i n g l y  popular  by t h e  convergence 
of  o t h e r ,  perhaps  d i f f e r i n g ,  p o l i c y  g o a l s .  Whereas, f o r  example,  t h e  r a i s i n g  
of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i m i t  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i s  r e c e n t l y  be ing  advanced by t h o s e  
who s e e  it a s  a  means t o  r educe  PAC i n f l u e n c e ,  t h e  same p roposa l  has  been 
espoused f o r  a  number of y e a r s  by t h o s e  who a r e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  opposed t o  
governmental  r e g u l a t i o n  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess .  When t h e  i n f l a t i o n  
argument advanced i n  academic c i r c l e s  i s  f a c t o r e d  i n ,  one s e e s  a  consensus  
b u i l d i n g  o u t  o f  a  v a r i e t y  of p o l i c y  g o a l s .  S i m i l a r  consensus  may w e l l  be  
b u i l d i n g  toward s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  p a r t i e s '  f u n d r a i s i n g  a b i l i t i e s ,  a l though  
such consensus  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  p r e s e n t  i n  such  o t h e r  s u g g e s t i o n s  a s  a b o l i s h i n g  
o r  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r a i s i n g  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  $25,000 l i m i t .  
D.  P u b l i c  Funding o f  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  E l e c t i o n s  
Probab ly  t h e  most s e v e r e  measure des igned  t o  l i m i t  PAC i n f l u e n c e  i s  t h e  
p roposa l  f o r  p u b l i c  fund ing  of  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s .  I n  1956, when t h e  
f i r s t  b i l l  proposing p u b l i c  funding of F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  was i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
Congress  ( S .  3242, 84 th  Cong.) ,  i t  d e c l a r e d :  
F r e e  and untrammeled r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  t h e  p u b l i c  i s  p o s s i b l e  
o n l y  when men and women i n  h i g h  o f f i c e  a r e  not  indeb ted  t o  
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  d o n a t i o n s .  - 246/
P u b l i c  fund ing  l e g i s l a t i o n  h a s  been proposed i n  v i r t u a l l y  every  Congress s i n c e  
t h a t  t i m e ,  and t h e  d e s i r e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  pe rce ived  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n f l u e n c e  
of  " s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s "  h a s  been one of t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  g o a l s  expressed  by t h e  
s p o n s o r s  i n  a lmost  e v e r y  c a s e .  
One r e c e n t  p roposa l  f o r  p u b l i c  funding was H.R.  3436, i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  
9 7 t h  Congress  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Matthew McHugh and 23 cosponsors .  I n  h i s  
s t a t e m e n t  on t h e  b i l l ,  which would e s t a b l i s h  a  matching fund sys tem f o r  t h e  
f i n a n c i n g  of  House and S e n a t e  pr imary and g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaigns,  McHugh 
s t a t e d :  
246/ Neuberger ,  R ichard .  F e d e r a l  Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  R e l i e v e  -
O f f i c e h o l d e r s  o f  P r i v a t e  O b l i g a t i o n s .  Congress iona l  Record,  v. 102,  
F e b r u a r y  20 ,  1956: 2855. 
F i r s t ,  p u b l i c  f i n a n c i n g  works,  and i t  works f o r  bo th  
pr imary and g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  a s  h a s  been demonstra ted  by 
t h e  1976 and 1980 P r e s i d e n t i a l  campaigns;  
Second, one of  t h e  unintended consequences  of  i t s  
s u c c e s s  h a s  been t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f low of 
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n t o  House and Sena te  e l e c t i o n  
campaigns ; and 
T h i r d ,  a s  t h e  expenses  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  runn ing  f o r  
Congress i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h o s e  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  
w i l l  a l s o  grow, and t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  of  t h e  American people  i n  
our e l e c t i o n  p rocess  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  e rode .  - 247/ 
P u b l i c  funding s u p p o r t e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  o n l y  by ending t h e  sys tem of  p r i v a t e  
f i n a n c i n g  of  e l e c t i o n s  w i l l  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  g a i n i n g  undue power by  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t s  through t h e i r  campaign d o n a t i o n s  be  s e r i o u s l y  c u r t a i l e d .  
As a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  some may s u p p o r t  o t h e r  p l a n s  t o  l i m i t  PACs d i r e c t l y  
( such  a s  Obey-Rai lsback) ,  w h i l e  u l t i m a t e l y  r e t a i n i n g  hope f o r  t h e  enactment 
of p u b l i c  fund ing  a s  a  more fundamental  s o l u t i o n  t o  what t h e y  s e e  a s  money's 
c o r r o s i v e  i n £  luence  on p o l i t i c s .  
Opppos i t ion  t o  p u b l i c  funding of e l e c t i o n s  i s  j u s t  a s  deep-rooted a s  
i s  suppor t  f o r  i t .  Opponents p o i n t  t o  such f a c t o r s  a s  t h e  h igh  c o s t  t o  t h e  
t a x p a y e r s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  a  t ime of  budge ta ry  c u t b a c k s ) ,  t h e  pe rce ived  
dangers  i n h e r e n t  i n  incumbent Members of Congress d r a f t i n g  t h e  r u l e s  govern ing  
t h e  campaign funding of t h e i r  opponen t s ,  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  d r a f t i n g  an 
e q u i t a b l e  sys tem a s  drawbacks t o  t h e  p u b l i c  f i n a n c i n g  i d e a .  Perhaps  more 
b a s i c  i s  t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  such a  sys tem would hamper t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  
i n d i v i d u a l s  t h a t  i s  d e s i r e d  i n  a  democracy. A s  noted by t h e  S e n a t e  S e l e c t  
Committee on P r e s i d e n t i a l  Campaign A c t i v i t i e s  ( t h e  Watergate  Committee) i n  
i t s  f i n a l  r e p o r t :  
2471 McHugh, Matthew F. ~ o n g r e s s i o n a l  Campaign F i n a n c i n g  Act of 1981. -
Congress iona l  Record [ d a i l y  e d . ]  v .  127,  May 5 ,  1981: E 2124. 
The committee's opposition is based like Jefferson's 
upon the fundamental need to protect the voluntary right 
of citizens to express themselves politically as guaranteed 
by the first amendment. - 248/
Some public financing foes have gone beyond their opposition to extending 
the system to congressional candidates and have called for the repeal of the 
existing Presidential funding system, as exemplified in former Representative 
McDonald's and Senator Goldwater's proposals in the 98th Congress (H.R. 3234 
and S. 1684). It is interesting that supporters of public financing for 
congressional elections see the increase in PAC contributions to congressional 
candidates as one outgrowth of the current Presidential system, which they 
presumably favor. They insist that inequities are bound to result from having 
different policies on private contributions for Presidential and for 
congressional elections. Rather than abolish the former, they support 
extending a similar system to the latter. 
Even supporters of public funding for congressional elections acknowledge 
the unfavorable climate for passage of such legislation in the immediate future. 
Previous Congresses, particularly in the post-Watergate period of the mid- 
19709, had devoted considerable attention to public funding of congressional 
elections; the Senate passed such proposals twice in the 93rd Congress, and 
the House appeared close to passage of similar ones on several occasions. By 
the 96th Congress, supporters were unable to get a bill (H.R. 1) reported 
from the House Administration Committee, despite some 155 co-sponsors of it. 
Only two bills (H.R. 3436, H.R. 6047) were introduced in the 97th Congress 
which proposed a public funding system for congressional elections, with only 
2481 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign -
Activities. Final Report pursuant to S. Res. 60, February 7, 1973. 
washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. (93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Senate. 
Report no. 93-981) p. 573. 
23 co-sponsors  of t h e  major one--H.R. 3436. While t h i s  had r e p r e s e n t e d  a  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  number of b i l l s  and co-sponsors i n  p rev ious  
Congresses ,  t h e  number of such p r o p o s a l s  r o s e  t o  s i x  i n  t h e  98 th  Congress 
w i t h  a s  many a s  130 cosponsors  on one of them (H.R. 2490).  One p roposa l  
(H.R. 2005; R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Brown) p rov ides  f o r  reduced m a i l i n g  c o s t s  f o r  
House c a n d i d a t e s  who a b i d e  by c e r t a i n  spending l i m i t s ;  ano the r  (H.R. 1893; 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  J a c o b s )  p rov ides  f o r  F e d e r a l  s u b s i d i e s  of media c o s t s  f o r  House 
c a n d i d a t e s ;  and t h e  o t h e r  f o u r  p rov ide  matching funds t o  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  
candidates- - two f o r  House c a n d i d a t e s  ( ~ e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Obey's  H . R .  2490 and 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  G r e e n ' s  H .R .  3812) and two f o r  S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  ( S e n a t o r  
Dixon ' s  S. 85 and S e n a t o r  P r o x m i r e ' s  S .  151) .  Although d i r e c t  p u b l i c  fund ing  
appeared t o  be  a  l i v e l y  p rospec t  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of t h e  98 th  Congress ,  s u p p o r t e r s  
of t h e  key proposal--H.R. 2490--shifted t o  t h e  i n d i r e c t  approach of t h e  100 
p e r c e n t  t a x  c r e d i t  through H.R .  4428 a t  t h e  c l o s e  of t h e  f i r s t  s e s s i o n ;  t h i s  
r e f l e c t e d  a  t a c t i c a l  change,  i n  view of t h e  con t inued  s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
d i r e c t  p u b l i c  s u b s i d i e s .  
It i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  apparen t  d e c l i n e  i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  
r e f l e c t s  a  s i m i l a r  d e c l i n e  i n  p u b l i c  suppor t  f o r  t h e  concep t .  A 1975 H a r r i s  
P o l l  found t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  favored by a  51-37 p e r c e n t  p l u r a l i t y  ' 'having a l l  
f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  f inanced  ou t  of p u b l i c  funds  wi th  s t r i c t l y  enforced  l i m i t s " ;  
by 1982, 43 p e r c e n t  expressed  a p p r o v a l ,  w h i l e  53 p e r c e n t  opposed t h e  i d e a .  2491 -
While t h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  i s  r e a f f i r m e d  i n  a  March 1982 C i v i c  S e r v i c e ,  I n c . ,  
s u r v e y ,  2501 an August 1982 Ga l lup  P o l l  found 55 p e r c e n t  a g r e e i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  -
2491 P u b l i c  F inanc ing  of F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  Opposed by Most Americans. -
The H a r r i s  Survey ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  J a n .  1 0 ,  1983. 
2501 A t t i t u d e s  Toward P u b l i c  F inanc ing :  A Nationwide P u b l i c  Opinion -
Survey.  C i v i c  S e r v i c e ,  I n c .  March 1982. 
a  good i d e a  f o r  " t h e  F e d e r a l  government t o  p rov ide  a  f i x e d  amount of  money f o r  
t h e  e l e c t i o n  campaigns of  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  Congress and t h a t  a l l  p r i v a t e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from o t h e r  s o u r c e s  be p roh ib i t ed" ;  31 p e r c e n t  s a i d  i t  i s  a  poor 
i d e a .  2511 While t h e  p o l l  r e s u l t s  appear  t o  be i n  c o n f l i c t ,  t h e r e  does  seem -
t o  b e  a  p e r c e p t i o n  among s u p p o r t e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  opponents  t h a t  t h e r e  does  no t  
e x i s t  a  p u b l i c  groundswel l  i n  f avor  o f  t h e  i d e a  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  I f  an i n c r e a s e  
i n  s u p p o r t  f o r  p u b l i c  f i n a n c i n g  i s  viewed a s  a  r e a c t i o n  t o  r e v e l a t i o n s  of  r e a l  
o r  a p p a r e n t  i m p r o p r i e t y  ( e . g . ,  w a t e r g a t e ) ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  i t  w i l l  t a k e  
some f u t u r e  p u b l i c  s c a n d a l  t o  r e v e r s e  what a p p e a r s  t o  be  a  g e n e r a l  l e v e l i n g  
o f f  ( i f  not  d e c l i n e )  i n  p u b l i c  and c o n g r e s s i o n a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  such a  p roposa l .  
251/ Americans Vote "Yes" f o r  E l e c t o r a l  Reform. The G a l l u p  Repor t .  -
No. 209. February  1983. 
111. P r o e n o s i s  f o r  t h e  F u t u r e  of  PACs 
I n  view o f  t h e  many v a r i a b l e s  a f f e c t i n g  PAC growth,  most o b s e r v e r s  a r e  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  make p r e d i c t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  f u t u r e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e i r  a g g r e g a t e  
l e v e l  of  a c t i v i t y ,  f i n a n c i a l  and o t h e r w i s e .  The q u e s t i o n  o f t e n  asked concerns  
whether we have seen most of t h e  PAC growth a l r e a d y  o r  whether t h e r e  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  b e  an even more a c c e l e r a t e d  growth i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h i s  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  w i l l  
e x p l o r e  some of t h e  s c e n a r i o s  which have been sugges ted  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  
q u e s t i o n ,  w i t h  an eye  toward r e t r o a c t i v e l y  v a l i d a t i n g  o r  i n v a l i d a t i n g  c e r t a i n  
f o r e c a s t s .  There  i s  no e x p e c t a t i o n ,  however, t h a t  d e f i n i t i v e  answers can 
emerge from t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n .  
A c o n f e r e n c e  sponsored by t h e  American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  P u b l i c  
P o l i c y  Research i n  t h e  f a l l  of 1979 s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  much of t h e  d i a l o g u e  
which has  ensued on t h e  s u b j e c t  of PACs and t h e i r  p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  r o l e  
i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system. O f  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l e v a n c e  a r e  t h e  papers  d e l i v e r e d  
by Michael  Malbin and Edwin E p s t e i n ,  which,  i n  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e s  
on how s i g n i f i c a n t  PAC growth had been ,  appeared t o  frame t h e  d i s p u t e  on 
how l a r g e  a  r o l e  they  might be expec ted  t o  p l a y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  With t h e  
e l e c t i o n s  of 1980 and 1982 having t r a n s p i r e d  s i n c e  t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e ,  we now 
have some a d d i t i o n a l  measure of  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  s c e n a r i o s  sugges ted  i n  
t h o s e  two papers  . 
Malbin viewed t h e  PAC phenomenon a s  n e i t h e r  "a mountain nor a  m o l e h i l l , "  
a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  whi le  PACs had grown s i n c e  1974, they  were not  "on a  growth 
c u r v e  w i l d l y  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  t o  t h e  growth of campaign c o s t s  a s  a  whole." - 2521 
2521 Malbin ,  Of Mountains and M o l e h i l l s :  PACs, Campaigns and P u b l i c  -
P o l i c y ,  p. 153. 
Taken a s  a  whole, PACs i n c r e a s e d  i n  number and became more 
impor tan t  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s  between 1974 and 1976, but-- 
d e s p i t e  t h e  p i c t u r e  g i v e n  by most ana lys t s - - they  were no more 
impor tan t  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  i n  1978 t h a n  t h e y  were i n  1976. - 253/
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  Malbin saw much of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  PAC spending a s  a  r e f l e c t i o n  
of  a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  way b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s  gave money t o  p o l i t i c a l  
campaigns,  r a t h e r  than  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of l a r g e  new, p r e v i o u s l y  untapped 
s o u r c e s  o f  fund ing ;  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  e x p l o r e d  e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  
h a s  been l a b e l e d  t h e  "old wine i n  new b o t t l e s "  theory .  Malb in ' s  arguments ,  
examined c u m u l a t i v e l y ,  seemed t o  sugges t  t h a t  PAC growth would l e v e l  o f f ,  
i f  it had not a l r e a d y  a t  t h a t  p o i n t ,  once campaign c o n t r i b u t o r s  f u l l y  a d j u s t e d  
t o  t h e  new modus o p e r a n d i  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  g i v i n g .  
E p s t e i n ' s  c o n c l u s i o n s  cou ld  b e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by h i s  comment t h a t :  
PAC o p e r a t i o n s  i n  1976 and 1978 r e v e a l  o n l y  t h e  t i p  o f  a 
p o s s i b l e  i c e b e r g - - c l e a r l y  f o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and o t h e r  b u s i n e s s -  
r e l a t e d  g roups ,  b u t  t o  some e x t e n t  even i n  t h e  c a s e  of  l a b o r .  254/ -
On one l e v e l ,  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  1980 e l e c t i o n s  g i v e s  an  
impor tan t  boos t  t o  E p s t e i n ' s  views v i s - a - v i s  Malb in ' s .  More than  one year  
b e f o r e  November 1980, E p s t e i n  sugges ted :  
I n  t h e  campaign of 1980,  t h e r e  cou ld  be  over  a  thousand 
c o r p o r a t e  PACs o p e r a t i n g  wi th  a g g r e g a t e  r e c e i p t s  of $25- 
30 m i l l i o n  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of  $15-18 m i l l i o n .  255/ -
As Chap te r  Three  r e v e a l e d ,  t h e r e  were 1204 c o r p o r a t e  PACs i n  e x i s t e n c e  a t  t h e  
end of  1980,  such PACs s p e n t  $31.4 m i l l i o n  and t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  a l o n e  amounted t o  $19.2 m i l l i o n .  I n  e v e r y  r e s p e c t ,  
E p s t e i n ' s  p r e d i c t i o n  was exceeded i n  1980 (and s i n c e ) ,  and it i s  noted t h a t  
I b i d . ,  
2541 E p s t e i n ,  Business  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign -
Act of  1971, p. 143.  
2551 I b i d . ,  p. 144.  -
E p s t e i n ' s  views were a t  t h e  t ime  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  
" a l a r m i s t "  camp r e g a r d i n g  t h e  whole PAC q u e s t  i o n .  
Fur the rmore ,  whi le  Malbin c o r r e c t l y  noted t h a t  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were 
no h igher  i n  1978 than  i n  1976 p r o p o r t i o n a t e  t o  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  of  campaign 
fund ing ,  t h e  same could  h a r d l y  be  s a i d  of t h e  i n c r e a s e  from 1978 t o  1980; 
t h e  pe rcen tage  o f  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  among t h e  o v e r a l l  r e c e i p t s  of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
e l e c t i o n  c a n d i d a t e s  who competed i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  jumped from 20 p e r c e n t  
t o  more than  25 pe rcen t  i n  t h o s e  two y e a r s ,  t h e  s h a r p e s t  such jump i n  t h e  
s i x - e l e c  t ion  pe r iod  covered i n  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
Most o b s e r v e r s  have focused on t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r  a s  t h e  key t o  f u t u r e  
a g g r e g a t e  PAC growth. The Harvard s t u d y  commented: 
Whatever t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  of  c o r p o r a t e  PACs w i t h i n  t h e i r  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  may b e ,  however, i t  i s  n o n e t h e l e s s  t r u e  t h a t  
t h e i r  numbers w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  i n c r e a s e .  256/ -
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  p rospec t  f o r  new PACs be ing  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  E p s t e i n  noted 
t h a t  "most c o r p o r a t e  PACs t h a t  a r e  a l r e a d y  f u n c t i o n i n g  have ample o p p o r t u n i t y  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s i z e  and scope of t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s . "  2571 
These e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  c o r p o r a t e  PACs appear  t o  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  
expressed  views of some of t h e  key spokespersons  f o r  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  PAC 
community. C l a r k  MacGregor i s  one such spokesman who commented: 
I t h i n k  t h a t  50 pe rcen t  of t h e  c o r p o r a t e  i c e b e r g  i s  
a l r e a d y  above water  i n  PACs. I s e r i o u s l y  q u e s t i o n  whether 
t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  w i t n e s s  any th ing  l i k e  t h e  r a p i d  growth i n  
c o r p o r a t e  PACs of  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  o r  four  y e a r s  . . . . 
From now on a d d i t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t e  PACs w i l l  be few and f a r  
between i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e i r  r a p i d  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  s i n c e  
1976 . . . . I would b e t  t h a t  t h e  next  f i v e  y e a r s  w i l l  
256/ Kayden, The Impact of  t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  o f  -
P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees, p. 208. 
2571 E p s t e i n ,  Business  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign -
Act of 1971,  p. 144.  
not  s e e - - i n f l a t i o n  discounted--a  d o u b l i n g  of t h e  a g g r e g a t e  
amount c o n t r i b u t e d  v o l u n t a r i l y  by i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e i r  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  ' PACs. - 2581
Don K e n d a l l ,  a  c o n s u l t a n t  f o r  BIPAC, a l s o  took i s s u e  w i t h  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  
con t inued  enormous growth f o r  c o r p o r a t e  PACs: 
There  i s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  growth,  b u t  many o f  t h o s e  working i n  
c o r p o r a t e  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s  b e l i e v e  t h e  pe r iod  of  r a p i d  growth 
i s  o v e r .  They p r e d i c t  a  more moderate  growth f o r  c o r p o r a t e  
PACs i n  t h e  n e x t  few y e a r s .  2591 -
Kendal l  noted t h a t  PACs i n  g e n e r a l  were l i k e l y  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  p r o l i f e r a t e  i n  
t h e  coming decade ,  i n  t h e  absence of t h e  enactment of  s h a r p l y  r e s t r i c t i v e  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  - 2601 
One a d d i t i o n a l  comment from t h e  b u s i n e s s  p e r s p e c t i v e  is  worthy of  ment ion 
h e r e  because  i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  between t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a s p e c t  of c o r p o r a t e  PACs 
and o t h e r  f a c e t s  of  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  Lee Ann E l l i o t t  ( c u r r e n t l y  s e r v i n g  on 
t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission) sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  focus  t h u s  f a r  
i n  t h e  " e a r l y  s t a g e s  of development" of c o r p o r a t e  PACs h a s  been on " g e n e r a t i n g  
and i n c r e a s i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  PAC." - 2611 She a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  con t inued  
s u c c e s s e s  of  c o r p o r a t e  PACs would depend upon how s e r i o u s l y  t h e y  devo ted  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e i r  o t h e r  s t a t e d  goal- - the  e d u c a t i o n  and involvement of  t h e i r  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  i n  PAC o p e r a t i o n s  and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  A l l  of t h e s e  
2581 MacGregor, C l a r k .  Commentary. I n  Malbin ,  P a r t i e s ,  I n t e r e s t  -
Groups,  and Campaign F inance  Laws, p. 208. 
2591 K e n d a l l ,  Don R .  Corpora te  PACs: Step-by-s tep  Formation and -
T r o u b l e f r e e  O p e r a t i o n .  Campaigns and E l e c t i o n s ,  v .  1, S p r i n g  1980: 1 6 .  
2601 I b i d . ,  p. 1 9 .  -
2611 E l l i o t t ,  Lee Ann. P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Commit tees--Precincts  of  t h e  -
' 8 0 ' s .  I n  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committees and Campaign F inance :  Symposium, 
p. 552-553. 
spokespersons  saw con t inued  growth of c o r p o r a t e  PACs, a l t h o u g h  not  a t  t h e  
same r a t e  of  growth a s  h i t h e r t o  exper ienced  and perhaps  f o c u s i n g  on forms 
of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  o t h e r  than  f i n a n c i a l  ones .  The d a t a  p resen ted  i n  
Chapter  Three  s u p p o r t s  t h e  v iew t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  PACs would p r o l i f e r a t e  a t  
a  slower r a t e  s i n c e  1980 than  b e f o r e ,  a l though  bo th  t h e i r  i n c r e a s e  i n  
numbers and money r a i s e d ,  s p e n t  and c o n t r i b u t e d  h a s  been q u i t e  impress ive .  
While most o b s e r v e r s  have focused on t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t h e i r  
a s sessments  of  f u t u r e  PAC growth,  t h e  o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  may be  g r e a t l y  a f f e c t e d  
by t h e  nonconnected g roup ing ,  a s  w e l l .  Not on ly  have t h e  non-connected PACs 
exceeded even t h e  c o r p o r a t e  PACs i n  r a t e  of  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  s i n c e  1977 (when 
t h e  former was broken o u t  i n t o  a  s e p a r a t e  c a t e g o r y  by t h e  FEC), b u t  they  
r e g i s t e r e d  t h e  l a r g e s t ,  r e c e n t  a g g r e g a t e  d o l l a r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  o v e r a l l  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  of any o t h e r  grouping.  The i r  enormous growth i n  1980 and 
1982 ( t o  f i r s t  p l a c e  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s )  may w e l l  be i n d i c a t i v e  of l a r g e  
f u t u r e  growth among t h e  u n a f f i l i a t e d  PACs, a l though  once a g a i n  t h e  "wild 
card"  n a t u r e  of  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  of PAC adds  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of f u t u r e  
prognoses .  
E p s t e i n  h a s  i s o l a t e d  two f a c t o r s  which have r e s u l t e d  from t h e  PAC growth 
of r e c e n t  y e a r s  which a r e  l i k e l y  t o  p l a y  a  major r o l e  i n  f u t u r e  PAC growth: 
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t y  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  b u s i n e s s  
community) and t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  which PACs have a t t a i n e d  a s  v e h i c l e s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y .  - 2621 These f a c t o r s  p rov ide  a  v a l u a b l e  framework th rough  which one 
can a s s e s s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of f u t u r e  PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and growth.  
I n  t e rms  of  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  f a c t o r ,  E p s t e i n  w r i t e s :  
While i n  t h e  p a s t  t h e  r a i s i n g  and spending of funds  were 
l a r g e l y  ad hoc , i n f o r m a l ,  and unsys temat ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
2621 E p s t e i n ,  Business  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign -
Act of  1971, p. 146. 
today  such e f f o r t s  have become i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  w i t h i n  
companies and a r e  i n  t h e  hands  of  s t a f f  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  
( u s u a l l y  i n  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s  p o s i t i o n s )  who s e r v e  on an 
ongoing b a s i s  a s  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f o c a l  p o i n t  f o r  
e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  PACs a r e  t h e r e f o r e  v i s i b l e  t o  
o f f i c e  h o l d e r s ,  p r o s p e c t i v e  c a n d i d a t e s ,  and p a r t y  
o f f i c i a l s - - a s  w e l l  a s  t o  each other--and have become 
p o r t s  o f  c a l l  f o r  o f f i c e  s e e k e r s  and fund r a i s e r s ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  mechanisms f o r  more e f f e c t i v e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  b u s i n e s s  g roups .  I n  summary, PACs a l l o w  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
and b u s i n e s s - r e l a t e d  a s s o c i a t i o n s  t o  o r g a n i z e  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  t h e i r  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  a  h i g h l y  
e f f i c i e n t  way. 2631 
E p s t e i n  s e e s  such i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  o c c u r r i n g  
through such d e v i c e s  a s  t h e  au tomat ic  p a y r o l l  d e d u c t i o n  t o  encourage 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  PAC, n o n p a r t i s a n  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and ge t -ou t - the -vo te  d r i v e s ,  
and g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  on i n t e r n a l  communications among management and 
s t o c k h o l d e r s ;  i n  such ways, c o r p o r a t i o n s  w i l l  be  m i r r o r i n g  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  
which have i n  t h e  p a s t  r e a l i z e d  i m p r e s s i v e  g a i n s  f o r  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r .  - 2641 
E q u a l l y  i m p o r t a n t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  E p s t e i n ,  h a s  been t h e  l e g i t i m i z a t i o n  
of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  "both w i t h i n  f i r m s  and i n  t h e  g r e a t e r  community": 
E l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s ,  s o  t o  speak ,  h a s  come o u t  of t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
c l o s e t  and i s  now recogn ized  a s  a  l e g a l  and a p p r o p r i a t e  
a c t i v i t y  f o r  b u s i n e s s .  Such enhanced s t a t u s ,  t o g e t h e r  wi th  a  
d e f i n e d  l e g a l  mechanism f o r  such a c t i v i t y - - t h e  PAC--makes i t  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  companies ( 1 )  t o  encourage p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
among c o r p o r a t e  p e r s o n n e l  (who might o t h e r w i s e  b e  r e l u c t a n t ) ;  
( 2 )  t o  encourage o t h e r  f i r m s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  e l e c t o r a l  
involvement by e s t a b l i s h i n g  PACs, t h e r e b y  "keeping up w i t h  t h e  
Joneses" ;  and ( 3 )  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t o  under take  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  
w i t h  a  he igh tened  s e n s e  of  r e c t i t u d e  and purpose .  - 2651 
While E p s t e i n  views t h e  new l e g i t i m a c y  a s  a  r e s u l t  of  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  
laws of  t h e  1970s,  one f i n d s  mixed s i g n s  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  environment a s  t o  
2631 I b i d . ,  p. 146. -
2641 I b i d . ,  p. 144.  -
2651 I b i d . ,  p. 146. -
t h e i r  con t inued  l e g i t i m a c y  wi th  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  When asked whether b u s i n e s s  
and l a b o r  PACs c o n s t i t u t e d  a  good o r  a  bad i n f l u e n c e  on p o l i t i c s  and government,  
a  64-27 pe rcen t  p l u r a l i t y  of Americans t o l d  a  1982 H a r r i s  Survey t h a t  l a b o r  
PACs were a  bad i n f l u e n c e  and a  71-20 p e r c e n t  p l u r a l i t y  s a i d  b i g  company PACs 
were a  bad i n f l u e n c e  - 2661; two y e a r s  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  same q u e s t i o n  had e l i c i t e d  a  
r e sponse  o f  49-35 p e r c e n t  "good i n f l u e n c e "  f o r  bo th  l a b o r  and b u s i n e s s  PACs. 267/  -
T h i s  s h i f t  i n  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  a g a i n s t  PACs ( a t  l e a s t  t h o s e  of o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r  
and t h e  b u s i n e s s  community) may w e l l  be t h e  r e s u l t  of  t h e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  media i n  t h e  p a s t  c o u p l e  of y e a r s  on t h e  r o l e  of PAC money i n  
t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s ,  which PAC s u p p o r t e r s  have a s s e r t e d  h a s  been l a r g e l y  
s l a n t e d  a g a i n s t  them. 
Examining t h i s  i s s u e  from a  d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  a n o t h e r  r e c e n t  o p i n i o n  
p o l l  o f f e r e d  ev idence  of t h e  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  of Americans i n t o  narrowly-focused 
groups  and c a u s e s ,  a s  was d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  r e a s o n s  
f o r  PAC growth.  T h i s  1981 G a l l u p  P o l l  found w i d e s c a l e  p u b l i c  membership i n  
and suppor t  of t h e  k i n d s  of i n t e r e s t  groups  which a r e  forming PACs today :  
S p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t  p o l i t i c s  i s  commonly thought  t o  comprise  
s m a l l ,  we l l -o rgan ized  groups  which wield  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  
g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  Congress and hence on t h e  p o l i c i e s  of 
t h e  f e d e r a l  government. 
C o n t r a r y  t o  t h i s  b e l i e f ,  t h e  Ga l lup  P o l l  r e c e n t l y  found 
t h a t  a s  many a s  20 m i l l i o n  Americans a r e  members of s p e c i a l -  
i n t e r e s t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  and ano the r  20 m i l l i o n  have g i v e n  
money t o  t h e s e  groups  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  y e a r .  
These p r o j e c t i o n s  may u n d e r s t a t e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
groups  formed t o  defend o r  promote s i n g l e - i s s u e  i n t e r e s t s ,  
s i n c e  t h e  su rvey  covered o n l y  a  s e l e c t e d  l i s t  of 16 t y p e s  
of  g roups .  
266/ Americans C a l l  Heavy Campaign Spending a  "Ser ious  Problem." The -
H a r r i s  Survey ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  J a n .  3 ,  1983. 
267/ L imi t  on P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committee Campaign C o n t r i b u t i o n s  Favored.  -
ABC News-Harris Survey ( p r e s s  r e l e a s e ) :  Apr. 3 ,  1980. 
For t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  a s  a  whole, t h e  su rvey  found t h a t  
1 3  p e r c e n t  of  t h e  a d u l t  p o p u l a t i o n  c la imed membership i n  one 
o r  more o f  t h e s e  groups  whi le  23 percen t  s a i d  t h e y  had g i v e n  
money. About one- four th  of t h e  p u b l i c  (26 p e r c e n t )  r e p o r t e d  
d o n a t i o n s  o r  membership o r  b o t h .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  39 p e r c e n t  
s a i d  t h e y  would l i k e  t o  become members o f  one o r  more of 
t h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  */ 
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  PACs a r e  a  r e f l e c t i o n  of  t h e  same t r e n d s  which a r e  l e a d i n g  
s o  many Americans t o  j o i n  and c o n t r i b u t e  t o  i n t e r e s t  g roups ,  one f i n d s  
s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  environment f o r  t h e  growth of  PACs. 
As E p s t e i n  no ted  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c o r p o r a t e  PACs: 
P o l i t i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y  coupled w i t h  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  
p o l i t i c s  w i t h i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  framework no doubt w i l l  
l e a d  t o  i n c r e a s e d  and more e f f e c t i v e  c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n .  269/ -
The same i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  p rocess  and t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  now accorded PACs no 
doubt  e x t e n d s  beyond j u s t  c o r p o r a t e  PACs and i n d i c a t e s  a  h o s p i t a b l e  c l i m a t e  
f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  growth of  PACs i n  g e n e r a l .  
T h i s  p r o g n o s i s ,  however, i s  n o t  wi thou t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  . S e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  
can b e  d i s c e r n e d  which w i l l  l i k e l y  have a  b e a r i n g  on t h e  f u t u r e  of PACs, w i t h  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c u r b i n g  t h e  k ind of growth now f o r e s e e n .  Each of t h e s e  b e a r s  
b r i e f  ment ion h e r e .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  r a t e  of  PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n  s i n c e  1980 
h a s  been n o t a b l e ,  from 21 p e r c e n t  a  year  b e f o r e  1980 t o  16 p e r c e n t  i n  1982 and 
j u s t  4 112 p e r c e n t  i n  1983. A s  was s a i d  i n  t h e  accompanying a n a l y s i s ,  i t  may 
w e l l  be  t h e  beg inn ing  of  a  l e v e l i n g  o f f  of new PAC growth.  
Second, a s  t h e  Harvard s t u d y  obse rved :  
2681 Broad P u b l i c  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  Found i n  ' S p e c i a l - I n t e r e s t '  P o l i t i c s .  -
The G a l l u p  P o l l  [ p r e s s  r e l e a s e ]  : August 16,  1981. 
269/ E p s t e i n ,  Bus iness  and Labor Under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign -
Act of  1971, p. 146. 
To a  l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  a l l  PACs a r e  dependent on t h e  i s s u e s  of  
t h e  day f o r  t h e i r  growth and a c t i v i t y .  The more adverse  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  f o r  a  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  un ion ,  i n d u s t r y ,  i n t e r e s t  
o r  segment of  s o c i e t y ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i t  w i l l  s eek  r e d r e s s  
through a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s .  2701 -
Governmental p o l i c i e s  which l ead  t o  l e s s  r e g u l a t i o n  could  reduce  t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  
of  h i t h e r t o  r e g u l a t e d  s e c t o r s  t o  form PACs. By t h e  same token ,  such p o l i c i e s  
cou ld  w e l l  l ead  t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  PACs by groups  which favor  g r e a t e r  government 
r e g u l a t i o n .  
T h i r d ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  w i l l  i n v a r i a b l y  a f f e c t  t h e  growth of  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees.  As ev idence  above po in ted  t o  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  
accorded PACs t o d a y ,  such a  h o s p i t a b l e  environment cou ld  be a l t e r e d  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e .  Opinion p o l l  r e s u l t s  a l r e a d y  show a  d e c l i n e  i n  suppor t  f o r  b u s i n e s s  
and l a b o r  PACs, a s  mentioned above.  Such o c c u r r e n c e s  a s  t h e  r e v e l a t i o n  of  
major i m p r o p r i e t i e s  r e s u l t i n g  from PAC campaign d o n a t i o n s  could  work t o  sour  
t h e  p u b l i c  t o l e r a n c e  of  i n t e r e s t  groups  and t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  on policy-making.  
Such developments ,  of c o u r s e ,  cannot  be f o r e s e e n  a t  any g iven  t ime .  
F o u r t h ,  t h e  r o l e  PACs w i l l  p l ay  i s  hinged on t h e  r o l e s  played by o t h e r  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess .  I f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  were t o  p lay  
a  s t r o n g e r  r o l e  i n  t h e  funding of campaigns,  f o r  example,  t h e  need f o r  PAC 
money w i l l  l i k e l y  be  l e s s e n e d  and,  i n  t u r n ,  t h e i r  r a i s o n  d ' e t r e  w i l l  be  
u n d e r c u t .  The s t r e n g t h  of  t h e  Republ ican P a r t y ' s  f u n d r a i s i n g  e f f o r t  i n  r e c e n t  
e l e c t i o n s  i s  one t a n g i b l e  i n d i c a t i o n  of such a  development a t  t h i s  t ime.  
F i f t h ,  and f i n a l l y ,  t h e  f u t u r e  of  PACs i s  i n v a r i a b l y  l i n k e d  t o  f u t u r e  
d e c i s i o n s  by t h e  Congress which a f f e c t  t h e  " r u l e s  of t h e  game." Some d e c i s i o n s  
cou ld  have a  b e a r i n g  on o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  a s  was mentioned 
270/  Kayden, The Impact of t h e  FECA on t h e  Growth and E v o l u t i o n  of  -
P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  C o m i t t e e s ,  p. 107 
above o r  a s  would b e  t h e  c a s e  i f  t h e  l i m i t s  on i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were 
s h a r p l y  r a i s e d .  Congress cou ld  a l s o  a c t  t o  r educe  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
t o  g i v e  t o  PACs, by d i s a l l o w i n g  t a x  c r e d i t s  f o r  such d o n a t i o n s .  Congress h a s  
t h e  power t o  w r i t e  t h e  r u l e s  f o r  s o l i c i t a t i o n  of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by PACs. The 
Harvard s t u d y  no ted :  
Should t h e  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  win t h e  r i g h t  t o  s o l i c i t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  e a s e ,  no t  o n l y  w i l l  t h e i r  numbers 
i n c r e a s e ,  b u t  s o  t o o ,  p o t e n t i a l l y ,  w i l l  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s  . . . . - 2711
These and o t h e r  a c t i o n s  would o b v i o u s l y  have a  g r e a t  impac t .  
Whether o r  n o t  PAC growth t o  d a t e  i s  mere ly  a  " t i p  o f  t h e  i ceberg"  w i l l  
t a k e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  t ime  t o  d e t e r m i n e .  The s h o r t  term o u t l o o k ,  however, i n  
t h e  words of  one o b s e r v e r ,  i s  f o r  "more of  t h e  same." 2721 -
2711 I b i d . ,  p. 108.  -
2721 P h i l l i p s ,  Kevin.  I n t r o d u c t i o n .  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  f o r  Bus iness :  -
The PAC Handbook. Washington,  F r a s e r  A s s o c i a t e s ,  1981. p. 4. 
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Alexander,  Herbert  E . The case  f o r  
1983. 32 p. (A Publ ic  A f f a i r s  
Author uses  s t a t i s t i c s  and 
PACs. Washington, Pub l i c  A f f a i r s  Counci l ,  
Council  Monograph) 
our  exper ience  t hus  f a r  with PACs t o  
suppor t  h i s  argument t h a t  PACs perform a  b e n e f i c i a l  r o l e  i n  t he  
p o l i t i c a l  system. 
----- and Brian A. Haggerty,  ed .  The Federa l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t :  a f t e r  a  
decade of p o l i t i a l  reform: r e p o r t  of  a  conference sponsored by C i t i z e n s '  
Research Foundation, Univers i ty  of  C a l i f o r n i a .  Washington, D. C . ,  
A p r i l  2-3, 1981. Los Angeles, The Foundation, 1981. 135 p. 
Chapter 4 d i s c u s s e s  pros and cons of sugges t ions  t o  a l t e r  t h e  r o l e  
played by PACs i n  t h e  campaign f inance  process .  
----- Financing p o l i t i c s :  money, e l e c t i o n s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  reform. 3rd ed. 
Washington, Congressional  Quar te r ly  P re s s ,  1984. 232 p. ( P o l i t i c s  
and publ ic  po l i cy  s e r i e s )  JK1991.A6797 1984 
A comprehensive l ook  a t  campaign f i nanc ing  and i t s  r e g u l a t i o n  today. 
Chapter 4 d e a l s  wi th  t h e  r o l e  of i n t e r e s t  groups and PACs i n  t h e  f inanc ing  
of  e l e c t i o n s  . 
----- PACs: what they a r e ,  how they  a r e  changing p o l i t i c a l  campaign f inanc ing  
p a t t e r n s .  Washington, Conn., Center f o r  Informat ion  on America, 1979. 
1 4  p. (Grass r o o t s  gu ides  on democracy and p r a c t i c a l  p o l i t i c s ;  booklet  
no. 62) J K  1991.A713 
A s u c c i n c t  review of  PACs and t h e  r o l e  t hey  have been playing i n  
American p o l i t i c s .  
----- P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees and t h e i r  co rpo ra t e  sponsors .  Publ ic  
a f f a i r s  review,  v. 2, 1981: 27-38. 
Looks a t  t h e  f u t u r e  of bus iness  PACs and p r e d i c t s  cont inued 
co rpo ra t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  a s  we l l  a s  cont inued cont roversy  over  
PACs i n  gene ra l .  
B a l i t z e r ,  Al f red .  A n a t i o n  of  a s s o c i a t i o n s :  t h e  o r i g i n ,  development and 
theo ry  o f  t h e  p o i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee. Washington, American Soc ie ty  
of Assoc ia t ion  Execut ives ,  1981. 104 p. 
"Present-day p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees play a  r o l e  i n  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  system t h a t  d a t e s  t o  c o l o n i a l  America. P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  a r e  i n sepa rab l e  from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y  of  t h e  
United States--a form of vo luntary  o rgan iza t ion  whose members 
a s s o c i a t e  of  t h e i r  own w i l l  t o  advance shared i n t e r e s t  and 
p r i n c i p l e .  A s  such ,  they  a r e  wholly c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t he  s p i r i t  
and l e t t e r  o f  democracy." 
Brenner, Steven N. Business and politics--an update. Harvard Business 
Review, v. 57, Nov.-Dec. 1979: 149-163. HF5001.H3, v. 57 
"A survey of HBR subscribers shows that executives think that 
for the 1980s greater involvement in politics is proper; the public 
is less sure." Compares 1978 poll with 1968 poll. 
Campaign finance reform. Commonsense, v. 6, Dec. 1983: 1-82. 
Partial contents--Campaign finance reform: expanding government's 
role or the parties' role? by J. Bibby--The real crisis in campaign 
financing, by P. Laxalt--PAC limitations and public financing: 
solutions in search of a problem? by B. Frenzel--Looking back at 
the future of campaign finance reform, by M. Malbin--Homogenizing 
Congress, by 3 .  Thomas--Major camapign finance reform legislation. 
Conference on Congressional Campaigns and Federal Law, Washington, D.C. 1979. 
The political campaign and election law committee of the Federal Bar 
Association presents a conference on congressional campaigns and Federal 
law, Four Seasons Rotel, Vashington, D.C. November 27-28, 1979. 
Washington, Federal Bar Association, 1979. 223p. KF4886 .A5C66 1979 
Conference addresses such issues as the effects of the Federal 
election campaign act on campaign strategy; permissible party 
activity on behalf of candidates for Federal office; corporate and 
union political activities; the Federal Election Commission; and 
congressional ethics guidelines. 
Conway, M. Margaret. PACs, the new politics, and congressional campaigns. 
In interest group politics. Allan J. Cigler and Rurdett A. Loomis, ed. 
Washington, CQ Press, 1983. Politics and Public Policy Series. p. 126-144. 
"Discusses the rise of PACs as potent political forces and assesses 
their impact upon the electoral and legislative processes. Conway 
examines various proposals directed at curbing the excesses--real and 
potential--of PAC influence, particularly those designed to strengthen 
political parties and increase the role of individuals in financing 
campaigns. " 
Dollar politics. 3rd ed. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982. 
163 p. 
Chapter 3--"PACs: A vital force in politicsw-provides a brief 
overview of the role of PACs and the debate regarding them. 
Drew, Elizabeth. Politics and money: the new road to corruption. New York, 
Macmillan, 1983. 166 p. 
Argues that despite the limitations on contribution and spending 
under the Federal Election Campaign Act, private money is continuing 
to play so large a role in our electoral system-through PACs and 
loopholes in the law--that the system itself is in danger of being 
seriously eroded. 
Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Laws: symposium. Emory law j o u r n a l ,  v .  29, s p r i n g  1980: 
3 1 3 - 4 3 6 .  K10.0885, V .  29 
P a r t i a l  con ten t s - -Po l i t i c s ,  money, coe rc ion ,  and t h e  problem 
wi th  co rpo ra t e  PACs, by W. Mayton--Federal r e g u l a t i o n  of  t h e  campaign 
f i nanc ing  a c t i v i t y  o f  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s :  a n  overview, by D. Swi l l i nge r .  
Gray, Robert  T. Involved bus iness  people: powerful new f o r c e  f o r  change. 
Nat ion ' s  bus ines s ,  v. 66,  May 1978: 23-26, 28, 30. HFl.N4, v. 66 
Examines "what i s  perhaps t he  most s i g n i f i c a n t  development i n  
c u r r e n t  p o l i t i a l  l i f e .  That d e v e l o p e n t  Is t h e  growth of  a  movement 
among bus ines s  men and women--from t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  of  smal l  shops t o  
t o p  execu t ives  o f  g i a n t  corporat ions-- to  o b t a i n  a  vo i ce  i n  t h e  
process  by which government makes t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  a f f e c t  them." 
Jacobson,  Gary C. Money i n  congress iona l  e l e c t i o n s .  New Haven, Yale 
Un ive r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1980. 251 p. JK1991.J32 
Documents t h e  incumbency advantage i n  t h e  f i nanc ing  of 
congres s iona l  e l e c t i o n s .  Provides d a t a  on sou rces  of funding,  
i nc lud ing  PACs. 
----- The p o l i t i c s  of  congress iona l  e l e c t i o n s .  Boston, L i t t l e ,  Brown 
and Co., 1983. 216 p. JK1067.53 1983 
Chapters  4  and 5  con ta in  u s e f u l  in format ion  about  t h e  f inanc ing  
of  congres s iona l  campaigns. 
Kel le r  , B i l l ,  and Irwin B. A r i e f f .  A s  campaign c o s t s  sky rocke t ,  l o b b y i s t s  
t ake  growing r o l e  i n  Washington fund- ra i se rs .  Congressional  q u a r t e r l y  
weekly r e p o r t ,  v.  38, May 17, 1980: 1333-1346. JKl.Cl5, v .  38 
Discusses  t h e  i nc reas ing  amount of  1l;oney provided t o  congress iona l  
campaigns by i a t e r e s t  groups and l o b b y i s t s .  
Malbin, Michael J. Campaign f inanc ing  and t h e  " s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t . "  Publ ic  
i n t e r e s t ,  no. 56, summer 1979: 21-42. 
A s s e r t s  t h a t  campaign f inanc ing  laws need r e v i s i o n ,  bu t  r a t h e r  
than  changing f inanc ing  laws because of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee 
funding,  Congress "should be cons ider ing  . . . t h e  more bas i c  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  b e s e t t i n g  our  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  PACs a r e  
on ly  a  sma l l  pa r t  of  t h e s e ,  and i f  Congress p e r s i s t s  i n  r e a c t i n g  
on ly  t o  PAC growth i t  may u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  s t r e n g t h e n  o t h e r  f o r c e s  
i n  ways t h a t  w i l l  haunt u s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  There may w e l l  be an 
argument t o  be made on behalf  of  some form of publ ic  campaign 
f i nanc ing ,  but  t h e  arguments now being made, and t h e  b i l l s  p r e sen t ly  
being cons idered ,  r e a c t  t o  a  minor phenomenon whi le  ignor ing  major 
t h r e a t s  Congress unwi t t i ng ly  has  been he lp ing ."  
,, ed.  P a r t i e s ,  i n t e r e s t  g roups ,  and campaign f i nance  laws. Washington, 
American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Publ ic  Po l i cy  Research, 1979. 384 p. 
(American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Publ ic  Po l i cy  Research. AEI symposia 
791) JK1118.P37 
Papers  presented a t  a conference sponsored by t h e  American 
E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  and held i n  Washington, D.C.  Sept .  4-5, 1979. 
Contents . - - Interest  groups and t h e  law: some pe r spec t ives  from 
ins ide . - - In te res t  groups and t h e  law: two overviews.--Campaign 
f i nance  and campaign s t r a t egy . - -Pa r t i e s  and campaign f :~ance  laws. 
Campaign f inance  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  pe r spec t ive .  
Malbin, Michael. The problem of PAC-journalism. Publ ic  Opinion, v. 5, 
Dec./Jan. 1983. p. 15-17. 
"Whatever e l s e  we may t h i n k  about t h e  campaign f i nance  laws 
o f  t h e  1970s, they d i d  no t  spawn something fo re ign  t o  American 
p o l i t i c s  when they  encouraged i n t e r e s t  ,),roups t o  form p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees." 
P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees. New York, WNET/Thirteen, 1982. 8 p. 
The MacNeil-Lehrer Report,  Nov. 9,  1982. 
Sen. William Proxmire, Rep. P h i l  Gramm, Richard Thaxton 
of  t h e  Nat ional  Assoc ia t ion  of Rea l to r s ,  and Ann McBride of  
Common Cause d i s c u s s  t h e  impact of  PAC money i n  t h e  1980 
congres s iona l  e l e c t i o n s .  
P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees and campaign f inance :  symposium. Arizona 
law review,  v. 22, no. 2, 1980: whole i s s u e .  LAW 
P a r t i a l  contents . - -Const i tut ional  l i m i t a t i o n  on r e s t r i c t i n g  
co rpo ra t e  and union p o l i t i c a l  speech,  by J.  Bolton.--PACing t h e  
Burger Court: t he  co rpo ra t e  r i g h t  t o  speak and the  publ ic  r i g h t  
t o  hear  a f t e r  F i r s t  Nat ional  Bank v .  B e l l o t t i ,  by T. Kiley-- 
P o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees: two l i f e  c y c l e s ,  
by C. Sprou1.--The Federal  E l ec t ion  Commission: a gu ide  f o r  co rpo ra t e  
counse l ,  by J. Baran.--The Obey-Railsback B i l l :  i t s  g e n e s i s  and e a r l y  
h i s t o r y ,  by H. Alexander.--Congressional responses  t o  Obey-Railsback. 
Reaves, Lynne. Campaign f inanc ing  reform: i s  Congress ready? American 
Bar Assoc ia t ion  jou rna l ,  v. 69, June 1983: 715-717. 
"The chances f o r  passage of  any campaign reform l e g i s l a t i o n  
t h i s  year  a r e  s l i m ,  but even tua l ly  i t  w i l l  happen, say  a number 
of long-term Congress watchers." 
Rees, John. The p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees a r e  throwing r i n g e r s .  
American op in ion ,  v .  23, June 1980: 27-29, 31-46, 85-86. 
AP2.04732, V .  23 
"The r i s e  o f  t he  independent and bus iness - re la ted  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees i s  seen a s  a b e n e f i c i a l  counter- t rend t o  publ ic  
apa thy  and l a c k  of  involvement i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process .  
R e s t r i c t i o n s  on campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  l i m i t s  on i n d i v i d u a l  
PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and on t o t a l  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have been 
intended t o  choke o f f  money flowing t o  t h e  new Conservat ive 
p o l i t i c a l  c and ida t e s  coming from o u t s i d e  t he  e s t a b l i s h e d  
' L i b e r a l '  par ty  h i e r a r c h i e s . "  
Reeves, Richard. When reform back f i r e s .  Esqu i r e ,  v .  93, Mar. 1980: 7 ,  11. 
AP2SE845, V. 93 
A s s e r t s  t h a t  campaign f inance  laws have "had r e s u l t s  d i f f e r e n t  
from those reformers  a n t i c i p a t e d . "  Notes t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number 
of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees, t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  co rpo ra t e  campaign 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and t h e  i nc rease  i n  s i n g l e  i n t e r e s t  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  
which have r e s u l t e d  from campaign f inance  reform l e g i s l a t i o n .  
Roeder, Edward. PACs arnericana: a  d i r e c t o r y  of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees 
(PACs) and t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  Washington, Sunshine Se rv i ce s  Corp., 1982. 
859 p. JK1991.R63 1982 
Deta i led  in format ion  about every PAC r e g i s t e r e d  wi th  t h e  FEC, 
i nc lud ing  aggrega te  d a t a  on t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1980, and 
f e a t u r i n g  a  breakdown of  PACs by i n d u s t r y  o r  a r e a  of  i n t e r e s t .  
Rothenberg, S t u a r t .  Campaign r e g u l a t i o n  and publ ic  pol icy:  PACs, 
ideo logy ,  and t h e  FEC. Washington, Free Congress Research 
and Educat ion Foundation, 1981. 82 p. 
Recommends " t h a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s ,  bo th  on p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees and on i n d i v i d u a l s ,  be e l imina t ed .  The 
system of  d i s c l o s i n g  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  should be 
main ta ined ,  and p e n a l t i e s  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  r e p o r t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
should be increased .  Removing c o n t r i b u t i o n  l i m i t s  would, i n  
a l l  l i k e l i h o o d ,  l e ad  t o  fewer independent expendi ture  
campaigns, s i n c e  PACs and wealthy i n d i v i d u a l s  could then 
h e l p  cand ida t e s  d i r e c t l y . "  
Samuelson, Robert J. The campaign reform f a i l u r e .  New r e p u b l i c ,  Sept .  5, 
1983: 28-36. 
A r e f u t a t i o n  of t h e  arguments advanced by E l i zabe th  Drew 
and PAC reformers  " t h a t  money has a t t a i n e d  unprecedented 
l eve rage  over government behavior .. . and t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
pos s ib l e  reforms t h a t  would r ep re sen t  s u b s t a n t i a l  improvements 
without aggrava t ing  c u r r e n t  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o r  c r e a t i n g  new ones." 
Schneider ,  William. Campaign f inanc ing:  cu rb  s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t  g iv ing  
but d o n ' t  go publ ic .  Nat ional  j ou rna l ,  v .  15,  Feb. 26, 1983: 472-473. 
Reviews r ecen t  publ ic  op in ion  surveys  on e l e c t i o n  f inanc ing ,  
f i nd ing  t h a t  no t  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees were ob j ec t ed  t o  
a s  bad in f luences .  "What people o b j e c t  t o  i s  not  PACs but  s e l f -  
s e rv ing  i n t e r e s t s .  . . . The convent iona l  s o l u t i o n  proposed by 
those  who oppose s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t  money i n  p o l i t i c s  i s  publ ic  
f inanc ing .  But t h e  publ ic  does no t  approve of  publ ic  f i nanc ing  
a s  a  remedy." 
Twentieth Century Fund. Task f o r c e  on p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees. 
What p r i ce  PACs? Report of t he  Twentieth Century Fund Task 
Force on P o l i t i c a l  Action Committees wi th  background paper by 
Frank J. Sorauf.  New Pork, The Fund, 1984. 122 p. 
Inc ludes  a  background paper " P o l i t i c a l  Action Committees i n  
American P o l i t i c s :  An Overview", by Frank J .  Sorauf .  p. 27-122. 
Shabecoff ,  P h i l i p .  Big bus iness  on t h e  o f f e n s i v e .  New York times magazine, 
Dec. 9 ,  1979: 134, 136, 138, 1 4 1 ,  143, 145-146. AP2.N6575, 1979 
"After  decades of r e t i c e n c e ,  t h e  bus ines s  community has  q u i e t l y  
become t h e  most i n f l u e n t i a l  lobby i n  Washington." Discusses  lobbying 
techniques and i s s u e s  ga in ing  support  of  t h e  bus iness  lobby. 
Silberman,  J o n a t h a n ,  and G i l b e r t  Yochum. The market  f o r  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  
funds:  a n  e x p l o r a t o r y  approach.  P u b l i c  c h o i c e ,  v .  35, 1980: 75-83. 
JAl.P77, v.  35 
" E x i s t i n g  t h e o r y  and econometr ic  work on t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  
r e p o r t e d  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  h a s  focused a lmos t  e x c l u s i v e l y  on 
supp ly  a s p e c t s . "  T h i s  s t u d y  e v a l u a t e s  " t h e  supp ly  and demand of  
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s . "  
U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  An a n a l y s i s  
o f  t h e  impact o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t ,  1972-78. From 
t h e  I n s t i t u t e  of P o l i t i c s ,  John F. Kennedy School of P o l i t i c s ,  
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1979. 1 4 1  p. 
9 6 t h  Congress,  1st s e s s i o n .  House. Committee p r i n t .  
"The s t u d y  reviews t h e  impact o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaign 
a c t  on  campaigns f o r  t h e  U.S. House o f  q e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  a s  w e l l  as 
t h e  impact o f  t h e  Act on p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and t h e  r e s u l t a n t  growth 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  cormnittees. An a d d i t i o n a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  s t u d y  
is  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  implementat ion o f  t h e  Act by t h e  F e d e r a l  
e l e c t i o n  commission." Study conc ludes  t h a t  post-Watergate ' r e f o r m s '  
i n  f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  laws have g iven  t h e  c o u n t r y  f i v e  y e a r s  o f  
o v e r r e g u l a t e d ,  underfunded p o l i t i c a l  campaigns even more dependent  
on s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  money t h a n  t h e y  were b e f o r e . "  
U.S. L i b r a r y  o f  Congress.  Congress ional  Research S e r v i c e .  Opt ions  t o  
l i m i t  f i n a n c i n g  and independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  s o u r c e  i n  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  elections--some l e g a l  and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  
E l i z a b e t h  Yadlosky. Washington, 1983. 33 p. (Repor t  No. 83-52s) 
Reviews c u r r e n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  and o t h e r  p r o p o s a l s  t o  c u r b  
PACs and independent  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
Watson, Tom. Soar ing  campaign spending g e n e r a t e s  renewed i n t e r e s t  i n  
e l e c t i o n  f i n a n c e  changes .  Congress iona l  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  
v. 41, J u l y  16,  1983: 1451-1453. 
"The l a r g e  sums pumped i n t o  some 1982 campaigns have r e k i n d l e d  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d e b a t e  on f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  f i n a n c i n g  laws.  But i t  
seems u n l i k e l y  t h a t  members w i l l  do  a n y t h i n g  immediate ly  t o  c u r b  
b i g  spending.  
Weinberger,  Marvin I . ,  and David U.  Greevy, comp. The PAC d i r e c t o r y :  a 
complete  g u i d e  t o  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees.  Cambridge, Mass., 
B a l l i n g e r ,  1982. 1552 p. ( i n  v a r i o u s  pagings)  JK1991.W44 1982 
L i s t s  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  on each PAC r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  t h e  FEC, 
i n c l u d i n g  a g g r e g a t e  f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  f o r  t h e  1978 and 1980 e l e c t i o n s ,  
a  l i s t  o f  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  each PAC's c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1978 and 1980, 
a  l i s t  o f  PACs g i v i n g  t o  s e l e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1978 and 1980, and 
a breakdown o f  c o r p o r a t e  PACs by i n d u s t r y .  
HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS 
( C i t a t i o n s  o f  books and a r t i c l e s  t h a t  t r a c e  i n t e r e s t  g roup  spend ing  and 
PAC growth and t h e  laws a f f e c t i n g  them) 
Adamany, David W. ,  and George E. Agree. P o l i t i c a l  money: a  s t r a t e g y  f o r  
campaign f i n a n c i n g  i n  America. Ba l t imore ,  Johns  Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1975. 242 p. JK1991.A64 
An a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  reform e f f o r t s  i n  t h e  1970s r e g a r d i n g  campaign 
f u n d i n g ,  and a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  many re fo rm p r o p o s a l s .  
Alexander ,  Herber t  E .  Money i n  p o l i t i c s .  Washington, P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  P r e s s ,  
1972. 353 p. JK1991 .A694 
A s t u d y  o f  campaign f i n a n c i n g  i n  American e l e c t i o n s  and t h e  e f f o r t s  
t o  re fo rm and r e g u l a t e  i t .  Chapters  9-10 f o c u s  on  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p ,  
b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  campaign f i n a n c i n g .  
Brown, Diane V.  Corporate  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  : e f f e c t  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  
e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  amendments of 1976. C a t h o l i c  U n i v e r s i t y  law rev iew,  
v .  26, summer 1977: 756-793. K3.A79, v .  26 
Comment conc ludes  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  1376 amendments a r e  on t h e  whole 
sound,  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  r i g h t  t o  s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s - - d i s t i n c t  
from t h e  r i g h t  t o  c o n t r i b u t e - - a r e  t o o  l i m i t i n g  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
r i g h t  t o  communicate. 
D o l l a r  P o l i t i c s .  Congress iona l  Q u a r t e r l y ,  Inc .  Washington, 1971-74. 2  v. 
JK199l.C66 1971 
P r o v i d e s  background on  campaign f i n a n c i n g  i s s u e s  through 1974 and 
a t t e m p t s  t o  r e g u l a t e  i t  th rough  t h a t  pe r iod .  I n c l u d e s  spending d a t a  
f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  and g roups  between 1970 and 1974. 
Egan, John.  A f f i l i a t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  under t h e  
a n t i p r o l i f e r a t i o n  amendments t o  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign 
Act o f  1971. C a t h o l i c  U n i v e r s i t y  l aw r e v i e w ,  v .  29, s p r i n g  1980: 
713-731. K3.A79, v.  29 
Comment examines t h e  unresolved s t a t u s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between t h e  AFL-CIO's committee on p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t i o n  and i t s  
member un ions '  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees and between t r a d e  
a s s o c i a t i o n s '  PACs v i s -a -v i s  t h e  1976 amendments t o  t h e  F e d e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act p r o h i b i t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  a  c a n d i d a t e  
by m u l t i p l e  PACs of  a  s i n g l e  e n t i t y .  
E p s t e i n ,  Edwin M. Corpora t ions  and l a b o r  un ions  i n  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s .  
I n  P o l i t i c a l  f i n a n c e :  reform and r e a l i t y .  P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  American 
Academy of  P o l i t i c a l  and S o c i a l  S c i e n c e ,  1976. (Anna l s ,  v .  425, 
May 1976) p. 33-58. Hl.A4, v.  425 
Reviews t h e  c o u r t  d e c i s i o n s ,  l e g i s l a  t i o n ,  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
a c t i o n s  which c r e a t e d  t h e  f a v o r a b l e  c l i m a t e  f o r  PAC p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
a s  o f  1976. 
E p s t e i n ,  Edwin M. C o r p o r a t i o n s ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  campaigns: 
F e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  p e r s p e c t i v e .  Rer k e l e y  , I n s t i t u t e  o f  Governmental 
S t u d i e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a ,  1968. 222p. KF4920.ZgE6 
T r a c e s  i n  d e t a i l  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e g i s l a t i v e  and j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s  
which r e g u l a t e d  c o r p o r a t e  (and l a b o r )  p o l i t i c a l  spending d u r i n g  most 
o f  t h e  2 0 t h  Cen tu ry ,  p r i o r  t o  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  laws o f  t h e  1970s .  
----- The emergence o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees .  I n  Alexander ,  H e r b e r t  E. 
P o l i t i c a l  f i n a n c e .  Bever ly  H i l l s ,  C a l i f . ,  Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s ,  1979. 
p .  159-198 (Sage e l e c t o r a l  s t u d i e s  yearbook,  v .  5 )  JK1991.P58 
T r a c e s  t h e  v a r i o u s  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  PAC growth provided by t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e ,  j u d i c i a l ,  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  1970s.  
----- The Business  PAC Phenomenon: An i r o n y  o f  e l e c t o r a l  reform.  R e g u l a t i o n ,  
v .  3 ,  May-June 1979: 35-41. K18.E6, v . 3  
Examines t h e  impetus  f o r  PAC growth provided by t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  t h e  1970s and a r g u e s  t h a t ,  i n  e a c h  c a s e ,  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r  
was t h e  major f o r c e  behind t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  changes  which rebounded 
u l t i m a t e l y  t o  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r .  
----- Labor and F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s :  t h e  new l e g a l  framework. I n d u s t r i a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  v .  15 ,  Oct .  1976: 257-274. HD6951.152, v .  15 
Cons ide r s  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  
and i t s  1974 and 1976 amendments on campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by l a b o r  
and c o r p o r a t i o n s .  S i n c e  t h e  1976 amendments and F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  
Commission r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  s o  new, t h e  1976 e l e c t i o n  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  
u n c e r t a i n t y  su r round ing  t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  
Heard,  Alexander .  The c o s t s  o f  democracy. Chapel H i l l ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
North  C a r o l i n a  P r e s s ,  1960. 493p. JK1991.H39 
An e a r l y  overview o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  money i n  e l e c t i o n s ,  w i t h  s e v e r a l  
c h a p t e r s  on t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  b u s i n e s s ,  l a b o r  and o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  g roups .  
McKeown, Margare t  T. A d i s c u s s i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  p o l i t i c a l  
campaigns.  Delaware j o u r n a l  o f  c o r p o r a t e  l aw,  v .  2 ,  no. 1, 1977: 
138-145. K4.E38, v .  2  
Comment d i s c u s s e s  t h e  law a f f e c t i n g  " t h e  r o l e  t h a t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
may p l a y  i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s ,  n o t  o n l y  f i n a n c i a l l y ,  b u t  
a l s o  th rough  o t h e r  l i t t l e  known avenues  of  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  a l l  w i t h i n  
t h e  framework o f  t h e  law." 
Mager, T. R ichard .  P a s t  and p r e s e n t  a t t e m p t e  by Congress and t h e  c o u r t s  
t o  r e g u l a t e  c o r p o r a t e  and union campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s  
i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  F e d e r a l  o f f i c i a l s .  Sou the rn  I l l i n o i s  U n i v e r s i t y  l a w  
j o u r n a l ,  v .  1976, Dec. 1976: 338-399. K23.078, v .  1976 
"This  a r t i c l e  summarizes and d i s c u s s e s  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  
p r o h i b i t i o n s  and r e g u l a t i o n  by Congress o f  c o r p o r a t e  and union 
campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s .  The language and l o g i c  
employed by t h e  c o u r t s  i n  c o n s t r u i n g  t h e s e  a c t s  . . . ( i s )  
c a r e f u l l y  ana lyzed .  The a u t h o r  a l s o  s u g g e s t s  some s o l u t i o n s  t o  
t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  problems which w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  a r i s e  o u t  o f  
t h e  anomal ies  c r e a t e d  by t h e  h i s t o r y  of  t h e  l aw i n  t h i s  f i e l d  and 
t h e  p r e s e n t  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  and i t s  amendments." 
Mayton, William T. Nixon's PACs Americana. Washington monthly, v.  11, 
Jan .  1980: 54-57. E838.W37, v.  11 
Maintains  t h a t  co rpo ra t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees a r e  i n  
essence  t h e  l e g a l i z a t i o n  of t he  co rpo ra t e  group s o l i c i t a t i o n  
program designed by the  1972 Nixon r e e l e c t i o n  committee f o r  
a l l e g e d l y  coerc ing  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from employees. 
Mazo, Mark E l l i o t t .  Impact on co rpo ra t i ons  of  t h e  1976 amendments 
t o  t h e  Federa l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t .  Business lawyer ,  v. 32, 
Jan .  1977: 427-450. LAW 
"The 1976 Amendments cont inue  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  
p o l i t i c a l  ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and expendi tures '  made by any 
co rpo ra t i on .  However, t h e  new s t a t u t e  does make s e v e r a l  
s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  t h e  scope of permiss ib le  c o r p o r a t e  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s . "  
Overacker,  Louise .  Labor 's  p o l i t i c a l  contributions. P o l i t i a l  s c i ence  
q u a r t e r l y ,  v. 54, Mar. 1939: 56-68. Hl.P8, v. 54 
Examines t h e  e a r l y  movement toward s e p a r a t e  segrega ted  funds 
by organized l a b o r ,  inc lud ing  spending d a t a  s i n c e  1900. 
----- P r e s i d e n t i a l  campaign funds.  New York, AMS P r e s s ,  1978. 76 p. 
(Gaspar G. Bacon l e c t u r e s  on t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
1945) JK1991.072 1978 
This  work i s  a  "Reprint  of t h e  1946 ed.  publ ished by Boston 
Univers i ty  P r e s s ,  Boston, which was i s sued  a s  t h e  Gaspar G. Bacon 
Lec tu re sh ip  on t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of t he  United S t a t e s ,  Boston 
Un ive r s i t y  l e c t u r e s ,  1946." 
Chapter 3  t r a c e s  t he  e a r l y  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  of  organized 
l a b o r ,  focusing on t h e  e a r l y  forerunners  o f  today ' s  PACs. 
Tanenhaus, Joseph.  Organized p o l i t i c a l  spending: t h e  law and i t s  consequences.  
J o u r n a l  of P o l i t i c s ,  v. 16,  Aug. 1954: 441-471. JAl . J6 ,  v. 16 
An account of l e g i s l a t i v e  e f f o r t s  t o  cu rb  unions '  p o l i t i c a l  power 
and a  review o f  l a b o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  spending s i n c e  World War 11. 
CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS 
( C i t a t i o n s  t o  congres s iona l  hea r ings  and r e p o r t s  on t h e  campaign f i nance  laws 
of  t h e  1970s and o t h e r  documents t h a t  r e l a t e  t o  t o p i c s  d i scussed  i n  t h i s  
r e p o r t )  
1971 Federa l  E l e c t i o n  Camaainn Act (FECA) 
U.S.  Congress. Conference Committees, 1971. Federa l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  
of  1971, conference r e p o r t  t o  accompany S.  382. Washington, 1J.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Off . ,  1971. 37 p. (92d Congress, 1st s e s s i o n .  Senate .  Report 
no. 92-580) 
This  r e p o r t  was a l s o  i s sued  a s  92d Congress,  1st s e s s i o n .  House. 
Report no. 92-752. 
U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  F e d e r a l  
e l e c t i o n  reform;  r e p o r t ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  s e p a r a t e ,  a d d i t i o n a l ,  
supp lementa l ,  and d i s s e n t i n g  views ( t o  accompany H.R. 11060).  
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1971. 36 p. (92d Congress ,  
1st s e s s i o n .  House. Report  no. 92-564) KF32.H6 1971 
U.  S. Congress.  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Subcommittee 
on E l e c t i o n s .  To l i m i t  campaign e x p e n d i t u r e s .  Hear ings ,  92d Congress ,  
1st s e s s i o n ,  on H.R. 5284. June 22, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  
Of f . ,  1971. 226 p. KF27.H645 1971 
U.S. Congress.  Sena te .  Committee on Rules  and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  F e d e r a l  
E l e c t i o n s  Campaign Act of 1971; r e p o r t ,  on S. 832. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1971. 128 p. (92d Congress ,  1st s e s s i o n .  Sena te .  
Report  no. 92-229) 
U.S. Congress.  Sena te .  Comrnittee on Rules  and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Subcommittee 
on P r i v i l e g e s  and E l e c t i o n s .  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  of 1971. 
Hear ings ,  92d Congress ,  1st s e s s i o n ,  on S. 382. May 24 and 25,  1971. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1971. 204 p. KF26.R867 1971 
1974 FECA Amendments 
U.S. Congress.  Conference Committees, 1974. F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  campaign 
a c t  amendments of 1974; confe rence  r e p o r t  t o  accompany S. 3044. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1974. 128 p. (93d Congress ,  
2d s e s s i o n .  House. Report  no. 93-1438) 
T h i s  r e p o r t  was a l s o  i s s u e d  a s  93d Congress.  2d s e s s i o n .  
Sena te .  Report  no. 93-1237. 
U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Federa l  
e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  amendments of 1974; r e p o r t  t o  accompany 
H.R. 16090, 93d Congress ,  2d s e s s i o n .  Washington,  U.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1974. 160 p. (93d Congress,  2d s e s s i o n .  House. 
Report  no.  93-1239) 
U. S .  Congress.  House. Commit t e e  on House A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Subcommittee 
on e l e c t i o n s .  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  reform. Hear ings ,  93d Congress,  1st 
s e s s i o n ,  on H.R. 7612, S. 372, and r e l a t e d  e l e c t i o n  re fo rm b i l l s .  
Oct.  2-Nov. 29, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1973. 
493 p. KF27.H645 1973a 
U.S. Congress.  Sena te .  Committee on Rules  and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  F e d e r a l  
e l e c t i o n  campaign a c t  amendments o f  1974; r e p o r t  t o  accompany S. 3044, 
93d Congress,  2d s e s s i o n .  Washington, Y.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1974. 
90 p. (93d Congress ,  2d s e s s i o n .  Sena te .  Report  no. 93-689) 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Subcornittee 
on Privileges and Elections. Federal Election Reform, 1973. Hearings, 
93d Congress, 1st session, on S. 23, S. 343, S. 372, S. 1094, S. 1189, 
S. 1303, S. 1355, and S.J. Res. 110. Apr. 11-June 7, 1973. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 406 p. KF26 .R867 1973 
----- Public financing of Federal elections. Hearings, 93d Congress, 1st 
session, on S. 1103, S. 1954, S. 2417. Sept. 18-21, 1973. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 634 p. KF26.R867 1973b 
1976 FECA Amendments 
U.S. Congress. Conference Committees, 1976. Federal election campaign act 
amendments of 1976; conference report to accompany S. 3065. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 77 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. House. 
Report no. 94-1057) 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Federal election 
campaign act amendments of 1976; report to accompany H.R. 12406. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 96 p. (94th Congress, 2d 
session. House. Report no. 94-917) 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee cn Rules and Administration. Federal 
election campaign act amendments of 1976; report to accompany S. 3065 
together with minority views. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1976. 62 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-677) 
"To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide 
for its administration by a Federal Election Commission appointed in 
accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, and for other 
purposes ." 
----- Subcommittee on privileges and elections. Federal election campaign 
act amendments, 1976. Hearings, 94th Congress, 2d session, on S. 2911, 
S. 2911-Amdt. no. 1396, S. 2912, S. 2918, S. 2953, S. 2980, and S. 2987. 
Feb. 18, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 207 p. 
KF26.R867 1976 
"Bills to amend the Federal election campaign act of 1971, as 
amended, to reconstitute a Federal Election Commission, and for 
other purposes ." 
Miscellaneous 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Public financing 
of congressional elections. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, on 
H.R. 1 and related legislation. Mar. 15-27, 1979. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 535 p. KF27.H6 1979 
----- Task force on elections. Campaign finance reform. Hearings, 98th 
Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984. 
837 p. 
Hearings held June 9-23, 1983, Washington, D.C.; July 8, 1983, 
Boston, Mass.; Aug. 22, 1983, Sacramento, Calif.; Aug. 23, 1983, 
Seattle, Wash.; Oct. 12, 1983, Atlanta, Ga. 
----- Contribution limitations and independent expenditures. Hearings, 
97th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1982. 437 p. 
Hearings held June 10, and July 28, 1982. Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Application 
and administration of the federal election campaign act of 1971, as 
amended. Hearings, on S. 1550, S. 1766, and S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st 
session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 369 p. 
Hearings held Nov. 20 and 24, 1981, Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. 
The final report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, pursuant to S. Res. 60, Feb. 7, 1973: a resolution to 
establish a select committee of the Senate to investigate and study 
illegal or improper campaign activities in the Presidential election 
of 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 1250 p. 
(93d Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 93-981) KF31.5.P7 1974 
TRENDS AND STATISTICS ON PAC ACTIVITY BY ELECTION CYCLE 
(Includes citations for books, articles, and monographs which provide data 
and assessments of PAC activity and spending as they applied to 
particular points in specific election cycles. Some assessments were 
based on provisional data, but all accounts provide a glimpse of 
overall trends during this period). 
Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1560 election. Princeton, Citizens' 
Research Foundation, 1964. 108 p. (Citizens' Research Foundation. 
Study no. 5 )  
Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1960 
national election, including details on interest group activity. 
Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1964 election. Princeton, Citizens' 
Research Foundation, 1966. 137 p. (Citizens' Research Foundation. 
Study no. 9) 
Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1964 
national elections, including details on interest group activity. 
----- Financing the 1968 election. Lexington, Mass. Heath Lexington 
Books, 1971. 355 p.  JK1991eA683 1971 
Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1968 
national elections, including details on interest group activity. 
Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1972 election. Lexington, Mass., 
D.C. Heath, 1976. 771 p. JK1991.A684 
Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 1972 
national elections, including details on interest group activity. 
Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1972 Federal campaign 
finances, interest groups, and political parties. Washington, 1974. 
3 V. JK1991eC655 1974 
Statistics on interest group contributions to congressional 
candidates in 1972. 
Common Cause. Campaign finance monitoring project. 1974 congressional 
campaign finances. Volume 5: interest groups and political parties. 
( various paging ) 
Statistics on interest group contributions to congressional 
candidates in 1974. 
Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1976 election. Washington, 
Congressional Quarterly, 1979. 871p. JK199l.A6798 
Statistical data and narrative on the financing of the 
1976 national elections, including details on interest group 
activity. 
Cohen, Richard E. There's a special interest in the congressional campaigns 
this year. National journal, v. 8, Oct. 23, 1976: 1514-1520. 
JKeN28, v.8 
Reports on the increasing role of special interest groups in 
the 1976 congressional elections due to the growth in the number 
of politial action committees of business and trade associations, 
expanded activities of conservative PACs, wider dissemination of 
rating of Members' voting records. 
Common Cause. Campaign F inance  Moni to r ing  P r o j e c t .  1976 F e d e r a l  campaign 
f i n a n c e s .  Wash ing ton , ' l 977 .  3v. JK1991 .C655 1977 
S t a t i s t i c s  on i n t e r e s t  group c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1976. 
F reed ,  Bruce F. Companies moving t o  s e t  up p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s .  Congress iona l  
q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  34. J a n .  1 0 ,  1976: 46-49. JKl .Cl5 ,  v .  34 
D e s c r i b e s  how, under a  p r o v i s i o n  of t h e  1974 F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  
campaign a c t ,  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
commit tees  t o  s o l i c i t  money from s t o c k h o l d e r s  and employees f o r  
campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
Malbin ,  Michael  J .  Corpora te  PAC-backers c h a r t  a  t r a i l  through Congress .  
N a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l ,  v. 8 ,  Apr. 10 ,  1976: 470-475. JKl.N28, v. 8  
R e p o r t s  on t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
committees under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act.  
----- Labor ,  b u s i n e s s  and money--a p o s t - e l e c t i o n  a n a l y s i s .  N a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l ,  
v .  9 ,  Mar. 19 ,  1977: 412-417. JKl.N28, v .  9 .  
"Organized l a b o r  c l e a r l y  knew what i t  was do ing  when i t  suppor ted  
e f f o r t s  i n  1974 and 1976 t o  r e v i s e  t h e  campaign f i n a n c e  law. The one 
s u r e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  changes was t o  i n c r e a s e  l a b o r ' s  r e l a t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  
on t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  r a c e s . "  
U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. C o r p o r a t e - r e l a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees ;  
r e c e i p t s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  1976 campaign. Washington,  U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  
O f f . ,  1977. 82 p. (U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. D i s c l o s u r e  
s e r i e s ,  no. 8) 
Data on c o r p o r a t e  PAC spending and r e c e i p t s  d u r i n g  t h e  1976 
e l e c t  ion .  
----- Labor - re la ted  p o l i t i c a l  commit tees ;  r e c e i p t s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  
1976 campaign. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1976.  65 p .  
(U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. D i s c l o s u r e  s e r i e s ,  no. 10)  
Data on l a b o r  PAC spending and r e c e i p t s  d u r i n g  t h e  1976 
e l e c t i o n .  
----- 1976 House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  campaigns;  r e c e i p t s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
Washington,  1977. 113 p. (U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. D i s c l o s u r e  
s e r i e s ,  no.  9 )  
Data on House c a n d i d a t e s  spending and r e c e i p t s  d u r i n g  t h e  
1976 e l e c t i o n .  
---a- 1976 S e n a t o r i a l  campaigns;  r e c e i p t s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s .  Washington,  
1977. 17 p. (U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. D i s c l o s u r e  s e r i e s , n o .  6 )  
Data on Sena te  c a n d i d a t e  spend ings  and r e c e i p t s  i n  the 1976 e l e c t i o n .  
Cook, Rhodes. P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee spend ing  s o a r e d  i n  1978. Congress iona l  
q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  37 ,  June  2 ,  1979: 1043-1045. JKl .Cl5 ,  v.  37 
D i s c u s s e s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made t o  p o l i t i c a l  
campaigns by p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees .  "According t o  a  r e c e n t l y  
completed r e p o r t  by t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission (FEC) , PACs 
c o n t r i b u t e d  $35.1 m i l l i o n  t o  f e d e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  d u r i n g  t h e  1978 
e l e c t i o n  cycle-- the  pe r iod  between J a n .  1 ,  1977, and Dec. 31,  1978. 
That was n e a r l y  t r i p l e  t h e  $12.5 m i l l i o n  i n  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  
1974 and more than  50 p e r c e n t  above t h e  1976 l e v e l  of  $22.6 m i l l i o n . "  
F e l t o n ,  J o h n ,  and C h a r l e s  E .  Hucker. Bus iness  groups  gave GOP a  l a t e  w i n d f a l l .  
Congress iona l  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  36 ,  Nov. 11, 1978: 3260-3262. 
JKl .Cl5 ,  v. 36 
A s s e r t s  t h a t  " l a s t -minu te  i n j e c t i o n s  of cash  by c o r p o r a t e  and 
t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  (PACs) boos ted  t h e  
campaigns o f  Republ ican c o n g r e s s i o n a l  c a n d i d a t e s  t h i s  f a l l .  The 
b u s i n e s s  PACs--some p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e i r  f i r s t  campaign--apparently 
s e t  a s i d e  a t  l e a s t  a  t h i r d  of t h e i r  budge t s  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  many 
Republ icans  and some moderate  Democrats i n  t h e  f i n a l  weeks b e f o r e  t h e  
Nov. 7  e l e c t i o n s .  Labor un ions ,  which have run PAC-type commit tees  
f o r  y e a r s ,  fo l lowed t r a d i t i o n  i n  g i v i n g  a lmost  a l l  t h e i r  money t o  
Democrats." 
Glen ,  Maxwell. A t  t h e  w i r e ,  c o r p o r a t e  PACs come th rough  f o r  t h e  GOP. 
N a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l ,  v .  11, Feb.  3 ,  1979: 174-177. JKl.N28, v .  11 
"With a  month t o  go i n  l a s t  y e a r ' s  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n ,  
t h e  growing number of c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees were 
g i v i n g  p r a c t i c a l l y  a s  much money t o  Democrats a s  Repub l icans .  But 
i n  Oc tober ,  c o r p o r a t e  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s  went overwhelmingly t o  
Repub l icans ,  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  GOP c a n d i d a t e s  r e c e i v e d  
61 p e r c e n t  of  a l l  c o r p o r a t e  PAC funds  th rough  O c t .  23. That  
t r e n d  i s  l i k e l y  t o  f u e l  e f f o r t s  i n  t h e  Democratic Congress t o  
e n a c t  p u b l i c  f i n a n c i n g  of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  campaigns." 
Hucker,  C h a r l e s  W .  Corpora te  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  a r e  l e s s  o r i e n t e d  
t o  Repub l icans  than  expec ted .  Congress iona l  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  
v. 36 ,  Apr. 8, 1978: 849-854. JKl .Cl5 ,  v .  36 
Reviews t h e  l e g a l  f o u n d a t i o n ,  growth,  f u n d r a i s i n g  methods,  and 
g i v i n g  p a t t e r n s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  PACs. 
----- Organized l a b o r  t a k e s  a  ha rd  look  a t  whom it w i l l  s u p p o r t  t h i s  f a l l .  
Congress iona l  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  36 ,  J a n .  28, 1978: 193-198. 
JKl .Cl5 ,  v .  36 
Examines t h e  s t a t u s  o f  o r g a n i z e d  l abor  a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e  
i n  t h e  1978 e l e c t i o n s .  
K i r s c h t e n ,  Dick. Corpora te  PACs--the GOP1s ace  i n  t h e  h o l e ?  N a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l ,  
v .  10 ,  Nov. 25,  1978: 1899-1902. JKl.N28, v .  10  
"This f u l l  p i c t u r e  won ' t  be  known u n t i l  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t s  on 
1978 campaign g i v i n g  a r e  i n  l a t e r  t h i s  y e a r ,  b u t  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  
f i g u r e s  show c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees ,  formed f o r  
t h e  purpose  of  making s e l e c t i v e  campaign g i f t s ,  a r e  hav ing  a  
s u b s t a n t i a l  impact on c o n g r e s s i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  There  a r e  now 776 
such c o r p o r a t e  PACs--up from 450 o n l y  two y e a r s  ago--and t h e y  
dona ted  $14.2 m i l l i o n  through S e p t .  30 ,  compared w i t h  $6.8 m i l l i o n  
f o r  a l l  of  1976." 
Perham, John C .  Big yea r  f o r  company p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n .  Dunn's Review, v .  111, 
Mar. 1978: 100-102, 105. HFl.D8, v .  111 
I I Corpora te  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  a r e  growing i n  numbers 
and know how a s  t h e y  gea r  up f o r  t h e  1978 r a c e s . "  
Ulman, N e i l .  Companies o r g a n i z e  employees and h o l d e r s  i n t o  a  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e .  
Wall S t r e e t  j o u r n a l ,  Aug. 1 5 ,  1978: 1, 18. HG1 .W26 
D i s c u s s e s  t h e  then-burgeoning development of  c o r p o r a t e  PACs a s  a  
p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e .  
U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. FEC r e p o r t s  on f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  
1977-1978; f i n a l  r e p o r t :  p a r t y  and non-party p o l i t i c a l  commit tees .  
Washington,  1980. 4  v .  
F i n a l  d a t a  on PAC (and p a r t y )  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  spend ing ,  and 
r e c e i p t s  d u r i n g  t h e  1977-78 e l e c t i o n  c y c l e .  
Alexander ,  Herber t  E. F inanc ing  t h e  1980 e l e c t i o n .  Lex ing ton ,  Mass., 
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"While c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees (PACs) a r e  
expec ted  t o  e x e r t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c l o u t  i n  t h e  1980 e l e c t i o n s  
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Q u a r t e r l y  s t u d y  of  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  of 10 l a r g e  PACs shows t h a t  
commit tees  r e p r e s e n t i n g  b u s i n e s s e s  have s t epped  up t h e i r  g i v i n g  t o  
Republ ican c a n d i d a t e s  ." 
Perham, John C .  PACs: t h e  new z e s t  of  t h e  c o r p o r a t e .  Dun's Review, v .  115 ,  
Feb.  1980: 50-52. HFl.D8, v .  115 
A s s e r t s  t h a t  "business-sponsored p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  
should  r a c k  up t h e i r  g r e a t e s t  impact  t o  d a t e  i n  t h i s  y e a r ' s  
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Berlow, Alan, and Laura B. Weiss. Energy PACs: p o t e n t i a l  power i n  e l e c t i o n s .  
Congressional  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  37, Nov. 3 ,  1979: 2455-2461. 
JKl.Cl5, V.  37 
Examines t h e  d i v e r s i t y  and r ap id  growth of 133 p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
committees t h a t  a r e  a f f i l i a t e d  with c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
o r  p r i v a t e  i n v e s t o r s  having s u b s t a n t i a l  o i l  and gas  i n t e r e s t s  and 
e v a l u a t e s  t h e i r  r o l e  i n  f u t u r e  e l e c t i o n s .  Inc ludes  a  c h a r t  on PAC 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  1978 Senate  c o n t e s t s  and a l i s t i n g  of  t he se  PACs 
wi th  t h e i r  co rpo ra t e  a f f i l i t a t i o n ,  d a t e  organized ,  energy i n t e r e s t ,  
and t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  Senate and House campaigns from 1977 
through September 1979. 
Clymer, Adam. Conservat ive p o l i t i c a l  committee evokes bo th  f e a r  and 
ado ra t i on .  New York t imes,  May 31, 1981: 1, 26. Newsp. 
A p r o f i l e  on t h e  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i d e o l o g i c a l  PAC dur ing  t h e  
1980 elections--NCPAC--one which con t inues  t o  s e rve  a s  a  precedent- 
s e t t e r  f o r  o t h e r  such groups. 
Conservat ive evange l i ca l  C h r i s t i a n s  i n  p o l i t i c s .  New York t imes ,  Aug. 17 ,  
1980, p. 1, 52 ;  Aug. 1 8 ,  p .  B7; Aug. 1 9 ,  p. D17; A u ~ .  20,  p. B22. 
News p. 
Descr ibes  t h e  growing network of conse rva t ive  e v a n g e l i c a l  
C h r i s t i a n  leaders  who a r e  "organizing t o  a rouse  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
e l e c t o r a t e ,  t o  shape t h e  ways i t  views i s s u e s ,  t o  r e g i s t e r  i t s  
members t o  v o t e ,  t o  g ive  i t  a  common language and means o f  
communication, t o  use i t  t o  i n f luence  law and po l i cy  a t  s t a t e  
and n a t i o n a l  l e v e l s ,  t o  r a i s e  funds t o  suppor t  c e r t a i n  
cand ida t e s  and t o  s e l e c t  and t r a i n  o t h e r  cand ida t e s  f o r  pub l i c  
o f f  i c e .  " 
Cook, Rhodes. P r e s i d e n t i a l  hopefuls  funnel  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  s a f e  r a c e s .  
Congressional  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v. 40, Aug. 21, 1982: 2074-2075. 
A p r o f i l e  of two prospec t ive  P r e s i l e n t i a l  c and ida t e s '  PACs 
(Kennedy's and Mondale's). 
C o t t i n ,  Jonathan.  Washington pressures :  BIPAC seeks  t o  e l e c t  pro-business 
members t o  Congress. Nat ional  j ou rna l ,  v.  2 ,  J u l y  18, 1970: 1525- 
1531. JKleN28, V. 2  
An in-depth l ook  a t  one of t h e  e a r l i e s t  bus iness -or ien ted  PACs, 
desc r ib ing  i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  i t s  methods and i t s  g o a l s .  Provides  a  
u s e f u l  background on a  major forerunner  of  today ' s  PACs. 
Dal ton,  James G. P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees: reshaping  t h e  U.S. 
e l e c t o r a l / l e g i s l a t i v e  scene. P ro fe s s iona l  eng inee r ,  v .  50, 
Sept .  1980: 10-13. 
Reviews t h e  e f f o r t s  of  t h e  Nat ional  Soc i e ty  of  P ro fe s s iona l  
Engineers '  PAC i n  t h e  1980 congress iona l  e l e c t i o n s .  
Davis ,  L .  J .  Conservat ism i n  America. H a r p e r ' s  magazine ,  v .  231, O c t .  1980: 
21-26. AP2.H3, v .  231 
Examines t h e  b e l i e f s  and a c t i v i t i e s  of c o n s e r v a t i v e  a c t i v i s t s  
Pau l  Weyrich,  Howard P h i l l i p s ,  T e r r y  Dolan,  and Richard  V i g u e r i e  and 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h e y  l e a d .  "Like t h e  Old R i g h t ,  t h e  New Righ t  
c o n s i s t s  of  a  s m a l l ,  t i g h t - k n i t  group of t r u e  b e l i e v e r s . "  
Demkovich, Linda E .  AMA--reports of i t s  d e a t h  have been g r e a t l y  e x a g g e r a t e d .  
N a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l ,  v .  11 ,  Dec. 1 ,  1979: 2017-2022. JK1. N28, v .  11 
"Desp i t e  some ev idence  t h a t  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  has  d imin i shed  i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  t h e  American Medical  A s s o c i a t i o n  remains  a  power on 
t h e  Washington scene.  It played a  key r o l e  i n  t h e  d e f e a t  of 
P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r ' s  h o s p i t a l  c o s t  conta inment  b i l l  and--in p a r t  
because  of  t h e  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by i t s  p o l i t i c a l  arm, t h e  
American Medical  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  Committee (AMPACI--is r e s p e c t e d  
on C a p i t o l  H i l l .  I t s  i n f l u e n c e  may be p r i m a r i l y  n e g a t i v e ,  b u t  
t h a t ' s  f i n e  wi th  t h e  M A . "  
Energy PACs--a q u i e t  e x p l o s i o n .  I n  common, v .  1 0 ,  summer 1979: 22-26. 
JK1.163, v .  10 
I I  Large  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from o i l  and gas  i n d u s t r y  
e x e c u t i v e s  have been a  long-s tand ing  t r a d i t i o n  i n  t h e  U.S. 
p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  Now t h e s e  energy i n t e r e s t s  a r e  moving 
i n t o  a  new i n f l u e n c e  game, t h a t  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees 
(PACs). The e x p l o s i o n  i n  t h e  number of energy PACs has  been 
a  q u i e t  one ,  unno t i ced  by most o b s e r v e r s .  But i t s  p o t e n t i a l  
impact on U.S. energy p o l i c y  i s  enormous ." 
E p s t e i n ,  Edwin M. PACs and t h e  modern p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  Prepared f o r  
d e l i v e r y  a t  a  c o n f e r e n c e  on t h e  impact of t h e  modern c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
sponsored by t h e  c e n t e r  f o r  law and economic s t u d i e s ,  Columbia 
U n i v e r s i t y  School of Law, The Henry Chauncey Conference C e n t e r ,  
P r i n c e t o n ,  Nov. 12-13, 1982. 131 p. 
1' . . . an examinat ion of t h e  r o l e  and impact of c o r p o r a t e  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees on e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l . "  
E r i c k s o n ,  J a c k .  The Democrats: r e b u i l d i n g  wi th  suppor t  g roups .  Campaigns 
and e l e c t i o n s ,  v .  3 ,  s p r i n g  1982: 4-14. 
"Reviews t h e  Big Ten of  t h e  new PACs, th ink- tanks  and p u b l i c  
i n t e r e s t  groups  t h a t  Democrats have formed t o  c o u n t e r b a l a n c e  t h o s e  
o f  t h e  Republ icans  and The New R i g h t .  They s u p p o r t  and h e l p  l i b e r a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  r i g h t  down t o  t h e  mayoral  l e v e l . "  
F e l d s t e i n ,  Pau l  J . ,  and Glenn A.  Melnick.  P o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by h e a l t h  
PACs t o  t h e  96 th  Congress.  I n q u i r y  (Chicago) ,  v .  19 ,  w i n t e r  1982: 283- 
294. 
Concludes " t h a t  h e a l t h  PACs, r e g a r d l e s s  of s i z e ,  suppor t  
c a n d i d a t e s  having i d e o l o g i e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  h e a l t h  PAC members' 
i n t e r e s t s .  Another f i n d i n g  i s  t h a t  a  congressman on a  House 
committee o r  subcommittee w i t h  j u r i s d i c t i o n  over  h e a l t h  i s s u e s  
i s  more l i k e l y  t o  be  s u p p o r t e d .  Support  f o r  incumbents i n  t h e  
House i s  a l s o  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  incumbents ' s  ideo logy .  Ideo logy  
a l s o  appears  t o  be a  good p r e d i c t o r  of  a  congressman 's  v o t e s  
on h e a l t h  i s s u e s . ' '  
F i a l k a ,  John J. Jewish groups inc rease  campaign dona t ions ,  t a r g e t  them 
p rec i se ly .  Wall S t r e e t  journa l ,  Aug. 3, 1983: 1, 13. 
"During the  l a s t  congress iona l  e l e c t i o n ,  Jews used over  30 
s e p a r a t e  p o l i t i c a l - a c t i o n  committees t o  g i v e  favored cand ida t e s  
$1.67 m i l l i o n ,  more than i n  any p r io r  e l ec t ion . "  
----- and Tim Carr ington.  Walls S t r e e t ' s  f i r m s  broaden g i f t  l i s t s  f o r  
Congress members. Wall S t r e e t  journa l ,  Oct. 17, 1983: 1, 27. 
Reviews p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  by Wall S t r e e t  
execu t ives  and t h e i r  f i rms '  PACs i n  t he  1982 e l e c t i o n s .  
Glen, Maxwell. L ibe ra l  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees borrow a page from 
t h e  conserva t ives .  Nat ional  j ou rna l ,  v. 13 ,  J u l y  4 ,  1981: 1197-1200. 
JKl.N28, V .  13 
"Last y e a r ,  conserva t ive  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees (PACs) 
helped swing t h e  White House and the  Senate  i n t o  t h e  Republican 
column. Now l i b e r a l s  a r e  adopting some o f  t h e  conse rva t ives '  
own t a c t i c s . "  
Graves, Florence.  The power brokers .  Common Cause, v. 7, Feb. 1981: 13-20. 
Discusses  the  National  Assoc ia t ion  of Rea l to r s  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committee and examines t h a t  a s s o c i a t i o n ' s  p o l i t i c a l  
g o a l s  i n  C a l i f o r n i a .  
Handler,  Edward, and John R. Mulkern. Business i n  p o l i t i c s :  campaign 
s t r a t e g i e s  of co rpo ra t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees. Lexington, 
Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 128 p. 
Hogan, B i l l ,  and Diane Kiese l .  Southern PACs: " I n t e r e s t e d "  money. 
A t l an t a  magazine, v .  22, Feb. 1983: 46-49, 63-67. 
"The l i s t  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees i n  t h e  Southeast  
reads  l i k e  a co rpo ra t e  'who's whoq. More than  three-quar te rs  
of t h e  r eg ion ' s  Fortune 500 companies have d e a l t  themselves 
i n t o  the  game." 
Holley, J o e ,  and Geoffrey Rips.  Tracking the  chemical lobby. Texas obse rve r ,  
V. 75, May 6, 1983: 1, 4-9. 
Describes t h e  Texas Chemical Council a s  a "rough beas t  plodding 
through the  Cap i to l ,  l eav ing  i n  i t s  wake angry env i ronmen ta l i s t s  
and l abo r  advoca tes ,  thwarted lawmakers and publ ic  i n t e r e s t  groups." 
Holloway, Harry. I n t e r e s t  groups i n  t h e  post  p a r t i s a n  e r a :  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
machine of  t h e  AFL-CIO. P o l i t i c a l  s c i ence  q u a r t e r l y ,  v .  94, sp r ing  
1979: 117-133. HlBP8, V.  94 
Describes t h e  t o o l s  used by COPE i n  i t s  e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
and examines t h e  connect ion between these  and t h e  AFL-CIO's 
lobbying arm. 
Hunter,  William A. The new r i g h t :  a  growing f o r c e  i n  s t a t e  p o l i t i c s .  
Washington, Conference on A l t e r n a t i v e  s t a t e  and l o c a l  p o l i c i e s ,  
1980. 106 p. 
P a r t i a l  contents--The New R igh t ' s  a c t i o n  strategy--The i s s u e s  
o f  t he  New Right--A look  a t  t he  New Right o rgan iza t ions  i n  s t a t e  
p o l i t i c s :  Nat ional  Conservative P o l i t i c a l  Action Committee (NCPAC); 
Nat ional  Right t o  Work Committee (RTWC); American L e g i s l a t i v e  Exchange 
Council (ALEC)--New Right i n  s t a t e  p o l i t i c s :  t e n  ca se  s t u d i e s .  
Jubak,  J i m .  Stumping f o r  t h e  environment: t h e  "green vote"  has  c l o u t  t h i s  
year  a s  never before .  Environmental a c t i o n ,  v .  1 4 ,  Oct./Nov. 1982: 
9-1 3  
Descr ibes  a  "wave of environmental a c t i v i s m  . . . up a g a i n s t  
tremendous odds i n  an e l e c t i o n  awash i n  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  money." 
Gives s p e c i f i c  examples of  envi ronmenta l i s t  support  of  p o l i t i c a l  
candida tes .  
Ka l in ,  Alan B. The r i g h t  of i d e o l o g i c a l  nonas soc i a t i on .  C a l i f o r n i a  law 
review,  v. 66, J u l y  1978: 767-808. LAW 
Comment reviews ca se  law dea l ing  wi th  compelled support  of 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  and sets f o r t h  t h e  c o n t r a s t i n g  approaches of 
two r e c e n t  Supreme Court dec i s ions .  Argues f o r  broad c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  a  r i g h t  o f  i d e o l o g i c a l  nonassoc ia t ion .  Considers government 
i n t e r e s t s  which might j u s t i f y  infr ingement  of  such a  r i g h t  and 
o u t l i n e s  a p p l i c a t i o n  of such a  r i g h t  t o  government f i nanc ing  of  
e l e c t i o n s .  
Kamber, Vic tor  S. PAC counsel .  Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s ,  v. 2 ,  f a l l  
1981: 46-48. 
"Discusses t h e  importance of  organized l a b o r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees,  and sugges t s  ways f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
candida te  t o  approach them. " 
Katskee, Melvin R. P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees: should n a t i o n a l  banks 
s t a y  away? Banking law jou rna l ,  v. 96, Sept .  1979. 738-745. 
LAW 
"Federa l  law p r o h i b i t s  n a t i o n a l  bank c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and 
expendi tures  i n  connect ion wi th  f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  and s t a t e  
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .  But t o  what e x t e n t  a r e  n a t i o n a l  banks 
prohib i ted  from s e t t i n g  up p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees,  
funded by i n d i v i d u a l  vo luntary  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  t o  suppor t  
cand ida t e s  f o r  f e d e r a l  and s t a t e  o f f i c e s ?  Does t h e  law 
permit bank loans  t o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  committees,  o r  
cand ida t e s?  May bank PACs s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from 
bank employees? The au thor  answers t he se  and many o t h e r  
ques t i ons  by p lac ing  the  1976 Amendments t o  t h e  Federa l  
E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act a g a i n s t  wide v a r i e t y  of p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  t h a t  n a t i o n a l  banks may be p r e s e n t l y  engaged i n  
o r  contemplating." 
K e l l e r ,  B i l l .  In  a  b u l l  market for  arms, weapons i ndus t ry  l o b b y i s t s  push 
products ,  not  po l icy .  Congressional  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  38, 
Oct.  25, 1980: 3201-3206. JKl.Cl5, v. 38 
Examines t h e  lobbying a c t i v i t i e s  and in f luence  of defense  
c o n t r a c t o r s .  "The consensus among those who handle  defense  
l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  t h a t  the  i n d u s t r y ' s  i n f luence  i s  probably 
marginal  compared t o  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  t h a t  shape defense  spending.'' 
Inc ludes  a  s e p a r a t e  d i s cus s ion  ( p .  3204) of t he  spending p r a c t i c e s  
of defense  company p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees. 
----- "New Right" wants c r e d i t  f o r  Democrats' Nov. 4  l o s s e s  but  GOP, 
o t h e r s  don ' t  agree.  Congressional  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v. 38, 
Nov. 15 ,  1980: 3372-3373. JKl.Cl5, v .  38 
A pos t -e lec t ion  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  r o l e  of t h e  New Right PACs 
i n  t h e  1980 e l e c t i o n  outcomes. 
La Mere, Joanne. PACs: channel for  co rpo ra t e  a c t i o n .  I n d u s t r i a l  development, 
v .  148, July-Aug. 1979: 22-26. HC107.Al3132, v .  148 
I n  t h e  f i r s t  of two a r t i c l e s ,  a  co rpo ra t e  government a f f a i r s  
manager a s s e r t s  t h a t  "companies can employ t h e  same product 
market ing and research  techniques  t o  e l e c t  a  reasonable  and 
i n t e l l i g e n t  Congress." Descr ibes  t h e  growth and ope ra t i on  of 
co rpo ra t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees (PACs) and d i scus se s  
some employee and co rpo ra t e  skept ic i sm about PACs. I n  t h e  
second a r t i c l e ,  execut ive  d i r e c t o r  of t he  bus iness  round 
t a b l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  "g ra s s roo t s  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  programs 
play an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  i n  determining l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n  while  
encouraging a c t i v e  i nd iv idua l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
process  .I'  
Larson,  Reed. Right t o  work b a t t l e s  b i g  l a b o r ' s  $3 -b i l l i on  k i t t y .  Human even t s ,  
v .  40, Sept .  13,  1980: 14-15, 17,  19, 21, 23-25. D45.H8, v. 40 
In te rv iew with "Reed Larson, head of t h e  Nat ional  Right t o  Work 
Committee and arch-foe of forced unionism and compulsory union dues 
used f o r  p o l i t i c a l  purposes,  who looks back on R-T-W's pas t  a c t i v i t i e s  
and fo re sees  a  major blow t o  Big Labor 's  c l o u t  i f  t h e  Helms-Dickinson 
b i l l  curbing the  use of union funds fo r  p o l i t i c a l  campaigns i s  passed 
by Congress .I1 
L igh t ,  Larry.  New l i b e r a l  money groups compete fo r  campaign funds.  
Congressional  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v. 39, Oct. 3 ,  1981: 1905-1908 
Reports on t he  f i v e  newly e s t a b l i s h e d  l i b e r a l  o r  democratic 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees--the Progress ive  P o l i t i c a l  Action 
Committee, Independent Act ion ,  Democrats f o r  t h e  '809, Fund f o r  
a  Democratic Major i ty ,  and Committee fo r  t h e  Future  of America-- 
which a r e  "hoping t o  r a i s e  money by f r i g h t e n i n g  l i b e r a l  g i v e r s  
with t h e  spec t e r  of New Right domination." 

Timberg, Robert. The PAC business. Baltimore Sun, July 11, 1982: A6-A7; 
July 12: 1, A6; July 13: 1, A4; July 14: 1, All, July 15: 1, A12; 
July 16 16: 1, A8-A9; July 17, 1, A4-A5; July 25: 1, A5. 
Series contains profiles on the inner workings of several 
ideological, nonconnected PACs. Titles include: -- "The Political Money Machines: Fat, Fancy, Free of Curbs" 
-- "NCPAC Means Business for Friends on the Right" 
-- "Insiders in NCPAC Operate Group Like a Family Business" 
-- "1,iberal PROPAC Set Up to Counteract Groups on Right" 
-- "Anti-Abortion PAC Sticks to Fund-Raising" 
-- "PACs, Principles and Profits: This Activist is a One-Man Band" -- "Anti-Abortion PAC Gives Aid Where it Isn't Wanted" 
-- "New Liberal PAC Follows Old Financial Game Rules" 
Trost, Cathy. Occidental Petroleum flexes its political muscles. Business 
and society review, no. 43, fall 1982: 46-49. 
"The combination of Occidental's PAC donations with 
corporate contributions on a private level only serve to 
strengthen Occidental's already-strong power base in 
Washington, where the company's influential lobbyists . . . 
complement the social and business diplomacy of eighty- 
three-year-old Chairman of the Board Armand Hammer." 
Tumin, Jonathan. How to bury liberals. New republic, v. 182, May 24, 
1980: 13-15. AP2 .W624, v. 182 
"The enormous increase in the number of corporate and trade 
PACs represents two major threats to liberal policies and 
politicians: first, through sheer numbers, conservative PACs are 
now greatly outspending labor union PACs, often endangering 
liberal Democrats in Congress; and second, these donations are 
jeopardizing pro-consumer legislation across a whole range of 
issues. " 
Wagner, Susan. The political action committee: a new way for publishers 
to make their voices heard. Publishers weekly, v. 209, Mar. 8, 1976: 
36-38. 21219.P28, v. 209 
Outlines , concerns facing publishers, such as copyright, postal 
rates and freedom of information and describes the lohbying activities 
of the Committee set up for publishers to support candidates and to 
make their feelings known on the Hill. 
HOW PACs WORK 
(Primarily, these citations are to guides on setting up a PAC or which offer 
some description of how PACs operate; some are articles which explore 
the inner workings of PAC operations) 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Federal election campaign 
guide task force. Compliance with Federal election campaign requirements: 
a guide for candidates. New York, 1980. 192 p. KF4920.A95 1980 
Appendix 5 summarizes laws on PACs and chapter 5 describes tax 
considerations for PACs and others. 
Anderson,  Gary. P o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees :  a t t a i n i n g  t e c h n i c a l  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  
Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s ,  v .  4 ,  summer 1983: 28-34. 
Execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  of t h e  Texas Medical  P o l i t i c a l  Ac t ion  C o r n i t t e e  
(TEXPAC) d e s c r i b e s  t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  a  model f o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
a s s o c i a t i o n  PAC development.  
Chamber of Commerce of  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  of America. P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  Dept .  
Corpora te  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee g u i d e l i n e s .  Washington,  1982. 1 v .  
( v a r i o u s  pag ings )  KF4886. G84 
"This  document i s  des igned t o  p rov ide  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  t r a d e  and 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  and chambers of commerce w i t h  a  r e f e r e n c e  
source  f o r  o r g a n i z i n g ,  o p e r a t i n g ,  and conduc t ing  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of a  
p o l i t i a l  a c t i o n  committee i n  accordance  wi th  bo th  t h e  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  
laws and r e g u l a t i o n s  and t h e  F e d e r a l  t a x  laws,  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  and r u l i n g s . "  
Hamburger, Tom. How t o  f l e e c e  t h e  PACs. washington Monthly,  v .  15 ,  
July-Aug. 1983: 27-31. 
F i n d s  t h a t  most p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees "were paying l e s s  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  phi losophy.  Some r e g u l a r l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  members of 
c e r t a i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  commit tees .  Some focused on c a n d i d a t e s  i n  
c l o s e  r a c e s .  But t h e  most common c r i t e r i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  
c o r p o r a t e  and i n d u s t r y  PACs, was what  avid) S t r a u s s  c a l l s  
' w i n n a b i l i t y .  "' I n  f a c t ,  " t h e  most i n f a l l i b l e  t r i c k  i s  t o  w a i t  
t o  f o r k  over  t h e  money u n t i l  t h e  workings of chance have f i n i s h e d ,  
and one c a n d i d a t e  o r  ano the r  h a s  a c t u a l l y  won." 
Hand le r ,  Edward, and John Mulkern. The governance of c o r p o r a t e  PACs. 
P repared  f o r  d e l i v e r y  a t  t h e  1982 annual  meet ing of t h e  American 
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  Denver, S e p t .  2-5, 1982. 
T h i s  paper  r e p r e s e n t s  an e f f o r t  t o  b r i n g  e m p i r i c a l  knowledge 
t o  bea r  on t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  about t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  of 
c o r p o r a t e  PACs and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  c o r p o r a t e  l e a d e r s h i p .  
It examines t h e  composi t ion and s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  committees t h a t  
run t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  and t h e i r  decision-making.  It then  e x p l o r e s  
t h e  e x t e n t  of  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and i n f l u e n c e  of CEOs and of c o n t r i b u t o r  
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  i n  t h e  a f f a i r s  of PACs. 
Herndon, James F. Access,  r e c o r d ,  and c o m p e t i t i o n  a s  i n f l u e n c e s  on i n t e r e s t  
group c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  campaigns. J o u r n a l  of P o l i t i c s ,  
v .  44 ,  Nov. 1982: 996-1019. 
Concludes from i n t e r v i e w s  wi th  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  f o u r  b u s i n e s s  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees and four  l a b o r  PACs t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  
groups  emphasize suppor t  f o r  incumbents (which s u g g e s t s  a  s t r a t e g y  
of  s e e k i n g  a c c e s s ) ,  whi le  t h e  l a b o r  groups  emphasize p a r t y  a f f i l i a t i o n  
( a  s t r a t e g y  of  r e c o r d - s t r e s s i n g ) .  "Business  g roups ,  s a t i s f i e d  ( a t  
l e a s t  not  t e r r i b l y  d i s s a t i f i e d )  w i t h  t h e  makeup of Congress ,  could  be 
expec ted  t o  emphasize l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  whereas l a b o r ,  somewhat 
unhappy wi th  t h e  membership of Congress ,  could  be  expected t o  p l a c e  
more emphasis on e l e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t y  ." 
Hershey,  Rober t  D . ,  J r .  $22,000 d i v i d e d  by f o u r  dozen r a c e s  e q u a l s  a  
busy day f o r  one commit tee .  New York t i m e s ,  Oc t .  13 ,  1982: B5. 
An i n s i d e  look a t  t h e  decis ion-making p rocess  on c a n d i d a t e  
s e l e c t i o n  i n  one c o r p o r a t e  PAC. 
Hunt, A l b e r t  R. An i n s i d e  look a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  h u s t l i n g  PACs. Wall  
S t r e e t  j o u r n a l ,  Oct .  1,  1982: 33,  37.  
I I What emerges a r e  some shameless  campaign s o l i c i t a t i o n s ,  
u n d e r s c o r i n g  t h e  need of p o l i t i c i a n s  of bo th  p a r t i e s  t o  r e l y  
more and more on s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t  money.'' 
K e n d a l l ,  Don R. Corpora te  PACs: s t ep -by-s tep  fo rmat ion  and t r o u b l e f r e e  
o p e r a t i o n .  Campaigns and e l e c t i o n s ,  v .  1, s p r i n g  1980: 14-20. 
JK1976.C33, v .  1  
An overview of what PACs a r e  and how t h e y  a r e  formed, f o c u s i n g  
on t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r .  
L i g h t ,  L a r r y .  The game of PAC t a r g e t i n g :  f r i e n d s ,  f o e s  and guesswork.  
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  q u a r t e r l y  weekly r e p o r t ,  v .  39,  Nov. 21,  1981: 2267-2270. 
Examines how p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  cormnittees t a r g e t  t h e i r  funds  
f o r  Congress iona l  c a n d i d a t e s .  
The PAC handbook: p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  f o r  b u s i n e s s .  Washington,  F r a s e r  
A s s o c i a t e s ,  1981. 363 p. JK467.P33 1981 
A "how-to" Guide f o r  t h o s e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  PAC, 
i n c l u d i n g  c a s e  s t u d i e s ,  l e g a l  g u i d e l i n e s ,  and s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  t h e  
f u t u r e .  It emphasizes  c o r p o r a t e  and t r a d e  PACs. 
PACs: how t o  back t h e  ' r i g h t '  c a n d i d a t e s .  Eng ineer ing  news-record,  v. 201, 
Nov. 2 ,  1978: 24-25, 27. TAl.E6, v .  201 
"Whether i t  was s i t u s  p i c k e t i n g  o r  l a b o r  law reform o r  
h i g h e r  t a x e s  on fo re ign-ea rned  income--or maybe j u s t  c l o s e r  
look a t  r e c e n t  changes i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  law--the r e s u l t  
i s  t h i s :  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  l i k e  b u s i n e s s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  i s  g e t t i n g  i n t o  
p o l i t i c s .  A growing number of  c o n s t r u c t i o n  companies and t r a d e  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  a r e  f o l l o w i n g  l a b o r ' s  l ead- - they 've  s topped t a l k i n g  
about p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  and s t a r t e d  t a k i n g  i t  through p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  committees (PACs)." I n c l u d e s  a  l i s t  of cons l l ruc t ion  
c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees .  
Sansweet ,  S tephen J .  P o l i t i c a l - a c t i o n  u n i t s  a t  f i r m s  a r e  a s s a i l e d  by some 
over  t a c t i c s .  Wall S t r e e t  j o u r n a l ,  J u l y  24,  1980: 1 ,  12. 
HG1. W26 
D i s c u s s e s  t h e  i s s u e  of  a l l e g e d  c o e r c i o n  of c o r p o r a t e  employees 
f o r  PAC c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  based on i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  managers,  employees,  
and o u t s i d e  o b s e r v e r s .  
Schwartz ,  Thomas J . ,  and Vigo G. N i e l s e n ,  Jr.  The c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  p o l i t i c s  
1982: PACs, lobby ing  l a w s ,  and p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s .  New York, P r a c t i s i n g  
Law I n s t i t u t e ,  1982. 529 p. ( c o r p o r a t e  law and p r a c t i c e  c o u r s e  
handbook s e r i e s  no. 385) 
P a r t i a l  con ten t s - -Cont r ibu t ion  and e x p e n d i t u r e  l i m i i a t i o n s  
under  t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign Act of 1981,  a s  amended, by 
V.  N i e l s e n ,  J r . - - C o n t r i b u t i o n s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s  by n a t i o n a l ,  s t a t e ,  
and l o c a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  commi t t ees ,  by C. D a r r - - R e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and e x p e n d i t u r e s  by b u s i n e s s  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  
by B. Vandegrift--House and Sena te  r u l e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  g i f t s  and 
h o n o r a r i a ,  by G .  Frampton,  J r . - - P o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  by n a t i o n a l  
banks and F e d e r a l  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  by T. Schwarz and A. S t raus . - -Corporate  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  and t r u s t e e  p l a n s ,  by J. Baran--Active 
c o r p o r a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  e l e c t i o n s ,  by C .  D a r r - - R e g i s t r a t i o n  and 
r e p o r t i n g  f o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee and o t h e r  non-candidate  
commi t t ees ,  by V. N i e l s e n ,  J r . - - P o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  by t r a d e  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  under t h e  F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Campaign A c t ,  by T. Schwarz 
and A. S t r a u s - - S o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by membership 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  and c o r p o r a t i o n s  w i t h o u t  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  
by T. Schwarz and A. S t raus--Federal  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  lobby ing  and 
e t h i c s  i n  government a c t s ,  by K .  Guido,  J r . - -Federa l  t a x a t i o n  o f  
c o r p o r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ;  by L. A t o r ,  Jr.--FEC compliance  and 
enforcement ,  by C .  S t e e l e  and N. L i t c h f i e l d .  
S o r a u f ,  Frank J. A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees :  who's i n  
charge?  Prepared  f o r  d e l i v e r y  a t  t h e  1982 a n n u a l  meet ing of  t h e  
American P o l i t i a l  Sc ience  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  Denver, S e p t .  2-5, 1982. 38 p. 
Exp lo res  t h e  q u e s t i o n s :  "Who r u n s  t h e  PACs, t o  whom do t h e y  
answer ,  and what u l t i m a t e  p o l i t i c a l  a c c o u n t i n g  must t h e y  make? 
I f  n o t  by l e g i s l t i o n ,  t h e n  by what o t h e r  mechanisms of  c o n t r o l  a r e  
t h e y  h e l d  t o  o u r  s t a n d a r d s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e t h i c s  and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . "  
Timberg, R o b e r t ,  and Grant  Wil l iams.  PACs cou ld  a l l o w  f o r e i g n  r o l e  i n  
e l e c t i o n s .  Ba l t imore  s u n ,  Aug. 29,  1982: 1, A 1 4 .  
"Fore ign  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  some i n  which f o r e i g n  
governments c o n t r o l  l a r g e  p o r t i o n s  o f  s t o c k ,  have d i r e c t  
l i n k s  t o  numerous p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  commit tees  i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  th rough  American s u b s i d i a r i e s  t h e y  own whol ly  o r  i n  
p a r t .  
These PACs e x i s t  d e s p i t e  a f e d e r a l  l aw t h a t  p r o h i b i t s  
f o r e i g n  involvement  i n  t h e  American p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  a t  
a l l  l e v e l s - - l o c a l ,  s t a t e  o r  f e d e r a l . "  
U.S. F e d e r a l  E l e c t i o n  Commission. Campaign g u i d e  f o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and 
l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1982. 56 p. 
A layman 's  g u i d e  t o  t h e  FECA1s r u l e s  f o r  s e t t i n g  u p  and 
o p e r a t i n g  a  c o r p o r a t e  o r  l a b o r  ( o r  o t h e r  a f f i l i a t e d )  PAC, i n  
f u l l  compl iance  w i t h  t h e  l a w ' s  r e p o r t i n g  and d i s c l s o u r e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
U.S. Federal Election Comuiission. Campaign guide for nonconnected committees. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 52 p. 
A layman's guide to the FECA's rules for setting up and operating 
an unaffiliated PAC, in full compliance with the law's reporting and 
disclosure requirements. 
----- Regulations. Washington, 1983. 278 p. KF4885 .A33 1983 
Regulations for compliance with the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971, as amended. 
THE IMPACT OF PAC CONTRIEUTIONS -
(These citations offer various perspectives on the connection between PAC 
contributions and outcome of policy decisions; these mostly focus on 
particular PACs or issues) 
Are Congressmen for sale to business? Business and society review, summer 
1980: 10-14. HD60.5.U5B855 
"It is widely estimated that business and trade associations, 
through lawful political action committees (PACs), will give 
approximately $30 million to congressional and presidential 
candidates this year. And this figure does not include 
donations by wealthy individuals, nor the huge sums given 
to state and local candidates." 
Cargogate. Ripon forum, v. 13, Aug. 15, 1977: 1-18. JK2351.955, v. 13 
Charges that the Carter administration's proposed cargo preference 
legislation is a return favor for iuerchant marine support and that this 
link is being kept from public scrutiny. Includes copies of memos to 
the President on options concerning cargo preference legislation. 
Cash politics. Wall Street journal, July 26, 1982: 1, 13; July 29: 1, 10; 
Aug. 2: 1, 13. 
Three part series examines the influence of political action 
committee funds on congressional decisions. Titles include: 
-- "Special Interest Money Increasingly Influences What Congress 
Enacts," 
-- "How Realtors PAC Rewards Office Seekers Uel.pful to the Industry," and 
-- "A Liberal Congressman Turns Conservative; Did PAC Gifts Do It?" 
Chappell, Henry W., Jr. Campaign contrihutions and voting on the cargo 
preference bill: a comparison of simultaneous models. Puhlic choice, 
v. 36, 1981: 301-312. JAl.P77, v. 36 
Correlates congressional voting on the Energy Transportation 
Security Act, a 1977 House bill which would have required that 9.5% 
of America's oil imports be carried on U.S. built and operated ships, 
with campaign contrihutions frora three maritime union political 
action committees--the National Pfaritine Union, the Marine Engineers, 
and the Seafarers. The author finds "unavoidably ambiguous" results 
for his hypothesis that interest group contributions influence 
legislative voting. 
Common Cause. A Common Cause guide to money, power, and politics in the 97th 
Congress. Washington, 1981. 239 p. 
"Lists all campaign contributions from PACs to some of 
the most important and powerful government decisionmakers 
in Washington--the Democratic and Republican leadership in 
Congress and House and Senate Committee Chairmen." 
- - --- House Agriculture Committee members facing key vote to limit dairy 
price supports received more than $350,000 from dairy industry PACs 
in last two elections. Washington, 1981. 5, 1 p. 
Presents statistics on canpaign contributions received by 
House Agriculture Committee members from the three major dairy 
political action committees. The committee is considering a 
measure to freeze automatic dairy price support increases. 
----- How money talks in Congress: a Common Cause study of the impact of 
money on congressional decision-making. Washington, 1978. 111 p. 
JKl99l .C655 1978 
This study is "intended to demonstrate the various ways in 
which political contributions, financial holdings, honoraria, 
outsiee earnjngs and lobbying expenditures affect congressional 
decisions that have an impact on the lives of all Americans." 
----- More than $1 million in political contributions pays off in key 
legislative victory. Washington, 1979. 5, 10 p. 
Argues that the $1.1 million contributed to 1978 
congressional candidates by the National Association of 
Realtors' political action committee was a factor in the 
June 7 House vote eliminating from the 1979 Housing and 
Community Development Act the power of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to issue cease-and-desist 
orders where there was reasonable cause to believe that 
fraudulent sales techniques had been used, in violation 
of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. 
Green, Mark. Political Pac-Man. New republic, v. 187, Dec. 13, 1982: 
18-21, 24-25. 
Expresses alarm at the link between political action 
committee contributions to candidates and PAC lobbying of 
Members of Congress. "According to studies by Public 
Citizen's Congress Watch and Common Cause, PAC contributions 
invariably correlate with legislative results. When specific 
economic interests invest substantial amounts in many members 
before key votes, the dividends roll in." 
Green, Mark, and J a c k  Newfield. Who owns Congress.  Washington p o s t  magazine,  
June  8 ,  1980: 10-19, 21. Newsp . 
From examinat ion of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committee 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  a l l e g e s  t h a t  many Members of Congress 
a r e  under t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of p a r t i c u l a r  b u s i n e s s  
i n t e r e s t s - - t h e  o i l ,  banking,  d e f e n s e ,  n u c l e a r  power, 
tobacco,  i n s u r a n c e ,  s h i p p i n g ,  t r u c k i n g ,  a i r l i n e ,  and 
automobi le  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and t h e  medica l ,  gun, and 
anti-FTC l o b b i e s .  I n c l u d e s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  (p .  1 6 )  
of spending by union PACs, by Spencer  Rich.  
Handel,  Ted. What PACs do. P u b l i c  power, v .  41, Mar.-Apr. 1983: 40-42, 
44,  46. 
Defends p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees from t h e  charge  t h a t  
t h e y  e x e r t  an  unhea l thy  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p rocess .  
"The f a c t  t h a t  c a n d i d a t e s  r e c e i v e  PAC money and when e l e c t e d  
suppor t  t h e s e  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  mean 
they  a r e  t a i n t e d .  They a l s o  may be v o t i n g  f o r  t h e i r  own b e l i e f  
and c o n s t i t u e n t s '  i n t e r e s t s .  I f  PACs do not  have t h e  s i n i s t e r  
i n f l u e n c e  a s c r i b e d  t o  them, what does a  group g a i n  by having 
one? Access." 
Huck, Susan L. M. Buying Congress.  American o p i n i o n ,  v.  21,  July-Aug. 1978: 
7 ,  9-16, 129 ,  131-132. AP2.04732, v. 21 
Charges t h a t  l a b o r  unions  and " v a r i o u s  L e f t i s t  p o l i t i c a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s "  i n  e f f e c t  "buy" sympathe t i c  Members of Congress 
w i t h  huge campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
K o s t e r l i t z ,  J u l i e .  A t  t h e  mercy of t h e  h i g h e s t  b i d d e r .  Common Cause,  v.  8 ,  
Aug. 1982: 8-20. 
Warns of t h e  growing i n f l u e n c e  i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  
and d e l i b e r a t i o n s  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  committees,  which "have 
g o t t e n  t o  be b i g  b u s i n e s s  i n  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  C a p i t a l .  And, s i n c e  
t h e  bulk of PAC d o l l a r s  go t o  incumbents,  PACs have a  powerful  
b u i l t - i n  c o n s t i t u e n c y  a g a i n s t  reform--Members of Congress 
themselves.  PACs' growth and apparen t  s u c c e s s  i s  sending a  
message t o  t h e  n a t i o n  t h a t ,  i n c r e a s i n g l y ,  o u r s  i s  a  government 
o f ,  by and f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s . "  
McMenamin, Michael ,  and W a l t e r  McNamara. Milking t h e  p u b l i c ;  how t h e  d a i r y  
lobby buys f r i e n d s  and f a v o r s  i n  C a r t e r ' s  Washington. I n q u i r y  
(San F r a n c i s c o ) ,  v. 1, Nov. 1 3 ,  1978: 9-13. 2839.5.15, v.  1 
Authors  d i s c u s s  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  d a i r y  lobby i n  Washington 
a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  "you d o n ' t  f i n d  t h e  d a i r y  lobby d r i v i n g  t r a c t o r s  o r  
he rd ing  an imals  through t h e  s t r e e t s  of Washington . When d a i r y  
fa rmers  want a n o t h e r  subs idy  from t h e  f e d e r a l  government, they  go 
t o  C a p i t o l  H i l l  q u i e t l y  and smoothly,  wi th  wel l -paid  l o b b y i s t s  and 
lawyers  c a r r y i n g  b r i e f c a s e s  f u l l  of money. Next t o  t h e  American 
Medical  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  t h e  d a i r y  lobby gave more campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t o  House and S e n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1976 t h a n  any o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  group-- 
over  1 .3  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s . "  
Public Citizen, inc. Congress watch. Nader study links oil contributions 
to pro-oil House vote. Washington, 1979. 2, 10, 2 p. 
"95% of 1T.S. Representatives who received more than $2500 from 
oil industry 'political action committees' voted on June 28, 1979, 
for an industry-favored version of the windfall profits tax, according 
to a study done by Public Citizen's Congress Watch, a consuiner advocacy 
group affiliated with Ralph Kader ." 
- The power of the PACs: campaign contributions from car dealers to 
congressional co-sponsors of resolutions to veto the FTC's used car 
rule. Washington, 1981. 6, 6 p. 
Presents statistics on campaign contributions given by the 
National Automobile Dealers Association's PAC to senators and 
members of Congress cosponsoring the congressional veto resolution 
to disapprove the proposed Federal Trade Commission rule requiring 
used car dealers to list all warranties and known defects. 
Robinson, Gail. Many happy returns. Environmental action, v. 12, Dec. 1980: 
28-32. HCllO.B5E496, v. 12 
Expresses skepticism that the Reagan administration will 
promote environmental protection and analyzes the impact of the 
1980 congressional elections on environmental causes in the 
97th Congress. Includes separate discussions on the outcome of 
antinuclear referenda in western states (p. 29) and on the effort 
to have congressional candidates reject contributions from the 
political action committees of the "Filthy Fivem--corporations 
which are allegedly major polluters (p. 31). 
Roeder, Edward. Catalyzing favorable reactions: a look at chemical industry 
PACs. Sierra, v. 66, Mar.-Apr. 1981: 23-26. F868.S5S476, v. 66 
Discusses the impact of chemical industry political action 
committee funds on legislation and elections. 
----- Lubricating Congress. Sierra, v. 65, Var.-Apr. 1980: 6-8, 10-11. 
F868.S5S476, v. 65 
"A shocking analysis of how Big Oil buys votes--and influence. 
How can we have independent legislators when so many are on the 
payroll?" 
Running with the PACs: how political action committees win friends and influence 
elections. Time, Oct. 25, 1982: 20-26. 
"Today the power of PACs threatens to undermine America's system 
of representative democracy." 
Sedacca, Sandra. Dirty money . . . dirty air? A Common Cause study of political 
action committee contributions to House and Senate Committees reviewing the 
clean air act. Washington, 1981. 14 p. 
Finds that members of the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health 
and Environment, with jurisdiction over the reauthorization of the 
expiring Clean Air Act, received almost $1.15 million in 1980 campaign 
contributions from the political action committees of seven industries-- 
automobiles, chemicals, forest products, metals and mining, oil and gas, 
steel, and electric utilities--affected by provisions of the law. 
Take $2,000 and call me in the morning: A Common Cause Study of American Medical 
Association political action committee contributions. Washington, Common 
Cause, 1983. 1 v. (various pagings). 
"Examines AMA PAC giving for the past three congressional 
election cycles--from January 1, 1977 through November 22, 
1982--in order to provide a picture of the cumulative impact 
PAC contributions can have in creating obligations for Members 
of Congress." 
INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURZS 
(Citations to some of the discussions of this form of campaign spending and 
how it overlaps with PAC activity) 
Glen, Maxwell. Free spenders--the 'other' campaign for Reagan chooses 
its targets. National journal, v. 12, Sept. 13, 1980: 1512-1515. 
JKl.N28, v. 12 
Describes the independent expenditure plans and activities 
of conservative groups seeking to advance Ronald Reagan's 
candidacy for President in 1980. 
----- How to get around the campaign spending limits. National journal, 
v. 11, June 23, 1979: 1044-1046. JKl.N28, v. 11 
Anticipates the increasing incidence of independent spending, 
particularly by PACs, as a means of influencing elections. 
----- Independent spenders are gearing up, and Reagan and GOP stand to 
benefit. Congressional quarterly weekly report, v. 15, nec. 17, 
1983: 2627-2631. 
"More money than ever is expected to be spent independently 
of candidates in 1984, and Democratic and liberal groups lag well 
behind Republicans in their plans." 
Independent political committees and the Federal election laws. University 
of Pennsylvania law review, v. 129. Apr. 1981: 955-4393. 
"Comment examines, in the context of presidential general 
election campaigns, the issues arising from" the Supreme Court's 
holding in Buckley v. Valeo, that limits imposed on independent 
campaign expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act were 
illegal, while upholding "the limitations on contributions." 
Considers implications of this revised treatment of independent 
expenditures. 
Kayden, Xandra. Campaign under siege: reflections on one senator's defeat. 
New York University review of law and social change, v. 10, no. 1, 
1980-1981: 67-79. 
Political scientist reviews the response to the advertising 
of the independent National Conservative Political Action Committee 
presented by a losing incumbent in the 1980 election, as an 
illustration of "the counter-strategies candidates are forced 
to develop in response to the negative spending tactics of special 
interest groups." 
Light, Larry. Independent Reagan groups have shaved spending plans. 
Congressional quarterly weekly report, v. 38, Oct. 18, 1980: 
3152-3153. JKl.Cl5, v. 38 
"Last summer, five groups announced media efforts totaling 
up to $70 million to aid the GOP presidential nominee. Now the 
organizations project overall spending of slightly less than 
515 million." 
----- Surge in independent campaign spending. Congressional quarterly 
weekly report, v. 38, June 14, 1980: 1635-1639. JKl.Cl5, v. 38 
Provides background on the independent spending phenomenon 
and its increasing popularity among PACs, particularly ideological 
ones. 
Public Citizen. New Right exploits campaign loophole (press release): 
May 1981. 
Reports on independent expenditures by individuals and groups 
(e.g., PACs) in 1980, arriving at a total of $16.1 million. 
U S .  Federal Ylection Commission. FEC issues final report on 1981-82 
independent spending (press release): Oct. 14, 1983. 6 p. 
Final summary data on independent expenditures in the 
1982 elections. 
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Independent 
expenditures in political campaigns--A discussion of 
constitutional constraints. Elizabeth Yadlosky. Washington, 1982. 
23 p. (Report no. 82-83s) 
Examines legal and constitutional aspects of independent 
expenditures. 
----- The evolution of and issues surrounding independent expenditures 
in election campaigns. Joseph F. Cantor. Washington, 1982. 78 p. 
(Report 82-87 GOV) 
Reviews the history and legal bases of independent expenditures, 
and examines their use through the 1980 elections and the debate 
surrounding them. 
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